The weapon used by the gunman was officially registered, and he himself held the relevant permits. According to journalists’ reports, the man turned out to be a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian Armed Forces – a native of Moscow with Ukrainian citizenship – who, according to some sources, had made donations in support of the so-called ‘special military operation’. According to preliminary information, he had already attacked people in the same shop three years earlier. Neighbours say he moved into the building at the start of the full-scale invasion.

These facts form a chilling picture, but our task is not to inflame emotions – it is to try to answer, calmly and honestly, the questions that this tragedy inevitably poses to society, the law enforcement system and the rule of law.

WEAPONS, LICENCES AND THE ILLUSION OF SAFETY

The first and most obvious conclusion that springs to mind is that this crime was committed using a legally registered weapon. This is not a mere detail but a fundamentally important circumstance that undermines one of the central arguments of those lobbying for the free circulation of firearms: ‘Legal Weapons = Safety’.

The debate over the liberalisation of the firearms market in Ukraine has raged for years, but it intensified particularly in the context of the full-scale war, when a section of society and a number of lawmakers began insisting on enshrining the right to bear arms in the constitution, citing the need for self-defence and patriotic duty. The tragedy in Korsun polarised society at the time: many people sympathised with the man who had used a weapon against law enforcement officers – which in itself is symptomatic and alarming.

The current case is fundamentally different. Here there is no ‘people’s avenger’ or ‘Korsun Robin Hood’, nor is there any hint of social conflict with the system. There is a retired lieutenant-colonel who shoots peaceful supermarket shoppers with a legally registered pistol. It is precisely this circumstance that should settle the debate: not ‘who’ commits the crime or what their ideology is, but the fact that Ukraine’s system for issuing firearms licences is structurally incapable of filtering out those who harbour hidden destructive intentions. Screening during the registration of firearms has proved futile. Previous attacks on people in the same shop did not lead to the licence being revoked. The system failed.

Here, however, we must refrain from oversimplification. The people’s right to resist tyranny remains a fundamental principle of constitutional theory and international legal tradition. The question is not whether a citizen has the right to defend themselves, but whether the state is capable of responsibly managing the circulation of weapons in conditions of hybrid warfare, social trauma and the psychological instability of the population. The answer provided by this tragedy is – not yet.

NEGOTIATIONS, DE-ESCALATION AND COMMUNICATION FAILURE

For around 40 minutes, negotiators attempted to establish contact with the attacker, but he did not respond. “He did not make contact. I did not hear him,” noted the head of the negotiation unit at the Kyiv National Police.

This is a key detail that requires separate analysis. Forty minutes is both a long time and a short time. For negotiators, this is a relatively brief period in tactical terms. But the very fact of a complete lack of any response from the attacker indicates not only his pathological determination, but also a fundamental problem: were these forty minutes used with genuinely professional techniques for engaging a person in crisis? Does our police force even have the necessary level of training for negotiators capable of working with people who have crossed a psychological threshold?

Today, a dangerous mindset prevails among some Ukrainian police officers: ‘Shoot First – Sort It Out Later’. This mindset has gained further momentum in a wartime environment, where violence is normalised and the right to use force is interpreted far more broadly than provided for by law and human rights standards. The Kyiv tragedy, like many before it, risks becoming not a catalyst for reform but a confirmation of this flawed logic. Meanwhile, the ECtHR consistently emphasises that when assessing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force, account must be taken not only of the actions of the perpetrators but also of all the surrounding circumstances – in particular, planning and control (Mikhalkova and Others v. Ukraine, para. 36; McCann and Others v. the UK [GC], para. 150). The legislative and administrative framework must clearly define the limited circumstances in which law enforcement officers may use firearms, and police officers must not be left in a state of uncertainty regarding these limits (Soare and Others v. Romania, para. 129).

The true measure of police effectiveness is the ability to resolve critical situations without resorting to lethal force. It is in this direction that modern policing is developing in democratic countries, where officers acquire skills honed over years in de-escalation, psychological influence and – only in extreme cases – the use of weapons. The ECtHR in Soare and Others v. Romania explicitly stated that the absence of clear rules and proper training explains the inadequate and autonomous actions of police officers in critical situations (para. 135). And in Celniku v. Greece, the Court held that Article 2 of the ECHR covers not only the direct actions of police officers but also staff training: if the level of training does not correspond to the complexity of the tasks at hand, the state bears responsibility.

