The two-day intensive programme formed part of the DIGNITY project, an initiative co-funded by the European Union and dedicated to bridging perspectives for a rights-based approach to pre-trial detention across member states.

Under the expert guidance of Ms. Marina Daliani, distinguished criminal and human rights lawyer and Vice President of the Hellenic League of Human Rights, the training brought together legal practitioners, human rights defenders, and detention monitoring experts from Greece, Portugal, and Ukraine.

The programme addressed critical contemporary challenges in pre-trial detention practices, including vulnerabilities of detained persons, barriers to effective legal representation, and the application of international human rights standards. Participants engaged in practical exercises encompassing UN complaint mechanisms, European Arrest Warrant simulations, and strategic litigation before the European Court of Human Rights.

Call for Papers

Wartime Crisis Mode: Crime, Justice and Social Control in Armed Conflicts in Europe

Edited by Dr. Dmytro Yagunov, Prof. Dr. Rita Haverkamp and Dr. Tetiana Melnychuk

Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

Endowed Professorship of Crime Prevention and Risk Management

Supported by the Philipp Schwartz Initiative of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation

About the Volume

Contemporary armed conflicts reshape legal systems, erode institutional trust, and fuel unprecedented criminal activity, making the criminological dimensions of warfare even more essential.

Building on the 2025 edition «Wartime Crisis Mode: The Impact of Russia’s Aggression on the System of Social Control in Ukraine (Crime, Institutes, and Trust in Criminal Justice)», this expanded volume brings together scholars and practitioners to analyse how contemporary war reconfigures legal norms, disrupts judiciary and law enforcement, and creates new condition for criminal activity.

This edited volume examines how armed conflicts impact criminal justice systems across multiple dimensions. It analyses the ways warfare destabilises economies, fractures political institutions, and erodes public trust in police, courts, prisons, and other core elements of national criminal justice systems.

While the main focus centers on Russian military action against Ukraine, this edition also welcomes academic submissions that analytically explore the broader ramifications of emerging security threats.

Topical Areas

We invite contributions addressing the following themes and related topics:

1. Theoretical Foundations of Studying Crime and Justice in Armed Conflict

• Defining the discipline: core principles and scope of criminology in armed conflicts.
• Conceptual frameworks: theories and models for analysing wartime criminality.
• Research methodologies: approaches for studying crime and justice in conflict zones.
• Comparative perspectives: criminal justice systems under wartime conditions.

2. Human Rights at War

• Human rights challenges and derogations during armed conflicts.
• Civilian protections and violations under international humanitarian law.
• Accountability mechanisms for human rights violations.
• Wartime related case law of international courts and tribunals.
• Protection of the rights of prisoners of war.

3. Impact of War on Crime

• War’s effects on crime: trends and patterns.
• War crimes and crimes against national security.
• Cross-border crimes and illicit markets (human trafficking, trafficking of arms and drugs).
• Violent crimes and gender-based violence during armed conflicts.
• Property crimes: extortion, bribery, and fraud.
• Mobilisation crimes and draft evasion.
• Environmental crimes in war zones.
• Cybercrime and information warfare.
• Use of artificial intelligence during conflicts.

4. Organised Crime and Gangs

• Organised crime networks during wartime.
• Criminal-conflict nexus: how armed conflicts create new opportunities for organised crime and how organised crime fuels the conflict.
• Street gangs and prison gangs in conflict-affected regions.
• Private military companies in armed conflicts: criminal threat assessment.

5. Torture Practices and War’s Impact on Vulnerable Groups

• Criminological aspects of wartime victimisation.
• Torture as a public policy in the 21st century.
• Gender-based and sexual violence.
• The criminology of genocide.

6. Criminal Justice Systems Under Siege

• Policing and prosecution in wartime: evolution and ethical dilemmas.
• Judicial systems in armed conflict: adaptation, continuity, and legitimacy.
• Prisons and probation under pressure: security, rehabilitation, and humanitarian concerns.

7. Society Under Strain: Cultural and Social Consequences of Conflict

• Fragile foundations: trust, heritage, and vulnerable lives.
• Beyond the battlefield: governance and social cohesion in crisis.
• Echoes across generations: trauma and long-term societal change.
• Preserving identity amid chaos: cultural heritage and human resilience.

8. Imperialism in the 21st Century: Continuities and Transformations

• 21st century imperialism: multiple manifestations.
• The Neo-imperial mindset: Ideology of Russian expansionism.
• Russia’s global ambitions: Historical roots and modern projections.
• The Ukrainian pattern: anatomy of Russian aggression.
• The prison state within: How criminal and prison culture shapes Russian governance.
• Governing through fear: The political architecture of Russia’s carceral system.
• Empire’s endgame: between collapse, evolution, and survival.

Submission Guidelines

We Welcome:

• Original empirical research (quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods).
• Theoretical and conceptual papers.
• Case studies and comparative analyses.
• Interdisciplinary approaches drawing from criminology, constitutional law, criminal law, sociology, political science, psychology, and related fields.
• Perspectives from both scholars and practitioners.

Abstracts Requirements

• Language: English
• Abstract: 500 words
• Keywords: 5-7 keywords
• Author information: Brief bio (100 words) and institutional affiliation

Manuscripts Requirements

• Language: English
• Length: 7,000-9,000 words (including references)
• Once a manuscript has been accepted following peer review.
• Editors reserve the right to reject abstracts and manuscripts if they do not meet the requirements in terms of subject matter, quality or scientific validity.

Edition

• The authors assume full responsibility for the manuscripts provided.
• The authors assume full responsibility for the accuracy of data and the validity of content.

Citations and References

• Citations in the text and Bibliography references must meet the requirements of the APA-Style.

• References to the literature are made in the text of the paper in brackets and consist of the author’s surname, year of publication with corresponding pages.

• References at the end of the article should be Latinised.

• When making bibliographic references to Cyrillic (including Ukrainian and Russian) articles published in journals and almanacs, we strongly recommend the following structure of references: 1) Name of author/authors (transliterated); 2) original title of the article transliterated by Latin symbols and its English translation in square brackets [ ]; 3) original title of the source transliterated by Latin symbols and its English translation in square brackets [ ]; 4) publisher’s imprint information in English.

• In References, when indicating a city of publication in both English and Cyrillic sources, the name of the city should be given in English, while the name of the publishing house should be transliterated.

Submission Process

• Abstract Submission Deadline: January 20, 2026
• Paper Submission Deadline: May 20, 2026
• Expected Publication Date: July 2026

Please submit your abstract and a short bio (100 words) to yagunov@posteo.de with the subject line “War Criminology – [Your Name]”.

In its 12th General Report published in 2002 (Developments concerning CPT standards in respect of police custody), the CPT directly focuses on the issue of training of police officers (§34, §49).

In its 20th General Report published in 2010 (Electrical discharge weapons), the CPT focuses again on the issues of training of police officers (§65, §78, §79).

