This statistical volatility cannot be interpreted merely as variations in criminal activity. Rather, the evidence suggests factual sabotage by law enforcement agencies in registering such crimes, particularly during the initial phase of the full-scale invasion in 2022 when institutional capacity was severely compromised and priorities shifted dramatically toward war-related offenses. The subsequent increases in 2024 and 2025, reaching and exceeding pre-war levels, indicate either a genuine surge in crimes against justice or a belated return to more comprehensive registration practices – or potentially both phenomena operating simultaneously.

Perhaps the most alarming trend revealed by the statistical data is the deteriorating ratio between registered crimes against justice (total numbers) and the number of criminal proceedings with suspects. This metric serves as a critical indicator of investigative effectiveness and prosecutorial follow-through. When crimes are registered but suspects are not identified, investigated, or prosecuted, it suggests systemic failures in accountability mechanisms and potentially indicates institutional tolerance for such offences.

The data reveals a troubling pattern: the ratio between registered crimes against justice and notifications of suspicion escalated from 2,34 in 2013 to a peak of 5,61 in 2019, indicating that at the height of dysfunction, nearly six crimes were registered for every suspect identified. This dramatic deterioration suggests a systemic collapse in investigative capacity and prosecutorial will during this period, effectively creating an environment of impunity for crimes against justice.

The subsequent decline to 1,62 in 2025, while appearing positive, requires careful interpretation – it may reflect genuine improvement in accountability mechanisms but could also indicate reduced crime registration, changes in statistical methodology, or prosecutorial selectivity. The 2019 peak coincided with a critical period in Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, potentially capturing the tension between increased reporting and insufficient institutional capacity to investigate. The current lower ratios demand verification through qualitative analysis to determine whether they represent authentic progress or merely statistical artifacts masking continued systemic deficiencies.

Intentional Non-Execution of the Court Decisions

Non-execution of court decisions represents a chronic pathology of the Ukrainian justice system, consistently flagged by the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights as a fundamental breach of the rule of law. The statistical data on criminal proceedings initiated under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (intentional non-execution of court decisions) for the period 2013-2025 reveals not merely the persistence of this problem, but its dramatic transformation in the context of Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.

During the period 2013-2020, the volume of registered crimes under Article 382 demonstrated relative stability, fluctuating within a range of 3200 to 4200 cases annually. The peak occurred in 2019, when law enforcement agencies registered 4212 crimes against justice of this type. This relatively consistent pattern suggested an equilibrium state where the problem existed at endemic levels but remained within certain predictable parameters. Following 2019, a gradual decline commenced: 3448 crimes in 2020, followed by 2668 in 2021 – a reduction that might superficially suggest systemic improvement but more likely reflected evolving enforcement priorities and resource constraints.

The year 2022 marked a critical inflection point. The number of registered crimes plummeted to a historic minimum of 1191 – less than one-third of the 2019 level and merely 45% of the 2021 figure. Applying the classical criminological principle that crime within certain boundaries constitutes a normal social phenomenon, this dramatic contraction reveals not improvement but rather the catastrophic impact of Russia’s February 2022 escalation on Ukraine’s justice infrastructure. The precipitous decline demonstrates how profoundly military aggression disrupted judicial and law enforcement systems that had been painstakingly developed through years of coordinated effort by successive Ukrainian presidents, legislators, executive authorities, and both international and domestic experts and civil society organisations.

However, the 2022 nadir must be interpreted through a dualistic analytical framework. On one dimension, the record-low registration of crimes under Article 382 reflects the objective realities and altered priorities of a wartime society, where judicial enforcement mechanisms necessarily yielded to immediate security imperatives. This dramatic reduction signals not an improvement in court decision execution, but rather the effective collapse of accountability mechanisms, as law enforcement resources were diverted to existential threats and territorial defence. The statistics illuminate a justice system operating in crisis mode, where violations that would ordinarily trigger criminal investigation instead occurred in a zone of impunity created by wartime exigencies.

On the second dimension, an examination of the ratio between total numbers of registered criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with identified suspects reveals an equally troubling trajectory. From 2017 through 2021, Ukraine demonstrated gradual but consistent progress in converting registered crimes into concrete criminal proceedings with concrete suspects. The ratio improved steadily: from merely 38 criminal proceedings with suspects identified among 3283 criminal proceedings in 2017 (1,2%) to 218 criminal proceedings with suspects among 2668 criminal proceedings in 2021 (8,2%). This positive trend suggested that the criminal justice system was functioning more effectively, with investigations increasingly producing actionable results and reasonable suspicions grounded in evidence.

The 2022 rupture reversed this hard-won progress catastrophically. While only 1191 crimes were registered, a mere 34 suspects were identified (2,9%) that represented significant regression from 2021 levels. More alarmingly, the subsequent period reveals an explosive divergence. In 2023, while crime registration modestly increased to 2065 cases, suspect identification surged to 415 (20,1%). The year 2024 witnessed 3537 registered crimes but an extraordinary 1800 identified suspects (50,9%). Preliminary data for 2025 shows this trend accelerating exponentially: 7180 crimes registered alongside 4576 suspects (63,7%).

Interference in judicial activities

Judicial independence constitutes a foundational pillar of democratic governance and human rights protection. In recognition of this principle, Article 376 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine criminalises interference in judicial activities, establishing both primary and aggravated forms of liability.

