However, every absolute encounters the reality of its implementation, and it is precisely in the sphere of implementation that its principal weakness is revealed. The Ukrainian state during the war has demonstrated this weakness with the utmost clarity. Notwithstanding Article 15 of the Convention, which expressly excludes derogation from Article 3 of the Convention even in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, the state in fact derogates from the absolute prohibition of torture precisely when the very existence of the state within its borders is at stake. This occurs not through a formal derogation, but through a silent, yet entirely deliberate, toleration of practices which by their nature fall within the scope of Article 3.

We must acknowledge this, and we must speak about it. Silence regarding this phenomenon is a precondition for its further covert legitimisation in conditions of crisis, and not only in Ukraine, but also in other European countries whose legal systems have been built over the past half-century on the principles of the legal space of the Council of Europe. It is for this reason that the subject of this article is neither a denial of the absolute prohibition of torture nor a search for justifications for the state, but an honest identification of a phenomenon which we propose to call, provisionally, the “torture quasi-compromise”.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Ukrainian scenario has demonstrated that during a war, which is a reality that cannot be denied, the question is placed on the agenda of the extent to which the state can survive without compulsory mobilisation. The problem is that compulsory mobilisation in Ukrainian conditions has proved to be inextricably linked to the use of ill-treatment and, in a significant proportion of cases, torture. This may sound harsh and may provoke, and certainly will provoke, criticism. But we are speaking of realities, not of a normative ideal.

When the state deliberately derogates from the absolute prohibition of torture, and this derogation is in fact not concealed at the national level, the manifestation of such derogation becomes a phenomenon which in Ukrainian society has acquired the name “busification” (busyfikatsiia). This word, which did not exist in the Ukrainian language just a few years ago, is today instantly recognised by every inhabitant of the country and denotes an entirely specific set of practices: the sudden apprehension of a man on the street, in a public place, at his workplace, in his own home or in his yard by officers of a Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support (TCR), his forcible placement into a vehicle, and his transportation to the TCR or directly to a training centre or military unit.

It is here that we identify the torture quasi-compromise. Its essence lies in the fact that the state turns a blind eye to mass unlawful apprehensions, which by their nature constitute manifestly unlawful deprivation of liberty and which, as a rule, are accompanied by ill-treatment. This ill-treatment takes place both at the moment of apprehension and subsequently. It occurs in public places and on the streets, as well as directly in the apartments and yards of citizens, when TCR officers, who, as the state itself asserts, have no authority to stop, detain or deprive persons of their liberty, nonetheless do so in an undisguised manner. Accordingly, not only Article 3 and Article 5 of the Convention come under attack, but also Article 8, since the right to respect for private and family life and the inviolability of the home are in these situations not regarded as existing at all.

As a result, an atmosphere of total tolerance of ill-treatment is created. Moreover, this tolerance extends both to the moment of apprehension and to the subsequent stages. The phenomenon of busification consists in the fact that even where the apprehension itself takes place without obvious signs of physical violence, it is, as a rule, only the first link in a chain. Next come persons who cannot be mobilised on health grounds, but who are nevertheless sent to the front. It is precisely here that the nexus lies between mass unlawful apprehensions (de facto arrests, since they may be called whatever one likes, but their essence does not change), the forgery of mobilisation documents, and the dispatch to the front of persons who are not subject to conscription on medical grounds.

In at least half of the cases, and possibly more, this path is accompanied by ill-treatment or torture, specifically during apprehension, during transportation to the recruitment centre, or directly on the premises of the TCR. What is at issue is not isolated excesses on the part of individual perpetrators, but a mass, recurrent, systemic practice which at the state level receives no adequate criminal-law or disciplinary response.

THE FIRST THESIS: THE REALITIES OF WAR AGAINST THE ABSOLUTE OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

The first point on which we insist is the following: however much we may exalt the absolute prohibition of torture, however often we may repeat that even in time of war torture and other forms of ill-treatment are outside the law, realities do their work. A state waging a war for survival finds a way to circumvent the absolute without formally denying it.

An important historical clarification is required here. Such practices are not new. Every war, as history testifies, has been accompanied by compulsory mass mobilisation, unlawful deprivation of liberty, de facto falsification of mobilisation documents, and so on. However, between what occurred during the First and Second World Wars and what contemporary Ukraine demonstrates there lies a chasm. This chasm was created by the establishment of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the corresponding body of Council of Europe law upon which member states build their national legal systems. This applies all the more to the European Union, within the framework of which a unique legal system of its own for the protection of fundamental rights has been created.

It is precisely the emergence of the phenomenon of busification that distinguishes today’s situation from what took place during past European and world wars. The problem is not that mass compulsory mobilisation as such is a historical novelty, but that such a phenomenon exists and reproduces itself within the legal system of the Council of Europe, of which Ukraine has been a member since 1995, and after three decades of development of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the absolute character of Article 3 has been repeatedly confirmed, including in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Selmouni v. France [GC] and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC].

In other words, the Ukrainian case is the first instance in which a member state of the Council of Europe, while under the full jurisdiction of the European Court and under the monitoring of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, wages a full-scale war for its existence and at the same time demonstrates that the absolute of Article 3 of the Convention proves, in practical terms, to be absolutely vulnerable. This is not an argument against the absolute. It is an argument in favour of the proposition that the absolute requires institutional safeguards, and not merely declarations.

THE SECOND THESIS: WHY THE WEST SEES ARTICLE 5 BUT DOES NOT SEE ARTICLE 3

The second thesis concerns the perception of Ukrainian realities outside Ukraine. The scale and nature of compulsory mobilisation in Ukraine, the reverse side of which frequently becomes ill-treatment, are undoubtedly noticed and analysed in other Council of Europe states and in the European Union. However, for the most part these practices are viewed through the prism of unlawful deprivation of liberty, unlawful apprehensions and other violations of the right to liberty – that is, predominantly in the categories of Article 5 of the Convention.

As a consequence, what in Ukraine has acquired the features of a mass practice of ill-treatment during or after unlawful apprehension is perceived in the West merely as a mass practice of unlawful deprivation of liberty. The violent, degrading and potentially torturous component of this phenomenon remains on the periphery of analysis. Thus, a problem which requires an independent qualification under Article 3 of the Convention is in fact reduced to a question of compliance with Article 5 of the Convention.

What the population of a country at war perceives as something understandable and commonplace, where words such as “TCR” or “busification” evoke a typical and characteristic reaction that is understood without explanation, is perceived in the West, even taking into account the mass scale of the phenomenon, merely as unlawful deprivation of liberty. That is, at most as a problem under Article 5 of the Convention, but by no means as a problem under Article 3 of the Convention, still less in its mass dimension.

THIS SHIFT OF OPTICS HAS AT LEAST THREE CAUSES.

First, the statistical and documentary base concerning ill-treatment during mobilisation is fragmentary: the victims are in military units, have no access to a lawyer, do not have their bodily injuries recorded, and criminal proceedings under the article on “torture” are either not opened or have no prospect. Second, the Western observer is inclined to apply to Ukraine a presumption of good faith on the part of a state defending itself against aggression, and therefore to interpret excesses as individual violations rather than as a systemic practice. Third, the very category of “deprivation of liberty” is cognitively more convenient: it does not require a threshold of severity of suffering, and it does not pose the uncomfortable question of whether a state that is the victim of aggression is at the same time a state that permits torture.