NEUTRALISATION OF THE ATTACKER: ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE

Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated that KORD special forces carried out a raid and neutralised the attacker. During the assault, the perpetrator resisted law enforcement officers and opened fire on them.

In the acute phase of a crisis, when a person is actively shooting at police officers, the use of lethal force is formally justified even under the strict standards of Article 2 of the Convention.

The ECtHR, in cases such as McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, Nachova v. Bulgaria and Finogenov v. Russia, has consistently developed the criterion of ‘absolute necessity’: the state is obliged to prove that the person’s death was the result of force that did not exceed what was absolutely necessary in the specific circumstances. At the same time, as explained in McCann and Others v. the UK [GC] (para. 200), the use of force is justified only where the agents genuinely believed that opening fire was necessary and had subjectively sufficient grounds for doing so — rather than merely following orders.

The standard of ‘absolute necessity’ is stricter than the criterion of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under Articles 8 and 11 of the ECHR: force must be strictly proportionate (Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], para. 199; Kelly and Others v. the UK, para. 93). In a situation involving the rescue of a hostage from an armed criminal offering active resistance, these conditions may be met — but this still requires verification.

But this is precisely where the issue begins that most commentators prefer to sidestep. The state is obliged to conduct an effective independent investigation into whether there really was no other tactical option. Were all possibilities for a non-violent resolution of the situation exhausted? Was the timing of the assault correctly chosen? Is every shot fired by KORD officers documented and justified? The ECtHR in Al-Skeini and Others v. the UK [GC] (para. 163) and Armani Da Silva v. the UK [GC] (para. 233) clearly stated: the investigation must cover not only the immediate actions of those carrying out the operation but also the planning and control of the operation as a whole; it must be capable of establishing whether the use of force was justified. Any shortcoming that undermines this capability constitutes a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the ECHR. A telling example is the case of Finogenov and Others v. Russia (Operation ‘Nord-Ost’), where the Court found a violation precisely because of the incompleteness and bias of the investigation.

In the context of Ukraine during a full-scale invasion, a public demand for an investigation into the circumstances of the death of a man who had just killed six civilians sounds critically unpopular. But this is precisely the essence of the rule of law: Article 2 of the ECHR protects the right to life not only of the criminal’s victims, but also of the criminal himself. Without this principle, the entire human rights framework becomes a situational compromise of the majority, rather than a system of universal guarantees. Article 2 of the ECHR imposes a positive obligation on the state not only to refrain from the intentional deprivation of life, but also to take preventive measures to protect persons within its jurisdiction (Yuriy Illarionovich Shchokin v. Ukraine, para. 35). A general legal prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life becomes ineffective without an effective review procedure: this is precisely how the Court formulated it in Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC] (para. 249) and Al-Skeini and Others v. the UK [GC] (para. 163). Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus demonstrates that even a hostage rescue operation resulting in the death of a perpetrator may be deemed lawful – but only provided that planning was carried out with a view to minimising risk, negotiations were conducted rationally, and the operatives had clear instructions to use only proportionate force (para. 194).

Furthermore, there is a purely practical argument: a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian Armed Forces who had lived in Ukraine, made donations to the ‘SVO’ and ultimately carried out a mass shooting – this was a source of information of exceptional value to counter-intelligence. His motives, connections, possible handlers and funding channels could all have been established during interrogations. His elimination has permanently shut down that channel.

THE DANGER OF ‘SECURITY’ DISCOURSE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

This tragedy will inevitably give rise to legislative initiatives. Some will be aimed at tightening controls on the circulation of weapons — and this is justified and necessary. But others — and this is where alarm bells should ring — will use this incident to justify expanding the police apparatus, intensifying preventive surveillance and legalising ‘proactive’ operational measures.

This mechanism is well known in human rights practice: a terrorist attack or large-scale crime becomes a ‘window of opportunity’ for the state to expand its powers in areas where citizens would not normally permit such intrusion. Laws passed ‘in the heat of the moment’ are, as a rule, not repealed even after the shock has passed.