Despite this robust legislative framework and persistent judicial complaints regarding external pressure, prosecutorial outcomes reveal a striking enforcement deficit. Statistical data from 2019-2025 demonstrates a systematic failure to transform registered crimes into concrete criminal proceedings. In 2019, 168 registered crimes yielded zero identified suspects. This pattern persisted through subsequent years: 143 crimes in 2020 (2 suspects), 122 in 2021 (0 suspects), 64 in 2022 (2 suspects), 102 in 2023 (2 suspects), 98 in 2024 (0 suspects), and 108 in 2025 (0 suspects). Cumulatively, 494 registered crimes over five years (2020-2025) resulted in merely four criminal proceedings with identified suspects – an identification rate of 0,8%.

The current equilibrium – hundreds of registered crimes, virtually no suspects – serves neither judicial independence nor rule of law. It either exposes judges to systematic pressure without remedy or normalises the inappropriate criminalization of procedural conflicts. Resolution requires empirical investigation into complaint origins, prosecutorial decision-making, and case outcomes, alongside doctrinal clarification of Article 376’s proper scope in protecting judicial independence without chilling legitimate advocacy.

This analysis examines crime statistics from 2013 to 2025, with particular focus on the wartime period (2022-2025), to demonstrate how armed conflict has disrupted crime control mechanisms and overwhelmed institutional capacity. The central thesis is that while Ukraine has experienced a dramatic surge in registered criminal offences during the war, the state’s ability to respond effectively has deteriorated significantly, as evidenced by the growing gap between registered crimes and criminal proceedings with identified suspects. This pattern reflects broader challenges facing states attempting to maintain rule of law under conditions of existential military threat.

Pre-War Crime Trends and the Initial Impact of Full-Scale Invasion

To understand the wartime crime crisis, it is essential to examine pre-war trends. From 2013 to 2016, Ukraine registered between 529139 and 592604 crimes annually, with a corresponding 159480 to 223561 criminal proceedings involving identified suspects. Following the 2014 Russian armed agression in Donbas and subsequent police reforms, crime rates showed a declining trend, reaching a historic low of 321443 registered crimes in 2021. This decade-long reduction suggested improvements in both crime prevention and institutional effectiveness.

The year 2020 marked the beginning of significant disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with 360622 registered crimes and 167098 proceedings with suspects. However, 2021 saw a further decrease to 321443 crimes with 172494 identified suspects, representing the lowest point in the observed period. The ratio between registered crimes and identified suspects remained relatively stable during these years, hovering around 50-54%, indicating that approximately half of all registered criminal offences resulted in specific individuals being notified of suspicion.

The full-scale invasion in February 2022 immediately disrupted this trajectory. In 2022, the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (hereafter – LEA) registered 362636 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings, where the above-mentioned numbers reflect both criminal proceedings with concrete suspects and so-called ‘factual’ criminal proceedings (without suspects). Despite the war beginning only in late February, this figure exceeded the entire 2021 total. Notably, only 132418 criminal proceedings involved identified suspects, yielding a suspect identification rate of approximately 36,5%, the lowest in the entire observation period. It should be noted that the number of registered crimes even for the period of ten months of 2022 almost reached the level of 2021 (a whole year). This initial year of war revealed a critical pattern: even as institutional capacity was redirected toward military defense and territorial integrity, criminal activity did not decrease but rather began to increase, while the state’s capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes deteriorated significantly.

The Escalating Crime Crisis: 2023-2025

The subsequent years demonstrated an alarming escalation in criminal activity. In 2023, the LEA registered 475595 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings where notes of suspicion were given in 189292 proceedings – a 31% increase from 2022 and a 48% increase from 2021. While the number of proceedings with identified suspects recovered somewhat, this represented only 39,8% of registered crimes, still significantly below pre-war levels. This partial recovery in suspect identification suggests some adaptation by law enforcement institutions, but the gap between crimes and investigative capacity continued to widen in absolute terms.

The year 2024 saw continued deterioration, with the LEA registering 492479 crimes and giving notes of suspicion in 194688 proceedings (39,5% rate). Most dramatically, 2025 data reveals an unprecedented spike: the LEA registered 608191 crimes with notes of suspicion given in only 165904 proceedings – the highest crime figure in the entire 2013-2025 period, representing an 89% increase from the 2021 baseline and a 24% increase from 2024. Paradoxically, despite this surge in registered criminality, the number of proceedings with identified suspects decreased in absolute terms, yielding a suspect identification rate of merely 27,3% – the lowest in the observed period.

These statistics reveal several critical patterns. First, the war has not led to a simple linear increase in crime but rather an accelerating crisis, with 2025 representing a particularly acute deterioration. Second, the state’s capacity to respond has not kept pace with the crime surge; in fact, it has declined in both relative and, in 2025, absolute terms. Third, the gap between registered crimes and effective investigation has reached crisis proportions, with over 442000 criminal proceedings in 2025 lacking identified suspects.

Structural Explanations and Systemic Implications

In line with patterns previously seen in other countries at various times, war has led to a significant increase in crime in Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian case is distinctive in several respects. Unlike historical conflicts that often occurred under authoritarian regimes with restricted civil liberties, Ukraine has attempted to maintain democratic governance and rule of law while fighting an existential war. This commitment to transparency is reflected in the continued registration and publication of crime statistics, even as these numbers reveal institutional weakness.

The dramatic increase in crimes without identified suspects reflects multiple systemic pressures. First, significant human resources have been redirected from law enforcement to military service, depleting investigative capacity. Second, territorial disruptions, population displacement, and infrastructure damage have complicated investigative processes and cross-jurisdictional cooperation. Third, war-related crimes – including collaboration with occupation forces, looting in conflict zones, and military-related offences – have added entirely new categories of criminality requiring specialised investigative approaches. Fourth, corruption and organised crime have adapted to wartime conditions, exploiting gaps in institutional oversight and the chaos of military logistics.

