Accordingly, the very fact of the use of physical force, and in a number of cases its excessive use, raises the question of the legality and compliance with international standards of the practice of concealing their faces by TRC employees when carrying out coercive actions.

Here, we can leave aside the legal assessment of the legality of the detention of citizens by TRC employees as such. This issue has been sufficiently researched, and the answer is clear: TRC employees do not have such powers.

Instead, the key aspect is that the very fact of using physical force during the detention of persons transforms the legal status of TRC employees (who are, by their nature, military personnel) into a status functionally identical to that of law enforcement officers, as they effectively assume the relevant law enforcement powers.

In this regard, it is worth noting the provisions of Article 1 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by Resolution 34/169 of the UN General Assembly on December 17, 1979, according to which the term “law enforcement officials” covers all appointed or elected officials who exercise police powers, including the power to arrest or detain. Thus, when a TRC employee, while in the status of a military serviceman, resorts to detention with the use of physical force, this indicates that he has effectively assumed the powers of law enforcement officials within the meaning of the aforementioned international act, which, in turn, raises questions both about the legality of such actions and about legal responsibility for them.

At the same time, in the context of preventing torture and inhuman treatment, given the practice of detentions carried out by TRC employees, the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) are of particular importance. The relevant CPT standards contain an unambiguous requirement: every state agent — regardless of their institutional affiliation (police officer, prison service officer, or other state official) — who exercises powers to detain persons is required to wear clear and unambiguous means of identification. Such means may include an individual number, surname, or appropriate markings on the uniform or protective equipment (in particular, a helmet).

In cases where officials perform their duties wearing balaclavas or helmets that cover their faces, the relevant identification numbers must be of sufficient size to ensure the unimpeded identification of the specific official exercising the power of detention and using physical force.

Thus, even if the actions of TRC employees in detaining citizens are illegal in nature, the obligation to have clear and unambiguous means of identification on uniforms remains relevant and important. Compliance with this requirement is a necessary prerequisite for ensuring the prompt identification of a specific individual who has used force and, where there are grounds for doing so, bringing them to justice.

Here we would like to recall certain ECHR standards regarding the wearing of balaclavas by law enforcement officers.

The CPT would also like to express its misgivings about the practice of law enforcement officials wearing masks when apprehending persons […] since this will hamper the identification of those responsible if and when instances of ill-treatment arise. The Committee considers that only exceptional circumstances can justify measures to conceal the identity of law enforcement officials [carrying out their duties]. Where such measures are applied, appropriate safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that the officials concerned are accountable for their actions (e.g. by means of a clearly visible number on the uniform) (Estonia, 2007, para 15).

The CPT considers that appropriate safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that police officers may be identified and can be held accountable for their actions (e.g. by way of a clearly visible means of individual identification on the uniform, such as a name or a number). This concerns in particular those police officers wearing masks/balaclavas or other equipment that may hamper their identification. Such a requirement is also likely to have a preventive effect and significantly reduce the risk of excessive use of force and other forms of ill-treatment (Austria, 2021, para 19).

The wearing of balaclavas (in addition to protective helmets) by members of specialised forces may exceptionally be justified in the context of high-risk operations (for instance, when dangerous arrests are necessary). However, the routine wearing of balaclavas during public order operations should be seriously reconsidered. Further, any pre-planned interventions should be videorecorded (e.g. with tactical cameras as part of the equipment of the officers concerned). Action must also be taken to ensure that plainclothes law enforcement officials effecting an apprehension and/or questioning an apprehended person in the context of public order operations clearly identify themselves (including by giving evidence of their status and professional identity as soon as is practicable) (Ukraine, February 2014, para 36).

The practical arrangements in place, in particular the display of a number on the back of helmets, did not generally allow persons apprehended in the context of the demonstrations to identify the law enforcement officials involved in their arrest. The CPT recommends that the  authorities take measures to ensure that all police officers involved in public order operations, whether they wear personal protection equipment or not, display a clearly visible means of individual identification (such as a name or a number) on the front of their uniforms or helmets (Türkiye, April 2025, para 36).

The Committee recommends that steps be taken to ensure that prison staff are always identifiable, preferably by wearing name tags [or short] identification numbers in a visible manner at all times whilst on duty (Hungary, 2013, para. 49).

