In addition, Russia is also involving Ukrainian children in acts of sabotage and terrorist attacks against their own country, often without their knowledge.

However, apart from the crimes committed by Russia against Ukrainian children, there are other problems that have not disappeared with the start of the full-scale war and that affect minors, such as bullying, teenage fights, etc.

Ukrinform spoke with the head of the Ukrainian juvenile police, Vasyl Bohdan, about this, as well as about bullying in educational institutions, juvenile crime, and how to increase children’s trust in adults.

– How many crimes against children have been recorded in Ukraine since the start of the large-scale war, and how many of them were committed by Russians?

– Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 11,000 crimes against children have been recorded. The highest number was recorded in 2023, when there were almost 4,700 such crimes. In 2024, 3,400 such crimes were recorded. Here we see a 26% decrease in the number of these offences, and this figure is even lower than in 2021, before the war.

It should be noted that most of these crimes are serious and particularly serious offences, in particular against sexual freedom and sexual integrity. Bullying, internet fraud, etc. were also recorded.

We do not keep separate statistics on crimes committed specifically by Russians. But the figures we have speak for themselves – for example, as of today, at least 20,000 children have been deported by the Russians.

In general, we continue to see a downward trend in the number of crimes committed against children.

– When it comes to general criminal offences against children, what types of crimes against minors have been recorded most since the start of the full-scale war?

– In this context, I can say that since the start of the full-scale invasion, most crimes committed against children have been crimes against life and health. Among them, the most common are intentional bodily harm, beatings, torture, and sexual offences.

In 2024 alone, we recorded 546 such cases. These include sexual violence, sexual acts with persons under the age of 16, molestation and others. These crimes account for a significant proportion of the total number of offences committed against children, and this is an extremely sensitive issue.

We are, of course, taking this into account and stepping up our preventive work with educational institutions. We are also involving parents in this process, because without joint action it will be very difficult for us to prevent such offences.

– How has the structure of crime changed in terms of crimes committed by children themselves, comparing the periods before and after the start of the full-scale war? What trends and major changes in this area can we talk about now?

– Since the start of the full-scale invasion, minors in Ukraine have committed more than 8,500 criminal offences. Most often these are thefts, bodily harm, etc.

It should be noted here that, for example, the number of crimes committed by children in the first year of the full-scale war decreased significantly compared to the pre-war year of 2021 – by almost 40%.

This is partly explained by restrictions on the movement of people, the transition of schools to distance learning, changes in lifestyle, the temporary occupation of territories and the evacuation of the population, including abroad.

In 2023, unfortunately, we saw an increase in the number of such cases compared to 2022, but in 2024 we again recorded a decrease in such offences. And now the number of these crimes continues to decline.

Another new phenomenon that we are increasingly encountering is digital crime – fraud through social networks, participation in various schemes in which children are involved by criminals and even hostile special services. For example, in 2024 alone, the number of fraud cases involving minors increased by almost 30%.

It should be noted that both COVID-19 and the war have created favourable conditions for the spread of such phenomena.

Speaking in general about crimes committed by children, over the past eight years, thanks to preventive measures, we have seen a downward trend in the number of these offences.

– Can you tell us whether children most often commit crimes alone or in groups? And what are the most common reasons and factors behind why they do this?

– A significant proportion of crimes are committed by teenagers alone, although there are also cases where offences are committed by groups. What they have in common are the reasons behind them. Most of these children are raised in difficult conditions without proper supervision.

Among the reasons for this, we see problems in the family, low levels of well-being, abuse by parents or guardians, alcohol, drugs, and the influence of criminal subculture, etc.

The main reason here is the lack of life experience and understanding of the consequences among the children themselves. That is why it is important for adults to be close to children and teach them to distinguish between what is acceptable and what is dangerous.

– In April this year, a teenager in the Kirovohrad region was sentenced to corrective labour instead of a prison term. How effective do you think this method is – imposing a more lenient punishment on children instead of imprisonment for crimes committed? And do you think this practice should be scaled up across Ukraine?

I believe that this practice is effective and necessary. In general, it is a path to the rehabilitation of the child, not to recidivism.

In most cases, when it comes to offences committed through carelessness, peer pressure or difficult life circumstances, harsh punishment in the form of imprisonment not only does not help, but sometimes even harms.

Our goal, as the police, juvenile prevention, and part of the state, is not to break the child, but to help them rethink their actions so that they understand where they made the wrong decision and what they should have done in a given situation, to help them change and get on the right track.

And it is community service or other alternative sanctions instead of prison terms that give them the opportunity to do so.

This form of responsibility also allows us not to separate the child from socialisation, to ensure their connection with their family, and at the same time teaches them that they must be responsible for all their actions.

If this is combined with educational work, the involvement of psychologists, and community support, the combined effect can be much stronger than that of the classic punitive model, so to speak.

Currently, we are working with the Office of the Prosecutor General to implement a pilot project on the implementation of international standards of child-friendly justice. And it is yielding positive results.

Therefore, in my opinion, this practice should not only be supported, but systematically scaled up throughout Ukraine — of course, with the caveat that lenient punishment should only be applied in cases where it is truly appropriate. In other words, it is not necessary to release everyone from imprisonment, nor is it necessary to do so in situations with serious consequences or in cases of repeat offences.

– Let’s talk about the recruitment of Ukrainian children by Russians. Has Russia started doing this less now? And can we say that in some regions of Ukraine children are recruited more often, and in others less? Does geography play a role here?

– Recently, we have seen a slight but steady decline in the recruitment of children by Russians. This has been achieved primarily through systematic preventive measures.

Geography is not a significant factor here. These cases occur throughout the country. Of course, in large regions, the proportion of recruited children is higher. In particular, this refers to the Odesa, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv regions, as well as Kyiv. However, this does not mean that children in other regions are not at risk or that the likelihood is lower.

– How many teenagers have been detained since the start of the full-scale war for committing acts of sabotage and terrorism while carrying out tasks for the Russian Federation? And were there any children among those who agreed to do this who were aware that they could die as a result of carrying out these tasks?

– This year, we have recorded 65 cases of criminal offences of a sabotage nature involving 62 children aged 13 to 17. These are not just numbers, these are tragedies that could have been avoided.

The main motivation that can be identified after communicating with such children is financial. These teenagers also have a desire to assert themselves or a blind belief that they will not be caught.

But none of the children realised that they could die or suffer terrible injuries. They all considered it an easy side job, sometimes without even knowing that they were working for the enemy.