The consequence of this shift is that the phenomenon of busification remains outside proper legal qualification. Yet the case law of the European Court is unequivocal: any recourse to physical force against a person under the control of state agents which was not made strictly necessary by that person’s own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle a violation of Article 3 (Bouyid v. Belgium [GC]). There is no basis whatsoever for considering that this standard does not apply to TCR officers who physically restrain a person, place him in a vehicle, strike him or use special means, or hold him on premises without access to water, food, medical assistance and contact with relatives. Nor is there any basis for considering that the dispatch to the front, on the basis of forged documents, of a person who is unfit for service on health grounds does not raise a separate issue under Article 3 of the Convention, and, in the event of death or serious injury, also under Article 2 of the Convention.

Thus, the second principal aspect on which we insist is that the legal qualification of busification must be transferred from the sphere of Article 5 of the Convention to the sphere of Article 3 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention, and that the mass scale and recurrence of this practice must be regarded as indicators of a systemic problem rather than as an aggregate of isolated incidents.

THE THIRD THESIS: A PROFESSIONAL ARMY AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE AND CORRUPTION

The third thesis is, in our view, the most important from the standpoint of political conclusions. The Ukrainian case has demonstrated how closely interlinked are the issues of creating a professional army, preventing corruption and preventing torture. These three problems are usually considered separately: reform of the armed forces is discussed in the categories of defence policy, corruption in the categories of economics and governance, torture in the categories of human rights. The Ukrainian experience shows that this is one problem with three faces.

In a system of coordinates in which the political elites display a manifest unwillingness to halt corruption schemes and to cut off corruption flows, while at the same time turning a blind eye to the phenomenon of busification, this cannot but lead to the accumulation of acute tension in society between the political elites and the rest of the population. Mobilisation that is carried out through coercion, violence and the forgery of documents, and which at the same time allows some to buy their way out while forcing others to fight contrary to their state of health, destroys the very idea of solidarity on which the defence of the state must rest. Torture during mobilisation and corruption surrounding mobilisation are not two separate phenomena, but two sides of one mechanism: where there is the possibility of unlawfully detaining, there arises the possibility of unlawfully releasing in exchange for a reward.

It is precisely for this reason that the creation of a professional army with properly remunerated military personnel and corresponding obligations voluntarily assumed by soldiers and officers was, from the very outset, the safeguard against torture which Ukraine could and should have adopted in the past. A professional army, a properly trained reserve and a transparent system of incentives substantially reduce the state’s dependence on chaotic compulsory mobilisation, although during a full-scale war they are not always capable of entirely eliminating the need for conscription. Such a set of measures substantially narrows the space for mass unlawful deprivation of liberty and, together with it, for the ill-treatment that accompanies compulsory mobilisation.

This is the principal message that must be proposed and disseminated among Western governments. As the Ukrainian case shows, in the event of war, even within a country that forms part of the legal system of the Council of Europe, in the absence of proper military training of the population and of appropriate incentives – including material and financial ones – for people to take up arms in defence of their country, the reverse side of the absence of such a policy for organising the armed forces will inevitably be mass compulsory mobilisation with the corresponding mass apprehensions and mass instances of ill-treatment. This pattern is not unique to Ukraine. It is structural, and any European state which today is discussing the reintroduction of conscription or preparing for a potential conflict must look at the Ukrainian experience not as an exotic curiosity, but as a warning.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, we propose three interrelated theses which form the basis of this article.

First, the absolute prohibition of torture, notwithstanding Article 15 of the Convention, has in practical terms proved to be absolutely vulnerable for a state waging a war for survival. Ukraine, being a member of the Council of Europe and under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, has in fact derogated from the absolute of Article 3 through the toleration of the phenomenon of busification. This must be acknowledged and must be spoken about, since silence is the first step towards the covert legitimisation of torture in conditions of crisis in other European states.

Second, the Western perception of busification as a problem exclusively under Article 5 of the Convention is inadequate. Mass unlawful apprehensions accompanied by physical violence, detention in improper conditions, the forgery of mobilisation documents and the dispatch to the front of persons unfit on health grounds must be qualified under Article 3, and their systemic character must be regarded as a structural problem rather than as an aggregate of individual excesses.

Third, the Ukrainian case demonstrates the inextricable link between a professional army, the prevention of corruption and the prevention of torture. The creation of professional armed forces on the basis of incentives rather than coercion is not only a question of defence capability, but also the principal institutional safeguard against the torture compromise. It is precisely this conclusion that must become the central message for the governments of European states which today are rethinking their own models of manning their armed forces in the light of the new security realities.

The torture quasi-compromise is not inevitable. It is the consequence of specific political decisions and, more importantly, of specific political inaction. Recognition of this fact is a necessary condition for the absolute prohibition of torture to remain an absolute not only in the text of the Convention, but also in the practice of the states that have sworn allegiance to that Convention.

The applicants in the case – 47 Serbian citizens – took part in this peaceful gathering. At around 7 p.m., at the moment when the participants were observing a fifteen-minute silence in memory of the victims, the crowd was suddenly struck by a powerful sound wave. According to the applicants’ own accounts, they experienced sudden instinctive fear, panic, shock, accelerated heartbeat, trembling, hearing problems, nausea, vomiting, tachycardia and similar symptoms. Some sustained bodily injuries as a result of the panic-induced crush. Witnesses described how it all began like a human “avalanche”: people ran, fell and screamed without understanding what was happening; the sound resembled the roar of an approaching aircraft or train. Up to four thousand people reported a similar experience, and many of them sought medical assistance in the following days because of persisting symptoms.

The authorities’ response was markedly one of denial. The Minister of Internal Affairs initially stated that the ministry possessed no sonic cannon or similar weapon, but later confirmed that the police owned acoustic systems (in particular the LRAD 100X and LRAD 450XL), acquired in 2021, while maintaining that they had never been used because they are regarded as unlawful weapons under Serbian law. The Serbian Law on the Police does not provide for the use of any kind of sonic or acoustic weapon – that is, there is a legal vacuum in which any use of such a weapon would be ultra vires. Activists submitted to the United Nations office in Belgrade a petition signed by more than half a million people, demanding an international investigation. The authorities, by contrast, turned for assistance to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. The published FSB report concluded that acoustic devices had not been used and advanced the theory of a “staged provocation” with movements synchronised via smartphones; independent experts criticised this report as failing to meet the formal requirements for documents of this kind, lacking methodology and an evidentiary basis, and more closely resembling propaganda.

In April 2025, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights carried out a mission to Serbia, focused on policing during the demonstrations and on the working conditions of civil society and human rights defenders. He stressed the critical importance of preserving the principles of democratic policing for the safety of all citizens and warned the authorities against stigmatising protesters through discourse that falsely portrays the protests as a “colour revolution”. The Commissioner also expressed concern about the unfavourable environment for non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders, aggravated by reports of the use of spyware against human rights defenders and journalists, stigmatisation campaigns and leaks of personal data.

THE NATURE OF SONIC WEAPONS AND THE PARALLEL WITH “HAVANA SYNDROME”

Acoustic (sonic) weapons operate through the propagation of sound – pressure oscillations travelling through an elastic medium (in particular air) – directed at striking a target. Most such devices are based on ultrasound, low frequencies or infrasound emitted at high intensity levels. So-called “long-range acoustic devices” (LRADs, or “sound cannons”) emit, instead of bullets, sound waves of extreme loudness. Ordinary sound weakens with distance, yet the acoustic signal of such a device can be heard loudly at distances of up to a kilometre, because the waves are emitted under high pressure. The impact of such a wave on the eardrum is capable of causing significant physical injury, but no less important is the psychological harm of an “invisible attack”. Despite the labelling of such means as “non-lethal” or “less lethal”, they are open to the same objections as other technologies bearing this label, and their use together with kinetic means in fact increases the risk of death. In international law, acoustic weapons have no authoritative definition and are not regulated, nor are they the subject of dedicated multilateral policy discussions.