The CPT also wishes to emphasise that it is opposed to the wearing of balaclavas by special-purpose forces within penitentiary establishments. The Committee recognises that, for operational and/or security reasons, the wearing of protective helmets may be necessary. However, it should be ensured that subsequent identification of the officers concerned is always possible by the relevant authorities and by prisoners through not only a clearly distinctive badge but also a prominent identification number on each uniform/helmet. In addition, interventions of this type should be videorecorded (e.g. with tactical cameras as part of the equipment of the penitentiary officers concerned) (Ukraine, 2012, para 21).

Further, in the context of border control activities at both land and sea borders, all law enforcement officials or state agents involved should display clearly visible identification numbers or tags on their uniforms. There can be no justification for balaclavas to be systematically worn. Border control activities should also be video recorded to prevent both ill-treatment and false accusations and be systematically monitored. In this regard, the authorities should guarantee the operation of effective and independent monitoring mechanisms for systematically monitoring border control activities (Greece, 2023, para 162).

The operation, which has now concluded, involved customs officers, federal police, and tax investigators working in concert, according to the Offenburg Federal Police. However, authorities have not yet disclosed key details about the raid’s outcomes, including whether any arrests were made, the number of properties searched, or what evidence was secured.

Geographic Scope of the Operation

The operation concentrated primarily on Baden-Württemberg, with searches conducted in:

• Cities: Baden-Baden, Böblingen, and Lörrach
• Districts: Ortenaukreis, Zollernalbkreis, and Enzkreis
• Additional searches were simultaneously carried out in Berlin.

Nature of the Investigation

The Baden-Baden public prosecutor’s office authorized the operation based on allegations that the suspects were involved in:

• Human smuggling of individuals from third countries
• Gang-related tax evasion
• Wage-related fraud

Next Steps

Authorities have indicated that additional information will be released on Friday. The investigation ties into broader concerns about organized crime in Germany, as highlighted in recent reports including the BKA situation report on organized crime’s economic impact and investigations into smuggling operations along the Balkan route.

Source and picture

Through practical exercises and interactive discussions, participants enhanced their understanding of how to systematically gather, assess, and use information from human sources to inform operational decisions. The workshop also encouraged the exchange of experiences and best practices among law enforcement professionals from across the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Đorđe Đogović, the ILP Project Manager at the Mission, emphasized the importance of the workshop, stating: “Effective intelligence gathering from human sources and analysis are at the heart of proactive policing. Strengthening the skills and knowledge of police officers in this field contributes to a more efficient, informed, and co-ordinated response to serious security threats.”

This workshop is part of the OSCE Mission to BiH project Enhancing Intelligence-led Policing to Combat Serious Security Threats and Crimes (ILP Project), implemented with the generous support of Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, and Türkiye. By strengthening capacities of law enforcement, the initiative contributes to safer communities, more resilient institutions, and enhanced overall security across Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Overall, the results of the action include:

• 22 296 officers from law enforcement and labour and tax authorities participating in the action;
• 194 995 entities checked (including 73 218 persons, 11 815 locations, 26 412 vehicles and 83 958 documents)
• 93 persons suspected of trafficking human beings identified (of which 92 for labour exploitation)
• 54 persons arrested for various crimes (of which 44 for labour exploitation)
• 404 potential victims of human trafficking identified (of which 393 potential victims of labour exploitation)
• 341 new investigations in various crimes launched (of which 43 in labour exploitation)

The objective of this recurrent action is for authorities to focus on the forms of labour exploitation most pertinent or widespread in their respective countries. Inspections were conducted across a wide array of sectors, including catering, gastronomy, food delivery, food and meat processing, beauty services, domestic healthcare, logistics and distribution, agriculture, construction, and mining.

Several countries have confirmed various modus operandi in trafficking in human beings for agricultural and labour exploitation. These include discrepancies between payments and employees’ working hours, violations of minimum wage laws, undeclared work, illegal schemes operated by temporary work agencies, breaches of maximum working hours, poor housing conditions provided by employers, the employment of minors, debt bondage, working without permits, and the retention of ID and travel documents. Additionally, non-EU nationals may use look-alike documents, falsified passports, and forged residence permits. In general, cases of labour exploitation and forced labour are significantly underreported and do not reflect the true extent of the issue.

