In stable political environments, closed-circuit television (CCTV) networks, digital monitoring systems, and biometric databases serve as constitutive elements of what sociologists term “formal social control.” They operate not merely through the detection of deviance but through the presumption of permanent visibility: the surveilled subject modifies behaviour in anticipation of observation. Modern states extend this gaze into previously private domains. Under peacetime conditions, total surveillance ostensibly underwrites public order by deterring crime, legitimising state authority, and providing evidentiary accountability.

The wartime context fundamentally reverses this relationship. A striking empirical illustration emerged in March 2026, when Israeli authorities were reported to have physically removed CCTV cameras across different territories, not to protect citizens from surveillance, but to conceal the extent of damage sustained from Iranian missile strikes. The apparatus of total surveillance — designed to observe and discipline the population — was dismantled by the very state that constructed it, in order to manage the state’s own information environment. This episode crystallises what may be termed the sovereign surveillance paradox: in conditions of existential threat, the state suppresses its own panoptic infrastructure to preserve the appearance of security — and, by extension, the legitimacy of its social control project.

From a criminological standpoint, this dynamic raises profound questions. First, it exposes the ideological dimension of surveillance: CCTV systems are not neutral instruments of order but political technologies whose deployment and removal are subject to calculations of power. Second, it illustrates how war produces a condition of norm suspension in which the legal and institutional frameworks governing social control are subordinated to military imperatives. Criminality and deviance do not disappear in wartime; rather, their definition, measurement, and governance are radically transformed. Ordinary crime statistics become unreliable, prosecutorial capacity collapses, and informal social control mechanisms (community solidarity, collective punishment, vigilante justice) rush in to fill the institutional vacuum.

The deliberate dismantling of surveillance infrastructure under conditions of armed conflict compels criminologists to reconsider the relationship between visibility, power, and order. Total surveillance, far from being the apotheosis of social control, is revealed as a contingent and reversible technology — one that states deploy in peacetime to govern populations and abandon, selectively, when its panoptic logic threatens to expose the state’s own vulnerabilities. War, in this sense, does not merely destroy institutions of social control: it strips them of their pretence.

California is among the first states to address the issue. The reporting was cited in the legislative analysis of the bill that ultimately became the law.

Senate Bill 524, signed into law Oct. 10, requires police officers to disclose when they use AI to write police reports. The tools include Draft One, an AI assistant that transcribes and summarizes body-camera footage to produce a draft report, which officers can then revise and edit.

Specifically, the law now requires a written disclosure to appear at the bottom of each page of a police report for which Draft One or other similar tools were used. The legislation also requires an “audit trail” that would preserve the original draft as well as identify the source bodycam footage or audio.

Police departments in East Palo Alto and Fresno were among the first in the state to adopt the technology.

For example, officers must fill in prompts within the generated report, then sign off on the report’s accuracy before it can be submitted. The tool also includes a disclaimer that Draft One was used, though police agencies have thus far been able to customize where in a report it’s placed.

Police departments have said the technology saves officers significant time, and even that some AI-generated reports are better than the ones written entirely by officers. Nevertheless, the bill arose out of concerns that bias or errors generated by AI software could make their way into final incident reports, which play a key role in charging, detaining and sentencing suspects.

Kate Chatfield, executive director of the California Public Defenders Association, which sponsored the bill, said she’s grateful the measure became law.

“Due process requires transparency,” Chatfield wrote in a public statement. “Everyone in the legal system — judges, juries, attorneys and the accused — deserve to know who wrote the police report.”

“With SB 524, California is sending a clear message: Innovation in policing must be tethered to accountability,” state Sen. Jesse Arreguín, who wrote the bill, said in the statement. “No more opaque reports, no more guessing whether AI shaped the narrative.”

Kevin Little, a defense attorney in Fresno, said the law is a step in the right direction, but not a true remedy.

“My own experience with AI in an unrelated context leads me to conclude that AI platforms have a significant amount of user bias and tend to support the agendas of the user,” he said.

Larry Bowlan, a spokesperson for the Fresno Police Department, said the agency had already implemented some of the safeguards now required by the law and does not expect the new rules to be especially burdensome.

“Our AI-powered narrative assistant … already generates a disclosure and requires our users to sign acknowledgements. Draft One also already produces the requisite audit trail,” he wrote in an email. “We are actively working with our vendor on the best solution for preserving and storing the first draft provided by the assistant, as well as a minor tweak to ensure the disclosure is present on each printed page, rather than just the first page as it is now.”

A spokesperson for the East Palo Alto Department said his agency has no official response to the law at this time.

Opponents of the bill included the California Police Chiefs Association and the Police Officers Research Association of California, a police union advocacy and lobbying group. The Chiefs Association did not respond to a request for comment. In a statement, PORAC President Brian R. Marvel said the signed version of the law is an improvement over earlier drafts.

“In its original form, SB 524 would have put significant administrative burden on already short-staffed police forces and created broad liability by requiring agencies to retain every AI-generated draft, interim, and final version of a report, each labeled with AI disclosure language,” he wrote. “PORAC advocated to amend this bill … We were pleased to see several of these amendments taken, with the final version of the bill significantly narrowed.”

Axon representative Victoria Keough said the company is committed to complying with all state and federal laws, including SB 524.

“When developing AI for public safety, transparency and accountability are essential,” Keough wrote in a statement. “Responsible innovation remains at the core of how Axon designs and delivers new technology.”

The new requirements go into effect on Jan. 1, 2026.

By Kerry Klein, KVPR

Kerry Klein is a reporter and editor with KVPR in Fresno. Additional reporting was provided by KQED’s Sukey Lewis. The story was produced with support from The California Newsroom, a collaboration of public media outlets throughout the state. 

Despite this, the system has continued to function as a system of social control informed by carceral logics. Families become trapped within this extensive system of surveillance, many who receive little reprieve from the issues that brought them to the system’s attention.

Once involved in the system, families are forced to comply with services focused on regulation of the behaviors deemed to be harmful or risky, while the system employs an escalating series of punishments to ensure compliance including the forcible separation of children from their families. In this paper, we analyze these functions of surveillance, regulation, and punishment, adapting and extending penal techniques described by Kohler-Hausmann (2019) to position the child welfare system as an arm of the carceral continuum used to maintain the oppression of Black communities.

As such, we use the term family policing to more accurately capture the carceral functions of the child welfare system and the role it plays in the lives of families.

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I will first discuss the key challenges that have combined to create this dramatic drop in public confidence, together with a brief analysis of these issues and why they are important. To start, I will give a brief outline of recent reports highlighting cases of egregious police conduct and corrosive operational culture. 

That will be followed by an exploration of how the police are in danger of losing the trust, legitimacy and authority they need to regain and sustain public confidence. 

Next, will be an evaluation of the extent and impact of operational culture on policing delivery, including the repeated and damaging charges of institutional racism, misogyny and bigotry. This will also include a discussion about the impact of politics and populism. 

Following, will be a brief assessment of the current governance model and the extent to which politics interferes with operational policing and decision making. 

In the next session, I will return to the role of policing and why it is essential to have a clear working definition. Without those agreed guidelines, it is impossible to determine the correct background, experiences, qualifications, skills and attitude needed by aspiring candidates. This has implications for ‘professionalising’ the police. 

The final part of my presentation will be the case for a Royal Commission on Policing. For too long, the response to crises has been superficial and ineffectual. Ambulatory measures, or band aid, will no longer suffice. They simply perpetuate the problems and reinforce cynicism. We are past that. The only way to address the challenge is to undertake a robust and rigorous investigation into policing and its governance.

Reports highlighting egregious police behaviour

Recent events have shone a light on the toxic culture in operational policing. This was brought into sharp focus by Baroness Casey’s report on culture and standards of behaviour in the Metropolitan Police. Most alarming was her finding that the Met was institutionally racist. 

As if that were not warning enough, the HMICFRS report on misogyny, misconduct and vetting, painted a very sombre picture of British policing. Ruth Davison, the Chief Executive of Refuge, said this: 

“This report, which highlights a systemic culture of misogyny, sexism, and predatory behaviour towards women in policing in many forces, presents an overview of abhorrent behaviours and practices running deep within the police force across the county. Behaviours which are directly contributing to the lack of trust that women have in the police, which makes them less likely to report crimes committed against them and puts their lives at risk.

