Accordingly, the very fact of the use of physical force, and in a number of cases its excessive use, raises the question of the legality and compliance with international standards of the practice of concealing their faces by TRC employees when carrying out coercive actions.

Here, we can leave aside the legal assessment of the legality of the detention of citizens by TRC employees as such. This issue has been sufficiently researched, and the answer is clear: TRC employees do not have such powers.

Instead, the key aspect is that the very fact of using physical force during the detention of persons transforms the legal status of TRC employees (who are, by their nature, military personnel) into a status functionally identical to that of law enforcement officers, as they effectively assume the relevant law enforcement powers.

In this regard, it is worth noting the provisions of Article 1 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by Resolution 34/169 of the UN General Assembly on December 17, 1979, according to which the term “law enforcement officials” covers all appointed or elected officials who exercise police powers, including the power to arrest or detain. Thus, when a TRC employee, while in the status of a military serviceman, resorts to detention with the use of physical force, this indicates that he has effectively assumed the powers of law enforcement officials within the meaning of the aforementioned international act, which, in turn, raises questions both about the legality of such actions and about legal responsibility for them.

At the same time, in the context of preventing torture and inhuman treatment, given the practice of detentions carried out by TRC employees, the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) are of particular importance. The relevant CPT standards contain an unambiguous requirement: every state agent — regardless of their institutional affiliation (police officer, prison service officer, or other state official) — who exercises powers to detain persons is required to wear clear and unambiguous means of identification. Such means may include an individual number, surname, or appropriate markings on the uniform or protective equipment (in particular, a helmet).

In cases where officials perform their duties wearing balaclavas or helmets that cover their faces, the relevant identification numbers must be of sufficient size to ensure the unimpeded identification of the specific official exercising the power of detention and using physical force.

Thus, even if the actions of TRC employees in detaining citizens are illegal in nature, the obligation to have clear and unambiguous means of identification on uniforms remains relevant and important. Compliance with this requirement is a necessary prerequisite for ensuring the prompt identification of a specific individual who has used force and, where there are grounds for doing so, bringing them to justice.

Here we would like to recall certain ECHR standards regarding the wearing of balaclavas by law enforcement officers.

The CPT would also like to express its misgivings about the practice of law enforcement officials wearing masks when apprehending persons […] since this will hamper the identification of those responsible if and when instances of ill-treatment arise. The Committee considers that only exceptional circumstances can justify measures to conceal the identity of law enforcement officials [carrying out their duties]. Where such measures are applied, appropriate safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that the officials concerned are accountable for their actions (e.g. by means of a clearly visible number on the uniform) (Estonia, 2007, para 15).

The CPT considers that appropriate safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that police officers may be identified and can be held accountable for their actions (e.g. by way of a clearly visible means of individual identification on the uniform, such as a name or a number). This concerns in particular those police officers wearing masks/balaclavas or other equipment that may hamper their identification. Such a requirement is also likely to have a preventive effect and significantly reduce the risk of excessive use of force and other forms of ill-treatment (Austria, 2021, para 19).

The wearing of balaclavas (in addition to protective helmets) by members of specialised forces may exceptionally be justified in the context of high-risk operations (for instance, when dangerous arrests are necessary). However, the routine wearing of balaclavas during public order operations should be seriously reconsidered. Further, any pre-planned interventions should be videorecorded (e.g. with tactical cameras as part of the equipment of the officers concerned). Action must also be taken to ensure that plainclothes law enforcement officials effecting an apprehension and/or questioning an apprehended person in the context of public order operations clearly identify themselves (including by giving evidence of their status and professional identity as soon as is practicable) (Ukraine, February 2014, para 36).

The practical arrangements in place, in particular the display of a number on the back of helmets, did not generally allow persons apprehended in the context of the demonstrations to identify the law enforcement officials involved in their arrest. The CPT recommends that the  authorities take measures to ensure that all police officers involved in public order operations, whether they wear personal protection equipment or not, display a clearly visible means of individual identification (such as a name or a number) on the front of their uniforms or helmets (Türkiye, April 2025, para 36).

The Committee recommends that steps be taken to ensure that prison staff are always identifiable, preferably by wearing name tags [or short] identification numbers in a visible manner at all times whilst on duty (Hungary, 2013, para. 49).

The CPT also wishes to emphasise that it is opposed to the wearing of balaclavas by special-purpose forces within penitentiary establishments. The Committee recognises that, for operational and/or security reasons, the wearing of protective helmets may be necessary. However, it should be ensured that subsequent identification of the officers concerned is always possible by the relevant authorities and by prisoners through not only a clearly distinctive badge but also a prominent identification number on each uniform/helmet. In addition, interventions of this type should be videorecorded (e.g. with tactical cameras as part of the equipment of the penitentiary officers concerned) (Ukraine, 2012, para 21).

Further, in the context of border control activities at both land and sea borders, all law enforcement officials or state agents involved should display clearly visible identification numbers or tags on their uniforms. There can be no justification for balaclavas to be systematically worn. Border control activities should also be video recorded to prevent both ill-treatment and false accusations and be systematically monitored. In this regard, the authorities should guarantee the operation of effective and independent monitoring mechanisms for systematically monitoring border control activities (Greece, 2023, para 162).

