However, every absolute encounters the reality of its implementation, and it is precisely in the sphere of implementation that its principal weakness is revealed. The Ukrainian state during the war has demonstrated this weakness with the utmost clarity. Notwithstanding Article 15 of the Convention, which expressly excludes derogation from Article 3 of the Convention even in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, the state in fact derogates from the absolute prohibition of torture precisely when the very existence of the state within its borders is at stake. This occurs not through a formal derogation, but through a silent, yet entirely deliberate, toleration of practices which by their nature fall within the scope of Article 3.

We must acknowledge this, and we must speak about it. Silence regarding this phenomenon is a precondition for its further covert legitimisation in conditions of crisis, and not only in Ukraine, but also in other European countries whose legal systems have been built over the past half-century on the principles of the legal space of the Council of Europe. It is for this reason that the subject of this article is neither a denial of the absolute prohibition of torture nor a search for justifications for the state, but an honest identification of a phenomenon which we propose to call, provisionally, the “torture quasi-compromise”.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Ukrainian scenario has demonstrated that during a war, which is a reality that cannot be denied, the question is placed on the agenda of the extent to which the state can survive without compulsory mobilisation. The problem is that compulsory mobilisation in Ukrainian conditions has proved to be inextricably linked to the use of ill-treatment and, in a significant proportion of cases, torture. This may sound harsh and may provoke, and certainly will provoke, criticism. But we are speaking of realities, not of a normative ideal.

When the state deliberately derogates from the absolute prohibition of torture, and this derogation is in fact not concealed at the national level, the manifestation of such derogation becomes a phenomenon which in Ukrainian society has acquired the name “busification” (busyfikatsiia). This word, which did not exist in the Ukrainian language just a few years ago, is today instantly recognised by every inhabitant of the country and denotes an entirely specific set of practices: the sudden apprehension of a man on the street, in a public place, at his workplace, in his own home or in his yard by officers of a Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support (TCR), his forcible placement into a vehicle, and his transportation to the TCR or directly to a training centre or military unit.

It is here that we identify the torture quasi-compromise. Its essence lies in the fact that the state turns a blind eye to mass unlawful apprehensions, which by their nature constitute manifestly unlawful deprivation of liberty and which, as a rule, are accompanied by ill-treatment. This ill-treatment takes place both at the moment of apprehension and subsequently. It occurs in public places and on the streets, as well as directly in the apartments and yards of citizens, when TCR officers, who, as the state itself asserts, have no authority to stop, detain or deprive persons of their liberty, nonetheless do so in an undisguised manner. Accordingly, not only Article 3 and Article 5 of the Convention come under attack, but also Article 8, since the right to respect for private and family life and the inviolability of the home are in these situations not regarded as existing at all.

As a result, an atmosphere of total tolerance of ill-treatment is created. Moreover, this tolerance extends both to the moment of apprehension and to the subsequent stages. The phenomenon of busification consists in the fact that even where the apprehension itself takes place without obvious signs of physical violence, it is, as a rule, only the first link in a chain. Next come persons who cannot be mobilised on health grounds, but who are nevertheless sent to the front. It is precisely here that the nexus lies between mass unlawful apprehensions (de facto arrests, since they may be called whatever one likes, but their essence does not change), the forgery of mobilisation documents, and the dispatch to the front of persons who are not subject to conscription on medical grounds.

In at least half of the cases, and possibly more, this path is accompanied by ill-treatment or torture, specifically during apprehension, during transportation to the recruitment centre, or directly on the premises of the TCR. What is at issue is not isolated excesses on the part of individual perpetrators, but a mass, recurrent, systemic practice which at the state level receives no adequate criminal-law or disciplinary response.

THE FIRST THESIS: THE REALITIES OF WAR AGAINST THE ABSOLUTE OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

The first point on which we insist is the following: however much we may exalt the absolute prohibition of torture, however often we may repeat that even in time of war torture and other forms of ill-treatment are outside the law, realities do their work. A state waging a war for survival finds a way to circumvent the absolute without formally denying it.

An important historical clarification is required here. Such practices are not new. Every war, as history testifies, has been accompanied by compulsory mass mobilisation, unlawful deprivation of liberty, de facto falsification of mobilisation documents, and so on. However, between what occurred during the First and Second World Wars and what contemporary Ukraine demonstrates there lies a chasm. This chasm was created by the establishment of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the corresponding body of Council of Europe law upon which member states build their national legal systems. This applies all the more to the European Union, within the framework of which a unique legal system of its own for the protection of fundamental rights has been created.

It is precisely the emergence of the phenomenon of busification that distinguishes today’s situation from what took place during past European and world wars. The problem is not that mass compulsory mobilisation as such is a historical novelty, but that such a phenomenon exists and reproduces itself within the legal system of the Council of Europe, of which Ukraine has been a member since 1995, and after three decades of development of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the absolute character of Article 3 has been repeatedly confirmed, including in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Selmouni v. France [GC] and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC].

In other words, the Ukrainian case is the first instance in which a member state of the Council of Europe, while under the full jurisdiction of the European Court and under the monitoring of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, wages a full-scale war for its existence and at the same time demonstrates that the absolute of Article 3 of the Convention proves, in practical terms, to be absolutely vulnerable. This is not an argument against the absolute. It is an argument in favour of the proposition that the absolute requires institutional safeguards, and not merely declarations.