It is unconscionable for politicians, police leaders and police forces to do anything other than take radical action to overhaul the police recruitment and complaints processes and instruct root and branch reform. The police are supposed to be the first line of defence for women and girls, yet wholly inadequate practices are allowing the wrong people to join, and stay in, the force, and turning a blind eye when these officers commit crimes, or display behaviours which should have no place in the force.

Minoritised men and women have warned for decades that the police are institutionally racist, and now we know that they are also allowing a culture of violent misogyny to go unchecked and largely unpunished. Officers with misconduct allegations are able to rotate between forces and serious incidents are falling through cracks in the system.  

The time for words and commitments to review is over. Only radical reform and a zero-tolerance policy will go anyway to restoring trust in the police”

Even more disturbing, was the rape and murder of Sarah Everard by serving Met officer, Wayne Couzens. 

Wayne Couzens should never have been a police officer and three separate forces “could and should have” stopped him, a damning report by Lady Elish Angiolini has found. The 51-year-old former firearms officer’s history of alleged sexual offending and predilection for violent and extreme pornography dated back to 1995. Couzens allegedly sexually assaulted a child and attempted to kidnap a woman at knife-point in the years before he abducted, raped and murdered Sarah Everard on 3 March 2021.

Although shocking, none of the revelations in these reports comes as a surprise, as there have been many such claims over the years, including those in the 1981 Scarman Report, which highlighted the burning mistrust of the police by many of the black community in Brixton.

Taken together, these reports explain why public confidence in policing is eroding and why there is a powerful case for radical reform.

Rick Muir from the Police Foundation asserts, like many other authoritative commentators, that these reports expose the existence of a toxic culture in parts of policing. A significant minority of officers have been engaging in racist, misogynistic, or homophobic behaviour that has not been ‘called out’ by the majority. 

As Muir correctly identifies, vetting procedures are woefully inadequate to prevent wholly inappropriate and unsuitable candidates from being appointed. Clearly a major overhaul is urgently required.

Muir makes a powerful argument for change. There should be zero tolerance of racism, misogyny, homophobia and any other kind of prejudice in policing. The challenge now is do we bring about that change? Piecemeal or ambulatory measures will never of themselves be sufficient. The problem is far more urgent and serious for that to work. 

Trust, legitimacy and authority

It seems axiomatic to say that good policing is founded on trust, legitimacy and authority and that, without it, there can be no true public consent. While the notion of policing by consent may appear to be a central tenet to the British approach, recent evidence suggests otherwise, particularly in respect of the policing of minority groups, whose relationships with the police have been at best strained and at worst hostile. These tensions have been inflamed where those communities feel there has been racial bias and police misconduct. 

The introduction of community policing was an attempt to bolster the public image and legitimacy of the police. But it has not always enjoyed the success it was designed for, principally because it was undermined by the introduction of ‘crime fighting’ targets in the 1990s and a more ‘managerialist’, and populist, approach to policing, from both Labour and Conservative governments. There has, though, been a growing acknowledgement that good policing can only be realised where the police have been given popular legitimacy by the communities they police. Procedural justice theories provide a significant development for policing in that they are a route to build legitimacy.

Hough suggests that for the police to be more effective in their crime fighting role, they must first build trust with those they police, which is a prerequisite to establish their legitimacy. 

Procedural justice theory is an integral part of the wider body of theories of policing. In respect of policing, Hough argues that procedural justice theory provides one explanation of the processes by which police and other law enforcement agencies can secure both compliance and acceptance of the law, without having to resort to coercive force. It is a social-psychological theory about legitimacy, which offers real and practical benefits to the police.

Hough explores some basic ideas around police legitimacy, as seen through the eyes of those being policed. Policing styles have a significant bearing on building legitimacy. He suggests that procedural fairness is the best route for success is for the police. The more dignity and respect shown by the police, the greater their legitimacy will be acknowledged.

Hough asserts that good policing is central to effective policing. He bases his argument on the evidence from research studies into procedural fairness, which he acknowledges is largely quantitative. What seems clear from the evidence is that people value fairness and fair treatment. Hough acknowledges it is not the only method to ensure compliance, as other instrumental strategies, such as inducements, rewards and punishments, can be deployed.

The points of friction between the police and minority groups are examined and Hough highlights how trust in the police can be lost through unaddressed stereotyping and racial discrimination. 

It is a highly contentious issue, with no simple solutions. However, Hough does offer some very useful suggestions to help address these structural challenges, some of which will be new to those in the field. First, Hough calls for clear leadership and advocacy of procedural fairness principles by chief officers and BCU commanders. Second, he argues the police should ensure that internal styles of management are consistent with principles of organisational justice. Third, there should be training for front line staff and their supervisors. Fourth, staff should be equipped with more specific de-escalation skills to help with the handling of conflict and defiance. Finally, there should be effective community consultation in place.

Many other scholars have focused their attention on this aspect of policing. See ‘Just Authority? Trust in the Police in England and Wales’, 2012, Jackson, Bradford, Stanko and Hohl.

Politics, populism and operational culture

The celebrated scholar, Professor Robert Reiner, has written extensively about the sociology of policing for over three decades. His knowledge and authority in this field are second to none. His exploration of police culture, in which he drew upon the work of other leading academics, remains essential reading for all students of policing and law enforcement.

Reiner builds on earlier research by Skolnick (1966), which attempted to describe and define the ‘working personality’ of a police officer. However, as noted by Reiner, Skolnick’s work failed to draw out the political dimensions, an important component of police occupational culture. Reiner argues that politics is therefore a critical consideration in the analysis of policing.

Through research, we know that policing remains for many officers more than just a job: it is a vocation with a worthwhile purpose. There is a sense of mission, where the objective is the maintenance of a valued way of life and the protection of the weak against the predatory. 

However, it can manifest in a set of sub-values, in which cynicism, pessimism, suspicion, isolation and solidarity can all figure prominently. This engenders a feeling that the police are a beleaguered minority, which is about to be overrun. Only the police, in this interpretation, can comprehend the scale of the challenge. 

Reiner asserts that the police service was, and largely remains, an occupation drawn from the working class, including chief constables. Evidence suggests the police are conservative, both politically and morally. This may not be surprising, given the nature of their work, the hierarchical rank structure and their perceived mission. Reiner further notes that the police have frequently been pitted against organised the Labour Party and the Left.

In terms of political affiliation or support, studies conducted in the 1970s and 1990s suggest the police are overwhelmingly Conservative. One study found that 80% of police considered themselves Tory supporters. Worryingly, 18% of that group identified as far right. 

Reiner (2010) said,

‘The police became a Tory-leaning partisan political lobby. A ‘bobby lobby’ emerged, spearheaded by public interventions by prominent chief police officers and by the Police Federation’s embracing of the Conservative Party’s espousal of law and order as an electoral issue. This played a crucial role in Margaret Thatcher’s election victory in 1979.’

Despite this clear evidence of Conservative support, the police have consistently opined that policing should be politically neutral. It would be interesting to see whether these findings would be replicated in 2024, now that Police and Crime Commissioners are firmly established in the governance model. 

With the rise of populism and authoritarian regimes, there has been increasing concern about the impact on law enforcement. 

The Washington Post on 10th January, 2021 reported, that several serving police officers faced dismissal, suspension or other forms of discipline for their involvement in, or proximity to, the Capitol riot in Washington on January 6th, 2021. Sadly, this is not surprising, as there is evidence that white supremacist groups may have infiltrated American police forces across the US and is widespread (The Guardian Newspaper, 27th August,2020).  While nothing of that magnitude has occurred in the UK, there is little doubt, judging from some aspects of social media, that serving and former officers are not necessarily fully immune from aspects of alt right populism. The Independent Newspaper on 5th March, 2020, reported that a young London police officer had been arrested for belonging to a proscribed organisation associated with right wing terrorism. 

There are clearly worrying developments that should cause considerable anxiety to all liberal democracies and senior policing leaders.