The right to private and family life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to the protection of personal data, the right not to be subject to preventive police surveillance without sufficient grounds – all these guarantees are under threat whenever society experiences a sudden surge of fear. The standard of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under Article 8 of the ECHR is less stringent than the criterion of ‘absolutely necessary’ under Article 2, but even this does not permit the state to introduce widespread preventive surveillance without individual grounds and judicial oversight. The task of the human rights community, the legal profession and the academic community is to ensure that a single tragedy does not become a justification for systemic restrictions on rights that will affect millions of people who have no connection whatsoever to the crime.

POLICE TRAINING

A dangerous trend that has long been brewing within the Ukrainian police has now gained new momentum: a readiness to use weapons before establishing the facts. The tragedy of 18 April risks becoming not a warning but a justification for this logic – and it is currently extremely difficult to assess the true scale of such a shift.

That is precisely why this case must serve as a compelling argument in favour of a systematic review of police training – but not in the direction of improving marksmanship or physical skills. We are talking about something fundamentally different: training officers in the art of communication, the ability to defuse tension in real time and the professional application of de-escalation techniques.

The true measure of the effectiveness of a modern police force is the ability to resolve critical situations without violence. The shift from a punitive model to one of dialogue and professional restraint is not romanticism but a practical necessity. This is where the future of Ukraine’s law enforcement system lies.

CONCLUSIONS

This tragedy presents a multi-layered challenge. For society, it is a call for restraint amidst emotional pressure and the temptation of simplistic answers. For legislators, it is a challenge to draft regulations that genuinely enhance safety without becoming instruments of punitive bureaucracy. For the police, it is a mirror in which they must see not their own heroism but their systemic shortcomings in training, de-escalation and tactical flexibility. For human rights defenders, it is a reminder that the protection of human rights cannot be conditional: either it applies to everyone, or it does not exist as a principle.

Six families are mourning their loved ones. This is an undeniable reality, and it takes precedence. But the appropriate response to these deaths is not a new wave of police aggression or a flurry of emotional legislation – it is a systematic, dispassionate and honest analysis of where the system failed, and how to fix it without losing our humanity.

Angela Lipps, a 50-year-old grandmother and mother of three, spent over five months behind bars after Fargo (North Dakota) police linked her to bank frauds committed in a state where, by her own account, she had never been. It was only after her extradition to North Dakota that her lawyer discovered bank records confirming that Lipps had been in Tennessee at the time the crimes were committed. The charges were dropped on 23 December, and she was released on Christmas Eve.

This case calls for a much deeper analysis than simply noting yet another algorithmic failure. It demonstrates a structural pattern inherent in every era of technological transformation in criminal justice: a new identification tool is introduced with enthusiasm and uncritical trust, supplanting tried-and-tested methods of establishing facts, whilst specific individuals become the victims of systemic errors. To see this pattern for oneself, one need only look at a case that took place over 120 years ago in London.

THE CASE OF ADOLF BECK: ANATOMY OF AN IDENTIFICATION ERROR AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In 1896, the Norwegian national Adolf Beck was convicted by the Central Criminal Court of London (the Old Bailey) for a series of frauds against women — allegedly, posing as a lord, he would approach them on the street, promise expensive gifts, and steal their jewellery. The verdict was based almost exclusively on witness testimony: the victims identified Beck unanimously. Moreover, the police established that similar crimes had been committed in 1877 by a person using the same modus operandi — and this old case was attributed to Beck without sufficient grounds.

After serving five years of his sentence, Beck was released in 1901 — only to find himself back in custody in 1904 on identical charges. And once again: confident, unanimous eyewitness testimony. And once again: an innocent man. The real offender — William Thomas, operating under the alias John Smith — was apprehended only by chance: he committed yet another fraud after Beck’s second arrest and was caught in the act. Beck was released and pardoned. The total duration of his wrongful imprisonment amounted to approximately seven years.

