According to investigators, the scheme operated systematically. Owners of so-called “porn offices” – premises used for the illegal production and distribution of erotic and pornographic content through internet platforms – paid police commanders 20,000 US dollars per month. The intermediary retained an additional 5,000 dollars. In exchange, the officials undertook not to take any enforcement action, not to document violations, and to provide advance warning of inspections.

At least several documented episodes of money transfers were established: 45,000 dollars in February 2026, 25,000 dollars in April, and a further 25,000 dollars in May – at the moment of detention. Searches yielded a fleet of luxury vehicles, five Swiss watches, weapons, and cash in various currencies totalling over UAH 22.6 million. This is not a personal success story of the suspects. It is materialised impunity.

LEGAL QUALIFICATION

The actions of the police commanders were charged under Part 4 of Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine — receipt of unlawful benefit in an especially large amount by an official holding a responsible position, committed by a group of persons pursuant to a prior conspiracy. The sanction provides for imprisonment from eight to twelve years with confiscation of property.

The qualifying element of “prior conspiracy by a group of persons” is of fundamental importance. This is not a technical detail – it is evidence of the organised, rather than spontaneous, character of the corruption. The multiple documented episodes of money transfers point to an established criminal practice, not a one-off incident.

Separate attention should be paid to the atypical architecture of the criminal group: only commanders and a driver – i.e. the highest and lowest tiers – without an intermediate level. This either reflects a carefully constructed scheme of insulation, or signals that the middle tier has not yet been identified. This structural dissonance merits separate investigative attention.

OFFICIAL STATISTICS AS A MIRROR OF LATENCY: THE CRIME IT IS PROFITABLE NOT TO RECORD

An analysis of official police statistics concerning two core articles – keeping brothels and procuring (Article 302 of the Criminal Code) and pimping or inducing a person into prostitution (Article 303 of the Criminal Code) – reveals a stark paradox. Official data shows a steady decline in registered crimes against the backdrop of widely documented growth in the underlying practices. This is not evidence of a successful law enforcement system – it is an indicator of the system’s institutional interest in keeping this market segment invisible.

This is precisely why these categories of crime are traditionally classified as “ancillary” offences relative to human trafficking: their true scale is structurally absent from official statistics, because registration runs contrary to the interests of those tasked with registering.

The peak figures were recorded in 2014 – 509 registered crimes and 379 notices of suspicion. A sustained downward trend followed, with several characteristic deviations. In 2022, following the start of the full-scale invasion, only 61 crimes of this category were recorded – a reduction of 88% compared to the peak. In 2025 the figure stood at 54.

If interpreted literally, these data would suggest that the sexual services industry in Ukraine has virtually disappeared. Reality, as documented by investigative journalism, tells the opposite story: frontline cities have become regional hubs for sexual services, with clearly structured pricing – from 30–40 euros for a “massage” to 200 euros for trips to the combat zone. Demand has grown, the market has transformed, yet none of this appears in official statistics. Because it is profitable for other people in uniform.

The dynamics under Article 303 differ somewhat but follow the same logic. After notable growth in 2017–2018 (412 crimes — the maximum for the entire period studied), figures fall again: 195 crimes in 2022, 244 in 2024, 171 in 2025. The temporary increase in 2023 (348 crimes) can be explained by a partial restoration of law enforcement functions and the dislocation of criminal networks to safer territories, but by no means by any genuine increase in this type of crime.

LATENCY AS A STRUCTURAL PHENOMENON: CRIMES TURNED INTO BUSINESS

Crimes in the sphere of sexual services are classic examples of structural latency – a condition in which crime is systematically not recorded not because it is absent, but because its registration is contrary to the interests of law enforcement. Classical criminology distinguishes natural latency (the victim does not report) from artificial latency (law enforcement conceals the crime). In the case of the “porn-rent” corruption exposed on 20 May 2026, we are dealing with the second type – institutionalised and monetised.

The mechanism is simple and robust.

First, the victims and participants in such crimes have their own interest in avoiding police attention – they are either themselves administrative offenders, or they depend on “protection”.

Second, police commanders, receiving regular payments for “non-interference”, do not merely look the other way passively – they actively suppress any attempts by subordinates to document these violations. Official statistics reflect not the actual state of crime, but the result of this active filtering.

Consider the “suspicion rate” indicator – the share of registered crimes for which a notice of suspicion has been issued. Under Article 302, it fluctuates between 64.3% (2016) and 94.4% (2025). This means that those cases which do make it into the statistics are investigated with reasonable effectiveness. The paradox lies elsewhere: only a small fraction of actual crimes are registered – predominantly those arising from competitive conflicts between market actors.

The statistical collapse of 2022 – a drop to 61 registered crimes under Article 302 – is telling. It coincided not with the disappearance of the market, but with Russia’s full-scale invasion. Law enforcement resources were redirected, traditional “protection rackets” were partially disrupted. But the market was not. The Kramatorsk hub, described in detail by investigative journalists, emerged precisely as an adaptation to new geographical and social conditions.

QUANTITATIVE DIMENSION OF THE HIDDEN SCALE

The true extent of latency can be estimated by cross-referencing several indicators. According to research estimates, the latency coefficient for prostitution-related crimes ranges from 1:10 to 1:50 in various countries – meaning that for every registered crime, between 10 and 50 go unregistered. Even applying the conservative multiplier of 1:10 yields a picture sharply at odds with official data: if 54 crimes under Article 302 were registered in 2025, the actual number of such instances may have reached 540 to 2,700 per year.

These estimates are consistent with the demographic logic: Ukraine in 2025 has over 25 million residents in government-controlled territories, a significant proportion of whom are internally displaced persons – predominantly women in extremely precarious economic circumstances. The combination of large-scale demographic vulnerability and weakened institutional control is a classic environment for the expansion of an unregulated sexual services market. Official statistics do not capture this process – they capture the size of the corruption shield that conceals it.

A further indicator is the structure of the online market. According to market participants’ estimates, approximately 90% of online sexual services advertisements are fraudulent (scams), which itself evidences the broad presence of organised criminal groups in the online segment. Organised crime, oriented towards large-scale and systematic profit, requires systematic “cover”. This is precisely the corruption rent we observe in the case of 20 May 2026.

THE CORE THESIS: PROHIBITION AS A GENERATOR OF CORRUPTION RENT

The systemic bribery exposed on 20 May 2026 is not a consequence of the personal immorality of particular police officers. It is a direct and foreseeable consequence of the state’s prohibition on the legitimate operation of adult content online platforms.

Any prohibition of profitable but technically feasible activity in conditions of mass demand creates a rent space: the market moves underground but does not disappear. Platforms such as OnlyFans are publicly accessible without registration, operate around the clock, and any person can use them without any real restrictions from the state. The prohibition, in other words, is de facto non-operational and incapable of operation.

Instead, it creates a legal lever for coercion: since the activity is “illegal”, law enforcement officials acquire the monopoly power to decide – to prosecute or to “overlook”. This discretion converts into money. This is precisely how corruption rent arises – a regular payment for non-prosecution of that which the state formally prohibits but is factually incapable of blocking.

Here an entirely absurd paradox of public administration emerges. On the one hand, the state attempts to tax women engaged in such activity. On the other hand, it classifies this very same activity as a crime and prosecutes the same women criminally. The result is the creation of ideal conditions for unlimited police racketeering. Would such systemic bribery have occurred if the operation of such platforms had been legalised? Obviously not. The state itself created the conditions for the commission of these crimes.

The criminalisation of online erotic platforms, contrary to its declared objective of eradicating them, effectively pushes them deeper into the shadows – to a place where there is no legal oversight whatsoever, where women are left entirely unprotected, and where the preconditions for direct sexual exploitation arise. Law enforcement officials occupied with collecting corruption rent objectively have neither the time nor the motivation to combat genuinely dangerous forms of crime — trafficking, forced prostitution, child pornography.

THE SYSTEMIC DIMENSION

The intermediary in the scheme was the personal driver of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. This is not a peripheral detail – it is a structural node of the entire construction. A driver is a person with constant physical access to a senior official, with unrecorded informal contacts, and with the capacity to conduct a parallel business life in the shadow of an official status. The question that inevitably arises: how far does the chain extend? No public suspicion has been directed at the Deputy Minister himself, but the mere fact that his immediate entourage proved to be the hub of a multi-oblast corruption network raises obvious institutional questions that cannot be ignored.

The scheme covered three regions simultaneously. This is not a local phenomenon and not a coincidence. It is either evidence of centralised coordination through a single intermediary, or – even more worrying – a sign of a widespread market practice in which regional police commanders independently and separately enter the market for protecting illegal businesses.