That is why we are talking about the importance of preventive work and conducting an active information campaign on this issue — so that every child knows that such offers should not be accepted.

– How often do children report attempts by Russians to recruit them? And speaking of the preventive information campaign conducted by the National Police, in particular, relevant lessons in schools in conjunction with law enforcement colleagues, how effective do you think it is?

– The number of reports we receive about attempts to recruit children increases in direct proportion to the increase in the intensity of this information campaign.

As of today, we have received almost 70 such reports from children about attempts to recruit them. And this is directly related to the information campaign currently being conducted by the juvenile prevention service in conjunction with the Security Service of Ukraine and educators.

We visit schools, talk to teenagers without moralising, honestly explain how the enemy works, what recruitment is, and what it can lead to. And we talk not only to children, but also to parents and teaching staff, communicating and explaining how to identify it and how to talk to children about it. And this set of measures gives us exactly these results.

The main goal here is not just to tell them, to talk about it, but to make sure that the child knows that they are not alone and that they can stop this crime before it happens.

– What responsibility will children bear who, for example, without realising what they were getting themselves into, carried out a few easy tasks from their supervisors, and after the supervisors gave them a difficult task, realised what was happening and wanted to report it to adults? Should they be afraid to report it to the police? Should they be afraid of, for example, imprisonment? Where does administrative responsibility end and criminal responsibility begin?

– If a child realises that someone is trying to involve them in a crime and reports it to adults or the police, or to the police together with adults, then this is an extremely correct and important step, and there is no need to be afraid in this situation.

When it comes to liability, each situation is unique. It depends on a large number of factors, including age and what the child has actually done.

If, for example, it is a matter of putting up posters or painting graffiti, this can be classified as an administrative offence. If a minor, even without realising it, has helped the enemy in sabotage activities, this falls under the Criminal Code.

But if the child stopped, did not complete the crime and voluntarily turned to the police, this is considered a mitigating circumstance. Law enforcement officers will meet such a child halfway, help them and support them, because we understand how important and difficult this step is for them.

It is very important that even in such situations, children are not afraid to tell the truth and turn to the police. This is a chance to prevent a tragedy that could happen.

Maria Gonchar, Kyiv

Photo by Danilo Antonuk

We discuss this in an interview with Andriy Nebitov, who headed the Kyiv Regional Police at the time of the full-scale invasion and now serves as Deputy Head of the National Police of Ukraine and Head of the Criminal Police.

“The National Police began a systematic reform from the very first full-scale invasion. This reform affected both the structure of the departments and the principles and directions according to which their activities should be carried out. All this time, while the war is going on, we are constantly looking for ways to be as useful as possible to the Security and Defence Forces. I will start with the main thing: the National Police has formed a separate assault brigade called ‘Lut’, which consists not of mobilised personnel, but of former police officers. That is, yesterday’s operatives, investigators, patrol officers – that is, regular police officers. They took up arms, formed a brigade and are now carrying out tasks in the east, in the Donetsk region, and destroying the enemy,” Andriy Nebitov said in an interview.

The deputy head of the National Police of Ukraine and head of the criminal police also shared:

• What were the first actions and decisions taken after receiving information about the start of the Russian troops’ offensive on the Kyiv region?
• What are the specifics of police work in the frontline regions?
• The police during the war: what new areas of work have emerged and what is the most difficult challenge in the realities of military operations?
• Has the crime situation in the rear regions worsened?
• Juvenile crime and war: why do minors so often agree to commit acts of sabotage – is there more to it than just money? And how can parents protect their children from committing crimes?
• Has the problem of drug trafficking in Ukraine increased since the start of the war and how does the situation compare with other European countries?
• How is the police fighting for the environment: how many crimes against the environment have been uncovered in Ukraine this year?
• The shadow trade in weapons: what mechanisms has the police developed to curb this threat?
  Why is the number of human trafficking cases increasing?
• Responsibility for war crimes: which of the investigations into the occupiers’ crimes in the Kyiv region is the most painful and at the same time the most fundamental?
• Juvenile crime and war: why do minors so often agree to commit acts of sabotage – is there more to it than just money? And how can parents protect their children from committing crimes?
• How has the war brought the Ukrainian police closer to their international partners and foreign colleagues?
• Extradition of criminals: which case of international police cooperation is an example of effective work?
• Why was it so important to rebuild the police station in Borodianka, which was destroyed by the occupiers?

The answers can be found in an extensive interview with Andriy Nebitov, Deputy Head of the National Police of Ukraine and Head of the Criminal Police, for the video project ‘Kyiv Region 24/7’ — ‘Denys Zhupnik. On Time.’

Source, text and picture

The political and legal reality that has developed over more than ten years of War has demonstrated the ability of Ukrainian constitutional institutions to function in unprecedented security and humanitarian conditions. Even during a full-scale invasion, which included missiles and bomb strikes across the country and the advance of enemy infantry along a 1200 km front line, public authorities and civil society institutions continued to function. The judicial system, which had undergone significant reforms during the War in 2016-2017, proved to be fully prepared for such challenges and, after the full-scale invasion, coped with all the challenges of wartime without undergoing any organisational changes. Of course, Ukraine’s constitutional design has undergone significant changes aimed at adapting the constitutional system to wartime conditions.

Among these changes, the following are key.

1. Introduction of martial law and general mobilisation

This involves restricting certain rights and freedoms of citizens, such as freedom of movement, assembly and demonstration, in order to ensure the security and defence capability of the state. As a first and necessary condition, Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 64/2022 of 24 February 2022 stipulates that, in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens provided for in Articles 30-34, 38, 39, 41-44, and 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine may be restricted, and temporary restrictions on the rights and legitimate interests of legal entities may be introduced to the extent necessary to ensure the possibility of introducing and implementing the measures of the legal regime of martial law provided for in part one of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Legal Regime of Martial Law.’ At the same time, the Decree obliges the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to ensure that the UN Secretary-General and officials of foreign states are informed in the established manner about the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, about restrictions on human and civil rights and freedoms, which constitute a derogation from the obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and about the limits of these derogations and the reasons for adopting such a decision. The implementation of general mobilisation required legislative changes and the establishment of a system of relevant public bodies.

2. Changes in public administration

During wartime, there is an objective centralisation of power and an increase in the powers of public authorities, which allows for faster decision-making in critical situations. Thus, the President of Ukraine acts as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (he has this status permanently, but during wartime it becomes titular). The functions of day-to-day governance are taken over by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the National Security and Defence Council. The government continues to function but the role of the Ministry of Defence is strengthened. The Armed Forces and other military formations are given expanded powers to protect national security. Local authorities form defence councils and assist the military command in introducing and implementing measures under the legal regime of martial law.