THE SECOND THESIS: WHY THE WEST SEES ARTICLE 5 BUT DOES NOT SEE ARTICLE 3

The second thesis concerns the perception of Ukrainian realities outside Ukraine. The scale and nature of compulsory mobilisation in Ukraine, the reverse side of which frequently becomes ill-treatment, are undoubtedly noticed and analysed in other Council of Europe states and in the European Union. However, for the most part these practices are viewed through the prism of unlawful deprivation of liberty, unlawful apprehensions and other violations of the right to liberty – that is, predominantly in the categories of Article 5 of the Convention.

As a consequence, what in Ukraine has acquired the features of a mass practice of ill-treatment during or after unlawful apprehension is perceived in the West merely as a mass practice of unlawful deprivation of liberty. The violent, degrading and potentially torturous component of this phenomenon remains on the periphery of analysis. Thus, a problem which requires an independent qualification under Article 3 of the Convention is in fact reduced to a question of compliance with Article 5 of the Convention.

What the population of a country at war perceives as something understandable and commonplace, where words such as “TCR” or “busification” evoke a typical and characteristic reaction that is understood without explanation, is perceived in the West, even taking into account the mass scale of the phenomenon, merely as unlawful deprivation of liberty. That is, at most as a problem under Article 5 of the Convention, but by no means as a problem under Article 3 of the Convention, still less in its mass dimension.

THIS SHIFT OF OPTICS HAS AT LEAST THREE CAUSES.

First, the statistical and documentary base concerning ill-treatment during mobilisation is fragmentary: the victims are in military units, have no access to a lawyer, do not have their bodily injuries recorded, and criminal proceedings under the article on “torture” are either not opened or have no prospect. Second, the Western observer is inclined to apply to Ukraine a presumption of good faith on the part of a state defending itself against aggression, and therefore to interpret excesses as individual violations rather than as a systemic practice. Third, the very category of “deprivation of liberty” is cognitively more convenient: it does not require a threshold of severity of suffering, and it does not pose the uncomfortable question of whether a state that is the victim of aggression is at the same time a state that permits torture.

The consequence of this shift is that the phenomenon of busification remains outside proper legal qualification. Yet the case law of the European Court is unequivocal: any recourse to physical force against a person under the control of state agents which was not made strictly necessary by that person’s own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle a violation of Article 3 (Bouyid v. Belgium [GC]). There is no basis whatsoever for considering that this standard does not apply to TCR officers who physically restrain a person, place him in a vehicle, strike him or use special means, or hold him on premises without access to water, food, medical assistance and contact with relatives. Nor is there any basis for considering that the dispatch to the front, on the basis of forged documents, of a person who is unfit for service on health grounds does not raise a separate issue under Article 3 of the Convention, and, in the event of death or serious injury, also under Article 2 of the Convention.

Thus, the second principal aspect on which we insist is that the legal qualification of busification must be transferred from the sphere of Article 5 of the Convention to the sphere of Article 3 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention, and that the mass scale and recurrence of this practice must be regarded as indicators of a systemic problem rather than as an aggregate of isolated incidents.

THE THIRD THESIS: A PROFESSIONAL ARMY AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE AND CORRUPTION

The third thesis is, in our view, the most important from the standpoint of political conclusions. The Ukrainian case has demonstrated how closely interlinked are the issues of creating a professional army, preventing corruption and preventing torture. These three problems are usually considered separately: reform of the armed forces is discussed in the categories of defence policy, corruption in the categories of economics and governance, torture in the categories of human rights. The Ukrainian experience shows that this is one problem with three faces.

In a system of coordinates in which the political elites display a manifest unwillingness to halt corruption schemes and to cut off corruption flows, while at the same time turning a blind eye to the phenomenon of busification, this cannot but lead to the accumulation of acute tension in society between the political elites and the rest of the population. Mobilisation that is carried out through coercion, violence and the forgery of documents, and which at the same time allows some to buy their way out while forcing others to fight contrary to their state of health, destroys the very idea of solidarity on which the defence of the state must rest. Torture during mobilisation and corruption surrounding mobilisation are not two separate phenomena, but two sides of one mechanism: where there is the possibility of unlawfully detaining, there arises the possibility of unlawfully releasing in exchange for a reward.

It is precisely for this reason that the creation of a professional army with properly remunerated military personnel and corresponding obligations voluntarily assumed by soldiers and officers was, from the very outset, the safeguard against torture which Ukraine could and should have adopted in the past. A professional army, a properly trained reserve and a transparent system of incentives substantially reduce the state’s dependence on chaotic compulsory mobilisation, although during a full-scale war they are not always capable of entirely eliminating the need for conscription. Such a set of measures substantially narrows the space for mass unlawful deprivation of liberty and, together with it, for the ill-treatment that accompanies compulsory mobilisation.