The case unfolds in the context of a full-scale war, and this gives it a qualitatively different dimension. Regional police department heads are not merely administrators. They are officials with access to operational information, accounting systems, security chains, and contacts with the SBU and military administration. A person who takes bribes and is dependent on a criminal business is a vulnerability in the country’s security system. In wartime, this is not merely corruption – it is a threat to national security.

The statistical data presented above confirm the systemic, rather than episodic, character of this phenomenon. If “protection rackets” were an isolated deviation, we would observe chaotic fluctuations in the statistics. Instead, we see a smooth downward registration trajectory with a clear correlation to general system stresses (the 2020 pandemic, the full-scale invasion of 2022) — and rapid recovery thereafter. This is structure, not accident.

A REGULATORY ALTERNATIVE

It is necessary to move away from artificial moralising and to frame the question in its real dimension: what specific moral harm has the existence of the relevant web platforms inflicted on Ukrainian society – and what moral harm has their protection by police inflicted? The answer is obvious.

The legalisation and regulation of online sex platforms is not a moral choice. It is an anti-corruption strategy. Its logic is simple: lawful activity does not require protection from the police — it is protected by law. The rent space disappears, and with it the corruption incentive.

Regulation, rather than prohibition, makes it possible to protect the rights of industry participants, introduce age and consent verification, tax revenues, and refocus law enforcement resources on real crimes — trafficking, coercion, child pornography. To speak of prohibition and criminal prosecution of something that exists completely openly, that requires no registration and operates 24/7, is entirely absurd. The state has discredited itself through the exposure of this scheme.

Statistical analysis confirms this conclusion methodologically. If over 13 years official statistics show an unvarying decline in crimes in a sphere that is clearly not declining in reality – this is not a problem with the offenders. It is a problem with the legal model, which generates structural latency and corruption rent instead of genuine protection.

One can predictably expect that, once the initial resonance fades, yesterday’s moralists in uniform will begin to speak of the need for legalisation – precisely because their own system for protecting illegal businesses has proven vulnerable. Society should take note of those voices and verify whether real reformist will stands behind them.

CONCLUSIONS

This case is more than a criminal scandal. It is a mirror of a systemic crisis generated by the convergence of three factors: an artificial prohibition that creates a corruption market; the structural latency of crimes that serves this prohibition; and the absence of real internal oversight within the law enforcement system.

Statistical data for 2013–2025 testify not to the success of efforts to combat crime in the sphere of sexual services, but to a persistent and systemic practice of concealing it from registration. The 88% decline in registered crimes under Article 302 of the Criminal Code and the 58% decline under Article 303 occurred in conditions where actual market volumes, by all independent estimates, were not shrinking — and in certain sub-periods were growing. This is materialised latency.

The true test of intentions will not be the arrests, but the verdicts. Even more telling will be whether this case prompts a systemic review of oversight mechanisms for regional police commanders, or whether it remains another signal after which the system reverts to its customary state.

Without structural changes — decriminalisation of online platforms, audit of the internal oversight system, refocusing of law enforcement resources on serious crimes, and a methodological revision of approaches to measuring latent crime — the next such scheme will be only a matter of time. And society will again pay for it — in money, security, and trust in the state at its most critical hour.

Pre-war (2013-2021), Ukraine demonstrated consistent crime reduction, reaching a historic low of 321443 registered crimes in 2021, with approximately 50-54% suspect identification rates. The full-scale invasion immediately disrupted this trajectory. By 2025, registered crimes surged to 608191 – an 89% increase from 2021 – while suspect identification plummeted to 27,3%, creating an unprecedented justice gap with over 442000 criminal proceedings lacking identified suspects.

The war fundamentally transformed crime patterns. Criminality became significantly more rural, with rural crime increasing from 20% (2013-2021) to 32,3% (2025) of total crimes. The urban-to-rural crime ratio declined from 4:1 to barely 2:1, reflecting occupation-related crimes, abandoned property theft, and frontline zone criminality.

Crime categories showed varied impacts: property crimes initially decreased but fraud increased dramatically (from 23847 in 2021 to 82609 in 2023). Domestic violence crimes surged (from 4800 in 2021 to 8900 in 2024). War crimes exploded from 253 in 2021 to 62128 in 2022. Intentional homicides with firearms peaked at 909 in 2023 – 25 times the 2021 baseline. Paradoxically, despite weapon proliferation, some firearms crimes showed complex patterns rather than simple increases.

Human trafficking statistics revealed troubling gaps: despite 6,5 million refugees creating unprecedented vulnerability, registered cases remained low (105 in 2024), suggesting severe underreporting and possible law enforcement complicity.

The study demonstrates that while Ukraine maintained statistical transparency during existential crisis, institutional effectiveness collapsed under wartime pressures, creating dangerous impunity that threatens post-war reconstruction and rule of law.

The data reveal several significant patterns across the 2013-2025 period. While crimes committed with firearms indeed increased substantially in 2022, reaching 1929 incidents – a more than six-fold increase from the 2021 figure of 300 cases – this surge must be contextualised within Ukraine’s broader contemporary history.

Most notably, the 2014 figure of 2523 firearm-related crimes remains the highest recorded level in the dataset, exceeding the 2022 figure by approximately 31%. This 2014 peak coincided with the Maidan Revolution, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the initial phase of Russian military aggression in Eastern Ukraine, suggesting that periods of intense political upheaval and initial conflict onset may generate more pronounced spikes in firearm criminality than subsequent phases of sustained warfare.

The period from 2015 to 2021 demonstrates a consistent downward trajectory, with firearm-related crimes declining from 1526 in 2015 to the aforementioned historical minimum of 300 in 2021. This trend persisted despite the ongoing armed conflict in Donbas throughout this period, indicating that sustained conflict itself does not necessarily correlate with elevated firearm crime rates in government-controlled territories. The 2015 figure of 1526 crimes is particularly noteworthy as it occurred during active hostilities yet remained substantially lower than both the 2014 peak and the 2022-2023 figures, suggesting that the initial shock of conflict disruption may be more criminogenic than its continuation.

The 2022-2023 period shows elevated but plateauing figures (1929 and 1867 respectively), followed by a sharp decline in 2024 (832) and relative stabilisation in 2025 (821).

A particularly troubling dimension concerns the relationship between criminal proceedings (total numbers) and criminal proceedings with suspects. Throughout the entire period, notifications consistently lag behind reported crimes, but this gap becomes especially pronounced during peak crime years.

In 2014, while 2523 crimes were recorded, only 833 notifications were filed – a clearance rate of approximately 33%. Similarly, in 2022, the 1929 reported crimes resulted in only 517 notifications, yielding an even lower rate of roughly 27%.

This declining ratio between crimes and suspects raises serious questions about law enforcement agency (LEA) effectiveness during periods of crisis. Several hypotheses merit consideration: First, the wartime redeployment of police resources to military and security functions may diminish investigative capacity for ordinary criminal matters. Second, territorial displacement and population movement may complicate witness cooperation and evidence collection. Third, the saturation of the criminal justice system with conflict-related cases may create processing bottlenecks. Fourth, and most concerning from a rule-of-law perspective, the data may reflect decreased accountability during periods when institutional controls are weakened.

The 2021 data present an interesting counterpoint: 300 crimes with 251 notifications represents an 84% notification rate – the highest in the dataset. This suggests that in stable conditions with lower caseloads, Ukrainian law enforcement demonstrates significantly greater effectiveness in investigating firearm-related crimes. The dramatic erosion of this capacity in 2022-2023, when it was arguably most needed, represents a critical challenge for maintaining the rule of law during armed conflict.

The escalation of firearm-related intentional homicides in the context of armed conflict presents a stark illustration of how warfare fundamentally disrupts criminal justice systems and public safety. Police statistics reveal a dramatic transformation in the incidence of intentional homicides committed with firearms, particularly during periods of military confrontation. After reaching a historic low of 36 registered criminal proceedings in 2021, the number surged to 247 cases in 2022, coinciding with the onset of full-scale hostilities. This seven-fold increase marked only the beginning of a more severe crisis, as 2023 witnessed an unprecedented spike to 909 registered proceedings – representing a twenty-five-fold increase compared to the pre-war baseline and the highest level recorded throughout the entire observation period.

The 2023 peak demands particular scholarly attention, as it exceeds even the initial shock of 2014, when 320 cases were registered following the outbreak of armed conflict in eastern regions. While the 2014 spike reflected localised warfare’s immediate impact on violent crime patterns, the 2023 figures suggest a more comprehensive destabilisation of social order and law enforcement capacity across broader territories. The subsequent decline to 295 proceedings in 2024 and 187 in 2025, while substantial, nevertheless maintains firearm homicide rates at levels five times higher than the 2021 baseline, indicating that wartime conditions have fundamentally restructured the criminal violence landscape rather than producing merely temporary disturbances.