In its 28th General Report published in 2019 (Preventing police torture and other forms of ill-treatment – reflections on good practices and emerging approaches), the CPT focuses that professional policing goes hand-in-hand with adequate training on the use of force in compliance with the principles of lawfulness, necessity and proportionality. Training should also provide opportunities to acquire appropriate investigative skills, taking due account of the age, gender, state of health, any disability or any other circumstances which may render certain persons under investigation particularly vulnerable. Moreover, no significant change can be expected without strong police leadership and management, which scrupulously supervise the observance of procedural safeguards and convey firm and unambiguous messages of zero tolerance of police ill-treatment (§71).

The CPT finds it positive that the police services cooperate with universities, and academic courses provided by universities form part of the syllabus for university training programmes for police officers (§76).

Considering that the Project is focused on training of police officers in procedural justice skills and de-escalation techniques, it should also be mentioned that the CPT encourages police practices which avoid common pitfalls associated with relying on preconceived conclusions. The CPT recommends the police services go outside ‘tunnel vision’ or ‘confirmation bias’ (§76). Further, the development of adequate initial and ongoing professional training is key in the effective implementation of any such framework for police interviewing (§80). Therefore, such an approach goes in line with Project which is focused on dialogue between the police and citizens in contrast to any punitive approaches.

Moreover, the CPT makes a special focus that introducing designated custody officers could also strengthen the practical implementation of various procedural and other safeguards. The police officers with the powers of arrest should be trained properly to pose the appropriate questions and to recognise and record indicative signs of a person in need of particular support and care. This is clearly good practice (§85).

Many cases of the European Court of Human Rights focus attention on the need of the European states to improve national systems of training of police officers in the area of prevention of harm and de-escalation techniques (Saso Gorgiev v. the FYRM, §47; Krastanov v. Bulgaria, §53; Mikhalkova and Others v. Ukraine, §36; Guliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], § 249; McCann and Оthers v. the UK [GC], §150; Soare and Others v. Romania, §129; Armani Da Silva v. the UK [GC], §247; Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, §194; Gül v. Turkey, п.§84-86; Ergi v. Turkey, §72; Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], §§ 95, 102, 106-108; Celniku v. Greece; Saso Gorgiev v. the FYRM, §49; Emars v. Latvia, §87; Gorovenky and Bugara v. Ukraine, §31-39).

In Celniku v. Greece, the ECtHR stated that Article 2 of the Convention related not only to the direct actions of police officers or security forces, but also to the planning of an operation or even the training of the relevant law enforcement personnel, if it can be proven that the law enforcement officers did not receive adequate training or that the level of their training was not commensurate with the complexity of the tasks assigned to them. One of the possible reasons for the killing of the applicants’ relative was the lack of proper practical training of the police officers.

In Saso Gorgiev v. the FYRM (§51), Abdullah Yilmaz v. Turkey (§§56-57), and Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia (§284), the ECtHR focused that States had to set high professional standards for their law enforcement systems and ensure that persons serving in such bodies meet the established requirements. In particular, when equipping police forces with firearms, care should be taken to provide appropriate special training for police officers.

The political and legal reality that has developed over more than ten years of War has demonstrated the ability of Ukrainian constitutional institutions to function in unprecedented security and humanitarian conditions. Even during a full-scale invasion, which included missiles and bomb strikes across the country and the advance of enemy infantry along a 1200 km front line, public authorities and civil society institutions continued to function. The judicial system, which had undergone significant reforms during the War in 2016-2017, proved to be fully prepared for such challenges and, after the full-scale invasion, coped with all the challenges of wartime without undergoing any organisational changes. Of course, Ukraine’s constitutional design has undergone significant changes aimed at adapting the constitutional system to wartime conditions.

Among these changes, the following are key.

1. Introduction of martial law and general mobilisation

This involves restricting certain rights and freedoms of citizens, such as freedom of movement, assembly and demonstration, in order to ensure the security and defence capability of the state. As a first and necessary condition, Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 64/2022 of 24 February 2022 stipulates that, in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens provided for in Articles 30-34, 38, 39, 41-44, and 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine may be restricted, and temporary restrictions on the rights and legitimate interests of legal entities may be introduced to the extent necessary to ensure the possibility of introducing and implementing the measures of the legal regime of martial law provided for in part one of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Legal Regime of Martial Law.’ At the same time, the Decree obliges the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to ensure that the UN Secretary-General and officials of foreign states are informed in the established manner about the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, about restrictions on human and civil rights and freedoms, which constitute a derogation from the obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and about the limits of these derogations and the reasons for adopting such a decision. The implementation of general mobilisation required legislative changes and the establishment of a system of relevant public bodies.

2. Changes in public administration

During wartime, there is an objective centralisation of power and an increase in the powers of public authorities, which allows for faster decision-making in critical situations. Thus, the President of Ukraine acts as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (he has this status permanently, but during wartime it becomes titular). The functions of day-to-day governance are taken over by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the National Security and Defence Council. The government continues to function but the role of the Ministry of Defence is strengthened. The Armed Forces and other military formations are given expanded powers to protect national security. Local authorities form defence councils and assist the military command in introducing and implementing measures under the legal regime of martial law.

3. Financial and economic changes

Certain economic activities are being frozen, and budget expenditures are being revised in favour of defence and recovery. At the level of constitutional doctrine, enhanced social protection for military personnel has been introduced. All these and other factors have a significant impact on the legal status of individuals and, consequently, on the future functioning of Ukraine as a constitutional state, where the activities of the state are limited by human rights.

An important guarantee for the realisation of constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens is Article 64 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which stipulates that such rights and freedoms cannot be restricted, except in cases provided for by the Constitution of Ukraine. This provision allows for the establishment of certain restrictions on rights and freedoms in times of war or emergency, specifying the duration of such restrictions.

At the same time, in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, a High Contracting Party may, in time of war, take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention, and in the event of exercising this right, it must inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the measures taken. Such notification shall be made by letter, accompanied by copies of the legal documents under which the emergency measures will be implemented.

Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine periodically and regularly sends to international organisations information prepared by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on derogations from its obligations under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Covenant, including on the extension of martial law. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the Covenant, Ukraine has been providing such information since 2015 in connection with the Russian Federation’s armed aggression against Ukraine. This regular practice has continued since February 2022 in connection with the start of a full-scale invasion and the introduction of martial law in Ukraine. In April 2024, Ukraine once again clarified the list of existing restrictions and reduced it. This notification was the twentieth since 2015. All notifications made by Ukraine regarding the derogation from its obligations are publicly available.

The notification itself does not introduce emergency measures but is only a means of informing the Council of Europe of the possibility of their introduction in accordance with the national legislation of the High Contracting Party.

In accordance with Article 3 of the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 64/2022 of 24 February 2022 ‘On the introduction of martial law in Ukraine’ in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens, provided for in Articles 30–34, 38, 39, 41–44, and 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine may be restricted, and temporary restrictions on the rights and legitimate interests of persons provided for in Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine No. 389 of 12 May 2015 ‘On the Legal Regime of Martial Law’ may be introduced.