This is the principal message that must be proposed and disseminated among Western governments. As the Ukrainian case shows, in the event of war, even within a country that forms part of the legal system of the Council of Europe, in the absence of proper military training of the population and of appropriate incentives – including material and financial ones – for people to take up arms in defence of their country, the reverse side of the absence of such a policy for organising the armed forces will inevitably be mass compulsory mobilisation with the corresponding mass apprehensions and mass instances of ill-treatment. This pattern is not unique to Ukraine. It is structural, and any European state which today is discussing the reintroduction of conscription or preparing for a potential conflict must look at the Ukrainian experience not as an exotic curiosity, but as a warning.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, we propose three interrelated theses which form the basis of this article.

First, the absolute prohibition of torture, notwithstanding Article 15 of the Convention, has in practical terms proved to be absolutely vulnerable for a state waging a war for survival. Ukraine, being a member of the Council of Europe and under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, has in fact derogated from the absolute of Article 3 through the toleration of the phenomenon of busification. This must be acknowledged and must be spoken about, since silence is the first step towards the covert legitimisation of torture in conditions of crisis in other European states.

Second, the Western perception of busification as a problem exclusively under Article 5 of the Convention is inadequate. Mass unlawful apprehensions accompanied by physical violence, detention in improper conditions, the forgery of mobilisation documents and the dispatch to the front of persons unfit on health grounds must be qualified under Article 3, and their systemic character must be regarded as a structural problem rather than as an aggregate of individual excesses.

Third, the Ukrainian case demonstrates the inextricable link between a professional army, the prevention of corruption and the prevention of torture. The creation of professional armed forces on the basis of incentives rather than coercion is not only a question of defence capability, but also the principal institutional safeguard against the torture compromise. It is precisely this conclusion that must become the central message for the governments of European states which today are rethinking their own models of manning their armed forces in the light of the new security realities.

The torture quasi-compromise is not inevitable. It is the consequence of specific political decisions and, more importantly, of specific political inaction. Recognition of this fact is a necessary condition for the absolute prohibition of torture to remain an absolute not only in the text of the Convention, but also in the practice of the states that have sworn allegiance to that Convention.

I deliberately make a point at the very outset that ought to be superfluous, but under present conditions is not: this text cannot, in any dimension, be construed as support for the territorial recruitment centres (TCCs) in those of their actions that constitute crimes and gross violations of the law. I write this as an advocate whose client was himself recently unlawfully deprived of liberty by a territorial recruitment centre; as an advocate who conducts administrative cases against the TCCs. My position on the crimes committed by TCC officials therefore needs no explanation – it is unequivocal.

But this post is not about the TCCs. It is about something far more dangerous: about the fact that society has simultaneously and unanimously demonstrated a readiness to justify torture, provided that the torture is applied – in quotation marks – “to scumbags.” About the idea that “proper” torture inflicted on villains is not merely permissible, but just and even desirable. This is precisely my central message.

What, in fact, happened

First, the facts – because it is in their juxtaposition that the essence of the problem lies.

Officers of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) exposed, in one of the district territorial recruitment and social support centres of the Odesa region, a large-scale scheme of unlawfully coercing citizens into mobilisation. In order to improve conscription figures, officials of the institution unlawfully held men on the centre’s premises, beat them, intimidated them, and exerted psychological pressure. The investigation also established individual instances of acts of a sexual nature of a violent character committed against the victims. Six TCC employees were assisted by three representatives of a local civic organisation, who tracked down citizens and gathered information about them. Nine members of the group were detained; they were notified of suspicion of torture, unlawful deprivation of liberty, and robbery committed by an organised group. The court chose a preventive measure in the form of detention in custody without the right to post bail.

This is torture. The SBI called it torture. The law calls it torture. And that is correct.

A PARALLEL EVENT

On social media, the public association “Non-Stop Ukraine” published a video, filmed, presumably, in the Odesa SIZO, showing a man – allegedly that same TCC employee – being forced to crawl on the floor, to perform dog commands, and to carry slippers in his teeth to other inmates. The commands were given to him by the so-called “overseer” (smotryashchiy) of the block. The State Criminal-Executive Service confirmed the opening of an internal inquiry, the management of the Odesa SIZO was suspended, and the SBI opened proceedings.

And here is the most important point. This second event was almost unanimously labelled by the media, officials, and society as “abuse” and “humiliation.” Not torture. Merely “abuse.” And it is precisely in this substitution of words that the entire machinery of legitimisation is concealed.

THE TWOFOLD MOVEMENT OF PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS

When the SBI exposed the group of TCC employees, society exploded. But it exploded not with indignation against torture as such. It exploded with popular vengeance.

In the mass reaction, two movements occurred simultaneously, which only at first glance appear unrelated.

The first movement is the demonisation of the TCC employees. This is understandable: particular officials who tortured and robbed citizens for the sake of figures deserve the response prescribed by law. But demonisation is not justice. Demonisation transforms a specific human being from a suspect, protected by the presumption of innocence, into an abstract “villain” with respect to whom, supposedly, “anything goes.”

The second movement is the whitewashing of the staff of the Odesa pre-trial detention centre – or, more precisely, of those who organised and permitted the torture of an inmate within the walls of a state institution. The treatment applied to the detained TCC employee was, in effect, recognised by society as lawful and just. “He deserved it.” “Serves him right.” “Justice at last.” Torture carried out by inmates under the tacit supervision of the SIZO administration was turned into an instrument of popular vengeance – and, in that capacity, approved.