This phenomenon is usefully considered in connection with the so-called “Havana syndrome” – a set of unexplained health disorders (headache, nausea, balance disturbances, auditory and cognitive symptoms) attributed to the possible effect of acoustic or directed-energy sources. Common to both phenomena is a mechanism that is invisible, easily denied and difficult to document, yet capable of causing entirely real physiological and psychological harm. It is precisely this combination – the reality of injury in the absence of obvious traces – that makes such means especially dangerous from the standpoint of human rights protection: the harm occurs, but proving it is made difficult, which creates room for denial with impunity.

WHY SUCH POLICING PRACTICES THREATEN HUMAN RIGHTS

The use of a sonic weapon against a peaceful assembly engages several Convention rights at once. First of all, Article 3 is concerned (prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment), and in certain circumstances Article 2 as well (the right to life): a means that causes mass panic, bodily injuries and potentially serious health consequences for a large number of people is fully capable of reaching the threshold of severity envisaged by Article 3. The State’s positive obligations under this Article, as formulated in the Court’s case-law, comprise three elements: the obligation to put in place a legislative and regulatory framework of protection; in clearly defined circumstances, the obligation to take operational measures to protect specific individuals from a risk of prohibited treatment; and the obligation to carry out an effective investigation of arguable allegations of such treatment. Alongside this, Article 8 is engaged (respect for private life, which encompasses a person’s physical and psychological integrity), as are Article 11 (freedom of peaceful assembly) and Article 10 (freedom of expression).

The fundamental flaw of a sonic weapon lies in its indiscriminate character. A sound wave cannot be directed solely at those particular individuals who are allegedly behaving aggressively – it strikes the entire crowd without distinction: peaceful protesters, passers-by, journalists, medics, the elderly, children. This makes it practically impossible to comply with the requirement of proportionality, which is an indispensable condition for any lawful use of force by law-enforcement officers. Interference with Convention rights is lawful only where it is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. In the present case, even the first condition is not met: since the Serbian Law on the Police does not provide for the use of a sonic weapon, any use of it is not “prescribed by law” and is therefore unlawful under domestic law itself.

A particular threat is posed by the “invisible” and easily deniable character of such an impact. Where the harm is real but difficult to prove, the burden of proof in effect shifts onto the victims, and the State is tempted to deny the very fact that the weapon was used. This generates a structural risk of impunity, which is itself a threat to human rights, as it renders impossible the effective protection and restoration of the violated right. Finally, the use of such means has a pronounced chilling effect: the awareness that participation in the next protest may turn into a sudden attack on one’s health deters people from exercising freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. The matter therefore concerns not only harm to specific applicants at a specific moment, but also a preventive, future-oriented risk to an indeterminate and very wide circle of persons.

THE EROSION OF TRUST IN THE POLICE

Democratic policing rests on legitimacy and the consent of society. According to the classic principles of policing, the effectiveness of the police depends not on fear but on approval, voluntary cooperation and the trust of the population. The use of a weapon that harms peaceful citizens turns the very protective function of the police inside out, transforming a body intended to safeguard people’s safety into a source of danger to them. Such an inversion destroys the social contract on which policing by consent rests, and has long-term consequences for public safety, for people’s willingness to cooperate with the police, and for the rule of law in general.

Trust is destroyed not only by the very fact of the possible use of a weapon, but also by the pattern of the authorities’ subsequent conduct – denial and concealment. The Minister’s contradictory statements (first a denial of the very existence of sonic cannons, then an admission of their acquisition in 2021 coupled with a denial of their use), and especially the handing over of the “investigation” to a foreign special service – the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation – strip the process of any signs of independence and impartiality. A report prepared by such a service and assessed by experts as propagandistic and methodologically untenable is not only incapable of establishing the truth but also finally undermines public trust. An investigation that is not independent, impartial, prompt and capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible does not satisfy the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention and at the same time destroys the legitimacy of the law-enforcement system.

The erosion of trust is deepened by accompanying practices: the stigmatisation of protesters as participants in a “colour revolution”, discrediting campaigns, reports of the use of spyware against journalists and human rights defenders, and leaks of personal data. All of this narrows civic space and entrenches the perception of the police as an instrument of political pressure rather than as a service to society. The only path to restoring trust in such circumstances is an effective, independent and impartial investigation, full transparency as to the means available and the circumstances of their possible use, and genuine accountability of those responsible. In the absence of this, the State loses not only trust in the police but also the capacity to maintain public order by methods compatible with democracy.

A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court governs interim (provisional) measures. Formally, it is contained not in the text of the Convention itself but in the Rules of Court, and it allows the Court, in exceptional circumstances – at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion – to indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted. Although formally this is an “indication”, the binding force of such measures derives from Article 34 of the Convention (the right of individual application): a State’s failure to comply with a Rule 39 measure may constitute a violation of Article 34. This approach was established in the Grand Chamber judgment Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC] and confirmed, in particular, in Paladi v. Moldova [GC], Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia and Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain. Interim measures are thus de facto binding for compliance.

The conditions for the application of Rule 39 form a settled test. A measure is taken only on an exceptional basis where there is, first, an imminent risk; secondly, irreparable harm; and thirdly, a Convention right of such a character that the harm caused would not subsequently be amenable to reparation, restoration or adequate compensation. The burden of substantiating an imminent risk of irreparable harm rests on the applicant. Measures may be taken where this is necessary in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings. The classic field of application of Rule 39 is cases concerning expulsion, extradition or forced return, in which the return of a person would expose them to a real risk of death (Article 2) or of torture or inhuman treatment (Article 3) – along the logic expressed as early as Soering v. the United Kingdom as regards non-return. Outside this field, interim measures are granted extremely rarely.

It is for this very reason that the decision in the present case is a notable and atypical example of the application of Rule 39, distinguished by several features at once. First, the measure has a preventive and future-oriented character: it is intended not to stop a specific imminent act against a named person at a known moment (such as a planned deportation), but to prevent an entire category of future conduct – any use of sonic devices for crowd control – at indeterminate future protests. Secondly, the measure has a general and collective character: it protects an indeterminate and exceptionally wide circle of persons, potentially the entire protesting community, rather than specific applicants who suffer individualised harm. Thirdly, it is open-ended in time – it operates “until further order”. Fourthly, it is addressed to the conduct of the State in the sphere of public-order maintenance and policing, rather than in the classic migration domain.

The Court’s reasoning was concise but telling. In granting the measure, the Court noted that the use of such a weapon for crowd control is unlawful under Serbian law, and also drew attention to the potentially serious health consequences for a large number of persons. It was precisely the combination of unlawfulness under domestic law with a grave and irreversible risk to the health of many people that, in the Court’s view, satisfied the threshold of imminence and irreparability of harm. At the same time, the Court strictly adhered to the principle of not prejudging the outcome: granting the measure does not mean that the Court has taken any position as to whether a sonic weapon was in fact used on 15 March 2025, and it does not affect any subsequent findings as to the admissibility or the merits of the case. Yet the very fact of granting the measure under such strict conditions signals at least the existence of an arguable (prima facie) complaint and of a real, rather than illusory, risk – otherwise the exceptional threshold of Rule 39 could not have been reached.