PCCs are affiliated to political parties. There are few, if any, safeguards to ensure that candidates going forward for election have the skills, knowledge, authority and wisdom to undertake such an important role (Bailey, 2017). Democracy trumps all of that. More about the governance model later.

Brogden and Ellison (2012)  assert that State policing is, and always has been, partisan. Now, as then, it is those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale (the ‘Other’), who bear the brunt of police attention. They argue that policing has always been committed to the maintenance of a divisive social order. Summary justice for those on the margins of society continues unchecked. 

The last government failed to recognise, understand and deal with the growing incidence of poverty. New responses were required to deal with the dispossessed, rather than locking them out of sight. 

Crime, in the eyes of those on the right, is seen as those offences generally committed by the working classes. It is visible and problematic. However, little mention is made of white-collar crime or corruption, which can account for many millions of pounds. Neither was there any commentary about the crisis in our prisons, where resources are stretched to breaking point and recidivism seems to be more evident than rehabilitation. 

Government policy needs to act positively in a cohesive and coherent manner that understands and frees people from being marginalised, rather than create a continuous circle of certainty. 

Democratic governance of the police

The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in 2012, together with a new governance model designed to hold the police to account, brought politics firmly into policing. Hitherto, the acknowledged convention was that operational policing and politics should be kept apart. The doctrine of operational independence appears to have been firmly endorsed by the recent Police Foundation Structural Review but it failed to mention a High Court judgement, which challenged this doctrine (see R v Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire Police, 2017).  This judgement, in making the PCC responsible for all operational policing activity, questions the tradition of constabulary independence.  This is clearly an issue that requires further testing in the courts (Loveday, 2018)

Interestingly, the recently published structural review of policing from the Police Foundation (see Section 12), appears to accept without too much challenge that Police and Crime Commissioners are performing well in their role of holding chief constables to account. The possibility of political interference is dismissed without question. However, PCCs wield enormous power and there is considerable evidence to suggest that the current governance model does not adequately provide the means or resources to hold them to account (Bailey, 2015 and 2017). The current batch of PCCs were elected in 2024 and almost all of them are active members of political parties. This is a marked change from the position in 2012, when nearly one third of PCCs claimed to be independent. Research has shown that where the PCC and Crime Panel share the same political affiliation, objectivity may be at risk. The outgoing Tory PCC from Devon and Cornwall made precisely this allegation and asserted strongly that politics should be removed from the equation (Bailey, 2017). Partisan politics would now appear to be the order of the day and this raises significant concerns around the need for, and delivery of, objective, evidence-based policing strategies.

There is no requirement for PCCs to have relevant skills, background or experience. Democracy and political agendas will always trump that. This can be problematic, given the only realistic way of removing them is by the ballot box every four years (Bailey, 2017). It is rather ironic that PCCs were introduced to hold chief constables to account but themselves have no effective scrutiny. There is only little acknowledgement in the Police Foundation Report that the current governance model may have some flaws around PCC accountability. Recommendation 45 suggests new legislation for the introduction of ‘recall referenda’, triggered by Police and Crime Panels with a two thirds majority, when PCCs no longer enjoy their confidence. There are just two grounds for this to occur and these are:

• Where the PCC has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
• Where the PCC has been found to have breached the Nolan principles of public life

If these conditions are satisfied, the Police and Crime Panel may proceed with a recall referendum, where just 10% of the electorate are required to terminate the PCC’s employment. What the Police Foundation Report fails to consider is the extent to which politics may get in the way of reaching objective decisions, especially where the PCC and the Police and Crime Panel are from the same political party. Tribal political allegiance could pose a significant threat to objectivity (See above)

There is no in-depth analysis in the Police Foundation Report about the effectiveness of Police and Crime Panels in scrutinising their Commissioners. There is now considerable evidence that Panels have neither the resources, nor expertise, to fulfil their role. Most Panel members are local councillors, who lack the time, authority and continuity to be effective. Representatives on the Panel come from the relevant local councils. Their portfolios are determined at annual council meetings, and it is not always certain that those who are best suited will be allocated to the Panel. Independent Panel members, on the other hand, are recruited for their professional skills and expertise. They are generally more committed, have greater continuity and are less prone to political bias. However, independent members are always in a small minority on their Panels. It seems clear that much more thought needs to be given to the role, power and resources of Panels (Bailey, 2017). 

When the governance model was first introduced in 2012, Police and Crime Panels were an after-thought. They were never intended to circumscribe the power of PCCs. It is now time for urgent reform (Bailey, 2017).

The clash between policing and politics is perhaps illustrated best when looking at the Metropolitan Police and the dismissal of two of its commissioners. In 2008, Ian Blair resigned after declaring he no longer had the confidence of the London Mayor, Boris Johnson. At the time, there was a Labour government, with whom Johnson repeatedly clashed. This situation was repeated earlier this year (2022), when Cressida Dick resigned after announcing she no longer had the support of the London Mayor, Sadiq Khan. As with the first ‘dismissal’, the government and the Mayor were from different political parties and there were clearly marked differences in policing philosophy. These differences are almost tribal in nature and have assumed centre stage, at the expense of critical evaluation of policing delivery and effective democratic governance. Some have argued for a complete overhaul of the governance model (Bailey, 2017), involving the introduction of highly qualified and professional PCCs. Given the adversarial nature of British politics, that appears unlikely to happen.

The need for democratic oversight of policing remains essential, especially given the serious and deteriorating loss of trust by the public in the police service, a point noted in the recently published Strategic Review of Policing. The challenge is to develop a system that acknowledges politics without being governed by petty tribalism, so that real progress, in terms of policing reform, becomes a reality. A half-way measure might be to reintegrate police governance with local government, in a way not dissimilar to the London Assembly system. However, that will not take away the element of adversarial, partisan politics. Neither will it address the problem of equipping local councillors with the time, experience, expertise and commitment to their role on the Police and Crime Panel (Bailey, 2017). It seems clear that the role of independents needs to be expanded, as they bring greater professional experience, more robust commitment and are free from party whips (Bailey, 2017). It is disappointing that the Police Foundation has not explored further the importance of having independent PCCs and Crime Panel members. 

The police role – a need for clarity

One of the central problems in policing is the absence of a universally agreed working definition of the police role. It is of vital importance because it is a prerequisite to determining the skills, qualifications, experience and psychological attitudes required to be a police officer. 

On the one hand, there is a view that police should confine themselves largely to crime-fighting and leave other agencies to manage the myriad of non-police related tasks. This is a view largely articulated by those on the right of politics, as we witnessed with the last Tory government. The alternative view, largely supported by the progressive Left, is that, as Reiner notes below, the police provide a 24 x 7 social service, responding to increasing demands for assistance that are not strictly crime related. In so doing, the police won the trust and legitimacy with their residents, leading to better relationships and increasing crime detection rates. The austerity cuts to policing and other public sector agencies meant that the police were being asked to do a lot more with fewer officers, leading to a critical reduction in community policing. The consequence has been a preponderance of response policing, with very little time for the police to engage constructively with their communities. This has added to the growing alienation between the police and the public. This has become a significant issue, and it is to be hoped the new Labour government will invest heavily in the expansion of Neighbourhood policing.

There is, though,  common agreement about the fundamentals of the police role, which the Police Foundation notes as:

‘The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen’s peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.’

There is considerable debate, however, among academics and police practitioners about what the police actually do. In the view of respected criminologists like Reiner, policing has never been primarily concerned about catching criminals. Indeed, he notes:

‘It raises false expectations about what the police can do about crime, condemns them to a quixotic quest beyond their capacity, and neglects what people in practice demand from the police. Its apparent obviousness derives largely from media representations, the main source of “information” about crime and policing for most people. Media stories (both news and fictional) focus overwhelmingly on successful police investigations of very serious violent crimes, especially murder, which form only a small part of the police workload. And the police are spectacularly less successful in clearing up crimes than media stories suggest: far fewer than 2% of crimes result in a conviction.’