Equally significant is the widening gap between registered criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with suspects. In 2023, only 173 of the 909 proceedings resulted in suspect identification – a clearance rate of merely 19%, compared to 94% in 2021. This deterioration in investigative effectiveness reflects the profound challenges confronting law enforcement agencies operating under wartime conditions, including resource diversion to military objectives, territorial displacement of both victims and perpetrators, destruction of forensic infrastructure, and the general chaos that impedes witness cooperation and evidence collection. The persistence of low clearance rates in subsequent years (52% in 2024 and 64% in 2025) suggests that investigative capacity remains compromised even as overall crime numbers decline, raising concerns about long-term impunity for violent offenses and the erosion of rule of law foundations.

The dynamics of intentional grievous bodily harm committed with firearms reveal two distinct peaks over the observed period. While the 2022 surge (18 criminal proceedings, all with suspects) can be directly attributed to the full-scale Russian military invasion, the 2014 spike presents a more complex pattern. Despite the absence of full-scale aggression, that year recorded 25 registered crimes – the highest figure in the entire dataset – though notifications remained relatively low at 8. This discrepancy between 2014’s elevated crime registration and lower notification rates, compared to 2022’s parity between both indicators, suggests fundamentally different underlying dynamics. The 2014 spike likely reflects the initial phase of armed conflict in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, while the 2018-2021 period shows sustained low levels (1-5 cases annually). The post-2022 stabilisation at 14-16 cases indicates a new baseline shaped by ongoing military conflict, with notification rates now closely tracking registered crimes – a pattern absent in the 2014 crisis.

The Figure below demonstrates the number of aggravated robberies committed with the use of firearms and the number of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings from 2013 to 2025.

On the one hand, we can observe a significant increase in aggravated robberies committed with firearms compared to 2021, when the indicator reached its lowest point at 17 registered cases. On the other hand, police statistics for 2013-2017 demonstrate substantially higher numbers of aggravated robberies – even when Ukrainian society was not as deeply saturated with firearms as in 2022.

The 2014 peak of 411 cases coincides with the outbreak of military actions in Eastern Ukraine and the initial destabilisation of state institutions following the Maidan Revolution. The subsequent decline through 2021 suggests gradual improvement in both law enforcement capacity and social order despite ongoing hostilities in Donbas. Paradoxically, the full-scale invasion in February 2022, which dramatically increased firearm availability through military mobilisation and territorial defense forces, did not produce a return to pre-2018 crime levels. The relatively modest increase to 32 cases in 2022, followed by further decline to 11 cases in 2024, contradicts expectations that widespread weapon proliferation would necessarily correlate with violent property crime.

This inverse relationship between firearm saturation and armed aggravated robbery rates warrants further investigation into whether wartime social cohesion, enhanced informal social control mechanisms, or changes in criminal opportunity structures may be mediating factors in crime suppression during the full-scale invasion period.

The Figure below presents data on crimes committed with explosives and notifications in corresponding criminal proceedings from 2013 to 2025.

The data reveal two concerning trends.

First, after a decline from 2014 (112 crimes) to 2021 (20 crimes), explosive-related crimes have increased substantially: 63 in 2023, 86 in 2024, and 98 in 2025. Second, despite this rising crime rate, the proportion of cases with suspects has decreased dramatically. While notifications roughly corresponded to crime numbers in earlier years (e.g., 55 of 65 in 2013), recent years show a widening gap: only 14 notifications for 63 crimes in 2023, 18 for 86 in 2024, and 32 for 98 in 2025. This divergence suggests significant challenges in investigative capacity, indicating that the clearance rate for explosive-related crimes has fallen to approximately one-third of cases, raising serious concerns about law enforcement effectiveness in addressing this category of criminal activity.

The statistical trajectory of firearms-related crime in Ukraine between 2013 and 2025 reveals a pattern fundamentally shaped by two periods of acute conflict: the initial phase following the Maidan Revolution and Russian annexation of Crimea (2014-2015), and the full-scale invasion beginning in 2022. However, the official figures – showing 2523 registered firearms crimes in 2014, declining to 300 by 2021, then resurging to 1929 in 2022 and 1867 in 2023 – represent only the visible surface of a far more complex and troubling reality.

The inherent limitations of police statistics during wartime and post-conflict periods cannot be overstated. When state institutions are under existential threat, when territories remain contested or temporarily occupied, and when law enforcement resources are redirected toward immediate survival imperatives, criminal registration systems inevitably suffer degradation. The stark spike in intentional homicides with firearms in 2023 (909 cases – the highest figure in the entire observation period) suggests that even as overall firearms crime statistics began to stabilise, the lethality and severity of incidents continued to escalate. Yet these recorded cases likely represent merely a fraction of actual incidents, particularly in conflict zones where bodies may remain unrecovered, crimes unreported, and perpetrators unidentified.

The proliferation of military-grade weaponry throughout Ukrainian society constitutes an unprecedented security challenge. Unlike the civilian firearms that characterised crime patterns in peacetime, contemporary Ukrainian society is saturated with automatic weapons, explosives, and military equipment distributed to territorial defense units, police, and irregular formations. The tragic incident in Cherkasy region on January 27, 2026, where a murder suspect killed four police officers and wounded another during an arrest attempt, exemplifies the lethal potential of this arsenal when weaponry remains in circulation after demobilisation or falls into criminal hands. This case also demonstrates how former or active combatants, when pursued by law enforcement, may employ military tactics and superior firepower against police forces trained primarily for civilian policing rather than armed confrontation with military-trained adversaries.

Organised crime groups have proven remarkably adaptive in exploiting the chaos of wartime conditions. The availability of military and police uniforms, combined with genuine uncertainty about the legitimacy of various armed formations operating in Ukraine’s complex security landscape, creates opportunities for criminal enterprises to commit offenses under the guise of state authority. The blurring of lines between legitimate security actors and criminals wearing appropriated insignia represents a fundamental challenge to the monopoly on legitimate violence that defines functional statehood. When criminals can plausibly impersonate soldiers or police officers, public trust in security institutions erodes, victimisation becomes more difficult to report, and the psychological distance between military service and organised crime narrows dangerously.

Yet perhaps the most concerning dimension of Ukraine’s firearms saturation extends beyond immediate criminal justice challenges into the realm of long-term social pathology. The reintegration of hundreds of thousands of demobilised combatants – many bearing psychological trauma, habituated to violence, and possessing both weapons training and often access to weaponry itself – represents a generational challenge. As an example, the mentioned above murder of four police officers was comitted by an ex-militaryman. Post-traumatic stress disorder, moral injury, and the difficulty of transitioning from the intense purpose and camaraderie of combat to the often hollow meaninglessness of post-war civilian existence create fertile conditions for violence, substance abuse, domestic abuse, and suicide. While the majority of veterans will successfully reintegrate, research from comparable conflicts suggests that a significant minority will engage in criminal activity, domestic violence, or self-destructive behavior.

The convergence of these factors – statistical underreporting masking true crime levels, widespread availability of military weaponry, organised crime exploitation of institutional weakness, and a large population of potentially vulnerable veterans – suggests that Ukraine faces not merely a temporary spike in firearms violence but a structural transformation in its security environment. The 2024-2025 figures, showing some decline from 2023 peaks, may reflect either genuine improvement or simply reduced state capacity to document crimes during intensified conflict.

The temporal dynamics of these offenses during 2013-2021 demonstrated a consistent downward trend, which the onset of armed conflict disrupted. By 2017-2018, the numbers had stabilised at approximately 225-234 registered crimes annually, though a minor uptick to 259 cases occurred in 2019. The year 2020 marked a dramatic inflection point, with registered crimes plummeting to 163 cases, likely reflecting the combined impact of pandemic-related restrictions and law enforcement reorientation.

This declining trajectory intensified through 2021 and reached its nadir in 2022, when only 61 registered crimes were documented – a reduction of more than 88% compared to the 2014 peak.

The dramatic collapse in 2022 coincides directly with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, which fundamentally disrupted both criminal networks and law enforcement capacity in affected regions. Despite a temporary reversal in 2023, when 129 cases were recorded, potentially indicating partial recovery of law enforcement functions or displacement of criminal activities to safer territories, the subsequent year witnessed a renewed decline to 79 registered offenses. The most recent available data from 2025 reveal a continuation of this declining trajectory, with 54 crimes of this type documented.