Considering the above and in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention, the Council of Europe was informed about the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the provisions of legislation that apply during this regime, the measures that may be applied by the authorised bodies during martial law, and a list of articles of the Convention and its Appendices was provided, from which, in connection with the possible application of the above measures, a corresponding derogation is permitted, namely: Articles 3, 8(3), 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 of the Covenant, as well as Articles 4 (3), 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16 of the Convention, Articles 1, 2, 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

Considering the requirement to notify such measures without delay, the above information on the introduction of martial law and the corresponding derogation was prepared and sent to the Council of Europe as soon as possible after the introduction of martial law. It was posted on the Council of Europe website on 1 March 2022.

According to the explanation to Article 15 of the Convention, derogation from obligations does not necessarily mean that the State will be unable to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Convention. In practice, when declaring a derogation from its obligations, the Contracting State usually stated that the measures it was taking ‘may’ entail a derogation from its obligations under the Convention.

Possible derogation is also provided for in Article 4 of the Covenant, which states that in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the Covenant only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not entail discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

This provision shall not constitute grounds for any derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18. Any State Party to the Covenant which avails itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Covenant, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons for its decision. It shall also notify, through the same intermediary, the date on which it ceases such derogation.

Thus, key human rights instruments allow for temporary derogations by states from their obligations to ensure certain human rights, subject to certain criteria.

On 21 May 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution ‘On Approval of the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ’On Ukraine’s Derogation from Certain Obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.

In this resolution, the Ukrainian parliament approved the Statement on the withdrawal from certain obligations specified in paragraph 3 of Article 2, Articles 9, 12, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention for the period until the complete cessation of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, namely until the withdrawal of all illegal armed formations controlled, managed and financed by the Russian Federation, Russian occupation troops and their military equipment from the territory of Ukraine, the restoration of Ukraine’s full control over its state border, and the restoration of constitutional order in the occupied territory of Ukraine.

In this Statement, among other things, Ukraine noted that the Russian Federation, as a state that has effectively occupied and controls part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is responsible for respecting and protecting human rights in these territories under both international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

The Statement also emphasises that the ongoing armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, accompanied by the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by both the regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and illegal armed formations controlled and financed by the Russian Federation, constitutes a public danger that threatens the life of the nation within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Covenant and Article 15(1) of the Convention. To ensure the vital interests of society and the State in the context of armed aggression, public authorities are forced to take decisions that constitute a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under the Covenant and the Convention.

In addition to such declarations, the Statement sets out obvious measures that formally constitute a derogation from international human rights standards but appear to be objective and necessary in the circumstances. For example, it states that on 12 August 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ’On Combating Terrorism‘ regarding the preventive detention of individuals involved in terrorist activities in the area of the anti-terrorist operation for a period exceeding 72 hours’.

In accordance with this Law, in the area of a long-term anti-terrorist operation, as an exception, individuals involved in terrorist activities may be preventively detained for a period exceeding 72 hours but not more than 30 days, with the consent of the prosecutor and without a court order. The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a certain departure by Ukraine from its obligations under Article 2(3), Articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention.

At the same time, the application of such provisions exclusively during anti-terrorist operations in exceptional cases with the aim of preventing serious crimes is justified by the acute danger caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups supported by the Russian Federation.

In addition, it is noted that on 12 August 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Special Regime of Pre-trial Investigation in Conditions of Martial Law, State of Emergency or in the Area of Anti-Terrorist Operations’.

In accordance with this Law, a special regime of pre-trial investigation is introduced for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation, according to which the powers of investigating judges, as defined by the current Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, are temporarily transferred to the relevant prosecutors, who acquire additional procedural rights. The special regime for pre-trial investigation applies exclusively in the area of anti-terrorist operations and provided that the investigating judge is unable to exercise the powers defined by the current Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Article 2(3), Articles 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

At the same time, the absence of functioning courts in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups supported by the Russian Federation, is the limit that allows the powers of investigating judges to be transferred to prosecutors in conditions that threaten the existence of the nation.

Through this Statement, Ukraine also informed the international community that on 12 August 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On the Administration of Justice and Criminal Proceedings in Connection with the Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations’.

In accordance with this Law, for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation, the territorial jurisdiction of court cases subject to the jurisdiction of courts located in the area of the anti-terrorist operation and the jurisdiction of criminal offences committed in the area of the anti-terrorist operation were changed in cases where it was impossible to conduct a pre-trial investigation. The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a certain departure from Ukraine’s obligations under Article 14 of the Covenant and Article 6 of the Convention. At the same time, the actual absence of functioning courts and pre-trial investigation bodies in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups supported by the Russian Federation, is the limit that allows for a change in the territorial jurisdiction of court cases and the jurisdiction of criminal offences in conditions that threaten the existence of the nation.

Ukraine also reported that on 3 February 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On Military-Civilian Administrations’.

In accordance with this Law, military-civilian administrations were established as temporary state bodies operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of the Anti-Terrorist Centre under the Security Service of Ukraine and designed to ensure the implementation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, ensure the security and normalisation of the population’s life, law and order, participating in countering sabotage and terrorist acts, and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in the area of the anti-terrorist operation.

This Law grants military-civilian administrations the authority, in particular, to establish restrictions on staying on the streets and in other public places at certain times of the day without specific documents; temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets, roads, and areas; organise the verification of identity documents of individuals and, if necessary, the inspection of belongings, vehicles, luggage and cargo, office premises and citizens’ homes, except for the restrictions established by the Constitution of Ukraine.

The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Articles 9, 12 and 17 of the International Covenant, Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

At the same time, the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation with the aim of averting the threat of destruction of the nation by armed aggression by the Russian Federation is the limit that allows for the temporary restriction of freedom of movement and the right to respect for private life.

Over the following periods, Ukraine repeatedly informed the Council of Europe and other international institutions about the state of affairs regarding human rights compliance during the armed aggression. For example, the Note of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine dated 29 November 2019, registered by the General Secretariat on 3 December 2019, contained a notification and partial withdrawal of the derogation.

With this Note, Ukraine informed the international community that, given that the Russian Federation is committing a crime of aggression against Ukraine and temporarily occupying part of its territory with armed formations of the Russian Federation, on 18 January 2018, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On the Specifics of State Policy to Ensure Ukraine’s State Sovereignty over the Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions’ (hereinafter referred to as Law No. 2268), which aims to define the specifics of state policy to ensure Ukraine’s state sovereignty in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. To ensure Ukraine’s state sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, state bodies and their officials, acting on the grounds, within the powers and in the manner provided for by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, shall take measures to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation (Article 5.3 of Law No. 2268). Measures to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation in the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions include measures to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which are carried out by security and defence bodies, other public bodies of Ukraine, and their officials (Article 7.1 of Law No. 2268).

The initiation and refinement of measures to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are determined by separate decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Article 8.3 of Law No. 2268). The President of Ukraine, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, by his Decree No. 116 of 30 April 2018, in accordance with Article 8. 3 of Law No. 2268, enacted the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the NSDC) on the commencement of national security and defence measures to repel and deter the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Forces Operation (JFO)).

In accordance with Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Combating Terrorism’ and Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 166 of 30 April 2018, a decision was made to terminate the anti-terrorist operation in connection with the launch of the JFO.