It seems clear that the police role covers a variety and wide-ranging list of tasks and responsibilities, with crime-fighting being an important, though not exclusive, element. If the broader role of policing is to be accepted, then there must be an explicit acknowledgement that crime, crime prevention and community safety cannot be left to the police alone. There is a powerful argument for re-establishing the community safety partnerships introduced in the early 1990s, following the release of the Morgan Report in 1991. It promoted multi-agency approaches to crime and community safety, involving both public and private sector bodies, through shared resources, shared data, joint training, aligned boundaries and ambitious targets. I was seconded from the Thames Valley Police in 1991 to help set up the Thames Valley Safer Communities Partnership. I recruited many of the trustees, including James Marshall, the author of this seminal report. 

The initial enthusiasm and advocacy for this holistic approach was palpable. Sadly, for a variety of reasons, the Partnerships were no longer viable and most have fallen by the wayside. I would be a keen supporter for their reintroduction, but it will require strong support from government, both in terms of resources and philosophy.

The case for a Royal Commission 

Public confidence and trust in the police is at an all time low. We have seen the service haemorrhaging support in recent years, caused by relentless reports of shocking and unacceptable behaviour. The police themselves have been impacted by these constant allegations of egregious conduct, combined with a growing disrespect for their senior leaders. Morale in the police service has plummeted and experienced officers are leaving in record numbers, which is deeply worrying. Surveys conducted by the Police Federation consistently paint a picture of a service at crisis point. The report from the Police Foundation commented lengthily and authoritatively about the need for reform but its recommendations fall short of what is required.

Hitherto, the police service has responded to crises by dealing with them in isolation, rarely acknowledging the wider contributary factors. This is akin to applying band aid and there is little wonder the results have always been the same. What’s needed is a root and branch review of policing to include a rigorous assessment of the role and governance of the service. 

Once the agreed role of the police is firmly established, appropriate recruitment criteria can be developed. This is especially important. The key components should be:

• Educational qualifications – including the capacity to undertake higher level /degree courses
• Agreement on ‘professional’ status of the police and what that means for aspiring applicants
• Clear entry routes for candidates
• People skills – communication, empathy, listening, problem solving
• Psychological suitability – to rule out extreme views and capacity to learn. Rigorous attitude testing before being called for interview
• Ongoing training – similar to that received by other professional practitioners

The Commission should also consider the following:

• A full review of the rank structure to acknowledge the importance of increasing professionalisation
• A review of supervisory roles – responsibilities, oversight and training
• A commitment to community safety partnerships – to consider joint agency training, data sharing and shared long-term objectives
• Reform of the governance model – Consider the removal of party politics and upskilling and properly funding Police and Crime Panels

There is so much more a Royal Commission will need to do to ensure the widest ranging thoroughgoing review of policing. To secure the necessary reform, it’s the only option.

Concluding comments

• Policing has lost its way. Now widespread recognition that things need to change
• Traditional responses to crises haven’t touched the surface
• Major review and reform is required – hence the call for a Royal Commission
• The new government must grasp this challenge. It is not a quick fix and there are few attractive soundbites
• The composition of the Commission is important – must be representative and led by a Judge

Dr Roy Bailey

In addition, Russia is also involving Ukrainian children in acts of sabotage and terrorist attacks against their own country, often without their knowledge.

However, apart from the crimes committed by Russia against Ukrainian children, there are other problems that have not disappeared with the start of the full-scale war and that affect minors, such as bullying, teenage fights, etc.

Ukrinform spoke with the head of the Ukrainian juvenile police, Vasyl Bohdan, about this, as well as about bullying in educational institutions, juvenile crime, and how to increase children’s trust in adults.

– How many crimes against children have been recorded in Ukraine since the start of the large-scale war, and how many of them were committed by Russians?

– Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 11,000 crimes against children have been recorded. The highest number was recorded in 2023, when there were almost 4,700 such crimes. In 2024, 3,400 such crimes were recorded. Here we see a 26% decrease in the number of these offences, and this figure is even lower than in 2021, before the war.

It should be noted that most of these crimes are serious and particularly serious offences, in particular against sexual freedom and sexual integrity. Bullying, internet fraud, etc. were also recorded.

We do not keep separate statistics on crimes committed specifically by Russians. But the figures we have speak for themselves – for example, as of today, at least 20,000 children have been deported by the Russians.

In general, we continue to see a downward trend in the number of crimes committed against children.

– When it comes to general criminal offences against children, what types of crimes against minors have been recorded most since the start of the full-scale war?

– In this context, I can say that since the start of the full-scale invasion, most crimes committed against children have been crimes against life and health. Among them, the most common are intentional bodily harm, beatings, torture, and sexual offences.

In 2024 alone, we recorded 546 such cases. These include sexual violence, sexual acts with persons under the age of 16, molestation and others. These crimes account for a significant proportion of the total number of offences committed against children, and this is an extremely sensitive issue.

We are, of course, taking this into account and stepping up our preventive work with educational institutions. We are also involving parents in this process, because without joint action it will be very difficult for us to prevent such offences.

– How has the structure of crime changed in terms of crimes committed by children themselves, comparing the periods before and after the start of the full-scale war? What trends and major changes in this area can we talk about now?

– Since the start of the full-scale invasion, minors in Ukraine have committed more than 8,500 criminal offences. Most often these are thefts, bodily harm, etc.

It should be noted here that, for example, the number of crimes committed by children in the first year of the full-scale war decreased significantly compared to the pre-war year of 2021 – by almost 40%.

This is partly explained by restrictions on the movement of people, the transition of schools to distance learning, changes in lifestyle, the temporary occupation of territories and the evacuation of the population, including abroad.

In 2023, unfortunately, we saw an increase in the number of such cases compared to 2022, but in 2024 we again recorded a decrease in such offences. And now the number of these crimes continues to decline.

Another new phenomenon that we are increasingly encountering is digital crime – fraud through social networks, participation in various schemes in which children are involved by criminals and even hostile special services. For example, in 2024 alone, the number of fraud cases involving minors increased by almost 30%.

It should be noted that both COVID-19 and the war have created favourable conditions for the spread of such phenomena.

Speaking in general about crimes committed by children, over the past eight years, thanks to preventive measures, we have seen a downward trend in the number of these offences.

– Can you tell us whether children most often commit crimes alone or in groups? And what are the most common reasons and factors behind why they do this?

– A significant proportion of crimes are committed by teenagers alone, although there are also cases where offences are committed by groups. What they have in common are the reasons behind them. Most of these children are raised in difficult conditions without proper supervision.

Among the reasons for this, we see problems in the family, low levels of well-being, abuse by parents or guardians, alcohol, drugs, and the influence of criminal subculture, etc.

The main reason here is the lack of life experience and understanding of the consequences among the children themselves. That is why it is important for adults to be close to children and teach them to distinguish between what is acceptable and what is dangerous.

– In April this year, a teenager in the Kirovohrad region was sentenced to corrective labour instead of a prison term. How effective do you think this method is – imposing a more lenient punishment on children instead of imprisonment for crimes committed? And do you think this practice should be scaled up across Ukraine?

I believe that this practice is effective and necessary. In general, it is a path to the rehabilitation of the child, not to recidivism.

In most cases, when it comes to offences committed through carelessness, peer pressure or difficult life circumstances, harsh punishment in the form of imprisonment not only does not help, but sometimes even harms.

Our goal, as the police, juvenile prevention, and part of the state, is not to break the child, but to help them rethink their actions so that they understand where they made the wrong decision and what they should have done in a given situation, to help them change and get on the right track.

And it is community service or other alternative sanctions instead of prison terms that give them the opportunity to do so.

This form of responsibility also allows us not to separate the child from socialisation, to ensure their connection with their family, and at the same time teaches them that they must be responsible for all their actions.

If this is combined with educational work, the involvement of psychologists, and community support, the combined effect can be much stronger than that of the classic punitive model, so to speak.

Currently, we are working with the Office of the Prosecutor General to implement a pilot project on the implementation of international standards of child-friendly justice. And it is yielding positive results.

Therefore, in my opinion, this practice should not only be supported, but systematically scaled up throughout Ukraine — of course, with the caveat that lenient punishment should only be applied in cases where it is truly appropriate. In other words, it is not necessary to release everyone from imprisonment, nor is it necessary to do so in situations with serious consequences or in cases of repeat offences.

– Let’s talk about the recruitment of Ukrainian children by Russians. Has Russia started doing this less now? And can we say that in some regions of Ukraine children are recruited more often, and in others less? Does geography play a role here?