The notification data demonstrate parallel patterns, with the ratio between registered criminal proceedings (total numbers) and criminal proceedings with suspects remaining relatively consistent throughout most years, suggesting stable detection and reporting mechanisms. The most recent available data from 2025 reveal a continuation of this declining trajectory, with 54 crimes of this type documented, though this figure represents only partial-year data.

However, we have a strong presumption that the official police statistics do not present a real picture. There is a strong presumption that any war stimulates prostitution and the illegal market of sex services. In January 2026, Ukrainian journalists published an investigation on the issue of the sex industry on the frontline (Lykhoglyad, L. (2026). From ‘massages’ to intimacy on the battlefield. How the sex services market works in frontline cities. Ukrainska Pravda, January 8, 2026), where one of the most remarkable and symbolic points was “No air raid alarm will stop a massage when it’s time for one”.

This study demonstrated how war changes the geography, economy, and social dynamics of the sex industry, creating new centres of demand and supply for services.

Kramatorsk has become the main epicentre of the market, serving as a regional hub for service providers from different regions of Ukraine. The market is structured around two main formats: so-called ‘massage parlours’ with a base price of 30-40 Euros for services, and classic intimate services for 100-150 Euros. Outcall services to the frontline zone cost from 200 Euros per day plus transport costs. A characteristic feature of the market is the high level of online fraud: according to respondents’ estimates, about 90% of online advertisements for services are fictitious, which indicates the possible involvement of organised criminal groups in this segment of the economy.

According to military personnel, clients’ motivations are multifactorial and not limited to physiological needs. The study identifies three main reasons for using these services: satisfying physiological needs in conditions of prolonged separation from partners, psychological relief after combat stress, and the search for emotional support and the illusion of care. The latter reason seems to be the most important from a socio-psychological perspective, as it points to a lack of psychological support for military personnel and a need for emotional contact, even in the context of commercial relationships. At the same time, the study notes that a significant proportion of military personnel refrain from using such services out of loyalty to their partners.

From a public health perspective, the situation is critical. The lack of medical supervision, combined with the high prevalence of HIV infection among service providers, poses epidemiological risks. Some workers in the industry try to minimise risks by distributing free condoms from charitable organisations, but there is no systematic medical supervision. The legal status of sex work in Ukraine remains in a grey area: formally prohibited by administrative law, it is effectively tolerated in frontline regions, depriving workers of legal protection and the possibility of receiving medical care without the risk of administrative prosecution.

The study demonstrates that the war not only changed the geography of the sex industry but also reveals deeper social problems: insufficient psychological support for the military, the lack of effective legal regulation of sex work, and gaps in the public health system. The economic migration of service providers to frontline areas reflects the rational logic of seeking solvent demand, which is confirmed by the significant increase in military personnel’s incomes compared to the pre-war period.

Comparative analysis of the police statistics prove the trend of decreasing numbers of crimes of running brothels, which are traditionally considered as ‘shadow crimes’ or ‘satellite crimes’ in relation to THB crimes. Therefore, the police statistics should be analysed more than critically, considering the realities and alternative investigations.

The analysis of official police statistics on brothel management and procuring in Ukraine from 2013 to 2025, when contrasted with journalistic investigations and field evidence, reveals a fundamental paradox that illuminates the enduring relationship between law enforcement and the sex industry during wartime. While registered offenses declined by 88% from their 2014 peak to reach historic lows in 2022-2025, empirical evidence from frontline regions demonstrates not the disappearance of the sex industry, but rather its expansion and structural transformation under conflict conditions.

Prostitution remains fundamentally a police-controlled business, rather than a genuinely suppressed criminal phenomenon. The dramatic collapse in official crime registrations coinciding with Russia’s full-scale invasion does not reflect the elimination of sex work – as the Kramatorsk case study vividly demonstrates – but rather signals the reorientation of law enforcement priorities, the collapse of traditional regulatory mechanisms, and potentially the continuation of informal police oversight in new forms. The emergence of Kramatorsk as a major hub for sex services, operating with apparent impunity despite formal legal prohibitions, suggests that the traditional model of police-managed tolerance has adapted to wartime conditions rather than disappeared.

This divergence between official data and documented reality carries profound implications for criminal justice policy, public health protection, and our understanding of state capacity during wartime. The critical public health risks identified in frontline regions – including high HIV prevalence among sex workers operating without medical supervision, widespread fraud in online markets suggesting organized crime involvement, and the psychological vulnerability of military personnel seeking emotional support through commercial intimacy – remain invisible in official statistics and therefore unaddressed by policy interventions.

The case of wartime Ukraine demonstrates that ‘satellite crimes’ associated with human trafficking and sexual exploitation cannot be accurately measured through conventional police statistics when the fundamental relationship between law enforcement and the sex industry remains one of controlled tolerance rather than genuine suppression. Researchers, policymakers, and international monitors must therefore approach official crime data with heightened critical awareness, recognizing that declining statistics may reflect not improved conditions but rather the invisibilisation of persistent problems under the pressures of armed conflict. The continued operation of the sex industry in frontline areas, documented through alternative investigative methods, proves that war disrupts the statistical recording of these phenomena far more than it disrupts the phenomena themselves – a reality that demands both methodological innovation in crime measurement and fundamental policy reconsideration of the legal status and health protection of sex workers in conflict zones.

This statistical volatility cannot be interpreted merely as variations in criminal activity. Rather, the evidence suggests factual sabotage by law enforcement agencies in registering such crimes, particularly during the initial phase of the full-scale invasion in 2022 when institutional capacity was severely compromised and priorities shifted dramatically toward war-related offenses. The subsequent increases in 2024 and 2025, reaching and exceeding pre-war levels, indicate either a genuine surge in crimes against justice or a belated return to more comprehensive registration practices – or potentially both phenomena operating simultaneously.

Perhaps the most alarming trend revealed by the statistical data is the deteriorating ratio between registered crimes against justice (total numbers) and the number of criminal proceedings with suspects. This metric serves as a critical indicator of investigative effectiveness and prosecutorial follow-through. When crimes are registered but suspects are not identified, investigated, or prosecuted, it suggests systemic failures in accountability mechanisms and potentially indicates institutional tolerance for such offences.

The data reveals a troubling pattern: the ratio between registered crimes against justice and notifications of suspicion escalated from 2,34 in 2013 to a peak of 5,61 in 2019, indicating that at the height of dysfunction, nearly six crimes were registered for every suspect identified. This dramatic deterioration suggests a systemic collapse in investigative capacity and prosecutorial will during this period, effectively creating an environment of impunity for crimes against justice.

The subsequent decline to 1,62 in 2025, while appearing positive, requires careful interpretation – it may reflect genuine improvement in accountability mechanisms but could also indicate reduced crime registration, changes in statistical methodology, or prosecutorial selectivity. The 2019 peak coincided with a critical period in Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, potentially capturing the tension between increased reporting and insufficient institutional capacity to investigate. The current lower ratios demand verification through qualitative analysis to determine whether they represent authentic progress or merely statistical artifacts masking continued systemic deficiencies.

Intentional Non-Execution of the Court Decisions

Non-execution of court decisions represents a chronic pathology of the Ukrainian justice system, consistently flagged by the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights as a fundamental breach of the rule of law. The statistical data on criminal proceedings initiated under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (intentional non-execution of court decisions) for the period 2013-2025 reveals not merely the persistence of this problem, but its dramatic transformation in the context of Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.

During the period 2013-2020, the volume of registered crimes under Article 382 demonstrated relative stability, fluctuating within a range of 3200 to 4200 cases annually. The peak occurred in 2019, when law enforcement agencies registered 4212 crimes against justice of this type. This relatively consistent pattern suggested an equilibrium state where the problem existed at endemic levels but remained within certain predictable parameters. Following 2019, a gradual decline commenced: 3448 crimes in 2020, followed by 2668 in 2021 – a reduction that might superficially suggest systemic improvement but more likely reflected evolving enforcement priorities and resource constraints.

The year 2022 marked a critical inflection point. The number of registered crimes plummeted to a historic minimum of 1191 – less than one-third of the 2019 level and merely 45% of the 2021 figure. Applying the classical criminological principle that crime within certain boundaries constitutes a normal social phenomenon, this dramatic contraction reveals not improvement but rather the catastrophic impact of Russia’s February 2022 escalation on Ukraine’s justice infrastructure. The precipitous decline demonstrates how profoundly military aggression disrupted judicial and law enforcement systems that had been painstakingly developed through years of coordinated effort by successive Ukrainian presidents, legislators, executive authorities, and both international and domestic experts and civil society organisations.