This is where the catastrophe occurs. For the very same torture that society rightly condemns when it is inflicted by TCC employees is the one it welcomes when it is inflicted in the SIZO – against the “right” victim.

“ABUSE” OR TORTURE? ON THE SUBSTITUTION OF WORDS

Note the language. What the SBI defendants did is “torture.” What the staff of the Odesa pre-trial detention centre did is merely “abuse” or “humiliation.”

This is neither coincidence nor journalistic carelessness. This is legitimisation in action.

Forcing an adult to crawl on their knees, to perform dog commands, to carry footwear in their teeth to other prisoners – this is not “abuse” in the everyday sense of the word. This is classic degrading treatment, and in terms of its intensity, systematic character, and purpose it is torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Article 127 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. For decades the European Court of Human Rights has qualified precisely such acts – humiliation that destroys the personality, that places a person in the position of an animal – as a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

When we call torture “abuse,” we make the first and most important concession. We soften the word in order to soften the act, in order ultimately to soften the prohibition. The lowering of the threshold of torture begins right here – in the vocabulary.

The most dangerous idea of contemporary Ukraine: “proper” torture

Let me state plainly what hangs in the air and what no one dares to say aloud: the idea has taken hold in society that torture is acceptable if it is applied to a villain.

This is the idea of a conditional, selective, “just” prohibition of torture. The idea that torture is a tool that is bad in the wrong hands, but good in the “right” hands, against the “right” objects.

This is a direct and absolute negation of the very concept of human rights.

For the prohibition of torture is absolute. It knows no exceptions. Article 3 of the Convention is one of the few that is not subject to any derogation, even in conditions of war or a state of emergency. No exceptional circumstances – neither war, nor the threat of war, nor internal political instability, nor any other state of emergency – can serve as a justification for torture. None. Never. Against no one.

And here it is worth recalling two circumstances that are forgotten in the heat of popular vengeance.

First, the person who was tortured in the SIZO had not been convicted. No verdict has been rendered against him. He is a suspect, nothing more. The presumption of innocence is not a formality for advocates’ speeches, but a load-bearing element of the entire edifice of law.

Second – and this is fundamental – even if a verdict is rendered, even if guilt is fully proven, this in no way justifies torture. A convicted murderer, rapist, torturer – all of them retain the right not to be subjected to torture. Not because they “deserve” it, but because the prohibition of torture protects not them – it protects us. It protects the very idea of human dignity, which cannot be taken away for any guilt. A society that agrees to torture “villains” very quickly discovers that the circle of “villains” expands, and that who falls within it is decided not by a court.

“AND IMAGINE WHAT THEY DO TO THE REST”

And the final, coldest thought. The acts permitted against the TCC employee were carried out languidly, openly, without concealment, with absolute cynicism – so much so that they were filmed on video. If such things are done for show, without hiding, to a person whose case is guaranteed to become public – imagine what is happening within the walls of that same Odesa SIZO to those whose names no one will ever learn. To those for whom there is no one to stand up. To those whose humiliation no one will film on a phone and post online.

This is precisely why this case is so important. It is not an exception, but an indicator. It shows not that a cruel “overseer” has appeared in one block, but that an entire system tolerates, uses, and tacitly approves torture – on condition that the victim is the “right” one.

THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE: A MACHINE OF BUREAUCRATIC BRUSH-OFFS

I did not confine myself to observations. I addressed the authorities – the State Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Odesa regional and district prosecutor’s offices, the Ministry of Justice, the SIZO institution itself, and the relevant interregional directorate – with a consolidated request and a statement concerning possible criminal offences in the conditions of the Odesa SIZO.

What did I receive? Brush-offs. In their purest, laboratory-pure form.

The Office of the Prosecutor General forwarded my statement “by territorial jurisdiction” to the Odesa regional prosecutor’s office – and notified me of this. By another letter the OPG forwarded the appeal “by competence” and kindly explained that I could appeal the actions of the investigator or prosecutor under the procedure of Articles 303–310 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Khadzhibey district prosecutor’s office of the city of Odesa forwarded my information requests further on and separately noted that it “is not the proper holder of the requested information.”

Not a single body said, “Yes, we are looking into this, here is what has been done.” Each one said, “This is not quite for us” – and redirected it further round the circle. A torture complaint is passed between instances like a hot potato, until it cools down and gets lost.

Here it is, the institutional cover of that same legitimisation. Society approves torture from below – and the state evades reacting from above. Both lead to the same point: impunity. And the impunity of torture is not a side effect. It is, according to the entire case-law of the ECtHR and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), a separate and self-standing violation, because it is precisely impunity that makes torture systemic.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: ON THE PRESENT, TO WHICH NO ONE PAYS ATTENTION

I do not wish to write at length in this post about the absolute prohibition of torture as a legal doctrine – it is obvious enough to anyone willing to see it. I want all the experts, civic associations, civic initiatives, and organisations that speak about human rights every day to finally reflect on what sounds mundane today and to which no one pays attention.