No less important for understanding the limits of Rule 39 is what the Court refused to grant. The applicants’ two other requests – not to allow the criminal prosecution of persons taking part in the public discussion of the events of 15 March, and to order the conduct of an effective investigation – the Court found to fall outside the Rule 39 procedure. This delineates the doctrinal limits of interim measures: Rule 39 is a shield against imminent irreparable physical harm, not an instrument for the preventive protection of the interests of freedom of expression or of the criminal process, nor a mechanism for compelling the conduct of an investigation. The latter is a matter of the State’s positive obligations, falling within the examination of the merits, rather than a subject for an interim measure. Such a position is consistent with the Court’s settled restrictive approach to Rule 39 and prevents it from being turned into a general means of influencing national policy.

Finally, an interim measure cannot exist in a vacuum: it is tied to existing or imminent proceedings. The Court therefore gave the applicants one month to submit a substantive application under Article 34 of the Convention. The State to which the measure is addressed is obliged to comply with it, and non-compliance risks a finding of a violation of Article 34; compliance is supervised by the Court and the Committee of Ministers. The significance of this case extends far beyond it: it is the first instance in the Court’s practice in which the question of acoustic (sonic) weapons has become the subject of an interim measure, and it will most likely shape European standards on “less lethal” crowd-control technologies and on the positive obligations of States. The case demonstrates the adaptability of Rule 39 beyond the migration paradigm – its suitability for responding to systemic risks in the sphere of public order – even though the Court formulated its measure cautiously and narrowly.

CONCLUSIONS

The case of Đorović and Others v. Serbia crystallises three interrelated propositions. First, the use of an indiscriminate, easily deniable weapon against peaceful assemblies is incompatible with the Convention: it engages Articles 3, 8, 10 and 11 and breaches the State’s positive obligations to protect people’s physical and psychological integrity and to carry out an effective investigation. Secondly, such practices, compounded by denial and by the imitation of an investigation by forces lacking independence, destroy the legitimacy and public trust on which democratic policing rests, transforming the police from a service of protection into a source of threat. Thirdly, Rule 39, traditionally a migration instrument, became in this case a rare preventive shield that protected an entire civic community from irreversible harm.

For Ukraine and other Council of Europe member States, this precedent is at once a warning and a standard. Crowd-control technologies require a clear legislative basis, strict observance of necessity and proportionality, independent oversight and an effective investigation of any allegations of their use. These requirements are entirely in keeping with the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) on the use of force by law-enforcement officers and on the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty or under the control of the police. In the absence of these guarantees, the State risks losing both human rights and its own legitimacy: when the police use a weapon against citizens and then conceal it, what is lost is not only trust in the police but the very foundational condition of public order in a democratic society.

I deliberately make a point at the very outset that ought to be superfluous, but under present conditions is not: this text cannot, in any dimension, be construed as support for the territorial recruitment centres (TCCs) in those of their actions that constitute crimes and gross violations of the law. I write this as an advocate whose client was himself recently unlawfully deprived of liberty by a territorial recruitment centre; as an advocate who conducts administrative cases against the TCCs. My position on the crimes committed by TCC officials therefore needs no explanation – it is unequivocal.

But this post is not about the TCCs. It is about something far more dangerous: about the fact that society has simultaneously and unanimously demonstrated a readiness to justify torture, provided that the torture is applied – in quotation marks – “to scumbags.” About the idea that “proper” torture inflicted on villains is not merely permissible, but just and even desirable. This is precisely my central message.

What, in fact, happened

First, the facts – because it is in their juxtaposition that the essence of the problem lies.

Officers of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) exposed, in one of the district territorial recruitment and social support centres of the Odesa region, a large-scale scheme of unlawfully coercing citizens into mobilisation. In order to improve conscription figures, officials of the institution unlawfully held men on the centre’s premises, beat them, intimidated them, and exerted psychological pressure. The investigation also established individual instances of acts of a sexual nature of a violent character committed against the victims. Six TCC employees were assisted by three representatives of a local civic organisation, who tracked down citizens and gathered information about them. Nine members of the group were detained; they were notified of suspicion of torture, unlawful deprivation of liberty, and robbery committed by an organised group. The court chose a preventive measure in the form of detention in custody without the right to post bail.

This is torture. The SBI called it torture. The law calls it torture. And that is correct.

A PARALLEL EVENT

On social media, the public association “Non-Stop Ukraine” published a video, filmed, presumably, in the Odesa SIZO, showing a man – allegedly that same TCC employee – being forced to crawl on the floor, to perform dog commands, and to carry slippers in his teeth to other inmates. The commands were given to him by the so-called “overseer” (smotryashchiy) of the block. The State Criminal-Executive Service confirmed the opening of an internal inquiry, the management of the Odesa SIZO was suspended, and the SBI opened proceedings.

And here is the most important point. This second event was almost unanimously labelled by the media, officials, and society as “abuse” and “humiliation.” Not torture. Merely “abuse.” And it is precisely in this substitution of words that the entire machinery of legitimisation is concealed.

THE TWOFOLD MOVEMENT OF PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS

When the SBI exposed the group of TCC employees, society exploded. But it exploded not with indignation against torture as such. It exploded with popular vengeance.

In the mass reaction, two movements occurred simultaneously, which only at first glance appear unrelated.

The first movement is the demonisation of the TCC employees. This is understandable: particular officials who tortured and robbed citizens for the sake of figures deserve the response prescribed by law. But demonisation is not justice. Demonisation transforms a specific human being from a suspect, protected by the presumption of innocence, into an abstract “villain” with respect to whom, supposedly, “anything goes.”

The second movement is the whitewashing of the staff of the Odesa pre-trial detention centre – or, more precisely, of those who organised and permitted the torture of an inmate within the walls of a state institution. The treatment applied to the detained TCC employee was, in effect, recognised by society as lawful and just. “He deserved it.” “Serves him right.” “Justice at last.” Torture carried out by inmates under the tacit supervision of the SIZO administration was turned into an instrument of popular vengeance – and, in that capacity, approved.

This is where the catastrophe occurs. For the very same torture that society rightly condemns when it is inflicted by TCC employees is the one it welcomes when it is inflicted in the SIZO – against the “right” victim.

“ABUSE” OR TORTURE? ON THE SUBSTITUTION OF WORDS

Note the language. What the SBI defendants did is “torture.” What the staff of the Odesa pre-trial detention centre did is merely “abuse” or “humiliation.”

This is neither coincidence nor journalistic carelessness. This is legitimisation in action.

Forcing an adult to crawl on their knees, to perform dog commands, to carry footwear in their teeth to other prisoners – this is not “abuse” in the everyday sense of the word. This is classic degrading treatment, and in terms of its intensity, systematic character, and purpose it is torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Article 127 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. For decades the European Court of Human Rights has qualified precisely such acts – humiliation that destroys the personality, that places a person in the position of an animal – as a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

When we call torture “abuse,” we make the first and most important concession. We soften the word in order to soften the act, in order ultimately to soften the prohibition. The lowering of the threshold of torture begins right here – in the vocabulary.

The most dangerous idea of contemporary Ukraine: “proper” torture

Let me state plainly what hangs in the air and what no one dares to say aloud: the idea has taken hold in society that torture is acceptable if it is applied to a villain.

This is the idea of a conditional, selective, “just” prohibition of torture. The idea that torture is a tool that is bad in the wrong hands, but good in the “right” hands, against the “right” objects.