– Recently, we have seen a slight but steady decline in the recruitment of children by Russians. This has been achieved primarily through systematic preventive measures.

Geography is not a significant factor here. These cases occur throughout the country. Of course, in large regions, the proportion of recruited children is higher. In particular, this refers to the Odesa, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv regions, as well as Kyiv. However, this does not mean that children in other regions are not at risk or that the likelihood is lower.

– How many teenagers have been detained since the start of the full-scale war for committing acts of sabotage and terrorism while carrying out tasks for the Russian Federation? And were there any children among those who agreed to do this who were aware that they could die as a result of carrying out these tasks?

– This year, we have recorded 65 cases of criminal offences of a sabotage nature involving 62 children aged 13 to 17. These are not just numbers, these are tragedies that could have been avoided.

The main motivation that can be identified after communicating with such children is financial. These teenagers also have a desire to assert themselves or a blind belief that they will not be caught.

But none of the children realised that they could die or suffer terrible injuries. They all considered it an easy side job, sometimes without even knowing that they were working for the enemy.

That is why we are talking about the importance of preventive work and conducting an active information campaign on this issue — so that every child knows that such offers should not be accepted.

– How often do children report attempts by Russians to recruit them? And speaking of the preventive information campaign conducted by the National Police, in particular, relevant lessons in schools in conjunction with law enforcement colleagues, how effective do you think it is?

– The number of reports we receive about attempts to recruit children increases in direct proportion to the increase in the intensity of this information campaign.

As of today, we have received almost 70 such reports from children about attempts to recruit them. And this is directly related to the information campaign currently being conducted by the juvenile prevention service in conjunction with the Security Service of Ukraine and educators.

We visit schools, talk to teenagers without moralising, honestly explain how the enemy works, what recruitment is, and what it can lead to. And we talk not only to children, but also to parents and teaching staff, communicating and explaining how to identify it and how to talk to children about it. And this set of measures gives us exactly these results.

The main goal here is not just to tell them, to talk about it, but to make sure that the child knows that they are not alone and that they can stop this crime before it happens.

– What responsibility will children bear who, for example, without realising what they were getting themselves into, carried out a few easy tasks from their supervisors, and after the supervisors gave them a difficult task, realised what was happening and wanted to report it to adults? Should they be afraid to report it to the police? Should they be afraid of, for example, imprisonment? Where does administrative responsibility end and criminal responsibility begin?

– If a child realises that someone is trying to involve them in a crime and reports it to adults or the police, or to the police together with adults, then this is an extremely correct and important step, and there is no need to be afraid in this situation.

When it comes to liability, each situation is unique. It depends on a large number of factors, including age and what the child has actually done.

If, for example, it is a matter of putting up posters or painting graffiti, this can be classified as an administrative offence. If a minor, even without realising it, has helped the enemy in sabotage activities, this falls under the Criminal Code.

But if the child stopped, did not complete the crime and voluntarily turned to the police, this is considered a mitigating circumstance. Law enforcement officers will meet such a child halfway, help them and support them, because we understand how important and difficult this step is for them.

It is very important that even in such situations, children are not afraid to tell the truth and turn to the police. This is a chance to prevent a tragedy that could happen.

Maria Gonchar, Kyiv

Photo by Danilo Antonuk

Forced displacement of Ukrainian children remains widespread in territories that are temporarily occupied or under constant shelling. At the same time, there is still no single transparent algorithm or mechanism that allows Ukrainian children deported to Russia to be returned. Another pressing issue is the lack of a systematic state reintegration programme for returned children, which should provide long-term support and assistance to the child and their family.

Unfortunately, no significant changes have taken place in the context of deinstitutionalisation. The newly adopted strategy to ensure every child in Ukraine has the right to grow up in a family environment carries a significant risk of non-implementation due to a lack of state funding and often declaratory nature of the commitments made. The development of social protection in local communities also remains very slow. Some communities, especially those with small budgets, cannot afford to hire even one social worker or specialist for the children’s needs. At the same time, those communities that do have such specialists or even social service centres and child welfare services are also unable to fully perform their functions due to inadequate staffing levels and an increase in socially vulnerable groups.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines six grave crimes against children: murder or mutilation, recruitment or enlistment in the military, attacks on schools and hospitals, rape, abduction/transfer and denial of access to humanitarian assistance. Due to Russia’s massive shelling of Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, children are being killed and maimed. There is evidence of a physical and sexual violence against children in the temporarily occupied territories. Children are being militarised and recruited into the war, and Ukrainians are being deported to Russia.

As of December 2024, approximately, 737000 Ukrainian children are internally displaced persons as a result of the hostilities. Another 1,7 million are refugees, many of whom have been separated from their parents. As of 31 March 2025, 606 children have been killed, 1846 have been injured to varying degrees, and 19 cases of sexual violence against children have been confirmed.

As a result of targeted attacks, as well as indiscriminate attacks, Russian military troops are destroying intentionally residential buildings, schools, hospitals, sport courts, historical and cultural sites. Even after the War ends, it will be impossible to return to a significant number of cities, towns and villages, as the infrastructure there has been virtually destroyed.

In three years of full-scale War, 236000 residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed, including 209000 private homes, 27000 apartment buildings and 600 dormitories. More than 4000 educational institutions have also been destroyed or damaged, including 229 schools, 110 kindergartens and 97 universities. Hospitals, clinics and other medical facilities are regularly targeted. In total, 1554 medical facilities have been damaged, including 515 hospitals, and 465 outpatient clinics. 3921 cultural facilities, 399 religious buildings and 343 sports complexes have also been damaged. There have been attacks on energy infrastructure and water supply facilities, causing Ukrainians to experience problems with electricity, water and heat supply, as well as communications, which worsens the conditions for the care and upbringing of children.

Russia is actively using prohibited weapons on the territory of Ukraine against the civilian population. Such weapons cause more serious injuries and damage than other types of ammunition. Cluster munitions, phosphorus and thermobaric weapons, butterfly mines, etc. are particularly dangerous. Over the three years of the War, more than 6900 cases of Russian occupiers using ammunition containing dangerous chemicals have also been confirmed. According to the Mine Action Centre, about 30% of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, and more than 139000 km2 of land and 14000 km2 of water bodies need to be surveyed by demining units.

In the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, there is extensive evidence of the occupiers using civilian facilities as military headquarters and/or warehouses for military equipment and ammunition. In conditions where children are forced to attend schools and kindergartens in the temporarily occupied territories and, when necessary, visit medical facilities, this means that the civilian population is being used as human shields during military operations. It also means that the population has no proper access to medical, social and educational services, which only exacerbates the humanitarian crisis in these territories.

The Russian Federation continues to involve Ukrainian children in the War. In particular, Russian special services use mobile gaming applications and establish contact through social networks and messengers to recruit minors. Children are usually offered monetary rewards for performing various tasks, such as photographing the area, monitoring certain objects, posting advertisements, etc. For more serious tasks (delivering bags with explosives, setting cars on fire, etc.), psychological pressure and manipulation are also used. As of the end of March 2025, the prosecutor’s office had opened 173 criminal cases on the recruitment of Ukrainian children for subversive activities.

For example, in August 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine and the National Police detained two underage Russian agents who, on orders from the Russian Federation, carried out a terrorist attack in Zhytomyr on 5 August. The attack involved the detonation of a homemade explosive device in one of the neighbourhoods of the capital of the region.  One man was killed and another was hospitalised in serious condition. The investigation established that the attack was planned by a 17-year-old student at a local vocational school and her peer, who had been recruited by the enemy. Both came to the attention of the aggressor while seeking for money on Telegram channels[1]/

In addition, Russia continues to expand its network of so called ‘military-patriotic education’ programmes for young people in the Russian Federation and in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine with the aim of waging a long-term war against Ukraine and possible future armed conflicts with Western countries.

As of early 2025, Russian invaders had forced nearly 60,000 children from temporarily occupied settlements in the Luhansk region, about 1,800 children from the Zaporizhzhia region, and 45,000 children from Crimea to join propaganda military-patriotic movements. In just eight months of 2025, Russia took almost 11000 Ukrainian children to 164 institutions. Moreover, the programme in such camps is becoming increasingly militarised[2].