The lowering of the threshold of torture and the maximal, absolute heightening of tolerance toward torture have already become our present. The Odesa case is merely an example, a litmus test, a flash that for a moment lit up the abyss.

The most terrible thing about torture is not the act of violence itself. The most terrible thing is the moment when society begins to approve of that violence. When “never, against anyone” quietly turns into “permissible, if he deserved it.” Because after that, the question is no longer whether there will be torture. The only question is who will be the next to be deemed to have “deserved” it.

The true scale of the problem is difficult to overestimate. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, as of early 2026 there were 1,401 criminal proceedings concerning torture pending, of which 704 were opened in 2025 alone (Hlavkom, 2026). At the same time, only a small fraction of cases reach trial: over the entire period from 2022 to 2025, suspicion notices were issued to 56–67 persons per year, while the number of indictments sent to court was significantly lower (Yagunov, 2026). These figures, taken on their own, attest to a systemic crisis in the criminal prosecution of torture.

The onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022 caused a sharp statistical drop in registered crimes of this category — to 68 cases — not because torture had diminished, but because a large share of incidents occurred in occupied or frontline territories where any documentation was virtually impossible (Yagunov, 2026). In subsequent years — 2023–2025 — figures recovered to 94–124 cases per year, consistent with the pre-war baseline, yet far below the actual number of incidents.

The true systemic problem lies not only in the acts of torture themselves, but in the algorithmic inefficiency of their prosecution. The ECtHR, in the case of Afanasyev v. Ukraine, had already established that Ukraine not only applies torture but effectively fails to punish it (Hlavkom, 2026). That verdict has not become obsolete — it is confirmed annually by new scandals, fragile convictions, and the impunity of uniformed torturers.

This review covers the most prominent specific cases in three categories: torture in National Police units, torture in the penitentiary system, and torture in Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres (TRC/SSC). Each case is analysed according to a uniform scheme: date and circumstances of the event, description of documented acts, response by authorities and society, suspicion notices issued, and the fate of the case in court.

SECTION I. TORTURE IN NATIONAL POLICE UNITS

The Kaharlik Case: Rape and Torture at a Police Station (2020–2026)

Although the underlying events occurred in May 2020, the Kaharlik police officers’ case became a litmus test for the state of police reform precisely during our study period — owing to its judicial resolution in 2023–2026.

Description of events. In May 2020, at the Kaharlik District Police Department of Kyiv Oblast, two officers — an investigator and the head of the criminal police sector — detained a woman suspected of involvement in a crime. Over an extended period they inflicted grievous bodily harm upon her, applied electric current, handcuffed her to a radiator in the corridor, transported her outside the city in the boot of a car, and raped her. In September–October of the same year, male detainees who had been subjected to torture stated that investigators had also transported them outside the city in car boots and tortured them with electric shocks to extract confessions of theft (LB.ua, 2026; NV, 2026).

The public outcry was unprecedented. The case became a symbol of post-Soviet police violence within the ‘reformed’ police service. The Office of the Prosecutor General placed the case under direct supervision. Both officers were dismissed and taken into custody.

On 24 May 2023 the Kaharlik District Court delivered a guilty verdict: both defendants were sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment under a combination of charges — torture (Art. 127), unlawful deprivation of liberty (Art. 146-1), and rape (Art. 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) (Hlavkom, 2023). In November 2024, the Kyiv Court of Appeal upheld the sentence (OBOZ.UA, 2024). On 19 February 2026 the Supreme Court of Ukraine definitively confirmed the conviction, drawing a line under 5.5 years of the victim’s judicial struggle for her rights (NV, 2026; LB.ua, 2026). The case became one of the rare examples of torture by police officers being prosecuted to a final, enforceable guilty verdict.

Torture at a Kharkiv Police Station: Sexual Violence to Obtain a Confession

Although this case came to public attention in 2021, its investigative and procedural context spans the study period.

A deputy head of one of Kharkiv’s police divisions detained a man suspected of murder and brought him to the station. For over an hour, officers struck the detainee on the head with a plastic water bottle. The deputy chief then put on rubber gloves and applied sexual violence — squeezing and pulling the victim’s genitals. Unable to endure the torture, the man confessed to killing his acquaintance. The court remanded him in custody, but he secured his release from the pre-trial detention facility and declared his innocence (SBI, 2021).

The SBI issued a suspicion notice to the deputy head of the police division for torture involving sexual violence. The case attracted wide attention owing to the striking resemblance of the ‘interrogation’ methods to Soviet-era militia practices.

Vinnytsia: Torture to the Point of Clinical Death over Suspected Petty Theft (September 2023 – February 2026)

This case is one of the most thoroughly documented examples of police violence in our study period, encompassing all stages — from the crime to the judicial proceedings.

In September 2023, three Vinnytsia police officers were checking information concerning a man’s possible involvement in the theft of a bag containing documents and bank cards. Late at night they brought him to a duty room and commenced what amounted to the ‘beating out of a confession.’ Throughout the night, officers delivered multiple blows with fists and a rubber baton, mostly to the abdomen. The beatings were accompanied by systematic psychological pressure aimed at breaking the person’s will and forcing him to confess. As a result of the torture, the victim sustained multiple severe injuries to internal organs, suffered intra-abdominal haemorrhage, and underwent clinical death — cardiac arrest on the operating table. His spleen was removed (SBI, 2026; TSN, 2026).