However, the 2022 nadir must be interpreted through a dualistic analytical framework. On one dimension, the record-low registration of crimes under Article 382 reflects the objective realities and altered priorities of a wartime society, where judicial enforcement mechanisms necessarily yielded to immediate security imperatives. This dramatic reduction signals not an improvement in court decision execution, but rather the effective collapse of accountability mechanisms, as law enforcement resources were diverted to existential threats and territorial defence. The statistics illuminate a justice system operating in crisis mode, where violations that would ordinarily trigger criminal investigation instead occurred in a zone of impunity created by wartime exigencies.

On the second dimension, an examination of the ratio between total numbers of registered criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with identified suspects reveals an equally troubling trajectory. From 2017 through 2021, Ukraine demonstrated gradual but consistent progress in converting registered crimes into concrete criminal proceedings with concrete suspects. The ratio improved steadily: from merely 38 criminal proceedings with suspects identified among 3283 criminal proceedings in 2017 (1,2%) to 218 criminal proceedings with suspects among 2668 criminal proceedings in 2021 (8,2%). This positive trend suggested that the criminal justice system was functioning more effectively, with investigations increasingly producing actionable results and reasonable suspicions grounded in evidence.

The 2022 rupture reversed this hard-won progress catastrophically. While only 1191 crimes were registered, a mere 34 suspects were identified (2,9%) that represented significant regression from 2021 levels. More alarmingly, the subsequent period reveals an explosive divergence. In 2023, while crime registration modestly increased to 2065 cases, suspect identification surged to 415 (20,1%). The year 2024 witnessed 3537 registered crimes but an extraordinary 1800 identified suspects (50,9%). Preliminary data for 2025 shows this trend accelerating exponentially: 7180 crimes registered alongside 4576 suspects (63,7%).

Interference in judicial activities

Judicial independence constitutes a foundational pillar of democratic governance and human rights protection. In recognition of this principle, Article 376 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine criminalises interference in judicial activities, establishing both primary and aggravated forms of liability.

Despite this robust legislative framework and persistent judicial complaints regarding external pressure, prosecutorial outcomes reveal a striking enforcement deficit. Statistical data from 2019-2025 demonstrates a systematic failure to transform registered crimes into concrete criminal proceedings. In 2019, 168 registered crimes yielded zero identified suspects. This pattern persisted through subsequent years: 143 crimes in 2020 (2 suspects), 122 in 2021 (0 suspects), 64 in 2022 (2 suspects), 102 in 2023 (2 suspects), 98 in 2024 (0 suspects), and 108 in 2025 (0 suspects). Cumulatively, 494 registered crimes over five years (2020-2025) resulted in merely four criminal proceedings with identified suspects – an identification rate of 0,8%.

The current equilibrium – hundreds of registered crimes, virtually no suspects – serves neither judicial independence nor rule of law. It either exposes judges to systematic pressure without remedy or normalises the inappropriate criminalization of procedural conflicts. Resolution requires empirical investigation into complaint origins, prosecutorial decision-making, and case outcomes, alongside doctrinal clarification of Article 376’s proper scope in protecting judicial independence without chilling legitimate advocacy.

This analysis examines crime statistics from 2013 to 2025, with particular focus on the wartime period (2022-2025), to demonstrate how armed conflict has disrupted crime control mechanisms and overwhelmed institutional capacity. The central thesis is that while Ukraine has experienced a dramatic surge in registered criminal offences during the war, the state’s ability to respond effectively has deteriorated significantly, as evidenced by the growing gap between registered crimes and criminal proceedings with identified suspects. This pattern reflects broader challenges facing states attempting to maintain rule of law under conditions of existential military threat.

Pre-War Crime Trends and the Initial Impact of Full-Scale Invasion

To understand the wartime crime crisis, it is essential to examine pre-war trends. From 2013 to 2016, Ukraine registered between 529139 and 592604 crimes annually, with a corresponding 159480 to 223561 criminal proceedings involving identified suspects. Following the 2014 Russian armed agression in Donbas and subsequent police reforms, crime rates showed a declining trend, reaching a historic low of 321443 registered crimes in 2021. This decade-long reduction suggested improvements in both crime prevention and institutional effectiveness.

The year 2020 marked the beginning of significant disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with 360622 registered crimes and 167098 proceedings with suspects. However, 2021 saw a further decrease to 321443 crimes with 172494 identified suspects, representing the lowest point in the observed period. The ratio between registered crimes and identified suspects remained relatively stable during these years, hovering around 50-54%, indicating that approximately half of all registered criminal offences resulted in specific individuals being notified of suspicion.

The full-scale invasion in February 2022 immediately disrupted this trajectory. In 2022, the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (hereafter – LEA) registered 362636 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings, where the above-mentioned numbers reflect both criminal proceedings with concrete suspects and so-called ‘factual’ criminal proceedings (without suspects). Despite the war beginning only in late February, this figure exceeded the entire 2021 total. Notably, only 132418 criminal proceedings involved identified suspects, yielding a suspect identification rate of approximately 36,5%, the lowest in the entire observation period. It should be noted that the number of registered crimes even for the period of ten months of 2022 almost reached the level of 2021 (a whole year). This initial year of war revealed a critical pattern: even as institutional capacity was redirected toward military defense and territorial integrity, criminal activity did not decrease but rather began to increase, while the state’s capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes deteriorated significantly.

The Escalating Crime Crisis: 2023-2025

The subsequent years demonstrated an alarming escalation in criminal activity. In 2023, the LEA registered 475595 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings where notes of suspicion were given in 189292 proceedings – a 31% increase from 2022 and a 48% increase from 2021. While the number of proceedings with identified suspects recovered somewhat, this represented only 39,8% of registered crimes, still significantly below pre-war levels. This partial recovery in suspect identification suggests some adaptation by law enforcement institutions, but the gap between crimes and investigative capacity continued to widen in absolute terms.

The year 2024 saw continued deterioration, with the LEA registering 492479 crimes and giving notes of suspicion in 194688 proceedings (39,5% rate). Most dramatically, 2025 data reveals an unprecedented spike: the LEA registered 608191 crimes with notes of suspicion given in only 165904 proceedings – the highest crime figure in the entire 2013-2025 period, representing an 89% increase from the 2021 baseline and a 24% increase from 2024. Paradoxically, despite this surge in registered criminality, the number of proceedings with identified suspects decreased in absolute terms, yielding a suspect identification rate of merely 27,3% – the lowest in the observed period.

These statistics reveal several critical patterns. First, the war has not led to a simple linear increase in crime but rather an accelerating crisis, with 2025 representing a particularly acute deterioration. Second, the state’s capacity to respond has not kept pace with the crime surge; in fact, it has declined in both relative and, in 2025, absolute terms. Third, the gap between registered crimes and effective investigation has reached crisis proportions, with over 442000 criminal proceedings in 2025 lacking identified suspects.

Structural Explanations and Systemic Implications

In line with patterns previously seen in other countries at various times, war has led to a significant increase in crime in Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian case is distinctive in several respects. Unlike historical conflicts that often occurred under authoritarian regimes with restricted civil liberties, Ukraine has attempted to maintain democratic governance and rule of law while fighting an existential war. This commitment to transparency is reflected in the continued registration and publication of crime statistics, even as these numbers reveal institutional weakness.

The dramatic increase in crimes without identified suspects reflects multiple systemic pressures. First, significant human resources have been redirected from law enforcement to military service, depleting investigative capacity. Second, territorial disruptions, population displacement, and infrastructure damage have complicated investigative processes and cross-jurisdictional cooperation. Third, war-related crimes – including collaboration with occupation forces, looting in conflict zones, and military-related offences – have added entirely new categories of criminality requiring specialised investigative approaches. Fourth, corruption and organised crime have adapted to wartime conditions, exploiting gaps in institutional oversight and the chaos of military logistics.

The state’s response demonstrates a critical tension in wartime governance: Ukrainian authorities continue to register criminal offences to the maximum extent possible, fulfilling transparency and documentation obligations, but lack sufficient resources, human capital, and organisational capabilities to bring perpetrators to justice. This creates a dangerous dynamic where impunity increases, potentially encouraging further criminal activity. The 2025 figures are particularly concerning, suggesting that as the war extends into its fourth year, institutional exhaustion has reached a critical threshold.

Moreover, the low suspect identification rates have profound implications for public trust in institutions, deterrence effects, and post-war reconstruction. If significant portions of wartime criminality remain unaddressed, this could normalise impunity and complicate efforts to restore rule of law. The challenge is compounded by the fact that many crimes committed during wartime – particularly corruption in military procurement, abuse of martial law provisions, and collaboration with occupation forces – have direct implications for state security and post-war accountability.