The state’s response demonstrates a critical tension in wartime governance: Ukrainian authorities continue to register criminal offences to the maximum extent possible, fulfilling transparency and documentation obligations, but lack sufficient resources, human capital, and organisational capabilities to bring perpetrators to justice. This creates a dangerous dynamic where impunity increases, potentially encouraging further criminal activity. The 2025 figures are particularly concerning, suggesting that as the war extends into its fourth year, institutional exhaustion has reached a critical threshold.

Moreover, the low suspect identification rates have profound implications for public trust in institutions, deterrence effects, and post-war reconstruction. If significant portions of wartime criminality remain unaddressed, this could normalise impunity and complicate efforts to restore rule of law. The challenge is compounded by the fact that many crimes committed during wartime – particularly corruption in military procurement, abuse of martial law provisions, and collaboration with occupation forces – have direct implications for state security and post-war accountability.

General Data: Conclusion

The evidence presented demonstrates that Ukraine’s criminal justice system is experiencing a severe crisis under the pressures of prolonged armed conflict. Registered crimes have increased by 89% from pre-war levels, while the capacity to identify and prosecute suspects has declined dramatically, creating a widening justice gap. The 2025 spike to over 608000 registered crimes with less than 166000 identified suspects represents an unprecedented challenge to rule of law. At the same time, it has revealed significant weaknesses in the state’s response to crime, as evidenced by the ratio between the number of registered criminal offences and the number of criminal proceedings in which individuals have been notified of suspicion. Thus, the state registers criminal offences to the maximum extent possible, but does not have sufficient resources, human resources and organisational capabilities to bring the perpetrators to justice.

These findings have significant implications for understanding how modern democratic states function under existential military threats. Ukraine’s experience suggests that transparency and institutional continuity can be maintained even under extreme pressure, but that effectiveness inevitably suffers when resources are diverted to survival. The growing gap between registered crimes and prosecuted cases represents not merely a statistical phenomenon but a fundamental challenge to social order, public safety, and democratic governance.

As the war continues, Ukrainian authorities face the dual challenge of maintaining immediate security while preventing the complete erosion of criminal justice capacity. International support for institutional strengthening, technical assistance in investigation techniques, and post-war reconstruction planning must account for this accumulated deficit in justice delivery. The Ukrainian case demonstrates that modern warfare affects not only military and economic capacity but fundamentally disrupts the legal order, with consequences that will extend well beyond the cessation of hostilities.

The data from 2013-2025 reveals that Ukraine is indeed serving as a critical case study for understanding crime and justice under conditions of total war in a democratic society. The lessons learned – both positive in terms of institutional resilience and concerning in terms of capacity limitations – will be essential for policy makers, international organisations, and scholars seeking to support states facing similar existential challenges. The path toward restoring effective criminal justice in Ukraine will require sustained effort, significant resources, and innovative approaches to addressing the massive backlog of uninvestigated crimes accumulated during the war years.

Effectiveness of the Law Enforcement Agencies

The operational capacity of Ukraine’s criminal justice system has undergone substantial transformation following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, with police statistics revealing a marked decline in the number of criminal proceedings involving identified suspects during the 2022-2024 period compared to pre-war benchmarks. This deterioration manifests most clearly in the ratio between registered criminal proceedings and notifications of suspicion – a critical metric that reflects the investigative effectiveness and overall functional integrity of the law enforcement apparatus.

Prior to the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s criminal justice system demonstrated a consistent trajectory of improvement in investigative outcomes. As crime statistics illustrate, the ratio between criminal proceedings and notifications of suspicion exhibited a stable downward trend from 2016 to 2021, declining from its peak of 3,71 in 2016 to a historic low of 1,86 in 2021. This six-year pattern suggested progressive enhancement in investigative capacity, indicating that law enforcement agencies were successfully identifying suspects in an increasing proportion of registered criminal cases. The 2021 ratio represented the most efficient performance within the analysed timeframe, signaling that for every registered criminal proceeding, investigators were able to issue notifications of suspicion to concrete individuals at nearly twice the rate observed five years earlier.

However, the onset of full-scale hostilities precipitated a reversal of this positive trend. While 2022 showed a modest increase to 2,74, and 2023-2024 maintained relatively stable figures of 2,51 and 2,53 respectively, the year 2025 witnessed a dramatic surge to 3,66 – approaching the 2016 peak and representing one of the highest ratios recorded in the past decade. This striking elevation indicates that the proportion of criminal proceedings concluding with identified suspects has diminished substantially, suggesting that nearly four registered crimes are now required to generate a single notification of suspicion. Such a ratio effectively doubles the investigative inefficiency observed during the system’s optimal 2021 performance.

Several interconnected factors may account for this deterioration in investigative effectiveness. The redeployment of experienced law enforcement personnel to military service has depleted institutional capacity, while ongoing hostilities have disrupted investigative procedures, evidence collection, and witness cooperation. Additionally, the occupation of territories, population displacement, and infrastructure destruction have created unprecedented obstacles to standard investigative practices. The wartime environment has simultaneously increased certain categories of crime while constraining the resources available for their investigation, creating a widening gap between reported criminality and prosecutorial outcomes.

The implications of this trend extend beyond mere statistical observation. A criminal justice system that registers criminal proceedings without corresponding suspect identification risks undermining public confidence in the rule of law, potentially encouraging impunity and eroding deterrence mechanisms. This is particularly concerning during wartime, when social cohesion and institutional legitimacy assume heightened importance. The 2025 spike further suggests that Ukraine faces mounting challenges in maintaining even the diminished investigative capacity observed in 2022-2024, potentially indicating accelerating institutional degradation absent targeted interventions to stabilise and restore criminal justice functionality under extraordinary operational conditions.