Information about the incident only became public in January 2026 — more than two years after the crime itself — when the SBI and the Office of the Prosecutor General released details of the case.

In January 2026, three police officers were served with suspicion notices for torture committed by a group of persons involving a state official, and for the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm. Two suspects were placed under house arrest; regarding the third, who had already left the police service, the question of issuing a suspicion notice was being resolved. In February 2026 the case was referred to court (OGP, 2026; Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 2026). A key concern: between the act of torture (September 2023) and the issuing of suspicion notices (January 2026) more than two years elapsed. During this time the victim remained without official victim status in a torture case.

SECTION II. TORTURE IN THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM

Findings of the Ombudsman’s Office: Special Report 2024

On 2 May 2024 the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights of Ukraine published a Special Report ‘On the State of Affairs Regarding the Prevention in Ukraine of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment in 2023’ (Ombudsman, 2024). The document recorded alarming trends that characterised the penitentiary system during the period of martial law.

As of 31 December 2023, 44,024 persons were held in 148 penal institutions and pre-trial detention facilities, compared with 42,726 in 2022. In parallel, 29 penal institutions located in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remain non-operational (Ombudsman, 2024).

The report documented numerous acts of violence by staff against convicted persons and persons held in custody: beatings with hands, feet, and rubber batons; compulsion to perform physical exercise to the point of exhaustion; threats of sexual violence. Particular concern was raised by the situation of persons sentenced to life imprisonment, who are confined to their cells for 23 hours a day and spend their one-hour exercise period in a cramped cubicle (Focus, 2026; Ombudsman, 2024).

According to data from the Department for the Execution of Criminal Sentences, in 2024–2025 only isolated criminal proceedings under Part 3 of Article 127 of the Criminal Code were opened against institutional staff — 1 in 2024 and a few in 2025 (Pravo.Ua, 2026). This statistical picture is strikingly understated relative to the actual situation, attesting to systemic latency of violence in penitentiary facilities.

ECtHR Judgment: Chornodubravskyy and Others v. Ukraine (2026)

In 2026 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in the case of Chornodubravskyy and Others v. Ukraine concerning 12 applicants. The Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention owing to cell overcrowding, absence of sanitary conditions, lack of access to showers and fresh air in Ukrainian pre-trial detention facilities (Pravo.Ua, 2026). This judgment continues a long series of analogous ECtHR verdicts, including the case of Sukachov v. Ukraine (2020), and confirms the systemic nature of violations in the domestic penitentiary system.

Statistical Overview (2022–2026)

Aggregating available data, as of early 2026 courts had delivered only 20 final convictions in cases of torture by law enforcement officers — across the entire observation period (Hlavkom, 2026). Police officers feature most frequently in such proceedings, accounting for approximately three-quarters of all suspicion notices. Penitentiary staff rank second, accounting for at least 36 cases in 2025 (Hlavkom, 2026). Meanwhile, researchers note that registered data for 2022–2025 are significantly understated, since they cover only incidents that occurred on government-controlled territory where investigation is possible (Yagunov, 2026). The actual number of torture incidents — in police stations, prisons, and especially in TRC facilities — remains unknown.

SECTION III. TORTURE IN TERRITORIAL RECRUITMENT AND SOCIAL SUPPORT CENTRES (TRC/SSC)

Systemic Violence as a ‘New Front’: The General Picture, 2023–2026

With the onset of large-scale mobilisation in 2023, a new wave of scandals connected to violence inside TRC/SSC facilities came to public attention. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights recorded that in 2022–2023 more than 500 applications were received from citizens regarding rights violations during mobilisation. In 2024 this number increased sixfold — to 3,312 complaints — and in 2025 it reached 6,127 applications (UNIAN, 2026). In total, over 2022–2025 the Ombudsman received nearly 12,000 complaints about TRC actions.

Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets described mobilisation in 2025 as the ‘most acute issue’ his office had faced, emphasising that ‘Ukrainian citizens must feel protected within TRC/SSC premises, not the opposite’ (RBK-Ukraine, 2026). The SBI characterised combating torture in TRCs as one of its ‘priority areas,’ noting: ‘Such actions are inadmissible, especially under martial law, and undermine public trust in state institutions’ (SBI, 2026).

Ternopil: Video Recording of the Beating of Conscripts at a TRC (October 2023 – May 2026)

On 7–8 October 2023 footage of the beating of conscripts — recorded the previous day — circulated online. Criminal proceedings were opened the following day. A verdict was delivered in October 2026 (Zaxid.net, 2026; Radio Svoboda, 2023).

On the evening of 6 October 2023, a grenadier soldier from the TRC security section, together with other service personnel, stopped a local resident in central Ternopil for a documents check. The man was brought to the TRC. In footage covertly recorded and subsequently published on social media, two servicemen are seen brutally beating two men lying on beds; pleas not to be beaten are audible. One victim sustained medium-severity bodily injuries; the other sustained minor injuries (SBI, 2024; NV, 2024).