What allowed this miscarriage of justice to occur not once but twice? The answer lies in the institutional attitude towards the new identification paradigm. The late nineteenth century was the era of what was then called ‘scientific policing’: Bertillon’s anthropometry, later fingerprinting, and systematised procedures for questioning witnesses. Eyewitnesses no longer simply ‘recognised’ a suspect — they participated in a procedure that carried the trappings of scientific rigour. The procedural authority of identification became self-sufficient evidence requiring no verification. Beck’s alibis were not seriously investigated precisely because ‘scientific’ identification appeared more reliable than any exculpatory counter-evidence.

The Beck case had significant legal consequences: in 1907, the Court of Criminal Appeal was established in England — directly as an institutional response to the demonstrated inability of the system to self-correct in cases involving identification errors.

STRUCTURAL PARALLELS: TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND FAILURES OF PROOF

A comparison of the Beck and Lipps cases reveals a striking structural isomorphism, suggesting a consistent pattern rather than mere coincidence.

First, in both cases the identification technology was introduced into law enforcement practice without proper validation and without established standards for its admissibility. The Fargo police chief admitted at a press conference that the department had acquired its own facial recognition system ‘without the knowledge of senior management’ and without agreed protocols for its use. ‘We would not have allowed this to be used,’ he stated, noting that the system has since been prohibited. In the Beck case, systematic in-person identification was similarly introduced as a tool of ‘progress’ without adequate consideration of its inherent limitations.

Second, in both cases alibis or counter-evidence were available from the outset but were not properly investigated, due to excessive reliance on the identification outcome. Lipps’s lawyers emphasised that ‘the police officer used facial recognition as a substitute for basic investigation’ and that ‘no investigation was carried out to establish whether she was even in North Dakota at the relevant time’. The word ‘substitute’ is key: the technology did not supplement traditional investigative methods — it replaced them.

Third, in both cases the institutional machinery continued to move by inertia even after the first signs of error appeared. The police received information about potentially exculpatory evidence as early as 12 December, yet a substantive response — involving the investigator, the prosecutor, and the judge — did not follow until 23 December, more than five months after the arrest.

Fourth, the legal consequences for the victims proved catastrophic beyond the scope of the criminal proceedings themselves. For Beck, prolonged detention destroyed his reputation and social standing. For Lipps, ‘the trauma, loss of liberty and reputational damage cannot be easily remedied’, her lawyers state, noting that they are considering bringing civil rights claims.

This parallel points to a central theoretical problem: why do such errors recur with each technological shift in the identification paradigm? The answer lies in what might be called technological determinism in evidence law — the tendency, once a new tool acquires ‘scientific’ status, to treat it as a priori superior to traditional forms of evidence. This cognitive bias is reinforced by a structural asymmetry: the flaws of traditional methods (eyewitness testimony, documentary records) are well known and openly discussed, whereas the flaws of the new tool remain systematically invisible until the first high-profile scandal.

PROCEDURAL AND NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS

The Lipps case highlights several normative questions long debated in the doctrine of criminal procedure, which have taken on new urgency with the widespread introduction of AI into law enforcement.

The first is the admissibility standard for algorithmic evidence. The result of Clearview AI’s facial recognition served as the basis for issuing an arrest warrant with inter-state extradition — without any verification by an independent competent authority.

The second concerns procedural safeguards when using automated systems. The ‘human-in-the-loop’ principle has gained widespread formal recognition, yet the Lipps case demonstrates its practical erosion: a human is technically present, but their role is reduced to relaying the algorithmic output without critical scrutiny. ‘The detectives mistakenly assumed that they had also been sent photographs from the scene along with the identification conclusion,’ the police chief admitted — describing a process in which even the minimal verification step nominally built into the procedure was bypassed by those captivated by the authority of the algorithm.

The third concerns remedial justice. The police chief declined to apologise, citing an ongoing investigation into a ‘wide network of individuals’. This stance is symptomatic: institutional denial of responsibility is as much a structural component of the pattern as the original error.

CONCLUSIONS: THE PERPETUAL RACE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

The Lipps case is neither an anomaly nor the product of purely individual negligence. It is the predictable outcome of an incomplete institutional understanding of a new identification paradigm. One hundred and thirty years separate the Adolf Beck case from the Angela Lipps case, yet the nature of the error is unchanged. Technological innovation alters only the instrument; the first victims are always those whose alibi proves ‘less convincing’ than the authority of an identification system that has not yet stood the test of time.