The militarisation of children is actively taking place from school age onwards. One example is last year’s publication of the first textbook for teaching drone operation in school labour classes for pupils in grades 8-9. Another example is the active manufacture of weapon parts for specific military units by pupils in schools in the Crimea.

Forced displacement remains widespread in territories that are temporarily occupied or under constant shelling. Children are often forcibly sent to ‘re-education camps’ in Russian-controlled territories, where propaganda and indoctrination are used to try to change their perceptions of their identity, Ukraine, and the course of the war. Children in such camps are forced to listen to the anthem and express support for Russia. Teenagers are often issued Russian passports, which makes it much more difficult for them to return home. The militarisation of boys and attempts to recruit them into the Russian army are also widespread. In addition, the conditions in which children are kept in such camps are unfit for human habitation. The Russians ignore the basic needs of children in terms of hygiene, medical care, adequate nutrition, etc.

According to statements by representatives of the occupation administrations, during the summer of 2024, 40,000 Ukrainian children were taken to ‘re-education camps’ as part of so called ‘Useful Holidays’ project. This is almost twice as many as last year. Children from the occupied territories went on propaganda trips to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don and Tula as part of the ‘Cultural Map 4+85’ and ‘Route for Youth’ programmes, ‘Route for Youth’ and ‘University Changes,’ and also took part in a series of ‘patriotic’ events, sometimes more than 8,000 kilometres from home.

As of March 31, 2025, Ukraine has confirmation of 19,546 deported Ukrainian children who were illegally taken to Russia, Belarus, and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The number of displaced children is likely to be significantly higher, but it is currently impossible to estimate the scale due to the lack of access to the temporarily occupied territories and the ongoing full-scale war. According to open sources cited by Russia, 744,000 children have been taken away. So far, joint efforts by civil society organizations and the government have managed to return 1,256 children.

A positive step towards preventing and returning deported Ukrainian children was the development of the White Paper “Protecting Children from Forced Displacement and Deportation” by the International Expert Group BringKidsBack UA. The book consistently debunks the Kremlin’s myths about so-called “evacuation” and, through international law, describes how the Russian Federation is systematically committing the crime of deportation and forced displacement of Ukrainian children. It strengthens Ukraine’s ability to develop effective international legal mechanisms for the return of abducted children and to ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration.

The regulatory framework for registering deported and forcibly displaced children in Ukraine has also been improved. In particular, in the fall of 2024, the Law of Ukraine “On the Registration of Information on Damage Caused to the Personal Non-Property Rights of Individuals as a Result of the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine” was adopted, which provides for the creation and functioning of a register of information on deported children.

The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1240 of October 29, 2024, which defines the mechanism for the creation, maintenance, and access to the Register of Information on Children Deported or Forcibly Displaced in Connection with the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and its use, came into force. An Interagency Commission on the Verification of Information on Children Deported or Forcibly Displaced in Connection with the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was established.

Furthermore, in October 2024, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Implementation Law No. 4012-IX in connection with the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and amendments thereto, according to which the deportation of children is now considered as genocide.

At the same time, there is still no single effective mechanism that allows Ukrainian children deported to Russia to be returned. The practice of returning children varies greatly – with the help of other countries, international organizations, through the offices of Ombudsmen, and often privately, when the parents or guardians themselves travel to the Russian Federation to pick up their children.

Another pressing issue is the lack of a state-run system for reintegrating kids who come back from the temporarily occupied territories, Russia, and Belarus, which should include long-term support and assistance for the kids and their families. Currently, there are only initiatives from the civil society sector to develop specific concepts for such reintegration in Ukraine, which include the involvement of social services, educational institutions, and the community as a whole in working with returned children. In fact, such children are currently cared for by the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights and involved civil society organizations, which, where possible, meet the children’s needs for humanitarian, psychological, social, legal, educational, and other types of assistance. At the same time, with a significant return of deported children, the existing practice of assistance will not be able to cope with the load. The state has to some extent become involved in addressing this problem with the adoption of the Procedure for the identification, return, support, and reintegration of children deported or forcibly displaced as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which requires that all returned children be placed exclusively in family-based care.

As of March 31, 2025, according to the Office of General Prosecutor, a total of 161,900 crimes of aggression and war crimes committed by the Russian Federation are under investigation in Ukraine. As of September 2024, about 4,000 criminal proceedings are related to crimes against children. The largest number of proceedings are in the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kherson regions. They concern cases of abduction and deprivation of liberty, forced deportation, and sexual violence. Fifty-four people have been notified of suspicion of war crimes against children. Investigations have been completed in 44 cases and the cases have been referred to court. Thirty-one war criminals have been convicted.

Among the positive steps taken, it is worth noting the pilot projects in the field of juvenile justice. In November 2024, a pilot project was launched in Ukraine to specialize judges in family and children’s cases. Its goal is to introduce child-friendly justice. Nearly 60 judges will undergo training. The pilot project is being implemented by the All-Ukrainian Public Center “Volunteer” in cooperation with the Civil Cassation Court within the Supreme Court and the Interagency Coordination Council on Juvenile Justice, with the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Ukraine. It is expected that the consideration of cases by specialized judges with in-depth knowledge of children’s rights and the age and psychological characteristics of children’s development will ensure the proper protection of the rights and well-being of every child who comes into contact with the justice system, considering their needs and life situation. It may also significantly speed up the consideration of the cases related to ensuring the right of the child to a family.

In addition, another pilot project initiated by the Interagency Coordination Council on Juvenile Justice, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, and the All-Ukrainian Public Center “Volunteer” with the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Ukraine has proven effective. Since autumn 2024, the project has been operating throughout Ukraine. It provides for the establishment of a register of psychologists who are involved in criminal proceedings involving children. The database greatly facilitates the search for the necessary specialists in the regions and ensures that the best interests of the child are respected during proceedings involving children.

Training for juvenile investigators remains essential, especially in relation to war crimes. Currently, there are almost no such investigators, and all law enforcement agencies are generally overburdened, with hundreds or even thousands of cases to handle at the same time.

It should also be noted that in early 2025, an important and positive decision for Ukraine was the appointment by the Council of Europe of a Special Representative on Ukrainian Children to draw attention to the problems they face, as well as to standards and initiatives aimed at supporting them. Her powers also include coordinating international cooperation and interaction with structures such as the Register of Damages and the Advisory Group on Children in Ukraine.

A detailed picture of administrative practice of abduction and transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia is presented in the judgement in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia[3]. What is important that the ECtHR considered the period starting from 2014 for the needs of a broader picture of crimes committed by Russian agents or other persons under the control of Russian agents.

The Court found undisputed that in the summer of 2014, three groups of a total of 85 residents of children’s homes in eastern Ukraine were escorted by armed “DPR” and “LPR” representatives across the Ukrainian-Russian border, on three separate dates and from different parts of the “DPR” and “LPR”[4].

The Court found undisputed that children from the “DPR”, the “LPR” and subsequently from other occupied territory were removed to the Russian Federation or to other occupied areas in Ukraine, separated from their legal caregivers and prevented from reuniting with them. Indeed, the evidence establishes clearly that there were such transfers in the “DPR” and the “LPR” shortly before the invasion, as purported “evacuation” measures.

In the following months, countless children from institutions and children attending holiday camps were transferred to Russia from occupied territory and were subsequently unable to return to their homes in Ukraine. Some were retained in holiday camps, while others were placed in foster care with Russian families across various regions in Russia and adopted once they acquired Russian nationality.

Numerous public statements by Russian officials do not dispute the mass removal of children from Ukraine and the ongoing presence of such children in Russia. The Commission of Inquiry was able to review the transfers of 195 such children. The “DPR authorities” themselves said that “all children previously in ‘DPR’ institutions” had been removed to Russia by July 2022. The Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights has claimed that 2,000 children arrived in Russia in February 2022 alone. The portal operated by the Ukrainian Government recorded that, by 30 September 2022 a total of 7,890 children had been removed from[5].