3. Financial and economic changes

Certain economic activities are being frozen, and budget expenditures are being revised in favour of defence and recovery. At the level of constitutional doctrine, enhanced social protection for military personnel has been introduced. All these and other factors have a significant impact on the legal status of individuals and, consequently, on the future functioning of Ukraine as a constitutional state, where the activities of the state are limited by human rights.

An important guarantee for the realisation of constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens is Article 64 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which stipulates that such rights and freedoms cannot be restricted, except in cases provided for by the Constitution of Ukraine. This provision allows for the establishment of certain restrictions on rights and freedoms in times of war or emergency, specifying the duration of such restrictions.

At the same time, in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, a High Contracting Party may, in time of war, take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention, and in the event of exercising this right, it must inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the measures taken. Such notification shall be made by letter, accompanied by copies of the legal documents under which the emergency measures will be implemented.

Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine periodically and regularly sends to international organisations information prepared by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on derogations from its obligations under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Covenant, including on the extension of martial law. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the Covenant, Ukraine has been providing such information since 2015 in connection with the Russian Federation’s armed aggression against Ukraine. This regular practice has continued since February 2022 in connection with the start of a full-scale invasion and the introduction of martial law in Ukraine. In April 2024, Ukraine once again clarified the list of existing restrictions and reduced it. This notification was the twentieth since 2015. All notifications made by Ukraine regarding the derogation from its obligations are publicly available.

The notification itself does not introduce emergency measures but is only a means of informing the Council of Europe of the possibility of their introduction in accordance with the national legislation of the High Contracting Party.

In accordance with Article 3 of the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 64/2022 of 24 February 2022 ‘On the introduction of martial law in Ukraine’ in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens, provided for in Articles 30–34, 38, 39, 41–44, and 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine may be restricted, and temporary restrictions on the rights and legitimate interests of persons provided for in Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine No. 389 of 12 May 2015 ‘On the Legal Regime of Martial Law’ may be introduced.

Considering the above and in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention, the Council of Europe was informed about the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the provisions of legislation that apply during this regime, the measures that may be applied by the authorised bodies during martial law, and a list of articles of the Convention and its Appendices was provided, from which, in connection with the possible application of the above measures, a corresponding derogation is permitted, namely: Articles 3, 8(3), 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 of the Covenant, as well as Articles 4 (3), 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16 of the Convention, Articles 1, 2, 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

Considering the requirement to notify such measures without delay, the above information on the introduction of martial law and the corresponding derogation was prepared and sent to the Council of Europe as soon as possible after the introduction of martial law. It was posted on the Council of Europe website on 1 March 2022.

According to the explanation to Article 15 of the Convention, derogation from obligations does not necessarily mean that the State will be unable to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Convention. In practice, when declaring a derogation from its obligations, the Contracting State usually stated that the measures it was taking ‘may’ entail a derogation from its obligations under the Convention.

Possible derogation is also provided for in Article 4 of the Covenant, which states that in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the Covenant only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not entail discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

This provision shall not constitute grounds for any derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18. Any State Party to the Covenant which avails itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Covenant, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons for its decision. It shall also notify, through the same intermediary, the date on which it ceases such derogation.

Thus, key human rights instruments allow for temporary derogations by states from their obligations to ensure certain human rights, subject to certain criteria.

On 21 May 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution ‘On Approval of the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ’On Ukraine’s Derogation from Certain Obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.

In this resolution, the Ukrainian parliament approved the Statement on the withdrawal from certain obligations specified in paragraph 3 of Article 2, Articles 9, 12, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention for the period until the complete cessation of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, namely until the withdrawal of all illegal armed formations controlled, managed and financed by the Russian Federation, Russian occupation troops and their military equipment from the territory of Ukraine, the restoration of Ukraine’s full control over its state border, and the restoration of constitutional order in the occupied territory of Ukraine.

In this Statement, among other things, Ukraine noted that the Russian Federation, as a state that has effectively occupied and controls part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is responsible for respecting and protecting human rights in these territories under both international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

The Statement also emphasises that the ongoing armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, accompanied by the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by both the regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and illegal armed formations controlled and financed by the Russian Federation, constitutes a public danger that threatens the life of the nation within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Covenant and Article 15(1) of the Convention. To ensure the vital interests of society and the State in the context of armed aggression, public authorities are forced to take decisions that constitute a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under the Covenant and the Convention.

In addition to such declarations, the Statement sets out obvious measures that formally constitute a derogation from international human rights standards but appear to be objective and necessary in the circumstances. For example, it states that on 12 August 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ’On Combating Terrorism‘ regarding the preventive detention of individuals involved in terrorist activities in the area of the anti-terrorist operation for a period exceeding 72 hours’.

In accordance with this Law, in the area of a long-term anti-terrorist operation, as an exception, individuals involved in terrorist activities may be preventively detained for a period exceeding 72 hours but not more than 30 days, with the consent of the prosecutor and without a court order. The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a certain departure by Ukraine from its obligations under Article 2(3), Articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention.

At the same time, the application of such provisions exclusively during anti-terrorist operations in exceptional cases with the aim of preventing serious crimes is justified by the acute danger caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups supported by the Russian Federation.

In addition, it is noted that on 12 August 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Special Regime of Pre-trial Investigation in Conditions of Martial Law, State of Emergency or in the Area of Anti-Terrorist Operations’.

In accordance with this Law, a special regime of pre-trial investigation is introduced for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation, according to which the powers of investigating judges, as defined by the current Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, are temporarily transferred to the relevant prosecutors, who acquire additional procedural rights. The special regime for pre-trial investigation applies exclusively in the area of anti-terrorist operations and provided that the investigating judge is unable to exercise the powers defined by the current Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Article 2(3), Articles 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

At the same time, the absence of functioning courts in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups supported by the Russian Federation, is the limit that allows the powers of investigating judges to be transferred to prosecutors in conditions that threaten the existence of the nation.

Through this Statement, Ukraine also informed the international community that on 12 August 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On the Administration of Justice and Criminal Proceedings in Connection with the Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations’.