This is a direct and absolute negation of the very concept of human rights.

For the prohibition of torture is absolute. It knows no exceptions. Article 3 of the Convention is one of the few that is not subject to any derogation, even in conditions of war or a state of emergency. No exceptional circumstances – neither war, nor the threat of war, nor internal political instability, nor any other state of emergency – can serve as a justification for torture. None. Never. Against no one.

And here it is worth recalling two circumstances that are forgotten in the heat of popular vengeance.

First, the person who was tortured in the SIZO had not been convicted. No verdict has been rendered against him. He is a suspect, nothing more. The presumption of innocence is not a formality for advocates’ speeches, but a load-bearing element of the entire edifice of law.

Second – and this is fundamental – even if a verdict is rendered, even if guilt is fully proven, this in no way justifies torture. A convicted murderer, rapist, torturer – all of them retain the right not to be subjected to torture. Not because they “deserve” it, but because the prohibition of torture protects not them – it protects us. It protects the very idea of human dignity, which cannot be taken away for any guilt. A society that agrees to torture “villains” very quickly discovers that the circle of “villains” expands, and that who falls within it is decided not by a court.

“AND IMAGINE WHAT THEY DO TO THE REST”

And the final, coldest thought. The acts permitted against the TCC employee were carried out languidly, openly, without concealment, with absolute cynicism – so much so that they were filmed on video. If such things are done for show, without hiding, to a person whose case is guaranteed to become public – imagine what is happening within the walls of that same Odesa SIZO to those whose names no one will ever learn. To those for whom there is no one to stand up. To those whose humiliation no one will film on a phone and post online.

This is precisely why this case is so important. It is not an exception, but an indicator. It shows not that a cruel “overseer” has appeared in one block, but that an entire system tolerates, uses, and tacitly approves torture – on condition that the victim is the “right” one.

THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE: A MACHINE OF BUREAUCRATIC BRUSH-OFFS

I did not confine myself to observations. I addressed the authorities – the State Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Odesa regional and district prosecutor’s offices, the Ministry of Justice, the SIZO institution itself, and the relevant interregional directorate – with a consolidated request and a statement concerning possible criminal offences in the conditions of the Odesa SIZO.

What did I receive? Brush-offs. In their purest, laboratory-pure form.

The Office of the Prosecutor General forwarded my statement “by territorial jurisdiction” to the Odesa regional prosecutor’s office – and notified me of this. By another letter the OPG forwarded the appeal “by competence” and kindly explained that I could appeal the actions of the investigator or prosecutor under the procedure of Articles 303–310 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Khadzhibey district prosecutor’s office of the city of Odesa forwarded my information requests further on and separately noted that it “is not the proper holder of the requested information.”

Not a single body said, “Yes, we are looking into this, here is what has been done.” Each one said, “This is not quite for us” – and redirected it further round the circle. A torture complaint is passed between instances like a hot potato, until it cools down and gets lost.

Here it is, the institutional cover of that same legitimisation. Society approves torture from below – and the state evades reacting from above. Both lead to the same point: impunity. And the impunity of torture is not a side effect. It is, according to the entire case-law of the ECtHR and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), a separate and self-standing violation, because it is precisely impunity that makes torture systemic.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: ON THE PRESENT, TO WHICH NO ONE PAYS ATTENTION

I do not wish to write at length in this post about the absolute prohibition of torture as a legal doctrine – it is obvious enough to anyone willing to see it. I want all the experts, civic associations, civic initiatives, and organisations that speak about human rights every day to finally reflect on what sounds mundane today and to which no one pays attention.

The lowering of the threshold of torture and the maximal, absolute heightening of tolerance toward torture have already become our present. The Odesa case is merely an example, a litmus test, a flash that for a moment lit up the abyss.

The most terrible thing about torture is not the act of violence itself. The most terrible thing is the moment when society begins to approve of that violence. When “never, against anyone” quietly turns into “permissible, if he deserved it.” Because after that, the question is no longer whether there will be torture. The only question is who will be the next to be deemed to have “deserved” it.

The true scale of the problem is difficult to overestimate. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, as of early 2026 there were 1,401 criminal proceedings concerning torture pending, of which 704 were opened in 2025 alone (Hlavkom, 2026). At the same time, only a small fraction of cases reach trial: over the entire period from 2022 to 2025, suspicion notices were issued to 56–67 persons per year, while the number of indictments sent to court was significantly lower (Yagunov, 2026). These figures, taken on their own, attest to a systemic crisis in the criminal prosecution of torture.

The onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022 caused a sharp statistical drop in registered crimes of this category — to 68 cases — not because torture had diminished, but because a large share of incidents occurred in occupied or frontline territories where any documentation was virtually impossible (Yagunov, 2026). In subsequent years — 2023–2025 — figures recovered to 94–124 cases per year, consistent with the pre-war baseline, yet far below the actual number of incidents.

The true systemic problem lies not only in the acts of torture themselves, but in the algorithmic inefficiency of their prosecution. The ECtHR, in the case of Afanasyev v. Ukraine, had already established that Ukraine not only applies torture but effectively fails to punish it (Hlavkom, 2026). That verdict has not become obsolete — it is confirmed annually by new scandals, fragile convictions, and the impunity of uniformed torturers.

This review covers the most prominent specific cases in three categories: torture in National Police units, torture in the penitentiary system, and torture in Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres (TRC/SSC). Each case is analysed according to a uniform scheme: date and circumstances of the event, description of documented acts, response by authorities and society, suspicion notices issued, and the fate of the case in court.

SECTION I. TORTURE IN NATIONAL POLICE UNITS

The Kaharlik Case: Rape and Torture at a Police Station (2020–2026)

Although the underlying events occurred in May 2020, the Kaharlik police officers’ case became a litmus test for the state of police reform precisely during our study period — owing to its judicial resolution in 2023–2026.

Description of events. In May 2020, at the Kaharlik District Police Department of Kyiv Oblast, two officers — an investigator and the head of the criminal police sector — detained a woman suspected of involvement in a crime. Over an extended period they inflicted grievous bodily harm upon her, applied electric current, handcuffed her to a radiator in the corridor, transported her outside the city in the boot of a car, and raped her. In September–October of the same year, male detainees who had been subjected to torture stated that investigators had also transported them outside the city in car boots and tortured them with electric shocks to extract confessions of theft (LB.ua, 2026; NV, 2026).

The public outcry was unprecedented. The case became a symbol of post-Soviet police violence within the ‘reformed’ police service. The Office of the Prosecutor General placed the case under direct supervision. Both officers were dismissed and taken into custody.

On 24 May 2023 the Kaharlik District Court delivered a guilty verdict: both defendants were sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment under a combination of charges — torture (Art. 127), unlawful deprivation of liberty (Art. 146-1), and rape (Art. 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) (Hlavkom, 2023). In November 2024, the Kyiv Court of Appeal upheld the sentence (OBOZ.UA, 2024). On 19 February 2026 the Supreme Court of Ukraine definitively confirmed the conviction, drawing a line under 5.5 years of the victim’s judicial struggle for her rights (NV, 2026; LB.ua, 2026). The case became one of the rare examples of torture by police officers being prosecuted to a final, enforceable guilty verdict.

Torture at a Kharkiv Police Station: Sexual Violence to Obtain a Confession

Although this case came to public attention in 2021, its investigative and procedural context spans the study period.