The Commission of Inquiry and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism mission experts concluded that in the Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv regions, the displacement of children was an organised process. Their reports concluded that the transfers were not justified by safety or medical reasons and lacked proper consent from the children’s legal caregivers. They further found that subsequent actions and omissions by the Russian authorities prevented the children’s reunification with their legal caregivers. The evidence shows that parents in Ukraine were not provided with information concerning their children’s location in Russia and that where contact was re-established it was often through coincidence or luck[6].

At the same time, Russian officials put in place dedicated legislative and policy measures for the removal and placement of Ukrainian children in Russia. Removal of allegedly orphaned Ukrainian children from Ukraine was carried out by the Russian armed forces and authorities, including by the Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights in person as well as by “DPR” and “LPR” armed groups, in coordination with the “DPR” and “LPR” “child protection authorities”. Once across the border, Russian authorities at federal and regional level accommodated the children in hospitals, social institutions or “camps” throughout. The trips were typically funded by Russia’s regional and republican governments, under the so-called “patronage” system. Official statements referred to the support of President Putin himself to the placement of Ukrainian children in Russian families[7].

The Russian Federation made it easier for Ukrainian children to acquire Russian citizenship and be adopted by Russian families. After 24 February 2022 children born in occupied territory were issued Russian birth certificates and Russian nationality. This practice was subsequently formalised with the annexation of the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in October 2022. Perceived to be Russian citizens, children from occupied territory in Ukraine could be adopted by Russian families from anywhere in Russia. The evidence indicates that they were listed for adoption or foster care in Russia[8].

It has been widely reported, and confirmed in the activity reports of her mandate, that the Russian Federation’s Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, spearheaded a wide range of initiatives aimed at transferring and accommodating Ukrainian children in the Russian Federation. She herself travelled to the Russian-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to coordinate the transfers and placements of children in Russian families. She also accompanied a group of children to Russia and reported on more groups of children being ready to travel to Russia for placement in Russian families. She further adopted a child from Mariupol herself. On 17 March 2023 a pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued arrest warrants for her and for President Putin, charging them with the war crime of unlawful deportation of children and that of unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation[9].

Finally, the Court concluded that there was the movement of numerous children across the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation between 2014 and 2018. It can be inferred from the regular presence of vehicles and personnel of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and the preparations for, and carrying out of, medical checks that the transfers were organised by the Russian Federation and involved significant logistical arrangements[10].

Evacuations may be carried out only in case of “imperative military reasons” or for the “safety of the population”; within the bounds of occupied territory unless impossible; and only temporarily. There are extensive procedural rules concerning the need for written consent from parents or legal guardians and the obligation to make arrangements to facilitate the return and reunification with their families of evacuated children. Changes in their personal status are prohibited.

However, the Russian Government has not provided evidence that the children’s removal from Ukraine in the circumstances complied with any of these provisions. There was nothing to show that any of the purported evacuations of children were carried out for the reasons provided for by international humanitarian law. It is also significant that the essence of the present complaint is that the children were transferred from occupied territory to the Russian Federation, which is in clear breach of international humanitarian law in the absence of evidence showing that transfer within occupied territory would have been impossible.

The Russian Government did not implement any measures to secure the return to Ukraine and the family reunification of children purportedly evacuated, and no such measures are described in the various reports before it.

On the contrary, numerous credible reports identify cases where Ukrainian children were themselves left to try to contact their parents, often with the manifest non-cooperation of the persons in whose custody they were. The policy put in place for the mass acquisition of Russian nationality by children in occupied areas after the 2022 invasion, in breach of international humanitarian law, was nothing less than the automatic imposition of Russian.

As a result, the Court concluded that, given the evidence of changes to nationality and adoption in the Russian Federation, the children’s transfer to Russia cannot be seen as a temporary measure. Considering these considerations, the children’s transfer from Ukraine to the Russian Federation would not appear to qualify as lawful “evacuation” under international humanitarian law.

Making conclusions to the analysed problems of the impact of the War on children, it is reasonable to draw the following recommendations:

1. To ensure that all crimes committed by Russian military personnel against Ukrainian children are recorded: murders, mutilations, cruel treatment of children, and others.

2. To engage international partners to monitor the situation of children who have been deported to Russia and their return to Ukraine or departure to third safe countries.

3. To apply child-friendly justice approaches, including training the necessary number of relevant specialists.

4. To standardise at the legislative level the juvenile specialisation of the police, prosecutors, judges, and probation services.

5. To develop a clear algorithm for the reintegration of children affected by the War, in particular those returned from deportation and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. 6. To disseminate recommendations for parents and educators on identifying potential risks of child recruitment and protecting children from negative influences.

[1] Oliinyk, T. (2025). Teenagers detained in Zhytomyr for blowing up two men on orders from Russia. Ukrainska Pravda. August 7, 2025. Source: www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/08/7/7525174

[2] Shurmakevich V. (2025) Only in 2025, the Russian Federation sent almost 11,000 Ukrainian children to re-education camps. Ukrainska Pravda. September 12, 2025. Source: https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/u-2025-roci-rosiyani-vivezli-do-taboriv-mayzhe-11-tisyach-ukrajinskih-ditey-310271/

[3] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025

[4] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1569.

[5] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1573.

[6] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1574.

[7] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1575.

[8] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1577.

[9] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1578.

[10] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1582.

Andrii Chernousov

PhD in Sociology, Vice-Chair (Kharkiv Institute for Social Research)

Ukraine’s law enforcement system, particularly before the Revolution of Dignity and during the early post-Soviet period, was deeply corrupt, inheriting many flaws from the Soviet system. The following characteristics and factors contributed to its systemic corruption:

Elite and Petty Corruption: Corruption permeated all levels of law enforcement. High-ranking officials engaged in elite corruption, such as embezzlement of state resources or protecting powerful criminal networks for personal gain. Meanwhile, petty corruption was rampant among lower-level officers, who frequently demanded bribes from citizens for routine services like traffic stops, permits, or avoiding minor penalties.

Infiltration by Organized Crime: The system was heavily infiltrated by organized crime, facilitated by corruption. Criminal groups often bribed or collaborated with police, prosecutors, and judges, creating networks that protected illegal activities like drug trafficking, extortion, and smuggling. This blurred the line between law enforcement and criminal enterprises.

Clan-Based Networks and Cronyism: Law enforcement operated through clan-like structures, where loyalty to personal networks trumped professional duty. Police chiefs, prosecutors, and judges often shared economic interests, forming tight-knit groups that prioritized mutual benefit over justice. Nepotism ensured that positions were filled based on connections rather than merit.

Soviet-Style Bureaucracy and Centralization: The system inherited a rigid, centralized structure from the Soviet era, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs holding near-absolute control. This monopolized power, concentrated in the hands of politically appointed figures, made the system prone to abuse and reduced accountability. Decentralization or independent oversight was virtually non-existent.

Low Salaries and Poor Infrastructure:  Officers were underpaid. It made them susceptible to bribery as a means of supplementing income. Inadequate funding also led to outdated equipment, poor training facilities, and dilapidated infrastructure, further demoralizing the force and fostering a culture of corruption to compensate for resource shortages.

Soviet Rudimentary Education and Training: Training for law enforcement was outdated, rooted in Soviet-era practices that emphasized control over service. Officers were often ill-equipped to handle modern policing challenges, relying on intimidation or corrupt practices rather than professional skills.

Lack of Public Trust: Systemic corruption eroded public confidence, as citizens viewed police as predatory rather than protective. This lack of trust discouraged cooperation with law enforcement, perpetuating a cycle where police relied on coercion or bribes to maintain authority.

For years, Ukrainian Society had been demanding fair, human-centered, and transparent law enforcement institutions, but these requests went largely unfulfilled, leaving anachronism, cronyism, and systemic corruption entrenched. Ukrainians saw the police forces as their primary function – to serve as the state’s primary security guardians, tasked with protecting people and property through public assistance, law enforcement, crime identification, investigation, prevention, and maintaining peaceful public order. As the frontline of state security, they are the most visible institution that citizens encounter daily.