For the doctrine of evidence law, the Lipps case reaffirms that proven reliability, reproducibility of results, and independent verification must remain the constant criteria for the admissibility of evidence, regardless of the technological nature of the tool. The foundational principle — that no evidence is self-sufficient and that all evidence must be tested in adversarial proceedings — is not superseded by the advent of artificial intelligence. On the contrary: the more powerful the tool, the stricter the procedural framework governing its use must be.

The genuine novelty of our era lies not in the fact that algorithms make mistakes — all identification systems do — but in the fact that the pace and scale of their deployment are outrunning the development of legal safeguards against their errors.

On October 28, 2025, a large-scale police operation took place in the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha communities, reportedly aimed at enforcing some 100 judicial warrants against individuals linked to organized criminal groups. According to official information, at least 121 people were killed, including four police officers. Some 81 people were detained.

For decades, the high lethality associated with policing in Brazil has become normalized, particularly in areas like Rio de Janeiro, where it has recently increased significantly. Brazil must break the cycle of extreme brutality and ensure that law enforcement operations comply with international standards regarding the use of force.

Türk called for prompt, independent, and effective investigations into Tuesday’s events and for a comprehensive policing reform.

Independent mechanisms should also be established to support the families and communities affected to help them access justice and reparation.

Türk urged the authorities to adopt a national policing strategy rooted in a human rights-based approach. Any use of potentially lethal force must be aligned with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination. Lethal force may only be used when strictly necessary to protect life or prevent serious injury from an imminent threat.

Addressing systemic racism against people of African descent in Brazil is paramount.

According to the International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement (EMLER), the killing of people of African descent by law enforcement in Brazil is not only generalized but is also carried out in a systematic way. An estimated 5,000 people of African descent are killed by the police each year. Young men of African descent living in impoverished areas are the main victims.

“It is time to end a system that perpetuates racism, discrimination, and injustice,” said the UN Human Rights Chief.

“Reforms are urgently needed to avoid repetition. Violations cannot go unpunished. Proper accountability processes must lead to truth and justice to avoid further impunity and violence.”

This theoretically will allow more retailers and restaurants to deliver goods and food by drone. The problem with that is economics. Delivery drones can’t carry much weight and have big obstacles for getting the product on the ground with damaging the drone, the goods or the family pet.

Moreover, point-to-point deliveries are expensive. A delivery driver normally can make as many as 200 residential stops a day and drop off multiple packages at one place. Wind, rain and snow can impede drone deliveries. These drawbacks are the reason FedEx and United Parcel Service long ago cooled their enthusiasm on the drone-delivery promise.

On the other hand, apart from myriad military uses, small commercial drones excel at inspection, surveillance and videography. Companies and governments use drones to inspect bridges or home rooftops, to cover news and sporting events, to stage spectacular light shows and to contribute unbelievable aerial shots for movies and nature documentaries.

The ability to provide live, aerial views at the fraction of the cost of a helicopter also makes drones useful for law enforcement and firefighters. Police departments are employing them to track suspects and give officers more situational awareness at crime scenes. A drone can help firefighters search dangerous areas for trapped people. As the FAA relaxes restrictions, you can expect to see more first-responder drones buzzing around the sky. This raises all kinds of privacy concerns. But if the police can come up with acceptable rules and transparency to safeguard citizens’ rights, drones can become a powerful tool.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department just this fall received FAA authorization for remote pilots to fly drones beyond visual line of sight except near airports and military facilities. In an even bigger breakthrough for drone proponents, the department got the nod to have one remote pilot operate up to four autonomous drones at the same time, Dori Koren, assistant deputy sheriff at the department, said in September during a presentation by drone maker Skydio. This latter permission will make it much more cost effective for cities nationwide to operate a drone-response program.

Pushback on the use of police drones has already started, spearheaded by the American Civil Liberties Union and groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The ACLU joined community organizations to sue the Baltimore Police Department to stop an aerial surveillance program, which used light airplanes at the time. A U.S. appeals court ruling in 2021 struck down the program, which by that time had ceased to operate.