General Data: Conclusion

The evidence presented demonstrates that Ukraine’s criminal justice system is experiencing a severe crisis under the pressures of prolonged armed conflict. Registered crimes have increased by 89% from pre-war levels, while the capacity to identify and prosecute suspects has declined dramatically, creating a widening justice gap. The 2025 spike to over 608000 registered crimes with less than 166000 identified suspects represents an unprecedented challenge to rule of law. At the same time, it has revealed significant weaknesses in the state’s response to crime, as evidenced by the ratio between the number of registered criminal offences and the number of criminal proceedings in which individuals have been notified of suspicion. Thus, the state registers criminal offences to the maximum extent possible, but does not have sufficient resources, human resources and organisational capabilities to bring the perpetrators to justice.

These findings have significant implications for understanding how modern democratic states function under existential military threats. Ukraine’s experience suggests that transparency and institutional continuity can be maintained even under extreme pressure, but that effectiveness inevitably suffers when resources are diverted to survival. The growing gap between registered crimes and prosecuted cases represents not merely a statistical phenomenon but a fundamental challenge to social order, public safety, and democratic governance.

As the war continues, Ukrainian authorities face the dual challenge of maintaining immediate security while preventing the complete erosion of criminal justice capacity. International support for institutional strengthening, technical assistance in investigation techniques, and post-war reconstruction planning must account for this accumulated deficit in justice delivery. The Ukrainian case demonstrates that modern warfare affects not only military and economic capacity but fundamentally disrupts the legal order, with consequences that will extend well beyond the cessation of hostilities.

The data from 2013-2025 reveals that Ukraine is indeed serving as a critical case study for understanding crime and justice under conditions of total war in a democratic society. The lessons learned – both positive in terms of institutional resilience and concerning in terms of capacity limitations – will be essential for policy makers, international organisations, and scholars seeking to support states facing similar existential challenges. The path toward restoring effective criminal justice in Ukraine will require sustained effort, significant resources, and innovative approaches to addressing the massive backlog of uninvestigated crimes accumulated during the war years.

Effectiveness of the Law Enforcement Agencies

The operational capacity of Ukraine’s criminal justice system has undergone substantial transformation following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, with police statistics revealing a marked decline in the number of criminal proceedings involving identified suspects during the 2022-2024 period compared to pre-war benchmarks. This deterioration manifests most clearly in the ratio between registered criminal proceedings and notifications of suspicion – a critical metric that reflects the investigative effectiveness and overall functional integrity of the law enforcement apparatus.

Prior to the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s criminal justice system demonstrated a consistent trajectory of improvement in investigative outcomes. As crime statistics illustrate, the ratio between criminal proceedings and notifications of suspicion exhibited a stable downward trend from 2016 to 2021, declining from its peak of 3,71 in 2016 to a historic low of 1,86 in 2021. This six-year pattern suggested progressive enhancement in investigative capacity, indicating that law enforcement agencies were successfully identifying suspects in an increasing proportion of registered criminal cases. The 2021 ratio represented the most efficient performance within the analysed timeframe, signaling that for every registered criminal proceeding, investigators were able to issue notifications of suspicion to concrete individuals at nearly twice the rate observed five years earlier.

However, the onset of full-scale hostilities precipitated a reversal of this positive trend. While 2022 showed a modest increase to 2,74, and 2023-2024 maintained relatively stable figures of 2,51 and 2,53 respectively, the year 2025 witnessed a dramatic surge to 3,66 – approaching the 2016 peak and representing one of the highest ratios recorded in the past decade. This striking elevation indicates that the proportion of criminal proceedings concluding with identified suspects has diminished substantially, suggesting that nearly four registered crimes are now required to generate a single notification of suspicion. Such a ratio effectively doubles the investigative inefficiency observed during the system’s optimal 2021 performance.

Several interconnected factors may account for this deterioration in investigative effectiveness. The redeployment of experienced law enforcement personnel to military service has depleted institutional capacity, while ongoing hostilities have disrupted investigative procedures, evidence collection, and witness cooperation. Additionally, the occupation of territories, population displacement, and infrastructure destruction have created unprecedented obstacles to standard investigative practices. The wartime environment has simultaneously increased certain categories of crime while constraining the resources available for their investigation, creating a widening gap between reported criminality and prosecutorial outcomes.

The implications of this trend extend beyond mere statistical observation. A criminal justice system that registers criminal proceedings without corresponding suspect identification risks undermining public confidence in the rule of law, potentially encouraging impunity and eroding deterrence mechanisms. This is particularly concerning during wartime, when social cohesion and institutional legitimacy assume heightened importance. The 2025 spike further suggests that Ukraine faces mounting challenges in maintaining even the diminished investigative capacity observed in 2022-2024, potentially indicating accelerating institutional degradation absent targeted interventions to stabilise and restore criminal justice functionality under extraordinary operational conditions.

Geographical Distribution of Crime: The Ruralisation of Criminality in Wartime

An analysis of crime trends in Ukraine reveals a significant transformation in its spatial distribution: crime has become less urbanised, with rural forms of criminal activity on the rise. Although in absolute terms urban crime (in cities and urban-type settlements) still prevails over rural crime, the armed conflict has led to a noticeable shift in the geography of crime from urban centres to rural areas.

This phenomenon may be due to several interrelated factors. First, crimes committed in the frontline zone against the backdrop of mass abandonment of property by owners. Second, crimes committed by servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (desertion and unauthorised abandonment of military units). Thirdly, criminal activities of Russian occupation forces in frontline and occupied territories.

At the same time, official statistics from the Office of the Prosecutor General contain significant contradictions that cast doubt on this hypothesis. In particular, there is a paradoxical situation: against the backdrop of an increase in the total number of crimes, especially those classified under Article 115 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (intentional murder) and traditionally associated with the activities of the occupiers and cases of missing persons, the number of registered crimes committed by foreigners on the territory of Ukraine shows a steady downward trend.

This discrepancy between expected and official statistics indicates systemic problems in the reliability and completeness of the official statistical picture of crime presented by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies. The underreporting or misclassification of crimes committed by foreign combatants – particularly Russian military personnel operating in occupied and frontline territories – suggests either systematic data collection failures or deliberate statistical manipulation. Such inconsistencies undermine the credibility of official crime statistics and complicate evidence-based policy responses to wartime criminality.

One of the main conclusions from research into crime trends since 2022 is that the war made criminality in Ukraine significantly more rural. The statistical evidence demonstrates a clear and consistent trajectory toward the ruralisation of crime that accelerated dramatically following the full-scale Russian invasion. In 2013, the ratio between crimes committed in urban and rural areas stood at 4,04, indicating that urban crime was approximately four times more prevalent than rural crime. This ratio remained relatively stable throughout the pre-war period, fluctuating between 3,82 and 4,19 from 2013 to 2019, reflecting Ukraine’s traditional pattern of urban-concentrated criminality typical of post-Soviet societies.

However, beginning in 2020 and accelerating sharply in 2022, this ratio underwent a dramatic transformation. By 2022, the urban-to-rural crime ratio decreased to 3,23, representing a reduction of nearly 20% compared to pre-war levels. This decline continued progressively, reaching 2,99 in 2023, 2,35 in 2024, and falling to just 1,99 in 2025. The 2025 figure represents an unprecedented historical low, indicating that urban crime is now barely twice as common as rural crime – a stark departure from the traditional four-to-one ratio that characterised Ukrainian criminality for decades.

The percentage distribution of crimes across urban and rural areas provides even more compelling evidence of this spatial transformation. In the period of 2013-2021, urban crimes occupied 77-78% in the general structure of criminality in Ukraine, with rural crimes accounting for approximately 19-20%. This distribution remained remarkably stable, with only minor annual fluctuations, suggesting an entrenched pattern of urban crime dominance rooted in Ukraine’s demographic and socioeconomic structure.

The beginning of the war in 2022 brought the minimum level of urban crime (74,14%) and maximum level of rural crime (22,97%) for the last decade of national crime prevention history. This represented the first significant breach of the established urban-rural crime distribution pattern. However, the trend did not stabilize at this new equilibrium but continued to evolve in subsequent years. By 2023, urban crime fell to 72,9% while rural crime rose to 24,3%. The transformation accelerated further in 2024, when police statistics demonstrated the lowest level of crimes in urban areas (67,6%) and the highest level of crimes in rural areas (28,7%) ever recorded in modern Ukrainian criminal statistics.

The 2025 data reveals an even more dramatic shift, with urban crime comprising only 64,3% of total registered crimes and rural crime reaching 32,3%. This means that nearly one-third of all crimes in Ukraine now occur in rural areas – a proportion that would have been inconceivable in the pre-war period. The shift of approximately 13 percentage points from urban to rural crime between 2013 and 2025 represents a fundamental restructuring of Ukraine’s criminal geography.