A deputy head of one of Kharkiv’s police divisions detained a man suspected of murder and brought him to the station. For over an hour, officers struck the detainee on the head with a plastic water bottle. The deputy chief then put on rubber gloves and applied sexual violence — squeezing and pulling the victim’s genitals. Unable to endure the torture, the man confessed to killing his acquaintance. The court remanded him in custody, but he secured his release from the pre-trial detention facility and declared his innocence (SBI, 2021).

The SBI issued a suspicion notice to the deputy head of the police division for torture involving sexual violence. The case attracted wide attention owing to the striking resemblance of the ‘interrogation’ methods to Soviet-era militia practices.

Vinnytsia: Torture to the Point of Clinical Death over Suspected Petty Theft (September 2023 – February 2026)

This case is one of the most thoroughly documented examples of police violence in our study period, encompassing all stages — from the crime to the judicial proceedings.

In September 2023, three Vinnytsia police officers were checking information concerning a man’s possible involvement in the theft of a bag containing documents and bank cards. Late at night they brought him to a duty room and commenced what amounted to the ‘beating out of a confession.’ Throughout the night, officers delivered multiple blows with fists and a rubber baton, mostly to the abdomen. The beatings were accompanied by systematic psychological pressure aimed at breaking the person’s will and forcing him to confess. As a result of the torture, the victim sustained multiple severe injuries to internal organs, suffered intra-abdominal haemorrhage, and underwent clinical death — cardiac arrest on the operating table. His spleen was removed (SBI, 2026; TSN, 2026).

Information about the incident only became public in January 2026 — more than two years after the crime itself — when the SBI and the Office of the Prosecutor General released details of the case.

In January 2026, three police officers were served with suspicion notices for torture committed by a group of persons involving a state official, and for the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm. Two suspects were placed under house arrest; regarding the third, who had already left the police service, the question of issuing a suspicion notice was being resolved. In February 2026 the case was referred to court (OGP, 2026; Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 2026). A key concern: between the act of torture (September 2023) and the issuing of suspicion notices (January 2026) more than two years elapsed. During this time the victim remained without official victim status in a torture case.

SECTION II. TORTURE IN THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM

Findings of the Ombudsman’s Office: Special Report 2024

On 2 May 2024 the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights of Ukraine published a Special Report ‘On the State of Affairs Regarding the Prevention in Ukraine of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment in 2023’ (Ombudsman, 2024). The document recorded alarming trends that characterised the penitentiary system during the period of martial law.

As of 31 December 2023, 44,024 persons were held in 148 penal institutions and pre-trial detention facilities, compared with 42,726 in 2022. In parallel, 29 penal institutions located in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remain non-operational (Ombudsman, 2024).

The report documented numerous acts of violence by staff against convicted persons and persons held in custody: beatings with hands, feet, and rubber batons; compulsion to perform physical exercise to the point of exhaustion; threats of sexual violence. Particular concern was raised by the situation of persons sentenced to life imprisonment, who are confined to their cells for 23 hours a day and spend their one-hour exercise period in a cramped cubicle (Focus, 2026; Ombudsman, 2024).

According to data from the Department for the Execution of Criminal Sentences, in 2024–2025 only isolated criminal proceedings under Part 3 of Article 127 of the Criminal Code were opened against institutional staff — 1 in 2024 and a few in 2025 (Pravo.Ua, 2026). This statistical picture is strikingly understated relative to the actual situation, attesting to systemic latency of violence in penitentiary facilities.

ECtHR Judgment: Chornodubravskyy and Others v. Ukraine (2026)

In 2026 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in the case of Chornodubravskyy and Others v. Ukraine concerning 12 applicants. The Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention owing to cell overcrowding, absence of sanitary conditions, lack of access to showers and fresh air in Ukrainian pre-trial detention facilities (Pravo.Ua, 2026). This judgment continues a long series of analogous ECtHR verdicts, including the case of Sukachov v. Ukraine (2020), and confirms the systemic nature of violations in the domestic penitentiary system.

Statistical Overview (2022–2026)

Aggregating available data, as of early 2026 courts had delivered only 20 final convictions in cases of torture by law enforcement officers — across the entire observation period (Hlavkom, 2026). Police officers feature most frequently in such proceedings, accounting for approximately three-quarters of all suspicion notices. Penitentiary staff rank second, accounting for at least 36 cases in 2025 (Hlavkom, 2026). Meanwhile, researchers note that registered data for 2022–2025 are significantly understated, since they cover only incidents that occurred on government-controlled territory where investigation is possible (Yagunov, 2026). The actual number of torture incidents — in police stations, prisons, and especially in TRC facilities — remains unknown.

SECTION III. TORTURE IN TERRITORIAL RECRUITMENT AND SOCIAL SUPPORT CENTRES (TRC/SSC)

Systemic Violence as a ‘New Front’: The General Picture, 2023–2026

With the onset of large-scale mobilisation in 2023, a new wave of scandals connected to violence inside TRC/SSC facilities came to public attention. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights recorded that in 2022–2023 more than 500 applications were received from citizens regarding rights violations during mobilisation. In 2024 this number increased sixfold — to 3,312 complaints — and in 2025 it reached 6,127 applications (UNIAN, 2026). In total, over 2022–2025 the Ombudsman received nearly 12,000 complaints about TRC actions.

Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets described mobilisation in 2025 as the ‘most acute issue’ his office had faced, emphasising that ‘Ukrainian citizens must feel protected within TRC/SSC premises, not the opposite’ (RBK-Ukraine, 2026). The SBI characterised combating torture in TRCs as one of its ‘priority areas,’ noting: ‘Such actions are inadmissible, especially under martial law, and undermine public trust in state institutions’ (SBI, 2026).

Ternopil: Video Recording of the Beating of Conscripts at a TRC (October 2023 – May 2026)

On 7–8 October 2023 footage of the beating of conscripts — recorded the previous day — circulated online. Criminal proceedings were opened the following day. A verdict was delivered in October 2026 (Zaxid.net, 2026; Radio Svoboda, 2023).

On the evening of 6 October 2023, a grenadier soldier from the TRC security section, together with other service personnel, stopped a local resident in central Ternopil for a documents check. The man was brought to the TRC. In footage covertly recorded and subsequently published on social media, two servicemen are seen brutally beating two men lying on beds; pleas not to be beaten are audible. One victim sustained medium-severity bodily injuries; the other sustained minor injuries (SBI, 2024; NV, 2024).

The video provoked wide public reaction. Ombudsman Lubinets personally announced an inspection, writing on Facebook: ‘Ternopil. I saw footage from the media and social networks showing the beating of conscripts. This must not happen!’ (Radio Svoboda, 2023). The Ternopil Specialised Prosecution in the Defence Sphere of the Western Region opened criminal proceedings. On 13 October 2023 a court imposed night-time house arrest on two suspects — the section commander and the grenadier soldier.

In early 2024 the accused returned to work at the TRC pending the conclusion of the trial. The case was substantially delayed, and several witnesses had left the country. On 20 May 2026 the Ternopil City-District Court delivered its verdict: both defendants pleaded guilty and received 1-year suspended sentences and a fine of UAH 850. In determining the sentence the court took into account the defendants’ combat record, the presence of children, their sincere remorse, and documented donations of UAH 50,000 each to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Zaxid.net, 2026). This verdict became a symbol of impunity in cases of violence at TRCs: the minimal punishment for a documented and publicly circulated brutal beating proved so disproportionate to the social harm caused that the case triggered a fresh debate on judicial independence in cases against members of the security forces.