Thus, on 30 April 2018, the anti-terrorist operation was terminated and measures were initiated to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (JFO).

The Note also states that, in accordance with Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Military-Civilian Administrations’ (as amended by Law No. 2268), military-civilian administrations in the area of the Joint Forces Operation, with the consent of the Commander of the Joint Forces, have the right to:

1) impose restrictions on staying on the streets and other public places without documents;

2) temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets, roads and areas of territory;

3) organise the verification of documents certifying the identity of individuals and, if necessary, the inspection of belongings, vehicles, luggage and cargo, office premises and citizens’ homes, except for the restrictions established by the Constitution of Ukraine.

In security zones adjacent to combat zones, a special procedure is in place that grants security and defence agencies and other public bodies of Ukraine the special powers necessary to carry out this operation (Article 8.2 of Law No. 2268).

To ensure the vital interests of society and the state during the period of repelling armed aggression in security zones adjacent to combat zones, military personnel, law enforcement officers and persons specified in Article 8 of Law No. 2268 who are involved in the implementation of the JFO measures in accordance with the Constitution and legislation of Ukraine, have the right to:

1) use weapons and special means in cases of extreme necessity against persons who have committed or are committing offences or other actions that impede the fulfilment of the lawful requirements of persons involved in the implementation of the JFO measures, or actions related to unauthorised attempts to enter the zone where these measures are being implemented;

2) detain and deliver to the National Police of Ukraine the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this part;

3) check documents certifying the identity of citizens and officials, and in the absence of documents, detain them to establish their identity;

4) conduct personal searches of citizens, searches of items in their possession, vehicles, and items they are transporting;

5) temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets and roads, prevent vehicles and citizens from entering certain areas and facilities, evict citizens from certain areas and facilities, and the vehicles;

6) enter residential and other premises, land plots belonging to citizens, areas, and premises of enterprises, institutions and organisations to inspect vehicles for the purposes of conducting environmental protection;

7) use for official purposes means of communication and vehicles, including special ones, belonging to citizens (with their consent), enterprises, institutions and organisations, except for vehicles of diplomatic, consular and other missions of foreign states and international organisations.

The presence of individuals not involved in such activities in the area of the Joint Forces Operation may be temporarily restricted by the commander of the Joint Forces for the duration of such activities (Article 12.4 of Law No. 2268). The implementation of these measures may entail a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Articles 9, 12, and 17 of the Covenant, Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 thereto, and necessitates the continuation of such derogation.

In the context of war and in order to ensure human rights, it was necessary to implement certain organisational measures in the field of justice. Thus, in accordance with Article 2.8 of Law No. 2268, the procedure for territorial jurisdiction of cases falling within the jurisdiction of courts located in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions for the duration of the Joint Forces Operation is established in accordance with Law of Ukraine No. 1632-VII of 12 August 2014 ‘On the Administration of Justice and Criminal Proceedings in Connection with the Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations’ (hereinafter referred to as Law No. 1632).

As stated in the aforementioned Article 2.8 of Law No. 2268, Law No. 1632 defines measures for legal regulation and aims to ensure access to justice for citizens and legal entities.

In accordance with Article 1 of Law No. 1632, due to the inability of certain courts to administer justice, the territorial jurisdiction of court cases is changed, and civil cases, administrative offences, administrative cases, commercial and criminal proceedings are considered by local and appellate courts as determined by the President of the Supreme Court. Issues relating to the competence of the investigating judge in criminal proceedings at the pre-trial investigation stage and carried out in the area of the Joint Forces Operation, in the event of the impossibility of administering justice, shall be considered by investigating judges of local courts of general jurisdiction as determined by the President of the Supreme Court (Article 1.2 of Law No. 1632).

The issue of access to justice in territories not controlled by Ukraine was considered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the cases of Khlebik v. Ukraine and Tsezar and Others v. Ukraine, in which the ECtHR found that the applicants’ inability to come to court at their place of residence did not violate the essence of the right of access to court and ruled that there had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

In paragraph 52 of the judgment in the case of Tsezar and Others v. Ukraine (applications nos. 73590/14, 73593/14, 73820/14, 4635/15, 5200/15, 5206/15 and 7289/15 of 13 February 2018), the ECtHR recognised that state authorities may sometimes face certain difficulties in ensuring the proper functioning of the courts in certain regions due to ongoing hostilities in those regions. Nevertheless, the Court noted that state authorities must take certain measures to resolve the problem, for example, by granting special permission to file lawsuits in courts in another region of the state. Thus, the ECtHR does not consider the above measures to be a violation by Ukraine of its obligations under Article 6 of the Convention.

In a communication contained in verbal note No. 31011/32-119-42777 from the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe, dated 17 June 2022, Ukraine transmitted to the Secretary General, on behalf of the Government of Ukraine, further information on measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention in accordance with Law of Ukraine No. 2201 of 14 April 2022 ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine on improving the procedure for conducting criminal proceedings under martial law’, which sets out a new version of Article 615 ’Special regime for criminal proceedings under martial law’ of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

In accordance with this law, during martial law:

– if there is no objective possibility of continuing or completing a pre-trial investigation and referring the case to court with an indictment, a motion for the application of coercive measures of a medical or educational nature, a motion for exemption from criminal liability – the term of the pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings shall be suspended on the basis of a reasoned decision of the prosecutor, setting out the relevant circumstances, and shall be resumed if the grounds for suspension cease to exist. Prior to the suspension of the pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor is obliged to decide on the extension of the period of detention (subparagraph 3 of part 1 of Article 615);

– if there is no objective possibility of performing procedural actions within the time limits specified in Article 220 ‘Consideration of motions during pre-trial investigation’, Article 221 ‘Familiarisation with the materials of the pre-trial investigation before its completion’, Article 304 ‘Time limit for filing a complaint against a decision, action or inaction of an investigator or prosecutor, his return or refusal to open proceedings in a case’, Article 306 ‘Procedure for considering complaints against decisions, actions or inaction of an investigator or prosecutor during a pre-trial investigation’, Article 308 ‘Appeals regarding failure to comply with reasonable time limits’, Article 376 ‘Announcement of a court decision’, Article 395 ‘Procedure and time limits for appeals’, Article 426 ‘Procedure and time limits for cassation appeals’ of the Criminal Procedure Code, – such procedural actions shall be carried out immediately, if possible, but no later than 15 days after the termination or cancellation of martial law (subparagraph 5 of part 1 of Article 615);

– if there are cases of detention of a person without a ruling by an investigating judge or court, as specified in Article 208 ‘Detention by an authorised official’ of the Criminal Procedure Code, or there are reasonable circumstances indicating that evasion is possible in order to avoid criminal liability of a person suspected of committing a crime – an authorised official has the right to detain such a person without a decision of an investigating judge, court or resolution of the head of the prosecution authorities. The period of detention without a decision of an investigating judge, court or resolution of the head of the prosecution authorities during martial law may not exceed 216 hours from the moment of detention, as determined in accordance with Article 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code (subparagraph 6 of part 1 of Article 615);