In accordance with this Law, for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation, the territorial jurisdiction of court cases subject to the jurisdiction of courts located in the area of the anti-terrorist operation and the jurisdiction of criminal offences committed in the area of the anti-terrorist operation were changed in cases where it was impossible to conduct a pre-trial investigation. The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a certain departure from Ukraine’s obligations under Article 14 of the Covenant and Article 6 of the Convention. At the same time, the actual absence of functioning courts and pre-trial investigation bodies in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups supported by the Russian Federation, is the limit that allows for a change in the territorial jurisdiction of court cases and the jurisdiction of criminal offences in conditions that threaten the existence of the nation.

Ukraine also reported that on 3 February 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On Military-Civilian Administrations’.

In accordance with this Law, military-civilian administrations were established as temporary state bodies operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of the Anti-Terrorist Centre under the Security Service of Ukraine and designed to ensure the implementation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, ensure the security and normalisation of the population’s life, law and order, participating in countering sabotage and terrorist acts, and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in the area of the anti-terrorist operation.

This Law grants military-civilian administrations the authority, in particular, to establish restrictions on staying on the streets and in other public places at certain times of the day without specific documents; temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets, roads, and areas; organise the verification of identity documents of individuals and, if necessary, the inspection of belongings, vehicles, luggage and cargo, office premises and citizens’ homes, except for the restrictions established by the Constitution of Ukraine.

The application of the provisions of this Law necessitates a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Articles 9, 12 and 17 of the International Covenant, Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

At the same time, the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation with the aim of averting the threat of destruction of the nation by armed aggression by the Russian Federation is the limit that allows for the temporary restriction of freedom of movement and the right to respect for private life.

Over the following periods, Ukraine repeatedly informed the Council of Europe and other international institutions about the state of affairs regarding human rights compliance during the armed aggression. For example, the Note of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine dated 29 November 2019, registered by the General Secretariat on 3 December 2019, contained a notification and partial withdrawal of the derogation.

With this Note, Ukraine informed the international community that, given that the Russian Federation is committing a crime of aggression against Ukraine and temporarily occupying part of its territory with armed formations of the Russian Federation, on 18 January 2018, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law ‘On the Specifics of State Policy to Ensure Ukraine’s State Sovereignty over the Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions’ (hereinafter referred to as Law No. 2268), which aims to define the specifics of state policy to ensure Ukraine’s state sovereignty in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. To ensure Ukraine’s state sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, state bodies and their officials, acting on the grounds, within the powers and in the manner provided for by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, shall take measures to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation (Article 5.3 of Law No. 2268). Measures to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation in the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions include measures to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which are carried out by security and defence bodies, other public bodies of Ukraine, and their officials (Article 7.1 of Law No. 2268).

The initiation and refinement of measures to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are determined by separate decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Article 8.3 of Law No. 2268). The President of Ukraine, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, by his Decree No. 116 of 30 April 2018, in accordance with Article 8. 3 of Law No. 2268, enacted the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the NSDC) on the commencement of national security and defence measures to repel and deter the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Forces Operation (JFO)).

In accordance with Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Combating Terrorism’ and Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 166 of 30 April 2018, a decision was made to terminate the anti-terrorist operation in connection with the launch of the JFO.

Thus, on 30 April 2018, the anti-terrorist operation was terminated and measures were initiated to ensure national security and defence, repel and deter armed aggression by the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (JFO).

The Note also states that, in accordance with Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Military-Civilian Administrations’ (as amended by Law No. 2268), military-civilian administrations in the area of the Joint Forces Operation, with the consent of the Commander of the Joint Forces, have the right to:

1) impose restrictions on staying on the streets and other public places without documents;

2) temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets, roads and areas of territory;

3) organise the verification of documents certifying the identity of individuals and, if necessary, the inspection of belongings, vehicles, luggage and cargo, office premises and citizens’ homes, except for the restrictions established by the Constitution of Ukraine.

In security zones adjacent to combat zones, a special procedure is in place that grants security and defence agencies and other public bodies of Ukraine the special powers necessary to carry out this operation (Article 8.2 of Law No. 2268).

To ensure the vital interests of society and the state during the period of repelling armed aggression in security zones adjacent to combat zones, military personnel, law enforcement officers and persons specified in Article 8 of Law No. 2268 who are involved in the implementation of the JFO measures in accordance with the Constitution and legislation of Ukraine, have the right to:

1) use weapons and special means in cases of extreme necessity against persons who have committed or are committing offences or other actions that impede the fulfilment of the lawful requirements of persons involved in the implementation of the JFO measures, or actions related to unauthorised attempts to enter the zone where these measures are being implemented;

2) detain and deliver to the National Police of Ukraine the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this part;

3) check documents certifying the identity of citizens and officials, and in the absence of documents, detain them to establish their identity;

4) conduct personal searches of citizens, searches of items in their possession, vehicles, and items they are transporting;

5) temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets and roads, prevent vehicles and citizens from entering certain areas and facilities, evict citizens from certain areas and facilities, and the vehicles;

6) enter residential and other premises, land plots belonging to citizens, areas, and premises of enterprises, institutions and organisations to inspect vehicles for the purposes of conducting environmental protection;

7) use for official purposes means of communication and vehicles, including special ones, belonging to citizens (with their consent), enterprises, institutions and organisations, except for vehicles of diplomatic, consular and other missions of foreign states and international organisations.

The presence of individuals not involved in such activities in the area of the Joint Forces Operation may be temporarily restricted by the commander of the Joint Forces for the duration of such activities (Article 12.4 of Law No. 2268). The implementation of these measures may entail a derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Articles 9, 12, and 17 of the Covenant, Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 thereto, and necessitates the continuation of such derogation.

In the context of war and in order to ensure human rights, it was necessary to implement certain organisational measures in the field of justice. Thus, in accordance with Article 2.8 of Law No. 2268, the procedure for territorial jurisdiction of cases falling within the jurisdiction of courts located in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions for the duration of the Joint Forces Operation is established in accordance with Law of Ukraine No. 1632-VII of 12 August 2014 ‘On the Administration of Justice and Criminal Proceedings in Connection with the Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations’ (hereinafter referred to as Law No. 1632).

As stated in the aforementioned Article 2.8 of Law No. 2268, Law No. 1632 defines measures for legal regulation and aims to ensure access to justice for citizens and legal entities.

In accordance with Article 1 of Law No. 1632, due to the inability of certain courts to administer justice, the territorial jurisdiction of court cases is changed, and civil cases, administrative offences, administrative cases, commercial and criminal proceedings are considered by local and appellate courts as determined by the President of the Supreme Court. Issues relating to the competence of the investigating judge in criminal proceedings at the pre-trial investigation stage and carried out in the area of the Joint Forces Operation, in the event of the impossibility of administering justice, shall be considered by investigating judges of local courts of general jurisdiction as determined by the President of the Supreme Court (Article 1.2 of Law No. 1632).