Geographical Distribution of Crime: The Ruralisation of Criminality in Wartime

An analysis of crime trends in Ukraine reveals a significant transformation in its spatial distribution: crime has become less urbanised, with rural forms of criminal activity on the rise. Although in absolute terms urban crime (in cities and urban-type settlements) still prevails over rural crime, the armed conflict has led to a noticeable shift in the geography of crime from urban centres to rural areas.

This phenomenon may be due to several interrelated factors. First, crimes committed in the frontline zone against the backdrop of mass abandonment of property by owners. Second, crimes committed by servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (desertion and unauthorised abandonment of military units). Thirdly, criminal activities of Russian occupation forces in frontline and occupied territories.

At the same time, official statistics from the Office of the Prosecutor General contain significant contradictions that cast doubt on this hypothesis. In particular, there is a paradoxical situation: against the backdrop of an increase in the total number of crimes, especially those classified under Article 115 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (intentional murder) and traditionally associated with the activities of the occupiers and cases of missing persons, the number of registered crimes committed by foreigners on the territory of Ukraine shows a steady downward trend.

This discrepancy between expected and official statistics indicates systemic problems in the reliability and completeness of the official statistical picture of crime presented by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies. The underreporting or misclassification of crimes committed by foreign combatants – particularly Russian military personnel operating in occupied and frontline territories – suggests either systematic data collection failures or deliberate statistical manipulation. Such inconsistencies undermine the credibility of official crime statistics and complicate evidence-based policy responses to wartime criminality.

One of the main conclusions from research into crime trends since 2022 is that the war made criminality in Ukraine significantly more rural. The statistical evidence demonstrates a clear and consistent trajectory toward the ruralisation of crime that accelerated dramatically following the full-scale Russian invasion. In 2013, the ratio between crimes committed in urban and rural areas stood at 4,04, indicating that urban crime was approximately four times more prevalent than rural crime. This ratio remained relatively stable throughout the pre-war period, fluctuating between 3,82 and 4,19 from 2013 to 2019, reflecting Ukraine’s traditional pattern of urban-concentrated criminality typical of post-Soviet societies.

However, beginning in 2020 and accelerating sharply in 2022, this ratio underwent a dramatic transformation. By 2022, the urban-to-rural crime ratio decreased to 3,23, representing a reduction of nearly 20% compared to pre-war levels. This decline continued progressively, reaching 2,99 in 2023, 2,35 in 2024, and falling to just 1,99 in 2025. The 2025 figure represents an unprecedented historical low, indicating that urban crime is now barely twice as common as rural crime – a stark departure from the traditional four-to-one ratio that characterised Ukrainian criminality for decades.

The percentage distribution of crimes across urban and rural areas provides even more compelling evidence of this spatial transformation. In the period of 2013-2021, urban crimes occupied 77-78% in the general structure of criminality in Ukraine, with rural crimes accounting for approximately 19-20%. This distribution remained remarkably stable, with only minor annual fluctuations, suggesting an entrenched pattern of urban crime dominance rooted in Ukraine’s demographic and socioeconomic structure.

The beginning of the war in 2022 brought the minimum level of urban crime (74,14%) and maximum level of rural crime (22,97%) for the last decade of national crime prevention history. This represented the first significant breach of the established urban-rural crime distribution pattern. However, the trend did not stabilize at this new equilibrium but continued to evolve in subsequent years. By 2023, urban crime fell to 72,9% while rural crime rose to 24,3%. The transformation accelerated further in 2024, when police statistics demonstrated the lowest level of crimes in urban areas (67,6%) and the highest level of crimes in rural areas (28,7%) ever recorded in modern Ukrainian criminal statistics.

The 2025 data reveals an even more dramatic shift, with urban crime comprising only 64,3% of total registered crimes and rural crime reaching 32,3%. This means that nearly one-third of all crimes in Ukraine now occur in rural areas – a proportion that would have been inconceivable in the pre-war period. The shift of approximately 13 percentage points from urban to rural crime between 2013 and 2025 represents a fundamental restructuring of Ukraine’s criminal geography.

It appears that such changes have resulted primarily from the 2022 Russian armed aggression, where many crimes were committed by Russian soldiers and officers in rural areas. The occupation and temporary control of vast rural territories, particularly in eastern and southern Ukraine, created conditions for systematic criminal activity by occupation forces. Rural areas, characterised by lower population density, weaker law enforcement presence, and greater distance from administrative centres, became particularly vulnerable to occupation-related crimes including looting, property destruction, violence against civilians, and other war crimes.

The displacement of civilian populations from frontline and occupied rural territories created opportunities for property crimes in abandoned settlements. Villages and agricultural areas near active combat zones experienced mass evacuation, leaving homes, farms, and infrastructure unguarded and susceptible to theft and vandalism by both occupation forces and opportunistic criminals. The absence of property owners and the collapse of local law enforcement structures in these areas created a criminogenic environment with minimal deterrence or oversight.

Military-related crimes by Ukrainian servicemen, particularly desertion and unauthorised abandonment of military units, also contributed to the ruralisation of crime statistics. As military operations concentrated in rural and semi-rural frontline areas, crimes committed by servicemen were more likely to be registered in rural jurisdictions rather than urban centres. The stress and trauma of prolonged combat operations, combined with inadequate military discipline mechanisms in some units, led to increased incidents of military crimes that statistically registered as rural offences.