– testimony obtained during the interrogation of a witness or victim, including the simultaneous interrogation of two or more persons, in criminal proceedings conducted under martial law may be used as evidence in court only if the course and results of such interrogations were recorded using available technical means of video recording. Testimony obtained during the interrogation of a suspect, including the simultaneous interrogation of two or more persons who have already been interrogated, in criminal proceedings conducted under martial law, may be used as evidence in court only if the defence counsel participated in such interrogation and the course and results of the interrogation were recorded using available technical means of video recording (subparagraph 11 of paragraph 1 of Article 615);

– the investigator or prosecutor shall ensure the participation of the defence counsel in a specific procedural action, including, if the defence counsel is unable to appear, through the use of technical means (video, audio) to ensure the remote participation of the defence counsel. The investigator or prosecutor shall ensure the participation of an interpreter to translate the explanations, testimony or documents of the suspect or victim at the earliest opportunity. If circumstances prevent the participation of an interpreter in criminal proceedings, the investigator or prosecutor shall have the right to personally translate explanations, testimony or documents if he or she speaks one of the languages of the suspect or victim (subparagraph 12 of part 1 of Article 615).

The provisions of Article 87 ‘Inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of a substantial violation of human rights and freedoms’ and Article 95 ‘Testimony’ of the Criminal Procedure Code shall apply considering the specific features set out in Article 615 of the Criminal Procedure Code (as amended by Law No. 2201).

The provisions of Article 87, ‘Inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of a substantial violation of human rights and freedoms’, and Article 95, ‘Testimony’, of the Criminal Procedure Code shall apply, considering the specific features set forth in Article 615 of the Criminal Procedure Code (as amended by Law No. 2201). The application of Law No. 2201 necessitates a departure from Articles 2 (paragraph 3), 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

On 5 April 2024, the derogation contained in Note No. 31011/32-119-46585 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine was partially withdrawn regarding Articles 4.3, 9, 13, 14 and 16 of the Convention.

In particular, it states that in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens provided for in Articles 30-34, 38, 39, 41, 44 and 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine may be temporarily restricted for the duration of martial law; temporary restrictions on the rights of individuals may also be introduced to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of the measures of the legal regime of martial law provided for in part one of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Legal Regime of Martial Law’.

The above-mentioned articles of the Constitution, which may be subject to restrictions, guarantee the inviolability of the home (Article 30); the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations and other communications (Article 31); non-interference in personal and family life (Article 32); freedom of movement, free choice of place of residence, the right to freely leave and return to the territory of Ukraine (Article 33); the right to freedom of thought and speech, free expression of views and beliefs, and the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information (Article 34); the right to participate in the management of public affairs and referendums, to freely elect and be elected to state and local authorities, and equal access to public service (Article 38); the right to hold assemblies, meetings, marches and demonstrations, as well as the right to strike (Articles 39, 44); the right to own, use and dispose of one’s property (Article 41); the right to entrepreneurship and work (Articles 42, 43); the right to education (Article 53).

In areas where martial law has been imposed, the military command may implement measures of the legal regime of martial law, in particular: compulsorily expropriate property that is privately or communally owned for the needs of the state under martial law, in accordance with the procedure established by law and issue relevant documents in this regard; introduce a curfew (a ban on being on the streets and in other public places during certain periods of time without specially issued passes and certificates) in accordance with the established procedure; establish a special regime for entry and exit in accordance with the established procedure, restrict the freedom of movement of citizens, foreigners and stateless persons, as well as the movement of vehicles; inspect belongings, vehicles, luggage and cargo, office premises and citizens’ homes in accordance with the established procedure, except restrictions established by the Constitution of Ukraine; prohibit peaceful assemblies, rallies, marches, demonstrations, and other mass events; establish, in accordance with the established procedure, a ban, or restriction on the choice of place of stay or residence of persons in the territory where martial law is in force; prohibit citizens who are on military or special registration from changing their place of residence without proper permission; establish a military housing tax for individuals and legal entities.

The possibility of applying the above measures entails a departure from the obligations provided for in Articles 12, 17, 19, 21, 25 of the Covenant and Articles 8, 10, 11 of the Convention, Articles 1, 2, 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

Derogation from the requirements under the previously specified Articles 3, 8(3), 9, 13, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27 of the Covenant and Articles 4(3), 9, 13, 14, 16 of the Convention is repealed.

Thus, in Ukraine’s declaration of derogation from certain obligations under the Convention, submitted on 4 April 2024, the scope of the derogation was revised and reduced. This is important because, in the context of ongoing armed aggression, Ukraine is consciously renewing its obligations and increasing the scope of the rights and freedoms it can guarantee.

In Verbal Note No. 31011/32-119-9327 of the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe dated 27 January 2025, updated information was provided on measures to derogate from its obligations under Article 2, paragraph 3, Articles 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. It is reported that, in accordance with Decision No. 8-r(II)/2024 of the Constitutional Court of 18 July 2024, part six of Article 615 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine ceased to have effect three months after the date of adoption of this Decision.

This part provided that in the event of martial law, if the term of a court decision on detention expired, and it was impossible for the court to consider the extension of the term of detention in accordance with the procedure established by the CPC, the preventive measure in the form of detention would be considered extended until the relevant issue was resolved by the court, but for no longer than two months.

At the same time, other provisions of this article, the possibility of applying which became the basis for the derogation, remain in force.

Thus, Article 615 of the CPC, considering the above changes, provides that in the event of the introduction of martial law:

– if it is not possible to draw up procedural documents on the conduct of investigative (search) or other procedural actions, the recording shall be carried out by technical means, with the subsequent drawing up of a protocol no later than 72 hours after the completion of these actions;

– if it is not possible to continue the proceedings, complete the pre-trial investigation and submit an indictment, a motion for the application of coercive measures of a medical or educational nature, a motion for the release of a person from criminal liability to the court, the term of the pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings shall be suspended because of a reasoned decision of the prosecutor stating the relevant circumstances and shall be subject to continuation if the grounds for suspension no longer exist. Prior to the suspension of the pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor is obliged to decide on the extension of the period of detention;

– if it is not possible to perform procedural actions within the time limits specified in the CPC, such actions shall be performed immediately, where possible, but no later than 15 days after the termination or cancellation of martial law;

– if it is impossible to hold a preliminary court hearing, the preventive measure in the form of detention chosen by the investigating judge or the head of the prosecution authorities during the pre-trial investigation shall be considered extended until it takes effect. The issue shall be resolved at a preliminary court hearing, but for no longer than two months;

– testimony obtained during the interrogation of a suspect in criminal proceedings may be used as evidence in court if the defence lawyer participated in the interrogation and its course and results were recorded by technical means of video recording. Video recording of the testimony of witnesses and victims obtained during the interrogation is also permitted;

– the investigator, prosecutor, and investigator are obliged to ensure: (i) the remote participation of the defence lawyer in a specific procedural action using technical means of video and audio communication if it is impossible for him to appear in person; (ii) the participation of an interpreter at the earliest opportunity in the translation of explanations, statements, or documents of the suspect or victim. If circumstances prevent the interpreter from participating, the investigator, inquiry officer or prosecutor is entitled to perform the relevant translation personally if they know one of the languages spoken by the suspect or victim.