The issue of access to justice in territories not controlled by Ukraine was considered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the cases of Khlebik v. Ukraine and Tsezar and Others v. Ukraine, in which the ECtHR found that the applicants’ inability to come to court at their place of residence did not violate the essence of the right of access to court and ruled that there had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

In paragraph 52 of the judgment in the case of Tsezar and Others v. Ukraine (applications nos. 73590/14, 73593/14, 73820/14, 4635/15, 5200/15, 5206/15 and 7289/15 of 13 February 2018), the ECtHR recognised that state authorities may sometimes face certain difficulties in ensuring the proper functioning of the courts in certain regions due to ongoing hostilities in those regions. Nevertheless, the Court noted that state authorities must take certain measures to resolve the problem, for example, by granting special permission to file lawsuits in courts in another region of the state. Thus, the ECtHR does not consider the above measures to be a violation by Ukraine of its obligations under Article 6 of the Convention.

In a communication contained in verbal note No. 31011/32-119-42777 from the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe, dated 17 June 2022, Ukraine transmitted to the Secretary General, on behalf of the Government of Ukraine, further information on measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention in accordance with Law of Ukraine No. 2201 of 14 April 2022 ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine on improving the procedure for conducting criminal proceedings under martial law’, which sets out a new version of Article 615 ’Special regime for criminal proceedings under martial law’ of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

In accordance with this law, during martial law:

– if there is no objective possibility of continuing or completing a pre-trial investigation and referring the case to court with an indictment, a motion for the application of coercive measures of a medical or educational nature, a motion for exemption from criminal liability – the term of the pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings shall be suspended on the basis of a reasoned decision of the prosecutor, setting out the relevant circumstances, and shall be resumed if the grounds for suspension cease to exist. Prior to the suspension of the pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor is obliged to decide on the extension of the period of detention (subparagraph 3 of part 1 of Article 615);

– if there is no objective possibility of performing procedural actions within the time limits specified in Article 220 ‘Consideration of motions during pre-trial investigation’, Article 221 ‘Familiarisation with the materials of the pre-trial investigation before its completion’, Article 304 ‘Time limit for filing a complaint against a decision, action or inaction of an investigator or prosecutor, his return or refusal to open proceedings in a case’, Article 306 ‘Procedure for considering complaints against decisions, actions or inaction of an investigator or prosecutor during a pre-trial investigation’, Article 308 ‘Appeals regarding failure to comply with reasonable time limits’, Article 376 ‘Announcement of a court decision’, Article 395 ‘Procedure and time limits for appeals’, Article 426 ‘Procedure and time limits for cassation appeals’ of the Criminal Procedure Code, – such procedural actions shall be carried out immediately, if possible, but no later than 15 days after the termination or cancellation of martial law (subparagraph 5 of part 1 of Article 615);

– if there are cases of detention of a person without a ruling by an investigating judge or court, as specified in Article 208 ‘Detention by an authorised official’ of the Criminal Procedure Code, or there are reasonable circumstances indicating that evasion is possible in order to avoid criminal liability of a person suspected of committing a crime – an authorised official has the right to detain such a person without a decision of an investigating judge, court or resolution of the head of the prosecution authorities. The period of detention without a decision of an investigating judge, court or resolution of the head of the prosecution authorities during martial law may not exceed 216 hours from the moment of detention, as determined in accordance with Article 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code (subparagraph 6 of part 1 of Article 615);

– testimony obtained during the interrogation of a witness or victim, including the simultaneous interrogation of two or more persons, in criminal proceedings conducted under martial law may be used as evidence in court only if the course and results of such interrogations were recorded using available technical means of video recording. Testimony obtained during the interrogation of a suspect, including the simultaneous interrogation of two or more persons who have already been interrogated, in criminal proceedings conducted under martial law, may be used as evidence in court only if the defence counsel participated in such interrogation and the course and results of the interrogation were recorded using available technical means of video recording (subparagraph 11 of paragraph 1 of Article 615);

– the investigator or prosecutor shall ensure the participation of the defence counsel in a specific procedural action, including, if the defence counsel is unable to appear, through the use of technical means (video, audio) to ensure the remote participation of the defence counsel. The investigator or prosecutor shall ensure the participation of an interpreter to translate the explanations, testimony or documents of the suspect or victim at the earliest opportunity. If circumstances prevent the participation of an interpreter in criminal proceedings, the investigator or prosecutor shall have the right to personally translate explanations, testimony or documents if he or she speaks one of the languages of the suspect or victim (subparagraph 12 of part 1 of Article 615).

The provisions of Article 87 ‘Inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of a substantial violation of human rights and freedoms’ and Article 95 ‘Testimony’ of the Criminal Procedure Code shall apply considering the specific features set out in Article 615 of the Criminal Procedure Code (as amended by Law No. 2201).

The provisions of Article 87, ‘Inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of a substantial violation of human rights and freedoms’, and Article 95, ‘Testimony’, of the Criminal Procedure Code shall apply, considering the specific features set forth in Article 615 of the Criminal Procedure Code (as amended by Law No. 2201). The application of Law No. 2201 necessitates a departure from Articles 2 (paragraph 3), 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

On 5 April 2024, the derogation contained in Note No. 31011/32-119-46585 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine was partially withdrawn regarding Articles 4.3, 9, 13, 14 and 16 of the Convention.

In particular, it states that in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens provided for in Articles 30-34, 38, 39, 41, 44 and 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine may be temporarily restricted for the duration of martial law; temporary restrictions on the rights of individuals may also be introduced to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of the measures of the legal regime of martial law provided for in part one of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Legal Regime of Martial Law’.

The above-mentioned articles of the Constitution, which may be subject to restrictions, guarantee the inviolability of the home (Article 30); the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations and other communications (Article 31); non-interference in personal and family life (Article 32); freedom of movement, free choice of place of residence, the right to freely leave and return to the territory of Ukraine (Article 33); the right to freedom of thought and speech, free expression of views and beliefs, and the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information (Article 34); the right to participate in the management of public affairs and referendums, to freely elect and be elected to state and local authorities, and equal access to public service (Article 38); the right to hold assemblies, meetings, marches and demonstrations, as well as the right to strike (Articles 39, 44); the right to own, use and dispose of one’s property (Article 41); the right to entrepreneurship and work (Articles 42, 43); the right to education (Article 53).