Furthermore, the transformation of rural areas into conflict zones altered the fundamental nature of criminal opportunity structures. Traditional urban crimes associated with commercial activity, public gatherings, and dense residential populations declined due to wartime restrictions, curfews, and economic disruption in cities. Simultaneously, new forms of rural criminality emerged, including illegal weapons trafficking, smuggling across changed administrative boundaries, and crimes related to the exploitation of humanitarian aid and reconstruction resources in affected rural communities.

Police statistics on torture (Article 127 of the Criminal Code) occupy a controversial place in the analysis of the general structure of crime in Ukraine. On one hand, systematic torture by the police, prison and military officers has shaped corresponding views on torture practices in the Ukrainian society and media. The Ukrainian society has a strong view that ill-treatment by the police and prison officers is a wide-spread phenomenon. On the other one, the number of officially registered crimes of torture determines many questions concerning the latent nature of this type of crime as well as the effectiveness of investigation of torture by state agents in Ukraine which become known to the society.

Official torture crime statistics demonstrate considerable volatility across the observation period. The initial post-Euromaidan years (2013 – 2017) showed relatively modest fluctuations, with registered cases ranging from 51 to 82 annually. A dramatic inflection occurred in 2018, when registered crimes spiked to 163 cases – a 98,8% increase from the previous year. This peak was followed by a gradual decline through 2019 – 2021, with cases settling in the 79-140 range.

The onset of full-scale war in February 2022 produced an immediate statistical shock: registered torture crimes plummeted to 68 cases, the lowest level in the entire observation period. However, this proved to be a temporary nadir. The subsequent years (2023 – 2025) demonstrated a recovery pattern, with case volumes stabilizing at 94-124 cases annually – levels comparable to the pre-2018 baseline but substantially below the 2018 peak.

Additionally, the percentage of dropped criminal proceedings stimulates additional questions about the effectiveness of pre-trial investigation of tortures. The specific feature of crimes of torture is that the victim can identify a perpetrator or at least to provide the information that he or she was subjected to torture in a concrete police department or in a concrete prison.

The critical deficiency in Ukraine’s pre-war torture prosecution system becomes evident when examining conversion rates between crime registration and judicial outcomes. The Statistics reveal a systematic pattern of investigative attrition that suggests profound institutional dysfunction rather than mere resource constraints.

During the 2016 – 2021 period, only 24,3% to 45,7% of registered torture crimes resulted in criminal proceedings with identified suspects. The year 2019 represents the nadir of investigative effectiveness, with merely 24,3% of cases advancing to this preliminary stage. Even in the relatively stronger year of 2017, less than half (45,1%) of registered crimes produced suspects – a conversion rate that would be considered unacceptable in functioning criminal justice systems addressing serious human rights violations.

The attrition intensifies at the indictment stage. Between 2016 and 2021, only 15.7% to 31,7% of registered torture crimes resulted in indictments forwarded to courts. The 2019 data is particularly striking: of 140 registered torture crimes, only 22 (15,7%) reached indictment. This represents an 84,3% failure rate at converting registered crimes into prosecutorial action – a statistic indicative of near-complete systemic breakdown.

Compounding this investigative ineffectiveness, the pre-war period witnessed high rates of case abandonment. Between 2016 and 2021, 17,8% to 41,9% of proceedings were dropped. The years 2016, 2020, and 2021 were particularly problematic, with drop rates exceeding 40%. This suggests not merely investigative difficulty but a systemic pattern of initiating proceedings that prosecutors lacked the capacity, evidence, or political will to pursue to completion.

The Russian full-scale invasion produced an unexpected reversal in investigative effectiveness metrics. Despite conditions that would logically impede torture investigations – displaced populations, overwhelmed institutions, diverted resources, occupied territories – the prosecution system demonstrated marked improvement in converting registered crimes into judicial outcomes.

The year 2024 represents the highest investigative effectiveness in the entire observation period: 1) 62,9% of registered crimes resulted in proceedings with suspects (compared to 24,3 – 45,7% pre-war); 2) 46,8% reached indictment stage (compared to 15,7% – 31,7% pre-war); 3) only 19,3% of proceedings were dropped (compared to 17,8% – 41,9% pre-war).

This effectiveness improvement proved sustainable across the war period:

• average suspect identification rate: ~ 58%;
• average indictment rate: ~ 42%;
• average drop rate: ~ 23%.

These metrics represent an approximate doubling of pre-war indictment rates and a near-halving of case abandonment rates.

The wartime improvement in investigative effectiveness fundamentally challenges resource-centric explanations of criminal justice dysfunction. If investigative failure resulted primarily from insufficient resources, the wartime period – characterised by severe resource constraints – should have witnessed deteriorating rather than improving metrics. The data instead suggests that pre-war dysfunction stemmed from systemic factors largely independent of resource availability: lack of political will, inadequate prosecutorial prioritisation, tolerance for impunity, or institutional capture.

The wartime period coincided with unprecedented international attention to human rights violations in Ukraine. The establishment of numerous documentation initiatives created external accountability pressures absent in the pre-war period. This international scrutiny likely increased both the visibility costs of investigative failure and the institutional support for pursuing cases.

The improved conversion rates may partially reflect a shift from quantity to quality in case selection. Faced with overwhelming caseloads and limited capacity, prosecutors may have adopted more rigorous screening criteria, pursuing only cases with strong evidentiary foundations. This would improve conversion rates while potentially allowing weaker but nonetheless meritorious cases to go unprosecuted.