The possibility of applying the above-mentioned provisions of Article 615 of the Code of Criminal Procedure necessitates a continued derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Article 2(3), Articles 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of fair trial and legal protection, including the principle of ne bis in idem.

Returning to the characterisation of Ukrainian constitutionalism during the war, we note that its very essence as a system of rights that limits the arbitrariness of the state is being seriously tested.

On the one hand, the state of political relations has an objective tendency towards the establishment of autocracy (at least during the war), while on the other hand, the mechanisms of the state and civil society institutions continue to perform their roles (albeit with varying degrees of effectiveness). Terms such as ‘military constitutionalism’ or ‘war constitutionalism’ are being introduced into scientific discourse as a special mechanism for the exercise of state power during wartime, which allows for derogations from the constitutional principles of the functioning of power provided for by the Constitution in peacetime.

In other words, war becomes a basis for rethinking those values whose inviolability in peacetime is obvious and beyond doubt, values that are a qualitative feature of the liberal human-centred approach to the exercise of public power.

To a certain extent, these concepts echo the doctrine of ‘militant democracy’, which was first proposed by the renowned German constitutionalist K. Löwenstein in his 1937 article ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights’. Describing the catastrophic situation with the dominance of totalitarian extremist regimes on the European continent, he called on democratic countries to defend themselves, which he briefly characterised with the words ‘fire must be fought with fire’. Its essence lies in banning political forces and movements of a fascist, communist or extremist nature (whose activities are aimed at supporting or promoting the suppression of citizens’ rights and freedoms, contributing to national, racial, class or religious hatred, etc.) and developing other instruments for the self-defence of democracy.

The War has threatened not only Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also the very foundations of constitutionalism. Therefore, the mechanisms of modern constitutionalism must be flexible. Derogations from commitments to ensure human rights is one way to ensure such flexibility.

However, derogation from obligations does not necessarily mean that the State is unable to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Convention. In fact, in practice, when declaring a derogation from its obligations, the State usually states that the measures it is taking “may” involve a derogation from its obligations under the Convention.

For this reason, whenever an applicant complains that his or her Convention rights have been violated during a period of derogation, the Court first examines whether the measures taken can be justified under the fundamental provisions of the Convention; and only if they cannot be justified in this way does the Court proceed to determine whether the derogation was lawful (A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 161; Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), § 15).

Ukraine’s experience with derogation is unique in its scope and duration, as is the war in Ukraine for the European continent. The practice of the ECtHR, which will inevitably arise in the future in connection with the derogations from the obligations under the Convention made during the war, will give impetus to the development of European constitutionalism in extraordinary circumstances.

Forced displacement of Ukrainian children remains widespread in territories that are temporarily occupied or under constant shelling. At the same time, there is still no single transparent algorithm or mechanism that allows Ukrainian children deported to Russia to be returned. Another pressing issue is the lack of a systematic state reintegration programme for returned children, which should provide long-term support and assistance to the child and their family.

Unfortunately, no significant changes have taken place in the context of deinstitutionalisation. The newly adopted strategy to ensure every child in Ukraine has the right to grow up in a family environment carries a significant risk of non-implementation due to a lack of state funding and often declaratory nature of the commitments made. The development of social protection in local communities also remains very slow. Some communities, especially those with small budgets, cannot afford to hire even one social worker or specialist for the children’s needs. At the same time, those communities that do have such specialists or even social service centres and child welfare services are also unable to fully perform their functions due to inadequate staffing levels and an increase in socially vulnerable groups.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines six grave crimes against children: murder or mutilation, recruitment or enlistment in the military, attacks on schools and hospitals, rape, abduction/transfer and denial of access to humanitarian assistance. Due to Russia’s massive shelling of Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, children are being killed and maimed. There is evidence of a physical and sexual violence against children in the temporarily occupied territories. Children are being militarised and recruited into the war, and Ukrainians are being deported to Russia.

As of December 2024, approximately, 737000 Ukrainian children are internally displaced persons as a result of the hostilities. Another 1,7 million are refugees, many of whom have been separated from their parents. As of 31 March 2025, 606 children have been killed, 1846 have been injured to varying degrees, and 19 cases of sexual violence against children have been confirmed.

As a result of targeted attacks, as well as indiscriminate attacks, Russian military troops are destroying intentionally residential buildings, schools, hospitals, sport courts, historical and cultural sites. Even after the War ends, it will be impossible to return to a significant number of cities, towns and villages, as the infrastructure there has been virtually destroyed.

In three years of full-scale War, 236000 residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed, including 209000 private homes, 27000 apartment buildings and 600 dormitories. More than 4000 educational institutions have also been destroyed or damaged, including 229 schools, 110 kindergartens and 97 universities. Hospitals, clinics and other medical facilities are regularly targeted. In total, 1554 medical facilities have been damaged, including 515 hospitals, and 465 outpatient clinics. 3921 cultural facilities, 399 religious buildings and 343 sports complexes have also been damaged. There have been attacks on energy infrastructure and water supply facilities, causing Ukrainians to experience problems with electricity, water and heat supply, as well as communications, which worsens the conditions for the care and upbringing of children.

Russia is actively using prohibited weapons on the territory of Ukraine against the civilian population. Such weapons cause more serious injuries and damage than other types of ammunition. Cluster munitions, phosphorus and thermobaric weapons, butterfly mines, etc. are particularly dangerous. Over the three years of the War, more than 6900 cases of Russian occupiers using ammunition containing dangerous chemicals have also been confirmed. According to the Mine Action Centre, about 30% of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, and more than 139000 km2 of land and 14000 km2 of water bodies need to be surveyed by demining units.

In the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, there is extensive evidence of the occupiers using civilian facilities as military headquarters and/or warehouses for military equipment and ammunition. In conditions where children are forced to attend schools and kindergartens in the temporarily occupied territories and, when necessary, visit medical facilities, this means that the civilian population is being used as human shields during military operations. It also means that the population has no proper access to medical, social and educational services, which only exacerbates the humanitarian crisis in these territories.

The Russian Federation continues to involve Ukrainian children in the War. In particular, Russian special services use mobile gaming applications and establish contact through social networks and messengers to recruit minors. Children are usually offered monetary rewards for performing various tasks, such as photographing the area, monitoring certain objects, posting advertisements, etc. For more serious tasks (delivering bags with explosives, setting cars on fire, etc.), psychological pressure and manipulation are also used. As of the end of March 2025, the prosecutor’s office had opened 173 criminal cases on the recruitment of Ukrainian children for subversive activities.