In areas where martial law has been imposed, the military command may implement measures of the legal regime of martial law, in particular: compulsorily expropriate property that is privately or communally owned for the needs of the state under martial law, in accordance with the procedure established by law and issue relevant documents in this regard; introduce a curfew (a ban on being on the streets and in other public places during certain periods of time without specially issued passes and certificates) in accordance with the established procedure; establish a special regime for entry and exit in accordance with the established procedure, restrict the freedom of movement of citizens, foreigners and stateless persons, as well as the movement of vehicles; inspect belongings, vehicles, luggage and cargo, office premises and citizens’ homes in accordance with the established procedure, except restrictions established by the Constitution of Ukraine; prohibit peaceful assemblies, rallies, marches, demonstrations, and other mass events; establish, in accordance with the established procedure, a ban, or restriction on the choice of place of stay or residence of persons in the territory where martial law is in force; prohibit citizens who are on military or special registration from changing their place of residence without proper permission; establish a military housing tax for individuals and legal entities.

The possibility of applying the above measures entails a departure from the obligations provided for in Articles 12, 17, 19, 21, 25 of the Covenant and Articles 8, 10, 11 of the Convention, Articles 1, 2, 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

Derogation from the requirements under the previously specified Articles 3, 8(3), 9, 13, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27 of the Covenant and Articles 4(3), 9, 13, 14, 16 of the Convention is repealed.

Thus, in Ukraine’s declaration of derogation from certain obligations under the Convention, submitted on 4 April 2024, the scope of the derogation was revised and reduced. This is important because, in the context of ongoing armed aggression, Ukraine is consciously renewing its obligations and increasing the scope of the rights and freedoms it can guarantee.

In Verbal Note No. 31011/32-119-9327 of the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe dated 27 January 2025, updated information was provided on measures to derogate from its obligations under Article 2, paragraph 3, Articles 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. It is reported that, in accordance with Decision No. 8-r(II)/2024 of the Constitutional Court of 18 July 2024, part six of Article 615 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine ceased to have effect three months after the date of adoption of this Decision.

This part provided that in the event of martial law, if the term of a court decision on detention expired, and it was impossible for the court to consider the extension of the term of detention in accordance with the procedure established by the CPC, the preventive measure in the form of detention would be considered extended until the relevant issue was resolved by the court, but for no longer than two months.

At the same time, other provisions of this article, the possibility of applying which became the basis for the derogation, remain in force.

Thus, Article 615 of the CPC, considering the above changes, provides that in the event of the introduction of martial law:

– if it is not possible to draw up procedural documents on the conduct of investigative (search) or other procedural actions, the recording shall be carried out by technical means, with the subsequent drawing up of a protocol no later than 72 hours after the completion of these actions;

– if it is not possible to continue the proceedings, complete the pre-trial investigation and submit an indictment, a motion for the application of coercive measures of a medical or educational nature, a motion for the release of a person from criminal liability to the court, the term of the pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings shall be suspended because of a reasoned decision of the prosecutor stating the relevant circumstances and shall be subject to continuation if the grounds for suspension no longer exist. Prior to the suspension of the pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor is obliged to decide on the extension of the period of detention;

– if it is not possible to perform procedural actions within the time limits specified in the CPC, such actions shall be performed immediately, where possible, but no later than 15 days after the termination or cancellation of martial law;

– if it is impossible to hold a preliminary court hearing, the preventive measure in the form of detention chosen by the investigating judge or the head of the prosecution authorities during the pre-trial investigation shall be considered extended until it takes effect. The issue shall be resolved at a preliminary court hearing, but for no longer than two months;

– testimony obtained during the interrogation of a suspect in criminal proceedings may be used as evidence in court if the defence lawyer participated in the interrogation and its course and results were recorded by technical means of video recording. Video recording of the testimony of witnesses and victims obtained during the interrogation is also permitted;

– the investigator, prosecutor, and investigator are obliged to ensure: (i) the remote participation of the defence lawyer in a specific procedural action using technical means of video and audio communication if it is impossible for him to appear in person; (ii) the participation of an interpreter at the earliest opportunity in the translation of explanations, statements, or documents of the suspect or victim. If circumstances prevent the interpreter from participating, the investigator, inquiry officer or prosecutor is entitled to perform the relevant translation personally if they know one of the languages spoken by the suspect or victim.

The possibility of applying the above-mentioned provisions of Article 615 of the Code of Criminal Procedure necessitates a continued derogation from Ukraine’s obligations under Article 2(3), Articles 9, 14 and 17 of the Covenant and Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of fair trial and legal protection, including the principle of ne bis in idem.

Returning to the characterisation of Ukrainian constitutionalism during the war, we note that its very essence as a system of rights that limits the arbitrariness of the state is being seriously tested.

On the one hand, the state of political relations has an objective tendency towards the establishment of autocracy (at least during the war), while on the other hand, the mechanisms of the state and civil society institutions continue to perform their roles (albeit with varying degrees of effectiveness). Terms such as ‘military constitutionalism’ or ‘war constitutionalism’ are being introduced into scientific discourse as a special mechanism for the exercise of state power during wartime, which allows for derogations from the constitutional principles of the functioning of power provided for by the Constitution in peacetime.

In other words, war becomes a basis for rethinking those values whose inviolability in peacetime is obvious and beyond doubt, values that are a qualitative feature of the liberal human-centred approach to the exercise of public power.

To a certain extent, these concepts echo the doctrine of ‘militant democracy’, which was first proposed by the renowned German constitutionalist K. Löwenstein in his 1937 article ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights’. Describing the catastrophic situation with the dominance of totalitarian extremist regimes on the European continent, he called on democratic countries to defend themselves, which he briefly characterised with the words ‘fire must be fought with fire’. Its essence lies in banning political forces and movements of a fascist, communist or extremist nature (whose activities are aimed at supporting or promoting the suppression of citizens’ rights and freedoms, contributing to national, racial, class or religious hatred, etc.) and developing other instruments for the self-defence of democracy.

The War has threatened not only Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also the very foundations of constitutionalism. Therefore, the mechanisms of modern constitutionalism must be flexible. Derogations from commitments to ensure human rights is one way to ensure such flexibility.

However, derogation from obligations does not necessarily mean that the State is unable to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Convention. In fact, in practice, when declaring a derogation from its obligations, the State usually states that the measures it is taking “may” involve a derogation from its obligations under the Convention.

For this reason, whenever an applicant complains that his or her Convention rights have been violated during a period of derogation, the Court first examines whether the measures taken can be justified under the fundamental provisions of the Convention; and only if they cannot be justified in this way does the Court proceed to determine whether the derogation was lawful (A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 161; Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), § 15).