It appears that such changes have resulted primarily from the 2022 Russian armed aggression, where many crimes were committed by Russian soldiers and officers in rural areas. The occupation and temporary control of vast rural territories, particularly in eastern and southern Ukraine, created conditions for systematic criminal activity by occupation forces. Rural areas, characterised by lower population density, weaker law enforcement presence, and greater distance from administrative centres, became particularly vulnerable to occupation-related crimes including looting, property destruction, violence against civilians, and other war crimes.

The displacement of civilian populations from frontline and occupied rural territories created opportunities for property crimes in abandoned settlements. Villages and agricultural areas near active combat zones experienced mass evacuation, leaving homes, farms, and infrastructure unguarded and susceptible to theft and vandalism by both occupation forces and opportunistic criminals. The absence of property owners and the collapse of local law enforcement structures in these areas created a criminogenic environment with minimal deterrence or oversight.

Military-related crimes by Ukrainian servicemen, particularly desertion and unauthorised abandonment of military units, also contributed to the ruralisation of crime statistics. As military operations concentrated in rural and semi-rural frontline areas, crimes committed by servicemen were more likely to be registered in rural jurisdictions rather than urban centres. The stress and trauma of prolonged combat operations, combined with inadequate military discipline mechanisms in some units, led to increased incidents of military crimes that statistically registered as rural offences.

Furthermore, the transformation of rural areas into conflict zones altered the fundamental nature of criminal opportunity structures. Traditional urban crimes associated with commercial activity, public gatherings, and dense residential populations declined due to wartime restrictions, curfews, and economic disruption in cities. Simultaneously, new forms of rural criminality emerged, including illegal weapons trafficking, smuggling across changed administrative boundaries, and crimes related to the exploitation of humanitarian aid and reconstruction resources in affected rural communities.

Police statistics on torture (Article 127 of the Criminal Code) occupy a controversial place in the analysis of the general structure of crime in Ukraine. On one hand, systematic torture by the police, prison and military officers has shaped corresponding views on torture practices in the Ukrainian society and media. The Ukrainian society has a strong view that ill-treatment by the police and prison officers is a wide-spread phenomenon. On the other one, the number of officially registered crimes of torture determines many questions concerning the latent nature of this type of crime as well as the effectiveness of investigation of torture by state agents in Ukraine which become known to the society.

Official torture crime statistics demonstrate considerable volatility across the observation period. The initial post-Euromaidan years (2013 – 2017) showed relatively modest fluctuations, with registered cases ranging from 51 to 82 annually. A dramatic inflection occurred in 2018, when registered crimes spiked to 163 cases – a 98,8% increase from the previous year. This peak was followed by a gradual decline through 2019 – 2021, with cases settling in the 79-140 range.

The onset of full-scale war in February 2022 produced an immediate statistical shock: registered torture crimes plummeted to 68 cases, the lowest level in the entire observation period. However, this proved to be a temporary nadir. The subsequent years (2023 – 2025) demonstrated a recovery pattern, with case volumes stabilizing at 94-124 cases annually – levels comparable to the pre-2018 baseline but substantially below the 2018 peak.

Additionally, the percentage of dropped criminal proceedings stimulates additional questions about the effectiveness of pre-trial investigation of tortures. The specific feature of crimes of torture is that the victim can identify a perpetrator or at least to provide the information that he or she was subjected to torture in a concrete police department or in a concrete prison.

The critical deficiency in Ukraine’s pre-war torture prosecution system becomes evident when examining conversion rates between crime registration and judicial outcomes. The Statistics reveal a systematic pattern of investigative attrition that suggests profound institutional dysfunction rather than mere resource constraints.

During the 2016 – 2021 period, only 24,3% to 45,7% of registered torture crimes resulted in criminal proceedings with identified suspects. The year 2019 represents the nadir of investigative effectiveness, with merely 24,3% of cases advancing to this preliminary stage. Even in the relatively stronger year of 2017, less than half (45,1%) of registered crimes produced suspects – a conversion rate that would be considered unacceptable in functioning criminal justice systems addressing serious human rights violations.

The attrition intensifies at the indictment stage. Between 2016 and 2021, only 15.7% to 31,7% of registered torture crimes resulted in indictments forwarded to courts. The 2019 data is particularly striking: of 140 registered torture crimes, only 22 (15,7%) reached indictment. This represents an 84,3% failure rate at converting registered crimes into prosecutorial action – a statistic indicative of near-complete systemic breakdown.

Compounding this investigative ineffectiveness, the pre-war period witnessed high rates of case abandonment. Between 2016 and 2021, 17,8% to 41,9% of proceedings were dropped. The years 2016, 2020, and 2021 were particularly problematic, with drop rates exceeding 40%. This suggests not merely investigative difficulty but a systemic pattern of initiating proceedings that prosecutors lacked the capacity, evidence, or political will to pursue to completion.

The Russian full-scale invasion produced an unexpected reversal in investigative effectiveness metrics. Despite conditions that would logically impede torture investigations – displaced populations, overwhelmed institutions, diverted resources, occupied territories – the prosecution system demonstrated marked improvement in converting registered crimes into judicial outcomes.

The year 2024 represents the highest investigative effectiveness in the entire observation period: 1) 62,9% of registered crimes resulted in proceedings with suspects (compared to 24,3 – 45,7% pre-war); 2) 46,8% reached indictment stage (compared to 15,7% – 31,7% pre-war); 3) only 19,3% of proceedings were dropped (compared to 17,8% – 41,9% pre-war).

This effectiveness improvement proved sustainable across the war period:

• average suspect identification rate: ~ 58%;
• average indictment rate: ~ 42%;
• average drop rate: ~ 23%.

These metrics represent an approximate doubling of pre-war indictment rates and a near-halving of case abandonment rates.

The wartime improvement in investigative effectiveness fundamentally challenges resource-centric explanations of criminal justice dysfunction. If investigative failure resulted primarily from insufficient resources, the wartime period – characterised by severe resource constraints – should have witnessed deteriorating rather than improving metrics. The data instead suggests that pre-war dysfunction stemmed from systemic factors largely independent of resource availability: lack of political will, inadequate prosecutorial prioritisation, tolerance for impunity, or institutional capture.

The wartime period coincided with unprecedented international attention to human rights violations in Ukraine. The establishment of numerous documentation initiatives created external accountability pressures absent in the pre-war period. This international scrutiny likely increased both the visibility costs of investigative failure and the institutional support for pursuing cases.

The improved conversion rates may partially reflect a shift from quantity to quality in case selection. Faced with overwhelming caseloads and limited capacity, prosecutors may have adopted more rigorous screening criteria, pursuing only cases with strong evidentiary foundations. This would improve conversion rates while potentially allowing weaker but nonetheless meritorious cases to go unprosecuted.

The 2022 Russian invasion fundamentally altered Ukraine’s political economy of law enforcement. Pre-war patterns of institutional tolerance for torture – rooted in authoritarian legacies, law enforcement impunity, and political interference – became politically untenable in a wartime context demanding international support and domestic legitimacy. Torture prosecution transformed from a low-priority administrative matter to a politically salient indicator of democratic commitment and rule of law.

The most significant limitation of this statistical analysis is its necessary exclusion of torture occurring in temporarily occupied territories. Russian occupation created zones of absolute impunity where torture has been extensively documented by international monitors but remains entirely absent from Ukrainian crime statistics. The registered crime figures for 2022 – 2025 therefore represent a severe undercount of actual torture incidence, capturing only cases occurring in government-controlled territory where investigative access exists.

This visibility gap has profound implications for assessing the true scale of the torture problem in Ukraine and for understanding the relationship between wartime conditions and human rights violations. The improved investigative effectiveness documented in official statistics may coexist with massively increased absolute torture incidence in territories where the Ukrainian criminal justice system cannot operate.

The statistical analysis of torture prosecution in Ukraine from 2013-2025 reveals three critical findings:

First, Ukraine’s pre-war torture prosecution system exhibited systematic dysfunction characterized by extraordinarily high attrition rates between crime registration and judicial outcomes. With indictment rates as low as 15,7% and case drop rates exceeding 40%, the system demonstrated fundamental institutional failure rather than normal investigative difficulty.

Second, the full-scale invasion paradoxically coincided with dramatic improvements in prosecutorial effectiveness, with indictment rates nearly doubling and case abandonment rates halving despite severe wartime constraints. This improvement suggests that pre-war dysfunction stemmed primarily from factors relating to political will, institutional priorities, and systemic corruption rather than technical capacity or resources.