We cordially invite all experts in the fields of criminal law, criminology, sociology, political science, and other areas and disciplines to discuss current issues related to the impact of Russian aggression on the state and society.

Date: 28 November 2025

Time: 11:00 (Kyiv time)

Format: online

Access: via the link

Some time ago, the government commissioned the National Prison and Probation Service to create sections in prisons for 15- to 17-year-olds who have committed serious crimes. This task is now being expanded to include 13- and 14-year-olds, according to the Swedish Ministry of Justice.

Sweden has been struggling for years with criminal gangs that repeatedly recruit minors to commit serious crimes on their behalf – including murder. Under current law, 13- and 14-year-olds are not yet criminally responsible. A bill proposed by Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson’s liberal-conservative government aims to change this in future for particularly serious crimes.

Lowering the age of criminal responsibility for the most serious crimes is important, among other things, to protect society, but also to help children leave the criminal path, said Justice Minister Gunnar Strömmer. He spoke of initially 100 to 150 places for offenders aged 13 to 17.

According to government information, the separate youth departments are to be operational from 1 July 2026. Departments for boys are to be set up in six prisons and for girls in two. The younger and older adolescents are to be separated from each other – and the plans are not expected to violate the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ministry said.

Source

Items worth €88m (£76m; $102m) were taken from the world’s most-visited museum last Sunday, when four thieves wielding power tools broke into the building in broad daylight.

France’s justice minister has conceded security protocols “failed”, leaving the country with a “terrible image”.

The Paris prosecutor’s office said in a statement that the arrests had been made on Saturday evening, without specifying how many people had been taken into custody.

One of the suspects was preparing to travel to Algeria, while it is understood the other was going to Mali.
Specialist police can detain and question them for up to 96 hours.

According to reports in French media on Sunday, DNA found at the scene of the robbery lead to the identification of one of the suspects.

The gang left behind a number of items, including gloves and a high-vis jacket.

It has previously been reported that they dropped a crown that once belonged to Empress Eugenie, the wife of Napoleon III.

The Paris prosecutor criticised the “premature disclosure” of information related to the case, adding that it hindered efforts to recover the jewels and find the thieves.

The thieves reportedly arrived at 09:30 (08:30 GMT), shortly after the museum opened to visitors.

The suspects arrived with a vehicle-mounted mechanical lift to gain access to the Galerie d’Apollon (Gallery of Apollo) via a balcony close to the River Seine.

Pictures from the scene showed the ladder leading up to a first-floor window.

Two of the thieves entered by cutting through the window with power tools.

They then threatened the guards, who evacuated the premises, and cut through the glass of two display cases containing jewels.

A preliminary report has revealed that one in three rooms in the area of the museum raided had no CCTV cameras, according to French media.

French police say the thieves were inside for four minutes and made their escape on two scooters waiting outside at 09:38.

The museum’s director told French senators this week that the only camera monitoring the exterior wall of the Louvre where they broke in was pointing away from the first-floor balcony that led to Gallery of Apollo.

CCTV around the perimeter was also weak and “ageing”, Laurence des Cars said, meaning that staff failed to spot the gang early enough to stop the theft.

Experts have also expressed concern that the jewels may have already been broken up into hundreds of pieces.

Security measures have since been tightened around France’s cultural institutions.

The Louvre has transferred some of its most precious jewels to the Bank of France following the heist. They will now be stored in the Bank’s most secure vault, 26m (85ft) below the ground floor of its elegant headquarters in central Paris.

This raises the question of who accepts and complies with such emergency rules and under what conditions.

The article addresses the question of norm acceptance during the COVID-19 pandemic based on empirical findings from an online vignette survey of 6,000 respondents in Germany.

The focus is on how security actors can promote norm acceptance among the population when enforcing emergency measures.

In presenting the results of the online vignette survey, the focus is on the influence of various factors, such as fairness, on the creation of norm acceptance among the population.

Finally, he encourages the government to reconsider certain protest-related provisions in the Crime and Policing Bill currently before the House of Lords, specifically the proposed new offence of concealing one’s identity, as well as restrictions on assemblies in the vicinity of places of worship.

Situation of trans people

In a separate letter addressed to the Chairs of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Women and Equalities Committee, the Commissioner shares observations on human rights standards that must be upheld in further steps following the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in For Women Scotland. 

He sets out key elements of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights that should be taken into consideration in this process. 

The Commissioner warns against measures that could exclude trans people from many areas of life. He also cautions against tendencies to view the human rights of different groups as a zero-sum game, noting that this approach builds on prejudice against trans people. 

The new Network, which is co-convened by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) and the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the University of Galway, fielded a team of seven legal observers to observe the policing of a pro-Palestine demonstration. 

The observers monitored gardaí as they, without justification, restrained and dispersed protesters using force and incapacitant (pepper spray). The report finds that actions of members of An Garda Síochána were in violation of garda policies and also Ireland’s international human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. 

This is the first report produced by the Network, established this year to monitor the policing of protests around Ireland. The report is published on the ICCL website and can be found here.