Ukraine’s experience with derogation is unique in its scope and duration, as is the war in Ukraine for the European continent. The practice of the ECtHR, which will inevitably arise in the future in connection with the derogations from the obligations under the Convention made during the war, will give impetus to the development of European constitutionalism in extraordinary circumstances.

We had an excellent opportunity to ask him several short questions about the new model, which is very promising both for the effectiveness of police activities and the protection of the human rights of persons detained in police custody.

What is Investigative interviewing?

Investigative interviewing is a non-coercive method for questioning victims, witnesses and suspects of crimes. Generally, investigative interviewing involves eliciting a detailed and accurate account of an event from a person to assist police and prosecutors decision-making.

This interviewing technique is ethical and research-based. It stimulates safe and effective gathering of evidence in criminal proceedings. The goal of an investigative interview is to obtain accurate, reliable and actionable information. The method aims at maximising the likelihood of obtaining relevant information and minimise the risks of contaminating evidence obtained in police questioning.

The method has been described as a tool for mitigating the use of torture, coercion and psychological manipulation, and for averting forced confessions and errors of justice leading to wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice.

Traditionally, the main aim of an interrogation has been to obtain a confession from a suspect to secure a conviction. Thus, investigative interviewing contrasts pervasive interrogation techniques aimed at making the suspect break down and confess. The difference between these two approaches has led some authors to argue that the term “interrogation” should be scrapped altogether, as it is inherently coercive and aimed at obtaining a confession.

Much of the scientific base of investigative interviewing stems from social- and cognitive psychology, including studies of human memory, interpersonal communication and decision making theory The method aims at mitigating the effects of inherent human fallacies and cognitive biases such as suggestibility, confirmation bias, priming and false memories.

In the interim report dated 5 August 2016 to the UN General Assembly of the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the investigative interviewing method is presented at length as an example of best practice. Responding to the interim report, a Steering committee in close cooperation with its advisory board, consisting of more than 100 experts from all over the world, published a set of principles on Effective Interviewing for Investigations and Information Gathering- today known as The Méndez Principles (2021).

It should be noted that accusatorial models of questioning tend to be confession-driven and characterized by a de facto presumption of guilt and the use of confrontation and psychological manipulation. Common manipulative techniques are coercive in nature and likely to impair the free will, judgment and memory of interviewees. Threats, inducements, misleading practices, protracted or suggestive questioning and the use of drugs or hypnosis are examples of problematic practices. Demeaning or condescending comments or accusations based on individual qualities or cultural identities are also of concern.

Coercive techniques, even when not amounting to torture or ill-treatment, are means to the same ends, administered by State agents to confirm their presumption of guilt. They are likely to produce faulty information and give rise to conditions conducive to the use of torture or ill-treatment. Strengthening protection against coercive questioning methods and championing an interviewing model based on the principle of presumption of innocence are accordingly key to preventing mistreatment during questioning and enhancing authorities’ effectiveness.

What was the evolution of this model?

The term investigative interviewing was introduced in the UK in the early 1990s to represent a shift in police interviewing away from a confession-oriented approach and towards evidence gathering. The UK was the first nation to build a stronger relationship between the police and scientists.

Norway followed it 10 years afterwards.

Five years after that, in fact, in the other part of the world, New Zealand became the third country to commit itself officially to investigative interviewing.

Australia is certainly moving in the same direction.

The Netherlands are certainly moving towards investigative interviewing. Canada also,  although Canada is still influenced by Northern American confession-orientated techniques.

Why is investigative interviewing important for contemporary police services?

Some States have moved away from accusatorial, manipulative and confession driven interviewing models with a view to increasing accurate and reliable information and minimizing the risks of unreliable information and miscarriages of justice.

Investigative interviewing models fashioned after the British model were subsequently adopted by other jurisdictions. Initially developed for criminal investigations, models of investigative interviewing can provide positive guidance for the protocol and be applied in a wide range of investigative contexts, including intelligence and military operations.

The investigative interviewing model comprises several essential elements that are key to the prevention of mistreatment and coercion and help to guarantee effectiveness.

Interviewers must, in particular, seek to obtain accurate and reliable information in the pursuit of truth; gather all available evidence pertinent to a case before beginning interviews; prepare and plan interviews based on that evidence; establish rapport with the interviewee; maintain a professional, fair and respectful attitude during questioning; allow the interviewee to give his or her free and uninterrupted account of the events; use open-ended questions and active listening; scrutinize the interviewee’s account and analyse the information obtained against previously available information or evidence; and evaluate each interview with a view to learning and developing additional skills.

The remainder of the present section provides an overview of some of these elements, on which the protocol should provide detailed guidance.

Open mindedness, impartiality and fairness are critical components of investigative interviews. They require officers to keep an open mind, even when the evidence against a person is strong. This stimulates an objective, impartial and fair interviewing process and hence, reducing the risks of resorting to confession-oriented techniques or coercion. It prevents eliciting false admissions or faulty intelligence. In criminal investigations, a fair police process will form the preparatory basis for a fair trial. Officers must remain professional and not allow their prejudices, preconceptions or emotions affect their performance during interviews.

Systematic and solid preparation increases the quality and likelihood of successful interviews. Conversely, insufficient preparation is bound to cause setbacks and creates risks that agents will resort to pressure or physical coercion to elicit information or confessions. Adequate preparation requires full knowledge of and compliance with applicable rules of procedure governing the conduct of interviews. To conduct the most effective interview possible, officers should, among other things, have clear knowledge and understanding of all information pertinent to the case, be fully cognizant of the legal definition of the offence under investigation and identify all potential evidence in the case file and every possible explanation of its origin. The preparation of a strategy and interview structure designed to best elicit information is also essential. Propper preparations  allows agents to remain flexible throughout the interview.

The development and maintenance of rapport is also a crucial determinant of effective non-coercive interviews. Rapport can help to reduce the interviewee’s anxiety, anger or distress. It stimulates communication and hence, increasing the likelihood of obtaining more complete and reliable information. Rapport building techniques must not be used for the purposes of manipulation or to exert undue pressure to induce confessions, which would be incompatible with the purpose and spirit of the investigative interviewing model. The protocol should clearly set out the duty of interviewers to maintain a professional attitude and refrain from using any form of coercion during the entire interview process. It must also emphasize that interviewers ought to obtain the cooperation of persons questioned, rather than to demonstrate their authority or gain control over them, manipulate them or force them to comply with their wishes.