Standout cases from across Europe

Spain

During a joint action on an agricultural property in Seville, a Nepalese victim of trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation was identified following an inspection at a kebab restaurant. The victim was found living in inhumane, unsanitary, and overcrowded conditions. An investigation has been launched, and the victim has been transferred to a police station for assistance and placed in a shelter. Additionally, labour authorities initiated three investigations involving five workers found working without labour contracts, two of whom were illegal immigrants in Spain.

Hungary

Following a notification from the victim assistance network, an investigation into suspected forced labour led to the discovery of seven Hungarian citizens, including a 15-year-old, working in inhumane conditions on local pig farms. The victims were forced to perform physically demanding tasks without contracts, pay, or proper accommodation. The farm owner was arrested and detained, and the victims were rescued. The investigation was conducted jointly by law enforcement and labour authorities.

In another ongoing investigation into a human trafficking ring recruiting vulnerable individuals from Romania to work in a paper/waste selection factory in Hungary, two additional suspects were arrested in Budapest. They are accused of accommodating victims and forcing them to work in poor conditions. A victim was found and interviewed during a search of the suspects’ residences, which revealed isolated sheds with poor living conditions. This case involves a joint investigation team between Hungary and Romania, with a total of 13 suspects arrested to date. Victims were promised better working conditions but were instead subjected to poor conditions, document confiscation, constant surveillance, and withheld salaries.

Ukraine

Ukrainian authorities have halted the illegal labour exploitation of 13 Uzbek citizens at an agricultural enterprise in the Kyiv Oblast. Four members of a criminal group (two Chinese citizens, one Ukrainian, and one Uzbek citizen) have been arrested and charged with trafficking in human beings.

Multidisciplinary approach and Europol’s support

In line with previous editions, the operation emphasised a multidisciplinary approach. The efforts of national and regional police forces, border guards, tax authorities, labour authorities, and labour inspectorates were coordinated and supported by Europol and the European Labour Authority. Several joint inspections involving enforcement authorities from different countries were facilitated. Consequently, the operation benefited from improved information flow and enhanced awareness of human trafficking indicators. This close collaboration among various authorities and law enforcement agencies significantly contributed to the success of the action week in combating labour exploitation.

Trafficking in human beings (THB) involves forcing or duping vulnerable individuals into another country, for the sole purpose of criminal profit. It can happen anywhere, in many different forms, and affects people of all ages, backgrounds, and genders.

Participating countries:

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom

We cordially invite all experts in the fields of criminal law, criminology, sociology, political science, and other areas and disciplines to discuss current issues related to the impact of Russian aggression on the state and society.

Date: 28 November 2025

Time: 11:00 (Kyiv time)

Format: online

Access: via the link

Key Developments in Surveillance:

• Moscow Metro Facial Recognition: The Moscow Metro is integrating next-generation turnstiles equipped with facial recognition technology for biometric payments and passenger identification. Over 4,500 such systems are projected to be installed by 2031.
• Highway Camera Networks: More than 1,500 “smart” cameras with recognition capabilities have already been deployed on major Moscow highways, with further expansion planned.
• Regional Expansion: Surveillance systems are spreading across the country. Voronezh, for example, will implement a 57-million-ruble system by 2025 to track crime and “extremism” suspects. The number of regions utilizing these technologies is expected to jump from 14 in 2020 to at least 68 by September 2025.
• Massive Camera Rollout: Russia currently operates over a million surveillance cameras, with one-third featuring facial recognition. The government aims to increase this to five million by 2030, investing approximately 12 billion rubles.
• Internet Control: Authorities are tightening their grip on the online sphere. Roskomnadzor’s main radio frequency center is acquiring advanced “technical means to counter threats” – devices mandated for telecom operators under the “sovereign Runet” law. These filters will enable more precise blocking, increased scrutiny of private communications, and enhanced tracking of individuals searching for “extremist material.”
• FSB Access to Banking Communications: A new order mandates credit institutions to implement operational and investigative measures, granting special services access to analyze customer correspondence, including voice messages, video recordings, and other user content. Banks are required to store this data by 2027.