For example, in August 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine and the National Police detained two underage Russian agents who, on orders from the Russian Federation, carried out a terrorist attack in Zhytomyr on 5 August. The attack involved the detonation of a homemade explosive device in one of the neighbourhoods of the capital of the region.  One man was killed and another was hospitalised in serious condition. The investigation established that the attack was planned by a 17-year-old student at a local vocational school and her peer, who had been recruited by the enemy. Both came to the attention of the aggressor while seeking for money on Telegram channels[1]/

In addition, Russia continues to expand its network of so called ‘military-patriotic education’ programmes for young people in the Russian Federation and in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine with the aim of waging a long-term war against Ukraine and possible future armed conflicts with Western countries.

As of early 2025, Russian invaders had forced nearly 60,000 children from temporarily occupied settlements in the Luhansk region, about 1,800 children from the Zaporizhzhia region, and 45,000 children from Crimea to join propaganda military-patriotic movements. In just eight months of 2025, Russia took almost 11000 Ukrainian children to 164 institutions. Moreover, the programme in such camps is becoming increasingly militarised[2].

The militarisation of children is actively taking place from school age onwards. One example is last year’s publication of the first textbook for teaching drone operation in school labour classes for pupils in grades 8-9. Another example is the active manufacture of weapon parts for specific military units by pupils in schools in the Crimea.

Forced displacement remains widespread in territories that are temporarily occupied or under constant shelling. Children are often forcibly sent to ‘re-education camps’ in Russian-controlled territories, where propaganda and indoctrination are used to try to change their perceptions of their identity, Ukraine, and the course of the war. Children in such camps are forced to listen to the anthem and express support for Russia. Teenagers are often issued Russian passports, which makes it much more difficult for them to return home. The militarisation of boys and attempts to recruit them into the Russian army are also widespread. In addition, the conditions in which children are kept in such camps are unfit for human habitation. The Russians ignore the basic needs of children in terms of hygiene, medical care, adequate nutrition, etc.

According to statements by representatives of the occupation administrations, during the summer of 2024, 40,000 Ukrainian children were taken to ‘re-education camps’ as part of so called ‘Useful Holidays’ project. This is almost twice as many as last year. Children from the occupied territories went on propaganda trips to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don and Tula as part of the ‘Cultural Map 4+85’ and ‘Route for Youth’ programmes, ‘Route for Youth’ and ‘University Changes,’ and also took part in a series of ‘patriotic’ events, sometimes more than 8,000 kilometres from home.

As of March 31, 2025, Ukraine has confirmation of 19,546 deported Ukrainian children who were illegally taken to Russia, Belarus, and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The number of displaced children is likely to be significantly higher, but it is currently impossible to estimate the scale due to the lack of access to the temporarily occupied territories and the ongoing full-scale war. According to open sources cited by Russia, 744,000 children have been taken away. So far, joint efforts by civil society organizations and the government have managed to return 1,256 children.

A positive step towards preventing and returning deported Ukrainian children was the development of the White Paper “Protecting Children from Forced Displacement and Deportation” by the International Expert Group BringKidsBack UA. The book consistently debunks the Kremlin’s myths about so-called “evacuation” and, through international law, describes how the Russian Federation is systematically committing the crime of deportation and forced displacement of Ukrainian children. It strengthens Ukraine’s ability to develop effective international legal mechanisms for the return of abducted children and to ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration.

The regulatory framework for registering deported and forcibly displaced children in Ukraine has also been improved. In particular, in the fall of 2024, the Law of Ukraine “On the Registration of Information on Damage Caused to the Personal Non-Property Rights of Individuals as a Result of the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine” was adopted, which provides for the creation and functioning of a register of information on deported children.

The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1240 of October 29, 2024, which defines the mechanism for the creation, maintenance, and access to the Register of Information on Children Deported or Forcibly Displaced in Connection with the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and its use, came into force. An Interagency Commission on the Verification of Information on Children Deported or Forcibly Displaced in Connection with the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was established.

Furthermore, in October 2024, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Implementation Law No. 4012-IX in connection with the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and amendments thereto, according to which the deportation of children is now considered as genocide.

At the same time, there is still no single effective mechanism that allows Ukrainian children deported to Russia to be returned. The practice of returning children varies greatly – with the help of other countries, international organizations, through the offices of Ombudsmen, and often privately, when the parents or guardians themselves travel to the Russian Federation to pick up their children.

Another pressing issue is the lack of a state-run system for reintegrating kids who come back from the temporarily occupied territories, Russia, and Belarus, which should include long-term support and assistance for the kids and their families. Currently, there are only initiatives from the civil society sector to develop specific concepts for such reintegration in Ukraine, which include the involvement of social services, educational institutions, and the community as a whole in working with returned children. In fact, such children are currently cared for by the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights and involved civil society organizations, which, where possible, meet the children’s needs for humanitarian, psychological, social, legal, educational, and other types of assistance. At the same time, with a significant return of deported children, the existing practice of assistance will not be able to cope with the load. The state has to some extent become involved in addressing this problem with the adoption of the Procedure for the identification, return, support, and reintegration of children deported or forcibly displaced as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which requires that all returned children be placed exclusively in family-based care.

As of March 31, 2025, according to the Office of General Prosecutor, a total of 161,900 crimes of aggression and war crimes committed by the Russian Federation are under investigation in Ukraine. As of September 2024, about 4,000 criminal proceedings are related to crimes against children. The largest number of proceedings are in the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kherson regions. They concern cases of abduction and deprivation of liberty, forced deportation, and sexual violence. Fifty-four people have been notified of suspicion of war crimes against children. Investigations have been completed in 44 cases and the cases have been referred to court. Thirty-one war criminals have been convicted.

Among the positive steps taken, it is worth noting the pilot projects in the field of juvenile justice. In November 2024, a pilot project was launched in Ukraine to specialize judges in family and children’s cases. Its goal is to introduce child-friendly justice. Nearly 60 judges will undergo training. The pilot project is being implemented by the All-Ukrainian Public Center “Volunteer” in cooperation with the Civil Cassation Court within the Supreme Court and the Interagency Coordination Council on Juvenile Justice, with the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Ukraine. It is expected that the consideration of cases by specialized judges with in-depth knowledge of children’s rights and the age and psychological characteristics of children’s development will ensure the proper protection of the rights and well-being of every child who comes into contact with the justice system, considering their needs and life situation. It may also significantly speed up the consideration of the cases related to ensuring the right of the child to a family.

In addition, another pilot project initiated by the Interagency Coordination Council on Juvenile Justice, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, and the All-Ukrainian Public Center “Volunteer” with the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Ukraine has proven effective. Since autumn 2024, the project has been operating throughout Ukraine. It provides for the establishment of a register of psychologists who are involved in criminal proceedings involving children. The database greatly facilitates the search for the necessary specialists in the regions and ensures that the best interests of the child are respected during proceedings involving children.

Training for juvenile investigators remains essential, especially in relation to war crimes. Currently, there are almost no such investigators, and all law enforcement agencies are generally overburdened, with hundreds or even thousands of cases to handle at the same time.

It should also be noted that in early 2025, an important and positive decision for Ukraine was the appointment by the Council of Europe of a Special Representative on Ukrainian Children to draw attention to the problems they face, as well as to standards and initiatives aimed at supporting them. Her powers also include coordinating international cooperation and interaction with structures such as the Register of Damages and the Advisory Group on Children in Ukraine.