It is recommended that interviewers begin each topic by asking open-ended questions and allow the interviewee to provide a free and uninterrupted account of the events under investigation. Contrary to complex, leading or compound questions, open-ended and neutral questions encourage memory retrieval and are less likely to induce statements against a person’s will, influence his or her account or contaminate his or her memory. Broad and open-ended questions will enable innocent suspects to provide information freely, while preventing guilty suspects from constructing false explanations.

As a matter of best practice, interviewers are encouraged to proceed, when necessary, with probing questions designed to elicit information that will test all possible alternative explanations identified during the preparation of the interview. Strategic probing and disclosure of potential evidence allows officers to explore the interviewee’s account in depth before proceeding to the next topic, helping to ensure that the presumption of innocence is respected while strengthening the case against a guilty suspect by preventing the subsequent fabrication of an alibi. Although interviewers may be persistent with their line of questioning when probing the interviewee’s account, questioning must never become unfair or oppressive.

The same guiding principles should apply to interviews of witnesses, victims and other persons in the criminal justice system. The protocol must additionally regulate objective, fair, human rights based, non-coercive and rapport-based intelligence interviews during intelligence and military operations. Research and experienced practitioners with knowledge of Investigative Interviewing agree that ethical information gathering approaches similar to those employed in the criminal justice system lead to greater information gains and offer a more effective model than coercive intelligence interviewing. 

Would it be possible to implement such a model in Ukraine?

I have done training and teaching in Asia, including Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and China. We see that in their police academies, they see that this is the direction they want to go. I am not saying that investigative interviewing is dominating all interactions between the Asian police and its people. However, they have started to understand that they should change.

Other countries, like Scandinavian countries and some other European countries, certainly have adopted many of the ideas, but what I have recently seen at international conferences on investigative interviewing is that quite a few of my colleagues say: “We are doing investigative interviewing“. But when I look at their methodology, I see that, yet they start off with investigative interviewing, and then they do a bit of interrogation, and then they go back to investigative interviewing. However, that is not investigative interviewing. Such an compo-approach is not the change of the mindset that we are referring to. I mean, that trick has been in the book for years – playing good cop, bad cop etc. The mindset of the detectives with such combo-approach remains the same – how to make suspects confess. They just use more manipulative, more subtle ways of seeking for their confirmation. 

Investigative interviewing requires a change of mindset. In CPT Standards from 2019 this change is referred to as a paradigm shift within policing.

According to the latest August data obtained by amNewYork, the attrition rate of officers either retiring or calling it quits before reaching the 20-year mark has reached a staggering high. The department has lost some 14,500 cops in the past 4 1/2 years, that’s almost half of the number of officers currently on the job.

An average of 316 NYPD rank-and-file officers departed the NYPD every month. Police have lost 5,248 individuals since January 2024 and have hired just 4,244 new officers in return.

Speaking with amNewYork under the assurance of anonymity, a recently retired cop who gave his name as John said due to the NYPD’s fleeting numbers he was worked to the bone, leaving a tremendous toll on his personal life.

“It just doesn’t affect me. It affects my immediate family. It affects my extended family. It even extended to my friends. I’d have to say: can you walk my son to school? I got stuck in this shift, and now I gotta work this day,” John said. “The job just didn’t affect you or your wife, your husband. It affects everybody. It really starts to bleed into people who aren’t even affiliated with the NYPD.”

John told amNewYork that he was part of a specialized unit but due to the lack of resources was often utilized as a beat cop and placed on a footpost, not only overworking him but also lowering his morale.
“You get brought into this unit, you achieve where you want to be. You get certain training, they spend a lot of money on training for you, and all they do then is basically use you as a rookie. You’re back on footpost again,” John said. “It’s crushing.”

As of August, the current NYPD headcount stands at 33,740, short of 1,261 of the department’s budgeted headcount of just over 35,000. It also falls below the 2019 numbers, which stood at 36,461, and well below 25 years ago, in 2000, when the city boasted some 40,285 members.

Delving into the numbers further reveals that so far in 2025, 1,807 cops have retired, and 517 have quit outright.

Officers amNewYork spoke with stated that the workload and its impact on family life have many cops trading in their NYPD patches for other law enforcement agencies.

Police sources reported that 21 former NYPD officers are set to start in Suffolk County this week. While the starting salary for a Suffolk County Police Department officer is just $50,000, after eight years, an officer can earn more than $189,000; by contrast, an NYPD officer’s salary starts at $60,884 and rises to $126,410 after 5 1/2 years of service.

An NYPD spokesperson said that the department has been attempting to attract more recruits by waving the application fee for police officer exams scheduled to take place next month, while also lowering the minimum age for police officer applicants to 20-years-old, something NYPD hopes will increase the amount of prospective cops. The Spokesperson also stated that the last NYPD graduating class was the largest in almost a decade.

“The NYPD recently welcomed nearly 1,000 officers to our ranks – the largest class since 2016. This is a department and a profession that is once again attracting young and bright talent in big numbers at scale. We will continue to attract the highest level of candidates to protect this city, and that starts with making the path to policing more accessible.”

Additionally, Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch has made several efforts to bolster her waning ranks. One is lowering the college credits needed to become a cop and boosting the number of college credits officers receive upon graduating from the academy. Still, the numbers are struggling to grow.

Police Benevolent Association President Patrick Hendry — who previously fought for a better pension for officers and, in turn, laid an incentive to keep cops on the job longer — says that the blue exodus will not be slowed unless the department alters the way in which cops are treated and lightens the workload.

“The NYPD’s staffing crisis is continuing to take an enormous toll on our members’ family lives and their physical and mental well-being. The burden is unsustainable, and it’s driving too many talented cops out the door,” Hendry said.

“The city needs to use every tool at its disposal to not only attract recruits but also keep the cops we already have. That means not only offering competitive pay and benefits, but also providing more time off, more predictable schedules and treating them like the professionals they are.”

John stated that he loved his job as a cop and yearned to stay longer than his 20 years, but told amNewYork he could no longer handle the toll of duty and the disproportionate number between cops and New York City citizens. He estimated that one cop alone would be responsible for nearly 400 New Yorkers.

“If there were three of us on this interview right now and we’re standing on a police footpost together, each of us would be responsible for 395 people on average. I always make the joke that I have a hard time controlling my two kids, but you want me to be able to control 395 people?” John asked. “We’re on one, maybe two or three hours of sleep sometimes, and then they expect you not to make mistakes. Nobody wants to be in that situation.”

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