On October 31, 2025, the European police agency Europol said that an unnamed number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who allegedly fought with Russian ‘private military companies’ Wagner and Redut are among the alleged perpetrators of war crimes on Ukrainian soil.

Other suspects among the total of 654 suspects identified by Europol include citizens of Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

“These individuals are believed to have committed war crimes such as acts of sexual violence, executions of prisoners of war and executions of civilians,” Europol said in a statement.

The European police agency said this was established by a joint operation it conducted with the Ukrainian and Moldovan police.

“Overall, the investigation led to the identification of a total of 654 members of the Russian private military companies Wagner and Redut, involved in combat operations against Ukraine,” the statement said.

During an operation with Moldova and Ukrainian police, 70 house searches were carried out in Moldova and Ukraine. Firearms and other weapons, ammunition, uniforms, insignia with symbols of paramilitary organisations and electronic equipment were seized.

Investigation Progress

Ukrainian police have successfully identified key elements of the mercenary network, including:

• Recruitment sites for Russian mercenaries
• Training bases and deployment areas
• Command structure and leadership
• Detailed circumstances of participation in hostilities

Investigators have amassed substantial evidence, including documents, video recordings, telephone data, and eyewitness testimonies that confirm war crimes such as the execution of civilians and prisoners of war, as well as the use of prohibited weapons.

Participating Agencies

The operation involves multiple law enforcement and intelligence agencies:

• Main Investigation Department of the National Police of Ukraine
• Department of Strategic Investigations
• Department of Criminal Investigation
• Department of Criminal Analysis
• Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
• Police of the Republic of Moldova

Procedural oversight is provided by prosecutors from the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases of the Republic of Moldova.

Europol coordinates the operation through its Virtual Command Post, enabling real-time information exchange, evidence sharing, and search result dissemination among all participating countries.

Evidence Seized

Authorities have confiscated significant evidence, including:

• Uniforms and chevrons bearing Wagner PMC symbols
• Mobile phones containing messenger correspondence
• Photo and video materials documenting participation in hostilities in Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo
• Firearms, edged weapons, and ammunition (seized in Moldova)

Criminal Charges

Following the searches, investigators have filed eleven charges against Ukrainian citizens who defected to the enemy during martial law and participated in combat operations with Wagner and Redut PMCs against Ukrainian forces.

Charges: High treason under Part 2, Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine
Potential Sentence: 15 years to life imprisonment with property confiscation

These individuals face immediate detention and extradition if they return to Ukraine or enter any state that recognizes Russian PMCs as terrorist organizations.

International Cooperation

Through the Department of International Police Cooperation, Europol’s SIENA channel, and Interpol, Ukrainian authorities have shared information on more than 280 foreign mercenaries who fought against Ukraine with law enforcement agencies in multiple countries, including:

• Azerbaijan
• Armenia
• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Moldova
• Kazakhstan
• Uzbekistan
• Tajikistan
• Turkmenistan

In most of these jurisdictions, mercenary activity carries sentences ranging from 5 to 15 years of imprisonment, with life imprisonment possible in certain cases. These crimes fall under universal jurisdiction, allowing prosecution in any country where suspects are located.

Concrete Results

The international cooperation has already produced tangible outcomes:

January 4, 2025: A Kazakh citizen and former Wagner PMC mercenary was detained at the US-Mexico border. Ukrainian police provided American law enforcement with comprehensive evidence of his involvement with Wagner PMC, officially designated as a terrorist organization in the United States.

June 17, 2025: Finnish authorities detained an active Wagner PMC member who personally participated in assaults on Soledar and Bakhmut.

Landmark Prosecution: Ukrainian law enforcement successfully prosecuted a foreign national for the first time under Article 447 (mercenary activity) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The Moldovan citizen participated in the capture and destruction of Bakhmut, Donetsk region, as part of Wagner PMC and received both Wagner medals and a state award from the Russian Federation.

Actions in Moldova

Investigative operations in Moldova have identified 25 Moldovan citizens who participated in Wagner PMC hostilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

17 citizens: Procedures underway to declare them wanted

8 citizens: Procedural documents prepared for formal notification of suspicion under Article 141, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova (mercenary participation in armed conflict or military operations aimed at overthrowing constitutional order or violating territorial integrity).