The 2022 Russian invasion fundamentally altered Ukraine’s political economy of law enforcement. Pre-war patterns of institutional tolerance for torture – rooted in authoritarian legacies, law enforcement impunity, and political interference – became politically untenable in a wartime context demanding international support and domestic legitimacy. Torture prosecution transformed from a low-priority administrative matter to a politically salient indicator of democratic commitment and rule of law.

The most significant limitation of this statistical analysis is its necessary exclusion of torture occurring in temporarily occupied territories. Russian occupation created zones of absolute impunity where torture has been extensively documented by international monitors but remains entirely absent from Ukrainian crime statistics. The registered crime figures for 2022 – 2025 therefore represent a severe undercount of actual torture incidence, capturing only cases occurring in government-controlled territory where investigative access exists.

This visibility gap has profound implications for assessing the true scale of the torture problem in Ukraine and for understanding the relationship between wartime conditions and human rights violations. The improved investigative effectiveness documented in official statistics may coexist with massively increased absolute torture incidence in territories where the Ukrainian criminal justice system cannot operate.

The statistical analysis of torture prosecution in Ukraine from 2013-2025 reveals three critical findings:

First, Ukraine’s pre-war torture prosecution system exhibited systematic dysfunction characterized by extraordinarily high attrition rates between crime registration and judicial outcomes. With indictment rates as low as 15,7% and case drop rates exceeding 40%, the system demonstrated fundamental institutional failure rather than normal investigative difficulty.

Second, the full-scale invasion paradoxically coincided with dramatic improvements in prosecutorial effectiveness, with indictment rates nearly doubling and case abandonment rates halving despite severe wartime constraints. This improvement suggests that pre-war dysfunction stemmed primarily from factors relating to political will, institutional priorities, and systemic corruption rather than technical capacity or resources.

Third, the 2022 collapse in registered cases and the ongoing inability to investigate torture in occupied territories means that official statistics severely undercount the true scale of torture during the war period. Improved investigative effectiveness in government-controlled territory coexists with zones of absolute impunity in occupied areas.

These findings have significant implications for understanding institutional reform dynamics, the political economy of criminal justice, and the complex relationship between war, state capacity, and human rights protection. They suggest that conventional assumptions about the enabling conditions for effective torture prosecution may require fundamental revision, and that crisis can, under specific circumstances, catalyze institutional improvement.

This is the first comprehensive study analysing the impact of Russian aggression on criminal justice, crime, and trust in law enforcement agencies in Ukraine. A team of domestic and foreign experts examines critical issues of the functioning of the state and society in a state of martial law.

The publication will make an important contribution to understanding the transformations of the social control system during full-scale war and will help form the basis for post-conflict reforms.

Download the Monograph

Call for Papers

Wartime Crisis Mode: Crime, Justice and Social Control in Armed Conflicts in Europe

Edited by Dr. Dmytro Yagunov, Prof. Dr. Rita Haverkamp and Dr. Tetiana Melnychuk

Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

Endowed Professorship of Crime Prevention and Risk Management

Supported by the Philipp Schwartz Initiative of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation

About the Volume

Contemporary armed conflicts reshape legal systems, erode institutional trust, and fuel unprecedented criminal activity, making the criminological dimensions of warfare even more essential.

Building on the 2025 edition «Wartime Crisis Mode: The Impact of Russia’s Aggression on the System of Social Control in Ukraine (Crime, Institutes, and Trust in Criminal Justice)», this expanded volume brings together scholars and practitioners to analyse how contemporary war reconfigures legal norms, disrupts judiciary and law enforcement, and creates new condition for criminal activity.

This edited volume examines how armed conflicts impact criminal justice systems across multiple dimensions. It analyses the ways warfare destabilises economies, fractures political institutions, and erodes public trust in police, courts, prisons, and other core elements of national criminal justice systems.

While the main focus centers on Russian military action against Ukraine, this edition also welcomes academic submissions that analytically explore the broader ramifications of emerging security threats.

Topical Areas

We invite contributions addressing the following themes and related topics:

1. Theoretical Foundations of Studying Crime and Justice in Armed Conflict

• Defining the discipline: core principles and scope of criminology in armed conflicts.
• Conceptual frameworks: theories and models for analysing wartime criminality.
• Research methodologies: approaches for studying crime and justice in conflict zones.
• Comparative perspectives: criminal justice systems under wartime conditions.

2. Human Rights at War

• Human rights challenges and derogations during armed conflicts.
• Civilian protections and violations under international humanitarian law.
• Accountability mechanisms for human rights violations.
• Wartime related case law of international courts and tribunals.
• Protection of the rights of prisoners of war.

3. Impact of War on Crime

• War’s effects on crime: trends and patterns.
• War crimes and crimes against national security.
• Cross-border crimes and illicit markets (human trafficking, trafficking of arms and drugs).
• Violent crimes and gender-based violence during armed conflicts.
• Property crimes: extortion, bribery, and fraud.
• Mobilisation crimes and draft evasion.
• Environmental crimes in war zones.
• Cybercrime and information warfare.
• Use of artificial intelligence during conflicts.

4. Organised Crime and Gangs

• Organised crime networks during wartime.
• Criminal-conflict nexus: how armed conflicts create new opportunities for organised crime and how organised crime fuels the conflict.
• Street gangs and prison gangs in conflict-affected regions.
• Private military companies in armed conflicts: criminal threat assessment.

5. Torture Practices and War’s Impact on Vulnerable Groups

• Criminological aspects of wartime victimisation.
• Torture as a public policy in the 21st century.
• Gender-based and sexual violence.
• The criminology of genocide.