Law enforcement can get ahead of privacy concerns and gain public confidence by offering transparency about when drones are deployed and how the data collected during flights is used and stored. Police drones shouldn’t be used to patrol the streets and certainly shouldn’t be peeking into people’s backyards or windows. Drones should be launched in conjunction only with a 911 call.

This is the policy for the 75-drone fleet of the Las Vegas police, an early adopter of drone technology. Every drone flight is logged and audited to make sure it’s in response to an active police call, Koren said at a news conference in September. The cameras will point up when the drone is on the way to the scene and the department won’t retain any data it doesn’t need, he said.

The drones, made by Skydio, have flashing red and blue lights and contain a parachute that deploys in case of a midair emergency, he said.

Las Vegas began its “Blue Sky” drone program last year with designated officers carrying drones in the back of police cruisers and launching them when arriving at the scene. With the additional FAA permissions, the program is now switching gears to become much more autonomous.

The department is installing 13 all-weather skyports around the city, mostly at existing police and fire department facilities. These skyports, which double as charging stations, house three drones — one that is deployed and two that serve as backup if the first one runs low on battery power. The drones can launch and land autonomously from the skyports, whose placement around the city can cut response time to seconds.

While the drones are in the air, a remote operator monitoring the video feed can click on a suspect’s car, for example, and the drone automatically follows the vehicle. In one dramatic scene in San Francisco, a police drone tracked a car thief without his awareness and caught him on video stealing license plates to put on his stolen vehicle. Officers were able to follow the thief and then lay down spike strips to stop the vehicle and arrest the perpetrator without violence or a high-speed chase.

The Las Vegas drone program, even with the limits of launching from the back of police cruisers, flew 1,100 missions since October last year. The drones located suspects in 169 incidents and provided critical support for 386 arrests, Koren said. That performance will improve with the autonomous drones spread across the city.

There’s more drone technology to come. Skydio has a small indoor drone that adeptly flies around objects in tight spaces and can provide surveillance in a building or house, which could be useful for executing search warrants or during a fire. The company is working on a fixed-wing drone that flies farther and is launched with a robotic arm. Adam Bry, Skydio’s co-founder and chief executive officer, predicts this tracking drone will help reduce or even eliminate dangerous high-speed chases.

One of the main privacy concerns about law enforcement drones is that they could randomly collect, use and share data from video, audio or even sensors, such as heat sensors, while they are airborne. Commitments to only collect and use data during a specific police or fire emergency call should be backed up by independent data audits and by providing the public continuous full transparency about when, where and why drone flights were made.

This can all be done automatically and not burden officers with more paperwork. “What we see with police surveillance technology in general is that there’s a lot of lip service paid up front to the privacy concerns, but then there is mission creep that happens,” said Beryl Lipton, a senior investigative researcher with Electronic Frontier Foundation. “With drones, we’re very concerned about the mission creep.”

As long as police departments take these privacy concerns seriously and use drones appropriately, the small flying machines will save lives, gain public confidence and pave the way for more long-distance commercial drone flights.

Source

We cordially invite all experts in the fields of criminal law, criminology, sociology, political science, and other areas and disciplines to discuss current issues related to the impact of Russian aggression on the state and society.

Date: 28 November 2025

Time: 11:00 (Kyiv time)

Format: online

Access: via the link

California is among the first states to address the issue. The reporting was cited in the legislative analysis of the bill that ultimately became the law.

Senate Bill 524, signed into law Oct. 10, requires police officers to disclose when they use AI to write police reports. The tools include Draft One, an AI assistant that transcribes and summarizes body-camera footage to produce a draft report, which officers can then revise and edit.

Specifically, the law now requires a written disclosure to appear at the bottom of each page of a police report for which Draft One or other similar tools were used. The legislation also requires an “audit trail” that would preserve the original draft as well as identify the source bodycam footage or audio.

Police departments in East Palo Alto and Fresno were among the first in the state to adopt the technology.

For example, officers must fill in prompts within the generated report, then sign off on the report’s accuracy before it can be submitted. The tool also includes a disclaimer that Draft One was used, though police agencies have thus far been able to customize where in a report it’s placed.

Police departments have said the technology saves officers significant time, and even that some AI-generated reports are better than the ones written entirely by officers. Nevertheless, the bill arose out of concerns that bias or errors generated by AI software could make their way into final incident reports, which play a key role in charging, detaining and sentencing suspects.