The 2005-2012 Georgia’s police reforms set a tone for some other neighbouring countries. It was remarkably successful and widely recognized. By eradicating corruption, organized crime (largely known as ‘thieves-in-Law’ mafia style soviet tradition), nepotism, and clan-based structures, Georgia laid a foundation for progress and the rule of law. In fact, many post-Soviet republics sought to emulate this model, but the absence of political will often hindered their efforts, diluting the commitment and spirit needed for meaningful reform.

Following Ukraine’s Dignity Revolution, reforming law enforcement became essential not only for societal trust but also for the country’s development. It was vital to fill the abyss of the Ukrainian public’s lack of confidence in the state Institutions, undermining feelings of safety, protection of businesses and private property, child safety, and adherence to human rights standards. Without the rule of law, a democratic society cannot exist, nor can it thrive without safeguarding human and property rights — core responsibilities of state institutions, particularly the police. Inspired by Georgia’s success, President Poroshenko’s government sought to replicate these reforms post-revolution. Police reform became a pathway to establishing the rule of law, gaining Euro-Atlantic support, and securing political backing. The Government understood that without law enforcement and anticorruption reforms, it would be difficult to acquire Western support and technical assistance.

The task required a near-complete overhaul of the law enforcement system, focusing on eliminating corruption, reducing crime, combating organized crime, earning public trust, protecting human and property rights, and maintaining public order. Achieving these goals was possible but depended heavily on the state and political leaders’ commitment, expressed through political will? It is not a specific law or individual but a unified government approach ensuring impartial law enforcement and punishment, simplified regulations, reduced bureaucracy, and efficient service delivery to citizens. Political will is essential to declare corruption as a common enemy and prioritize transparent institutions to expose hidden financial flows. It was important for Ukraine’s law enforcement, which was plagued by elite and petty corruption, infiltration by organized crime, bureaucratic inefficiencies, Soviet-style rudimentary education, clan-based networks linking prosecutors, judges, and police chiefs through shared economic interests, low salaries, and poor infrastructure.

In 2012, Georgia’s elections saw pro-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili defeat reformist, pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili. Legal cases were launched against Saakashvili and his allies. As a reform expert, Saakashvili was invited to Ukraine, catalysing the import of Georgia’s police reform model. The Soviet-inherited, highly centralized, and monopolized police system, controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, lacked decentralization or checks and balances.  In Ukraine, this was exemplified by the powerful Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, whose political influence overshadowed institutional autonomy. President Poroshenko and Minister Avakov were “kind” enemies. Nowadays, I can admit that the Minister of Internal Affairs, with its enormous forces, was more influential than the President of Ukraine. At least, he used his power effectively. Police forces typically included traffic police, the first responders to crime, criminal police for investigation and operations, special forces, and crowd control units. But the Minister was more powerful than a police chief; he obtained an institutional control over the National Guard. The new National Guard absorbed the Interior Ministry’s ‘Internal Troops’ and volunteer battalions. The National Guard functioned as a territorial defence and support to the Armed Forces during wartime, civilian law enforcement: guarding government buildings, managing protests, and protecting critical infrastructure and forces during civilian unrest. Possessing control over the National Guard was one of the issues of controversy between the President and the Minister from different political groups.

The first wave of reform targeted the patrol police, abolishing the corrupt Soviet-era traffic police and establishing a modern, prevention-focused patrol police department.

Key factors included:

• a transparent recruitment system with rigorous vetting;
• modern tactical and intellectual training;
• geographic redistribution for patrolling;
• new uniforms and equipment;
• decent salaries and social benefits.

The appointment of Eka Zguladze as Avakov’s deputy kickstarted the patrol police reform, supported significantly by the U.S. ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, a specialized initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice. Since its founding in 1986, ICITAP has played a pivotal role in helping foreign governments build professional, transparent, and rights-respecting law enforcement institutions.) program, which focused on recruitment.

The process involved vacancy announcements, strict criteria, general and psychological testing, physical assessments, and competitive salaries with social benefits. During the recruitment of patrol officers, candidates underwent specialized psychological testing, which constituted a critical element of the selection process. These assessments were designed to evaluate emotional resilience, ethical judgment, and the capacity to perform under pressure – qualities essential for building public trust and ensuring professional conduct in law enforcement. The integration of psychological screening marked a departure from previous practices and reflected a broader commitment to institutional reform and modernization.

Ultimately, the patrol police reform succeeded, mobilising nearly 15,000 new recruits. Training occurred at the Interior Ministry’s academy, not as higher education but as intensive, U.S.-style courses lasting a few months, with tactics developed by American police experts. Within six months, Kyiv’s patrol police department was operational. The emphasis on young, patriotic officers was key, as reforming the old, corrupt system was deemed impossible.

In December 2015, Ukraine’s National Police was established—a legislative step forward, though insufficient. The law didn’t grant the National Police chief enough independence from the politically appointed Interior Minister. Despite debates in the Verkhovna Rada, the law was a compromise, leaving the Interior Ministry dominant and the police with limited autonomy. After the patrol police’s success, the focus shifted to the criminal police, a more resistant and sensitive area due to its entrenched clan-based structures and cronyism.

The public trust in the Patrol Police increased to 60%, but the main challenge remained the vetting (attestation) process of former militia officers. My idea was that without passing attestation, former militia officers should not be allowed to be appointed to the Police staff. The main challenge was a political one. Heads of departments and regional districts had been too influential and tied to the different political figures to be vetted properly. The commissions reviewed approximately seventy thousand former Militia and fired over five thousand, or nine percent of police in 2016.

The Central Commission consists of five members:

• Two representatives appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs.
• One – nominated by the Chief of Police.
• Two public representatives recommended by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights – chosen from persons with impeccable reputation, strong professional standards.

As you have seen, the balance in the commissions was in favour of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The same principle was at the different cities where all regional Militia had been vetted. The vetting process was accompanied by a huge scandal. One of the scandals was the firing of a Head Anti-Drug Unit – Ilia Kyva, who later betrayed Ukraine and escaped to Russia. It was a symbol of the broader struggle between reform and entrenched figures from the political clans covered by the Influential Minister. Vetting faced lots of criticism.

The vetting process was met with profound systemic resistance. Former members of the militia organized demonstrations, issued personal insults, and made threats. The persistence of double standards and impunity within the police force could not be overcome without a high degree of independence in the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office. One of the most detrimental outcomes of the vetting process was the legal reinstatement of dismissed officials, which ultimately undermined and halted the reform of the criminal police.

Regional police chiefs could neither be dismissed nor appointed without the direct involvement of the Minister, reflecting the centralised nature of decision-making. Legislative progress was severely hindered due to the absence of political support in the Verkhovna Rada, where reform initiatives lacked both allies and a dedicated parliamentary faction. The reform agenda was overshadowed by significant political interests at play.

A functional internal audit service was never established. The prosecutor’s office operated primarily in pursuit of its own institutional interests. Given that both the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Internal Affairs were political appointees, the police frequently served as a tool of political influence rather than as an impartial law enforcement body.

Ultimately, Ukrainian society expected more than I was able to deliver, as the reform did not reach its full potential. Nevertheless, I believe that the most significant component of the police reform – the patrol police – was genuinely felt by the public.

The level of engagement from international donors and civil society was unprecedented. This collaborative effort laid the foundation for a new model of public service, one that prioritized transparency, accountability, and citizen trust.

During Russia’s full-scale invasion, both the patrol police and the reformed criminal police demonstrated that the protection of citizens and patriotic commitment were paramount. Their response under crisis conditions reaffirmed the core values of the reform and highlighted the resilience and dedication of Ukraine’s law enforcement institutions.

Khatia Dekanoidze

• Member of Parliament of Georgia
• Minister of Education and Science of Georgia (2012)
• Chief of the National Police of Ukraine (2015–2016)

The Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Ihor Klymenko, took part in the presentation.

During the discussion panel, the Minister spoke about the work of the bodies and departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and security projects that are already successfully operating in communities.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs plans to ensure that by the end of the year, every Ukrainian community, except for those directly adjacent to the front line, will have its police officer and community rescue officer.

This was announced by Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko during his speech at the presentation of the Government Action Programme.

‘Indeed, by the end of the year, we plan to provide all communities, except those directly close to the front line, where other police units are working, with community police officers. This is a necessity of the present time,’ he said.