Verkhovyna TRC (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast): Systemic Torture and Extortion (November 2025 – May 2026)

Following verification of complaints from citizens and members of parliament regarding beatings, torture, and extortion of money at one of the Prykarpattia TRCs, the SBI launched an investigation. It established that a lieutenant-colonel, deputy head of the Verkhovyna District TRC/SSC, had systematically humiliated and beaten conscripts. One victim — a service member — publicly spoke out about the violence. The investigation established that at least four subordinates of the lieutenant-colonel were involved in the beatings (Suspilne Ivano-Frankivsk, 2026). On 21 November 2025 the lieutenant-colonel was detained and remanded in custody. The SBI noted that after media publications and official appeals, an increasing number of victims began contacting law enforcement. In January 2026 another subordinate of the lieutenant-colonel — a serviceman from the security platoon involved in the beatings — was detained. The actions of the commander and three subordinates were classified as torture committed by a state official. The court remanded all persons charged in custody without the right to bail. On 18 May 2026 the SBI referred the indictment to court (Podrobnosti, 2026; Leopolis News, 2026). On 29 May 2026 a preparatory hearing took place at which the second victim appeared for the first time; the court granted an application for panel adjudication (Pravda.If.Ua, 2026).

Ternopil (Second Episode): Torture at a TRC with Fluoroscopy and Organ Removal (2025–2026)

The SBI conducted an inspection in response to citizens’ complaints of beatings, torture, and extortion of money at one of the district TRCs. At least two criminal episodes were established. In the first, the victim was beaten for refusing to undergo a fluoroscopic examination: initially in the corridor of a hospital, then on TRC premises. In the second, servicemen forcibly detained a man; the commander personally delivered blows; tear gas was deployed; the victim lay on a concrete floor. As a result of the injuries sustained, he underwent complex surgery involving the removal of one of his organs (Leopolis News, 2026; Focus, 2026). Suspects were served with suspicion notices in November 2025 and January 2026. Following media publications, the number of victims approaching law enforcement increased.

Kharkiv TRC: Torture and Shooting, Extortion of Money (April 2026)

The SBI issued suspicion notices to a group of servicemen from one of Kharkiv’s district TRCs, as well as to servicemen from other units who had acted in concert. Among those charged was a major of the TRC who held a commanding position and organised the actions of the accomplices. According to the investigation, the group extorted money from individuals and, in cases of refusal, resorted to violence and threats. Shooting episodes were also recorded in the case. Suspicion notices were issued for torture committed by prior conspiracy by a group of persons (SBI, 2026; Hlavkom, 2026). The pre-trial investigation was ongoing, with prosecutorial supervision exercised by the Kharkiv Specialised Prosecution in the Defence Sphere of the Eastern Region.

Mykolaiv: TRC Officer Suspected of Beatings (January 2026)

On 8 January 2026 the SBI issued a suspicion notice to an officer of one of Mykolaiv’s district TRCs for beating and humiliating conscripts (Hlavkom, 2026). The SBI reiterated that ‘combating torture is one of the Bureau’s priority areas’ and that such actions ‘undermine public trust in state institutions’ (SBI, 2026).

Kyiv Oblast: TRC Officer for Beating and Humiliation (February 2026)

On 3 February 2026 the SBI detained and served a suspicion notice on the head of the civil-military cooperation support group of one of the Kyiv Oblast district TRCs for beating and systematic humiliation of conscripts (SBI, 2026). The case demonstrates that violence at TRCs is not a local anomaly but a widespread practice across different regions of the country.

Rivne TRC: Beating with a Bat and Corruption (May 2025)

In May 2025 the SBI issued additional suspicion notices to the former head of the Rivne District TRC. Initially criminal proceedings had been opened against him for beating one of his subordinates with a bat. During a search, narcotics were discovered. A further charge concerned assisting persons in evading mobilisation: ‘The official created conditions enabling certain conscripts to avoid mobilisation’ (ArmyInform, 2025). This case illustrates the typical ‘compounded corruption’ of TRCs: violence combined with corrupt schemes to evade service.

Dnipro: Beating at TRC, Video on Telegram (August 2025)

On 8 August 2025 a Telegram channel published footage apparently showing the beating of a former serviceman by Dnipro TRC employees. The Dnipro Specialised Prosecution in the Defence Sphere immediately registered criminal proceedings (Donbas Patriot, 2025). The case is instructive: footage in public messaging applications became the primary ‘trigger’ for opening proceedings.

SECTION IV. STATISTICAL DIMENSIONS AND SYSTEMIC CONCLUSIONS

Quantitative Picture, 2022–2025

According to official data of the Office of the Prosecutor General as of early 2026 (Hlavkom, 2026), the total number of criminal proceedings regarding torture currently pending is 1,401, of which 704 were opened during 2025. The number of persons served with suspicion notices was 56 in 2022 and 67 in 2025; 41 indictments were referred to court in 2025. The total number of final guilty verdicts over the entire study period is 20. These indicators demonstrate an extremely low rate of criminal prosecution effectiveness: of more than 1,400 proceedings opened, only 20 resulted in a final conviction — a ‘verdict-to-proceeding’ conversion rate of less than 1.5%.

Structural Causes of Impunity

Analysis of the documented cases reveals several systemic factors that perpetuate the impunity of torture in Ukraine even in conditions of prolonged human rights advocacy and declared reforms.

First, protracted investigations. In the Vinnytsia case, more than two years elapsed between the act (September 2023) and the suspicion notice (January 2026). In the Ternopil TRC case, between the video (October 2023) and the verdict (May 2026) — almost three years. Procedural delay exhausts victims and increases the risk of evidence loss.

Second, disproportionate penalties. The verdict in the Ternopil TRC case (a 1-year suspended sentence and a UAH 850 fine for a documented and filmed brutal beating) plainly demonstrates that courts do not always adequately assess the social danger of torture committed by state officials.

Third, fear and latency. The Ombudsman’s Office, the SBI, and independent researchers unanimously indicate that the actual number of torture incidents is many times higher than the registered figure. Victims fear repeated persecution, lack confidence in the system’s effectiveness, and under conditions of martial law may find themselves in a state of dependency on the very structures that abused them (Yagunov, 2026).

Fourth, institutional loyalty. The return of the accused in the Ternopil TRC case to their workplaces before the verdict became enforceable, justification on circumstantial grounds, and similar practices — all attest to the fact that certain institutions continue to protect ‘their own’ and resist external oversight.

Fifth, the systemic character of violence at TRCs. The increase in complaints from 500 in 2022–2023 to 6,127 in 2025 (UNIAN, 2026) signifies not only a greater willingness of people to complain, but also a genuine spread of violent practices in the context of large-scale mobilisation.

CONCLUSIONS

This documentary review of the most prominent cases from 2022–2026 paints a grim picture of systemic violence and corporate impunity within Ukraine’s key security institutions. The police, the penitentiary service, and the TRCs — three separate agencies with no organisational connection — demonstrate identical patterns of behaviour: the application of physical pain to obtain a desired result (confessions, compliance, money); minimisation of the risk of accountability; and loyalty of leadership towards subordinate torturers.

The reform of the SBI that is under way and the increased activity of the defence-sphere prosecution are positive signals. However, without overcoming systemic impunity — through strengthening judicial independence, legislative reinforcement of the inevitability of punishment for torture, and genuine functional parliamentary and public oversight — any reforms will remain cosmetic.