Kate Chatfield, executive director of the California Public Defenders Association, which sponsored the bill, said she’s grateful the measure became law.

“Due process requires transparency,” Chatfield wrote in a public statement. “Everyone in the legal system — judges, juries, attorneys and the accused — deserve to know who wrote the police report.”

“With SB 524, California is sending a clear message: Innovation in policing must be tethered to accountability,” state Sen. Jesse Arreguín, who wrote the bill, said in the statement. “No more opaque reports, no more guessing whether AI shaped the narrative.”

Kevin Little, a defense attorney in Fresno, said the law is a step in the right direction, but not a true remedy.

“My own experience with AI in an unrelated context leads me to conclude that AI platforms have a significant amount of user bias and tend to support the agendas of the user,” he said.

Larry Bowlan, a spokesperson for the Fresno Police Department, said the agency had already implemented some of the safeguards now required by the law and does not expect the new rules to be especially burdensome.

“Our AI-powered narrative assistant … already generates a disclosure and requires our users to sign acknowledgements. Draft One also already produces the requisite audit trail,” he wrote in an email. “We are actively working with our vendor on the best solution for preserving and storing the first draft provided by the assistant, as well as a minor tweak to ensure the disclosure is present on each printed page, rather than just the first page as it is now.”

A spokesperson for the East Palo Alto Department said his agency has no official response to the law at this time.

Opponents of the bill included the California Police Chiefs Association and the Police Officers Research Association of California, a police union advocacy and lobbying group. The Chiefs Association did not respond to a request for comment. In a statement, PORAC President Brian R. Marvel said the signed version of the law is an improvement over earlier drafts.

“In its original form, SB 524 would have put significant administrative burden on already short-staffed police forces and created broad liability by requiring agencies to retain every AI-generated draft, interim, and final version of a report, each labeled with AI disclosure language,” he wrote. “PORAC advocated to amend this bill … We were pleased to see several of these amendments taken, with the final version of the bill significantly narrowed.”

Axon representative Victoria Keough said the company is committed to complying with all state and federal laws, including SB 524.

“When developing AI for public safety, transparency and accountability are essential,” Keough wrote in a statement. “Responsible innovation remains at the core of how Axon designs and delivers new technology.”

The new requirements go into effect on Jan. 1, 2026.

By Kerry Klein, KVPR

Kerry Klein is a reporter and editor with KVPR in Fresno. Additional reporting was provided by KQED’s Sukey Lewis. The story was produced with support from The California Newsroom, a collaboration of public media outlets throughout the state. 

Legislation in the field of combating organised crime requires improvement. In September 2020, the National Security Strategy and the Strategy for Combating Organised Crime were approved. It is important to define the status of the National Coordinator, who will provide organisational support for the implementation of state policy in the field of combating organised crime. Currently, these functions are temporarily assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. In 2022, an Interagency Working Group was established to coordinate the introduction of the SOCTA assessment system. In 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine submitted a report on the results of the assessment of threats posed by serious organised crime to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. The results of this assessment should form the basis for the Strategy for Combating Organised Crime for 2026–2030. In 2025, a phased transformation of operational and search activities into criminal intelligence is planned, with the establishment of clear criteria for distinguishing it from criminal procedural, intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

In June 2024, the law on the “relaunch” of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine entered into force. The competition for the position of Director of this body has been completed, but the process of appointing the winner of the competition has been complicated. After this, the process of attesting its staff is expected to begin, which will last up to 18 months. At the same time, these steps should be a priority, and subsequently, efforts should focus on enhancing the analytical capacity of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, introducing modern management practices, assessment systems, etc., for the comprehensive reform of this law enforcement body.

All pre-trial investigation bodies are to varying degrees responsible for investigating financial crimes. In October 2024, Ukraine approved a Procedure that defines the concepts of financial investigation, financial analysis, their purpose, and the principles of financial analysis in the meanings provided in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 30. The issue of delineating the investigative jurisdiction of pre-trial investigation bodies regarding financial investigations, including predicate offences, remains relevant, as does the improvement of the criminal statistics collection system concerning financial investigations as a separate category of criminal proceedings.