6. Criminal Justice Systems Under Siege

• Policing and prosecution in wartime: evolution and ethical dilemmas.
• Judicial systems in armed conflict: adaptation, continuity, and legitimacy.
• Prisons and probation under pressure: security, rehabilitation, and humanitarian concerns.

7. Society Under Strain: Cultural and Social Consequences of Conflict

• Fragile foundations: trust, heritage, and vulnerable lives.
• Beyond the battlefield: governance and social cohesion in crisis.
• Echoes across generations: trauma and long-term societal change.
• Preserving identity amid chaos: cultural heritage and human resilience.

8. Imperialism in the 21st Century: Continuities and Transformations

• 21st century imperialism: multiple manifestations.
• The Neo-imperial mindset: Ideology of Russian expansionism.
• Russia’s global ambitions: Historical roots and modern projections.
• The Ukrainian pattern: anatomy of Russian aggression.
• The prison state within: How criminal and prison culture shapes Russian governance.
• Governing through fear: The political architecture of Russia’s carceral system.
• Empire’s endgame: between collapse, evolution, and survival.

Submission Guidelines

We Welcome:

• Original empirical research (quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods).
• Theoretical and conceptual papers.
• Case studies and comparative analyses.
• Interdisciplinary approaches drawing from criminology, constitutional law, criminal law, sociology, political science, psychology, and related fields.
• Perspectives from both scholars and practitioners.

Abstracts Requirements

• Language: English
• Abstract: 500 words
• Keywords: 5-7 keywords
• Author information: Brief bio (100 words) and institutional affiliation

Manuscripts Requirements

• Language: English
• Length: 7,000-9,000 words (including references)
• Once a manuscript has been accepted following peer review.
• Editors reserve the right to reject abstracts and manuscripts if they do not meet the requirements in terms of subject matter, quality or scientific validity.

Edition

• The authors assume full responsibility for the manuscripts provided.
• The authors assume full responsibility for the accuracy of data and the validity of content.

Citations and References

• Citations in the text and Bibliography references must meet the requirements of the APA-Style.

• References to the literature are made in the text of the paper in brackets and consist of the author’s surname, year of publication with corresponding pages.

• References at the end of the article should be Latinised.

• When making bibliographic references to Cyrillic (including Ukrainian and Russian) articles published in journals and almanacs, we strongly recommend the following structure of references: 1) Name of author/authors (transliterated); 2) original title of the article transliterated by Latin symbols and its English translation in square brackets [ ]; 3) original title of the source transliterated by Latin symbols and its English translation in square brackets [ ]; 4) publisher’s imprint information in English.

• In References, when indicating a city of publication in both English and Cyrillic sources, the name of the city should be given in English, while the name of the publishing house should be transliterated.

Submission Process

• Abstract Submission Deadline: January 20, 2026
• Paper Submission Deadline: May 20, 2026
• Expected Publication Date: July 2026

Please submit your abstract and a short bio (100 words) to yagunov@posteo.de with the subject line “War Criminology – [Your Name]”.

1.1. Research Context and Methodology

Ukraine’s criminal justice system in 2025 operates under extraordinary strain due to Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion. The fourth year of war has driven profound structural shifts in crime patterns that extend well beyond statistical fluctuations.

1.2. Overview of the Reporting Period

Between January and October 2025, overall crime rates stabilized at elevated levels while the composition of offences worsened, with serious and particularly serious crimes comprising a growing share. Criminologists describe this as “criminal severity inflation” — a direct result of societal militarization, weapon proliferation, and heightened psychosocial stress. A troubling “statistical gap” has emerged between registered proceedings and cases sent to court, indicating a critical backlog of uninvestigated cases, particularly regarding war crimes.

2. Overall Crime Structure Analysis

2.1. Quantitative Data and Severity Classification

The Prosecutor General’s Office recorded 524,552 criminal offences during the first ten months of 2025. This figure, while statistically dry, reveals the true magnitude of law enforcement challenges.

The breakdown by severity reveals a concerning shift toward the most dangerous offences, with nearly three-quarters falling into serious or particularly serious categories:

The combined 74.2% share of serious and particularly serious crimes is abnormal for peacetime but typical for states experiencing intense armed conflict. This stems partly from legislative changes under martial law that elevated penalties for certain crimes (such as theft and robbery), automatically reclassifying them as serious offences. Additionally, crimes against national security and peace — inherently particularly serious — significantly inflate these statistics.

2.2. Pre-Trial Investigation Effectiveness

Analysis of pre-trial investigation outcomes reveals substantial gaps between crime registration and prosecution, with clearance rates varying by offence category and reflecting law enforcement priorities.

For crimes against life and health, investigators served suspicion notices in only 18,000 of 72,500 registered cases — a clearance rate of approximately 24.8%. This low rate likely reflects investigation difficulties in combat-adjacent areas, where evidence collection is hampered or impossible due to shelling. Cases involving missing persons and civilian casualties requiring lengthy investigations also contribute to this figure.

Conversely, crimes against Ukraine’s national security (Criminal Code Articles 109-114-2) show significantly better results. Suspects were identified in 2,056 of 4,968 registered proceedings — a 41.4% rate. This demonstrates focused, effective work by the Security Service of Ukraine and prosecutors in identifying collaborators, traitors, and spotters. The higher rate also reflects that such crimes are often documented during commission or through irrefutable digital evidence.

The overall picture reveals a systemic problem: courts cannot process the investigative caseload, while investigations are overwhelmed by registration volumes, preventing quality investigative work.