Ukraine has assumed obligations before the Council of Europe, the ECtHR, and, potentially, towards its future EU membership. Fulfilment of those obligations requires not merely a statistical increase in the number of suspicion notices, but the genuine punishment of torturers — irrespective of their rank and institutional affiliation.

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Accordingly, the very fact of the use of physical force, and in a number of cases its excessive use, raises the question of the legality and compliance with international standards of the practice of concealing their faces by TRC employees when carrying out coercive actions.

Here, we can leave aside the legal assessment of the legality of the detention of citizens by TRC employees as such. This issue has been sufficiently researched, and the answer is clear: TRC employees do not have such powers.

Instead, the key aspect is that the very fact of using physical force during the detention of persons transforms the legal status of TRC employees (who are, by their nature, military personnel) into a status functionally identical to that of law enforcement officers, as they effectively assume the relevant law enforcement powers.

In this regard, it is worth noting the provisions of Article 1 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by Resolution 34/169 of the UN General Assembly on December 17, 1979, according to which the term “law enforcement officials” covers all appointed or elected officials who exercise police powers, including the power to arrest or detain. Thus, when a TRC employee, while in the status of a military serviceman, resorts to detention with the use of physical force, this indicates that he has effectively assumed the powers of law enforcement officials within the meaning of the aforementioned international act, which, in turn, raises questions both about the legality of such actions and about legal responsibility for them.

At the same time, in the context of preventing torture and inhuman treatment, given the practice of detentions carried out by TRC employees, the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) are of particular importance. The relevant CPT standards contain an unambiguous requirement: every state agent — regardless of their institutional affiliation (police officer, prison service officer, or other state official) — who exercises powers to detain persons is required to wear clear and unambiguous means of identification. Such means may include an individual number, surname, or appropriate markings on the uniform or protective equipment (in particular, a helmet).

In cases where officials perform their duties wearing balaclavas or helmets that cover their faces, the relevant identification numbers must be of sufficient size to ensure the unimpeded identification of the specific official exercising the power of detention and using physical force.

Thus, even if the actions of TRC employees in detaining citizens are illegal in nature, the obligation to have clear and unambiguous means of identification on uniforms remains relevant and important. Compliance with this requirement is a necessary prerequisite for ensuring the prompt identification of a specific individual who has used force and, where there are grounds for doing so, bringing them to justice.

Here we would like to recall certain ECHR standards regarding the wearing of balaclavas by law enforcement officers.

The CPT would also like to express its misgivings about the practice of law enforcement officials wearing masks when apprehending persons […] since this will hamper the identification of those responsible if and when instances of ill-treatment arise. The Committee considers that only exceptional circumstances can justify measures to conceal the identity of law enforcement officials [carrying out their duties]. Where such measures are applied, appropriate safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that the officials concerned are accountable for their actions (e.g. by means of a clearly visible number on the uniform) (Estonia, 2007, para 15).

The CPT considers that appropriate safeguards must be in place in order to ensure that police officers may be identified and can be held accountable for their actions (e.g. by way of a clearly visible means of individual identification on the uniform, such as a name or a number). This concerns in particular those police officers wearing masks/balaclavas or other equipment that may hamper their identification. Such a requirement is also likely to have a preventive effect and significantly reduce the risk of excessive use of force and other forms of ill-treatment (Austria, 2021, para 19).

The wearing of balaclavas (in addition to protective helmets) by members of specialised forces may exceptionally be justified in the context of high-risk operations (for instance, when dangerous arrests are necessary). However, the routine wearing of balaclavas during public order operations should be seriously reconsidered. Further, any pre-planned interventions should be videorecorded (e.g. with tactical cameras as part of the equipment of the officers concerned). Action must also be taken to ensure that plainclothes law enforcement officials effecting an apprehension and/or questioning an apprehended person in the context of public order operations clearly identify themselves (including by giving evidence of their status and professional identity as soon as is practicable) (Ukraine, February 2014, para 36).

The practical arrangements in place, in particular the display of a number on the back of helmets, did not generally allow persons apprehended in the context of the demonstrations to identify the law enforcement officials involved in their arrest. The CPT recommends that the  authorities take measures to ensure that all police officers involved in public order operations, whether they wear personal protection equipment or not, display a clearly visible means of individual identification (such as a name or a number) on the front of their uniforms or helmets (Türkiye, April 2025, para 36).

The Committee recommends that steps be taken to ensure that prison staff are always identifiable, preferably by wearing name tags [or short] identification numbers in a visible manner at all times whilst on duty (Hungary, 2013, para. 49).

The CPT also wishes to emphasise that it is opposed to the wearing of balaclavas by special-purpose forces within penitentiary establishments. The Committee recognises that, for operational and/or security reasons, the wearing of protective helmets may be necessary. However, it should be ensured that subsequent identification of the officers concerned is always possible by the relevant authorities and by prisoners through not only a clearly distinctive badge but also a prominent identification number on each uniform/helmet. In addition, interventions of this type should be videorecorded (e.g. with tactical cameras as part of the equipment of the penitentiary officers concerned) (Ukraine, 2012, para 21).

Further, in the context of border control activities at both land and sea borders, all law enforcement officials or state agents involved should display clearly visible identification numbers or tags on their uniforms. There can be no justification for balaclavas to be systematically worn. Border control activities should also be video recorded to prevent both ill-treatment and false accusations and be systematically monitored. In this regard, the authorities should guarantee the operation of effective and independent monitoring mechanisms for systematically monitoring border control activities (Greece, 2023, para 162).

The two-day intensive programme formed part of the DIGNITY project, an initiative co-funded by the European Union and dedicated to bridging perspectives for a rights-based approach to pre-trial detention across member states.

Under the expert guidance of Ms. Marina Daliani, distinguished criminal and human rights lawyer and Vice President of the Hellenic League of Human Rights, the training brought together legal practitioners, human rights defenders, and detention monitoring experts from Greece, Portugal, and Ukraine.

The programme addressed critical contemporary challenges in pre-trial detention practices, including vulnerabilities of detained persons, barriers to effective legal representation, and the application of international human rights standards. Participants engaged in practical exercises encompassing UN complaint mechanisms, European Arrest Warrant simulations, and strategic litigation before the European Court of Human Rights.

The Spark: Mayor’s Assassination

The protests were catalyzed by the November 1st assassination of Uruapan Mayor Carlos Manzo, who was shot while attending a Day of the Dead festival. Manzo had been vocal about demanding tough action against drug cartels terrorizing Mexican communities. Demonstrators honored his memory by carrying banners reading “We are all Carlos Manzo” and wearing cowboy hats in tribute.

Escalating Violence

The situation deteriorated when protesters dismantled barriers protecting the National Palace, where Sheinbaum resides. Police responded with tear gas, and authorities arrested 20 people on charges including robbery and assault, according to Mexico City security chief Pablo Vazquez.

Political Tensions

President Sheinbaum has attributed the protests to right-wing political opposition, claiming they were funded by her critics. Days before the march, she suggested the demonstration was being promoted by bots online, questioning the authenticity of the grassroots movement while affirming support for freedom of expression.

Sheinbaum’s Balancing Act

Despite maintaining approval ratings above 70% in her first year, Sheinbaum faces mounting pressure. She has made progress on fentanyl-trafficking enforcement—a priority for U.S. President Donald Trump—but resists calls for an all-out drug war, citing the bloody failures of previous administrations’ approaches.

The protests highlight growing frustration with Mexico’s ongoing security crisis, even as the president attempts to chart a different course than her predecessors in addressing cartel violence.