The reform of the National Agency of Ukraine for Detection, Search and Management of Assets Obtained from Corruption and Other Crimes has begun. There are certain improvements in the anti-money laundering system at the level of draft laws. The quality of implementation of the Action Plan for the Asset Recovery Strategy remains formal and lacks an adequate level of public engagement in practice.

A separate law on civilian firearms has not yet been adopted, and the conditions for the acquisition, storage, registration, safeguarding, carrying, transportation and use of firearms are regulated by a subordinate legal act. In 2023, the Unified Firearms Register became operational, and in 2024, a Coordination Centre for Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Their Essential Parts and Components, and Ammunition (NFFP) was established. Criminal liability for illicit trafficking in firearms is inadequate, and the illicit trafficking in essential parts of firearms has not been criminalised at all. Legislative decisions on these matters are under consideration by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

The reform of the Security Service of Ukraine remains an open issue, considering the requirements of wartime. The general direction of the reform — transforming the SSU into a counterintelligence body — is supported by all stakeholders. However, the scope of such reform is viewed differently, primarily in relation to the retention of investigative functions for crimes against national security and terrorism.

Combating corruption within law enforcement agencies is carried out through the implementation of several anti-corruption measures provided for in anti-corruption strategies, the adoption of which is mandatory. Relevant anti-corruption prevention and enforcement units are responsible for this. Overall, the internal control system is well-developed, and the requirements for professional ethics and integrity are gradually being strengthened.

Recruitment to positions in all law enforcement agencies is carried out on a competitive basis. Appointments to managerial positions in new agencies (the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the State Bureau of Investigation, and the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine) are made following competitive selection. In contrast, such competitions are currently not mandatory in the National Police of Ukraine. The competitive appointment of the Head of the National Police of Ukraine and the overall depoliticisation of the police remain pressing issues. The Rule of Law Roadmap has provided clarity regarding the Government’s plans on this matter, but the relevant measures require effective implementation.

Ukraine actively cooperates with European bodies for international cooperation — Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). It has working arrangements with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and actively uses such instruments as Joint Investigation Teams (JITs).

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has brought new challenges in the field of combating trafficking in human beings, associated with increased risks of falling into situations of trafficking due to internal displacement or travel abroad, lack of access to occupied territories, destruction of critical infrastructure, economic destabilisation, and other factors. These challenges significantly complicate the activities and affect the entire system of actors involved in combating trafficking in human beings in Ukraine. Certain systemic issues that existed before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia remain unresolved, and no substantial progress was made in addressing them during 2023–2024. Specifically, these relate to gaps in legislation and inconsistency with international standards and recommendations of international institutions; the ineffectiveness of criminal prosecution of trafficking-related crimes by law enforcement agencies, with a low number of convictions and a near-total absence of compensation paid to victims, among other issues.

Cybersecurity and combating cybercrime are priorities under the Strategy adopted in 2021. A new challenge in the context of war has been cyberattacks on critical infrastructure facilities. Liability for cybercrimes requires improvement, primarily through the introduction of the concept of “cyberviolence.” The concept of electronic evidence is still absent from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, unlike in other proceedings (administrative, civil, commercial).

The witness protection system mainly consists of physical security measures — personal protection and warning of danger. At the same time, no threat assessment is carried out, and the material support of the system is insufficient. The legal framework is outdated and does not meet current needs, as the relevant law was adopted back in 1993 and has not undergone significant amendments since then. The current vision of the Government is to assign these functions exclusively to law enforcement bodies, although earlier public policy documents envisaged the establishment of a separate independent body for this purpose.

“We will erase that disgraceful chapter of history and make sure that the police fully stand as a democratic force that protects the Constitution and the people through neutrality and democratic oversight”.

Police should strive to become a “smart” force capable of responding to emerging threats, such as voice phishing and deepfake cybercrimes, pointing out the need for stronger interagency collaboration and the use of artificial intelligence in efforts to prevent those crimes in advance.

It was also called for “preemptive” measures to better protect ordinary citizens amid a rise in dating-related crimes and stalking, as well as taking aggressive measures to crack down on narcotics crimes and ensure related treatment and rehabilitation systems are firmly established.