3. Military Justice: Disciplinary Crisis and Institutional Failure

Among 2025’s most critical and politically sensitive trends is the explosive growth in military criminal offences, particularly unauthorized absence from duty and desertion. This phenomenon transcends legal concerns to impact national defence capacity.

3.1. Unauthorised Absence From Military Service: Scale and Dynamics

The Prosecutor General’s Office registered over 161,000 criminal proceedings under Criminal Code Article 407 (unauthorized absence from military service) during the first ten months of 2025.

This figure is shocking both in absolute terms and growth trajectory — four times higher than the same period in 2024.

The acceleration rate illustrates the crisis depth: while 2022 averaged 6,000 annual cases, 2025 sees approximately 16,000 new desertion cases monthly. The entire 2022 year’s caseload now accumulates in less than two weeks.

These statistics point to interconnected problems:

1. Personnel psychological exhaustion: Unclear demobilization and rotation timelines demoralise even motivated service members.
2. Recruitment challenges: Mobilisation quality issues and coercive methods result in individuals neither morally nor physically prepared for service.
3. Command deficiencies: Desertion often responds to internal unit conflicts or inappropriate orders.

3.2. Procedural System Collapse

Crime registration is merely the first step. The greater problem is law enforcement agencies’ (State Bureau of Investigation, military prosecutor’s office) and courts’ inability to respond effectively to this wave. Military crime prosecution statistics reveal effective paralysis.

Of 161,461 registered proceedings, only 9,300 military personnel received formal charges—just 6% of total cases. Court referrals are even worse at approximately 5%.

This situation differs radically from early war conditions. In 2022, the court referral rate was 20% (one in five cases). The fourfold efficiency drop combined with a tenfold workload increase indicates the system has reached capacity limits. SBI investigators physically cannot conduct necessary procedural actions (interrogations, document seizures, suspicion announcements) across thousands of new monthly proceedings.

4. Economic Crime: War Adaptation

Economic crime demonstrates remarkable adaptability to martial law conditions. Criminal organizations are transforming methods, exploiting digital space vulnerabilities and citizen social insecurity.

4.1. Fraud Evolution (Criminal Code Article 190)

Fraud remains among the most common property crimes, though 2025 dynamics show some decline from previous years’ peaks.

Throughout 2022, the Prosecutor General’s Office recorded 32,000 Article 190 proceedings (with suspicions reported in 7,500 cases).

However, just the first ten months of 2025 saw 42,000 Article 190 proceedings (with suspicions reported in 10,000 cases).

This confirms war has created favourable manipulation conditions: from fake Armed Forces fundraising to housing rental schemes targeting displaced persons and fraudulent “UN aid” claims.

5. Crimes Against Public Morality: Digital Pornography

Morality-related crimes, particularly pornographic content circulation (Criminal Code Articles 301 and 301-1), show steady growth reflecting global sex industry digitalization trends.

5.1. Statistical Patterns and Structure

During the first ten months of 2025, nearly 1,522 criminal proceedings were opened under Article 301 (with suspicions reported in 1,438 cases).

5.2. Legal Paradox and High Detection Rate

This crime category exhibits phenomenally high detection rates. Suspects receive suspicion notices in 95% of cases, with 81% of proceedings successfully referred to court. This efficiency stems from documentation simplicity: digital traces, bank transactions, and test content purchases provide indisputable evidence.

6. Russian Federation War Crimes: Documenting Genocide

A separate, extensive law enforcement area involves documenting and investigating international crimes committed during Russia’s armed aggression. While excluded from traditional “peacetime” crime statistics, this category places the greatest burden on the justice system.

6.1. Documented Atrocities Scale

As of October 2025, the Prosecutor General’s Office had officially documented over 170,000 war crimes, with later updates approaching 190,000 cases. These represent systematic violations of war laws and customs (Criminal Code Article 438), including indiscriminate shelling, torture, deportation, and civilian killings.

6.2. Infrastructure and Medical Facility Attacks

A defining feature of 2025 war crimes was systematic critical infrastructure attacks. The World Health Organization documented 2,195 attacks on Ukrainian medical facilities between February 2022 and December 2024, with 459 occurring in 2024 alone. This tactic continued in 2025, aimed at creating humanitarian catastrophe. Between March and August 2025, over 100 energy infrastructure attacks occurred, causing significant generation deficits.

8. Conclusions and Forecast Scenarios

Analysis of the first ten months of 2025 yields the following conclusions:

1. Structural Crime Deformation: War has completely transformed Ukraine’s crime landscape. The predominance of serious and particularly serious crimes (74.2% of total) indicates increased criminal act danger. Rising crimes involving weapons and explosives directly result from uncontrolled weapon circulation.
2. Critical Military Justice State: Military crime investigation (offences, desertion) has reached systemic collapse. The gap between registered proceedings (over 161,000) and court referrals (5%) demonstrates the existing law enforcement model’s inability to address the military disciplinary crisis. This demands immediate approach revision: from specialised military court creation to personnel management paradigm shifts.
3. Economic Crime Adaptability: Cybercrime and fraud show high resilience, rapidly adapting to new social realities. Despite some proceeding decreases, fraud levels remain significantly above pre-war levels, requiring constant cyber countermeasure improvements.
4. Procedural Overload: Low suspect identification rates in life/health (24.8%) and property crime cases indicate investigative resources are diverted to priority areas (national security, war crimes), leaving “ordinary” crime peripheral. These risks increased latent crime and declining public law enforcement confidence.
5. International Dimension: Ukraine’s ICC integration and active international institutional cooperation are key factors in combating war crime impunity. However, the national justice system must prepare to shoulder the main investigative burden for tens of thousands of crimes beyond The Hague’s jurisdiction.