Third, the 2022 collapse in registered cases and the ongoing inability to investigate torture in occupied territories means that official statistics severely undercount the true scale of torture during the war period. Improved investigative effectiveness in government-controlled territory coexists with zones of absolute impunity in occupied areas.

These findings have significant implications for understanding institutional reform dynamics, the political economy of criminal justice, and the complex relationship between war, state capacity, and human rights protection. They suggest that conventional assumptions about the enabling conditions for effective torture prosecution may require fundamental revision, and that crisis can, under specific circumstances, catalyze institutional improvement.

1.1. Research Context and Methodology

Ukraine’s criminal justice system in 2025 operates under extraordinary strain due to Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion. The fourth year of war has driven profound structural shifts in crime patterns that extend well beyond statistical fluctuations.

1.2. Overview of the Reporting Period

Between January and October 2025, overall crime rates stabilized at elevated levels while the composition of offences worsened, with serious and particularly serious crimes comprising a growing share. Criminologists describe this as “criminal severity inflation” — a direct result of societal militarization, weapon proliferation, and heightened psychosocial stress. A troubling “statistical gap” has emerged between registered proceedings and cases sent to court, indicating a critical backlog of uninvestigated cases, particularly regarding war crimes.

2. Overall Crime Structure Analysis

2.1. Quantitative Data and Severity Classification

The Prosecutor General’s Office recorded 524,552 criminal offences during the first ten months of 2025. This figure, while statistically dry, reveals the true magnitude of law enforcement challenges.

The breakdown by severity reveals a concerning shift toward the most dangerous offences, with nearly three-quarters falling into serious or particularly serious categories:

The combined 74.2% share of serious and particularly serious crimes is abnormal for peacetime but typical for states experiencing intense armed conflict. This stems partly from legislative changes under martial law that elevated penalties for certain crimes (such as theft and robbery), automatically reclassifying them as serious offences. Additionally, crimes against national security and peace — inherently particularly serious — significantly inflate these statistics.

2.2. Pre-Trial Investigation Effectiveness

Analysis of pre-trial investigation outcomes reveals substantial gaps between crime registration and prosecution, with clearance rates varying by offence category and reflecting law enforcement priorities.

For crimes against life and health, investigators served suspicion notices in only 18,000 of 72,500 registered cases — a clearance rate of approximately 24.8%. This low rate likely reflects investigation difficulties in combat-adjacent areas, where evidence collection is hampered or impossible due to shelling. Cases involving missing persons and civilian casualties requiring lengthy investigations also contribute to this figure.

Conversely, crimes against Ukraine’s national security (Criminal Code Articles 109-114-2) show significantly better results. Suspects were identified in 2,056 of 4,968 registered proceedings — a 41.4% rate. This demonstrates focused, effective work by the Security Service of Ukraine and prosecutors in identifying collaborators, traitors, and spotters. The higher rate also reflects that such crimes are often documented during commission or through irrefutable digital evidence.

The overall picture reveals a systemic problem: courts cannot process the investigative caseload, while investigations are overwhelmed by registration volumes, preventing quality investigative work.

3. Military Justice: Disciplinary Crisis and Institutional Failure

Among 2025’s most critical and politically sensitive trends is the explosive growth in military criminal offences, particularly unauthorized absence from duty and desertion. This phenomenon transcends legal concerns to impact national defence capacity.

3.1. Unauthorised Absence From Military Service: Scale and Dynamics

The Prosecutor General’s Office registered over 161,000 criminal proceedings under Criminal Code Article 407 (unauthorized absence from military service) during the first ten months of 2025.

This figure is shocking both in absolute terms and growth trajectory — four times higher than the same period in 2024.

The acceleration rate illustrates the crisis depth: while 2022 averaged 6,000 annual cases, 2025 sees approximately 16,000 new desertion cases monthly. The entire 2022 year’s caseload now accumulates in less than two weeks.

These statistics point to interconnected problems:

1. Personnel psychological exhaustion: Unclear demobilization and rotation timelines demoralise even motivated service members.
2. Recruitment challenges: Mobilisation quality issues and coercive methods result in individuals neither morally nor physically prepared for service.
3. Command deficiencies: Desertion often responds to internal unit conflicts or inappropriate orders.

3.2. Procedural System Collapse

Crime registration is merely the first step. The greater problem is law enforcement agencies’ (State Bureau of Investigation, military prosecutor’s office) and courts’ inability to respond effectively to this wave. Military crime prosecution statistics reveal effective paralysis.

Of 161,461 registered proceedings, only 9,300 military personnel received formal charges—just 6% of total cases. Court referrals are even worse at approximately 5%.

This situation differs radically from early war conditions. In 2022, the court referral rate was 20% (one in five cases). The fourfold efficiency drop combined with a tenfold workload increase indicates the system has reached capacity limits. SBI investigators physically cannot conduct necessary procedural actions (interrogations, document seizures, suspicion announcements) across thousands of new monthly proceedings.

4. Economic Crime: War Adaptation

Economic crime demonstrates remarkable adaptability to martial law conditions. Criminal organizations are transforming methods, exploiting digital space vulnerabilities and citizen social insecurity.

4.1. Fraud Evolution (Criminal Code Article 190)

Fraud remains among the most common property crimes, though 2025 dynamics show some decline from previous years’ peaks.

Throughout 2022, the Prosecutor General’s Office recorded 32,000 Article 190 proceedings (with suspicions reported in 7,500 cases).

However, just the first ten months of 2025 saw 42,000 Article 190 proceedings (with suspicions reported in 10,000 cases).

This confirms war has created favourable manipulation conditions: from fake Armed Forces fundraising to housing rental schemes targeting displaced persons and fraudulent “UN aid” claims.

5. Crimes Against Public Morality: Digital Pornography

Morality-related crimes, particularly pornographic content circulation (Criminal Code Articles 301 and 301-1), show steady growth reflecting global sex industry digitalization trends.

5.1. Statistical Patterns and Structure

During the first ten months of 2025, nearly 1,522 criminal proceedings were opened under Article 301 (with suspicions reported in 1,438 cases).

5.2. Legal Paradox and High Detection Rate

This crime category exhibits phenomenally high detection rates. Suspects receive suspicion notices in 95% of cases, with 81% of proceedings successfully referred to court. This efficiency stems from documentation simplicity: digital traces, bank transactions, and test content purchases provide indisputable evidence.

6. Russian Federation War Crimes: Documenting Genocide

A separate, extensive law enforcement area involves documenting and investigating international crimes committed during Russia’s armed aggression. While excluded from traditional “peacetime” crime statistics, this category places the greatest burden on the justice system.

6.1. Documented Atrocities Scale

As of October 2025, the Prosecutor General’s Office had officially documented over 170,000 war crimes, with later updates approaching 190,000 cases. These represent systematic violations of war laws and customs (Criminal Code Article 438), including indiscriminate shelling, torture, deportation, and civilian killings.

6.2. Infrastructure and Medical Facility Attacks

A defining feature of 2025 war crimes was systematic critical infrastructure attacks. The World Health Organization documented 2,195 attacks on Ukrainian medical facilities between February 2022 and December 2024, with 459 occurring in 2024 alone. This tactic continued in 2025, aimed at creating humanitarian catastrophe. Between March and August 2025, over 100 energy infrastructure attacks occurred, causing significant generation deficits.

8. Conclusions and Forecast Scenarios

Analysis of the first ten months of 2025 yields the following conclusions:

1. Structural Crime Deformation: War has completely transformed Ukraine’s crime landscape. The predominance of serious and particularly serious crimes (74.2% of total) indicates increased criminal act danger. Rising crimes involving weapons and explosives directly result from uncontrolled weapon circulation.
2. Critical Military Justice State: Military crime investigation (offences, desertion) has reached systemic collapse. The gap between registered proceedings (over 161,000) and court referrals (5%) demonstrates the existing law enforcement model’s inability to address the military disciplinary crisis. This demands immediate approach revision: from specialised military court creation to personnel management paradigm shifts.
3. Economic Crime Adaptability: Cybercrime and fraud show high resilience, rapidly adapting to new social realities. Despite some proceeding decreases, fraud levels remain significantly above pre-war levels, requiring constant cyber countermeasure improvements.
4. Procedural Overload: Low suspect identification rates in life/health (24.8%) and property crime cases indicate investigative resources are diverted to priority areas (national security, war crimes), leaving “ordinary” crime peripheral. These risks increased latent crime and declining public law enforcement confidence.
5. International Dimension: Ukraine’s ICC integration and active international institutional cooperation are key factors in combating war crime impunity. However, the national justice system must prepare to shoulder the main investigative burden for tens of thousands of crimes beyond The Hague’s jurisdiction.