A detailed picture of administrative practice of abduction and transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia is presented in the judgement in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia[3]. What is important that the ECtHR considered the period starting from 2014 for the needs of a broader picture of crimes committed by Russian agents or other persons under the control of Russian agents.

The Court found undisputed that in the summer of 2014, three groups of a total of 85 residents of children’s homes in eastern Ukraine were escorted by armed “DPR” and “LPR” representatives across the Ukrainian-Russian border, on three separate dates and from different parts of the “DPR” and “LPR”[4].

The Court found undisputed that children from the “DPR”, the “LPR” and subsequently from other occupied territory were removed to the Russian Federation or to other occupied areas in Ukraine, separated from their legal caregivers and prevented from reuniting with them. Indeed, the evidence establishes clearly that there were such transfers in the “DPR” and the “LPR” shortly before the invasion, as purported “evacuation” measures.

In the following months, countless children from institutions and children attending holiday camps were transferred to Russia from occupied territory and were subsequently unable to return to their homes in Ukraine. Some were retained in holiday camps, while others were placed in foster care with Russian families across various regions in Russia and adopted once they acquired Russian nationality.

Numerous public statements by Russian officials do not dispute the mass removal of children from Ukraine and the ongoing presence of such children in Russia. The Commission of Inquiry was able to review the transfers of 195 such children. The “DPR authorities” themselves said that “all children previously in ‘DPR’ institutions” had been removed to Russia by July 2022. The Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights has claimed that 2,000 children arrived in Russia in February 2022 alone. The portal operated by the Ukrainian Government recorded that, by 30 September 2022 a total of 7,890 children had been removed from[5].

The Commission of Inquiry and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism mission experts concluded that in the Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv regions, the displacement of children was an organised process. Their reports concluded that the transfers were not justified by safety or medical reasons and lacked proper consent from the children’s legal caregivers. They further found that subsequent actions and omissions by the Russian authorities prevented the children’s reunification with their legal caregivers. The evidence shows that parents in Ukraine were not provided with information concerning their children’s location in Russia and that where contact was re-established it was often through coincidence or luck[6].

At the same time, Russian officials put in place dedicated legislative and policy measures for the removal and placement of Ukrainian children in Russia. Removal of allegedly orphaned Ukrainian children from Ukraine was carried out by the Russian armed forces and authorities, including by the Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights in person as well as by “DPR” and “LPR” armed groups, in coordination with the “DPR” and “LPR” “child protection authorities”. Once across the border, Russian authorities at federal and regional level accommodated the children in hospitals, social institutions or “camps” throughout. The trips were typically funded by Russia’s regional and republican governments, under the so-called “patronage” system. Official statements referred to the support of President Putin himself to the placement of Ukrainian children in Russian families[7].

The Russian Federation made it easier for Ukrainian children to acquire Russian citizenship and be adopted by Russian families. After 24 February 2022 children born in occupied territory were issued Russian birth certificates and Russian nationality. This practice was subsequently formalised with the annexation of the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in October 2022. Perceived to be Russian citizens, children from occupied territory in Ukraine could be adopted by Russian families from anywhere in Russia. The evidence indicates that they were listed for adoption or foster care in Russia[8].

It has been widely reported, and confirmed in the activity reports of her mandate, that the Russian Federation’s Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, spearheaded a wide range of initiatives aimed at transferring and accommodating Ukrainian children in the Russian Federation. She herself travelled to the Russian-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to coordinate the transfers and placements of children in Russian families. She also accompanied a group of children to Russia and reported on more groups of children being ready to travel to Russia for placement in Russian families. She further adopted a child from Mariupol herself. On 17 March 2023 a pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued arrest warrants for her and for President Putin, charging them with the war crime of unlawful deportation of children and that of unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation[9].

Finally, the Court concluded that there was the movement of numerous children across the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation between 2014 and 2018. It can be inferred from the regular presence of vehicles and personnel of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and the preparations for, and carrying out of, medical checks that the transfers were organised by the Russian Federation and involved significant logistical arrangements[10].

Evacuations may be carried out only in case of “imperative military reasons” or for the “safety of the population”; within the bounds of occupied territory unless impossible; and only temporarily. There are extensive procedural rules concerning the need for written consent from parents or legal guardians and the obligation to make arrangements to facilitate the return and reunification with their families of evacuated children. Changes in their personal status are prohibited.

However, the Russian Government has not provided evidence that the children’s removal from Ukraine in the circumstances complied with any of these provisions. There was nothing to show that any of the purported evacuations of children were carried out for the reasons provided for by international humanitarian law. It is also significant that the essence of the present complaint is that the children were transferred from occupied territory to the Russian Federation, which is in clear breach of international humanitarian law in the absence of evidence showing that transfer within occupied territory would have been impossible.

The Russian Government did not implement any measures to secure the return to Ukraine and the family reunification of children purportedly evacuated, and no such measures are described in the various reports before it.

On the contrary, numerous credible reports identify cases where Ukrainian children were themselves left to try to contact their parents, often with the manifest non-cooperation of the persons in whose custody they were. The policy put in place for the mass acquisition of Russian nationality by children in occupied areas after the 2022 invasion, in breach of international humanitarian law, was nothing less than the automatic imposition of Russian.

As a result, the Court concluded that, given the evidence of changes to nationality and adoption in the Russian Federation, the children’s transfer to Russia cannot be seen as a temporary measure. Considering these considerations, the children’s transfer from Ukraine to the Russian Federation would not appear to qualify as lawful “evacuation” under international humanitarian law.

Making conclusions to the analysed problems of the impact of the War on children, it is reasonable to draw the following recommendations:

1. To ensure that all crimes committed by Russian military personnel against Ukrainian children are recorded: murders, mutilations, cruel treatment of children, and others.

2. To engage international partners to monitor the situation of children who have been deported to Russia and their return to Ukraine or departure to third safe countries.

3. To apply child-friendly justice approaches, including training the necessary number of relevant specialists.

4. To standardise at the legislative level the juvenile specialisation of the police, prosecutors, judges, and probation services.

5. To develop a clear algorithm for the reintegration of children affected by the War, in particular those returned from deportation and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. 6. To disseminate recommendations for parents and educators on identifying potential risks of child recruitment and protecting children from negative influences.

[1] Oliinyk, T. (2025). Teenagers detained in Zhytomyr for blowing up two men on orders from Russia. Ukrainska Pravda. August 7, 2025. Source: www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/08/7/7525174

[2] Shurmakevich V. (2025) Only in 2025, the Russian Federation sent almost 11,000 Ukrainian children to re-education camps. Ukrainska Pravda. September 12, 2025. Source: https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/u-2025-roci-rosiyani-vivezli-do-taboriv-mayzhe-11-tisyach-ukrajinskih-ditey-310271/

[3] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025

[4] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1569.

[5] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1573.

[6] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1574.

[7] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1575.

[8] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1577.

[9] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1578.

[10] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1582.

Andrii Chernousov

PhD in Sociology, Vice-Chair (Kharkiv Institute for Social Research)