The video provoked wide public reaction. Ombudsman Lubinets personally announced an inspection, writing on Facebook: ‘Ternopil. I saw footage from the media and social networks showing the beating of conscripts. This must not happen!’ (Radio Svoboda, 2023). The Ternopil Specialised Prosecution in the Defence Sphere of the Western Region opened criminal proceedings. On 13 October 2023 a court imposed night-time house arrest on two suspects — the section commander and the grenadier soldier.

In early 2024 the accused returned to work at the TRC pending the conclusion of the trial. The case was substantially delayed, and several witnesses had left the country. On 20 May 2026 the Ternopil City-District Court delivered its verdict: both defendants pleaded guilty and received 1-year suspended sentences and a fine of UAH 850. In determining the sentence the court took into account the defendants’ combat record, the presence of children, their sincere remorse, and documented donations of UAH 50,000 each to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Zaxid.net, 2026). This verdict became a symbol of impunity in cases of violence at TRCs: the minimal punishment for a documented and publicly circulated brutal beating proved so disproportionate to the social harm caused that the case triggered a fresh debate on judicial independence in cases against members of the security forces.

Verkhovyna TRC (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast): Systemic Torture and Extortion (November 2025 – May 2026)

Following verification of complaints from citizens and members of parliament regarding beatings, torture, and extortion of money at one of the Prykarpattia TRCs, the SBI launched an investigation. It established that a lieutenant-colonel, deputy head of the Verkhovyna District TRC/SSC, had systematically humiliated and beaten conscripts. One victim — a service member — publicly spoke out about the violence. The investigation established that at least four subordinates of the lieutenant-colonel were involved in the beatings (Suspilne Ivano-Frankivsk, 2026). On 21 November 2025 the lieutenant-colonel was detained and remanded in custody. The SBI noted that after media publications and official appeals, an increasing number of victims began contacting law enforcement. In January 2026 another subordinate of the lieutenant-colonel — a serviceman from the security platoon involved in the beatings — was detained. The actions of the commander and three subordinates were classified as torture committed by a state official. The court remanded all persons charged in custody without the right to bail. On 18 May 2026 the SBI referred the indictment to court (Podrobnosti, 2026; Leopolis News, 2026). On 29 May 2026 a preparatory hearing took place at which the second victim appeared for the first time; the court granted an application for panel adjudication (Pravda.If.Ua, 2026).

Ternopil (Second Episode): Torture at a TRC with Fluoroscopy and Organ Removal (2025–2026)

The SBI conducted an inspection in response to citizens’ complaints of beatings, torture, and extortion of money at one of the district TRCs. At least two criminal episodes were established. In the first, the victim was beaten for refusing to undergo a fluoroscopic examination: initially in the corridor of a hospital, then on TRC premises. In the second, servicemen forcibly detained a man; the commander personally delivered blows; tear gas was deployed; the victim lay on a concrete floor. As a result of the injuries sustained, he underwent complex surgery involving the removal of one of his organs (Leopolis News, 2026; Focus, 2026). Suspects were served with suspicion notices in November 2025 and January 2026. Following media publications, the number of victims approaching law enforcement increased.

Kharkiv TRC: Torture and Shooting, Extortion of Money (April 2026)

The SBI issued suspicion notices to a group of servicemen from one of Kharkiv’s district TRCs, as well as to servicemen from other units who had acted in concert. Among those charged was a major of the TRC who held a commanding position and organised the actions of the accomplices. According to the investigation, the group extorted money from individuals and, in cases of refusal, resorted to violence and threats. Shooting episodes were also recorded in the case. Suspicion notices were issued for torture committed by prior conspiracy by a group of persons (SBI, 2026; Hlavkom, 2026). The pre-trial investigation was ongoing, with prosecutorial supervision exercised by the Kharkiv Specialised Prosecution in the Defence Sphere of the Eastern Region.

Mykolaiv: TRC Officer Suspected of Beatings (January 2026)

On 8 January 2026 the SBI issued a suspicion notice to an officer of one of Mykolaiv’s district TRCs for beating and humiliating conscripts (Hlavkom, 2026). The SBI reiterated that ‘combating torture is one of the Bureau’s priority areas’ and that such actions ‘undermine public trust in state institutions’ (SBI, 2026).

Kyiv Oblast: TRC Officer for Beating and Humiliation (February 2026)

On 3 February 2026 the SBI detained and served a suspicion notice on the head of the civil-military cooperation support group of one of the Kyiv Oblast district TRCs for beating and systematic humiliation of conscripts (SBI, 2026). The case demonstrates that violence at TRCs is not a local anomaly but a widespread practice across different regions of the country.

Rivne TRC: Beating with a Bat and Corruption (May 2025)

In May 2025 the SBI issued additional suspicion notices to the former head of the Rivne District TRC. Initially criminal proceedings had been opened against him for beating one of his subordinates with a bat. During a search, narcotics were discovered. A further charge concerned assisting persons in evading mobilisation: ‘The official created conditions enabling certain conscripts to avoid mobilisation’ (ArmyInform, 2025). This case illustrates the typical ‘compounded corruption’ of TRCs: violence combined with corrupt schemes to evade service.

Dnipro: Beating at TRC, Video on Telegram (August 2025)

On 8 August 2025 a Telegram channel published footage apparently showing the beating of a former serviceman by Dnipro TRC employees. The Dnipro Specialised Prosecution in the Defence Sphere immediately registered criminal proceedings (Donbas Patriot, 2025). The case is instructive: footage in public messaging applications became the primary ‘trigger’ for opening proceedings.

SECTION IV. STATISTICAL DIMENSIONS AND SYSTEMIC CONCLUSIONS

Quantitative Picture, 2022–2025

According to official data of the Office of the Prosecutor General as of early 2026 (Hlavkom, 2026), the total number of criminal proceedings regarding torture currently pending is 1,401, of which 704 were opened during 2025. The number of persons served with suspicion notices was 56 in 2022 and 67 in 2025; 41 indictments were referred to court in 2025. The total number of final guilty verdicts over the entire study period is 20. These indicators demonstrate an extremely low rate of criminal prosecution effectiveness: of more than 1,400 proceedings opened, only 20 resulted in a final conviction — a ‘verdict-to-proceeding’ conversion rate of less than 1.5%.

Structural Causes of Impunity

Analysis of the documented cases reveals several systemic factors that perpetuate the impunity of torture in Ukraine even in conditions of prolonged human rights advocacy and declared reforms.

First, protracted investigations. In the Vinnytsia case, more than two years elapsed between the act (September 2023) and the suspicion notice (January 2026). In the Ternopil TRC case, between the video (October 2023) and the verdict (May 2026) — almost three years. Procedural delay exhausts victims and increases the risk of evidence loss.

Second, disproportionate penalties. The verdict in the Ternopil TRC case (a 1-year suspended sentence and a UAH 850 fine for a documented and filmed brutal beating) plainly demonstrates that courts do not always adequately assess the social danger of torture committed by state officials.

Third, fear and latency. The Ombudsman’s Office, the SBI, and independent researchers unanimously indicate that the actual number of torture incidents is many times higher than the registered figure. Victims fear repeated persecution, lack confidence in the system’s effectiveness, and under conditions of martial law may find themselves in a state of dependency on the very structures that abused them (Yagunov, 2026).

Fourth, institutional loyalty. The return of the accused in the Ternopil TRC case to their workplaces before the verdict became enforceable, justification on circumstantial grounds, and similar practices — all attest to the fact that certain institutions continue to protect ‘their own’ and resist external oversight.

Fifth, the systemic character of violence at TRCs. The increase in complaints from 500 in 2022–2023 to 6,127 in 2025 (UNIAN, 2026) signifies not only a greater willingness of people to complain, but also a genuine spread of violent practices in the context of large-scale mobilisation.

CONCLUSIONS

This documentary review of the most prominent cases from 2022–2026 paints a grim picture of systemic violence and corporate impunity within Ukraine’s key security institutions. The police, the penitentiary service, and the TRCs — three separate agencies with no organisational connection — demonstrate identical patterns of behaviour: the application of physical pain to obtain a desired result (confessions, compliance, money); minimisation of the risk of accountability; and loyalty of leadership towards subordinate torturers.

The reform of the SBI that is under way and the increased activity of the defence-sphere prosecution are positive signals. However, without overcoming systemic impunity — through strengthening judicial independence, legislative reinforcement of the inevitability of punishment for torture, and genuine functional parliamentary and public oversight — any reforms will remain cosmetic.

Ukraine has assumed obligations before the Council of Europe, the ECtHR, and, potentially, towards its future EU membership. Fulfilment of those obligations requires not merely a statistical increase in the number of suspicion notices, but the genuine punishment of torturers — irrespective of their rank and institutional affiliation.

REFERENCES

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NV (New Voice of Ukraine). (2024, November 4). The torture and rape case at Kaharlik Police Station — court dismissed appeal by former officers [in Ukrainian]. https://incident.obozrevatel.com/ukr/crime/sud-vidhiliv-apelyatsiyu-kolishnih-politsejskih

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Active digitalisation, the advancement of AI and recent geopolitical dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have intensified the issue of crime-related hybrid threats and the appropriate legal responses [1; 9; 12].

EU states are increasingly facing forms of criminality that are taking on hybrid patterns: from the smuggling of conscripts and weapons triggered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to interference in domestic political and economic processes through disinformation campaigns and illicit financial flows. The escalation of hybrid threats serves as a catalyst for legal transformation within the EU, given the public demand for security (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Seventh Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Security Union Strategy and Annex, COM (2024)). However, the imperative of security, which requires flexibility and rapid adaptation, often conflicts with the law, traditionally focused on stability, consistency and proceduralism.

In response to the growing threats, states continually seek a balance between repressive and preventive countermeasures commensurate with the danger dimension. Nevertheless, there is a noticeable lag in social and legal control over organised crime, particularly considering its trends of transnationalisation. Governments are constrained by regulatory, linguistic, and jurisdictional barriers, the temporality of law, and diplomatic procedures. Criminals, as a rule, do not face such obstacles and actively exploit legal gaps. Under these circumstances, states tend to use security instruments that deviate from the classical approaches to counteraction based on principles of the rule of law more often.

The prioritisation of security facilitates the emergence of the “rule of security”, which can be defined as a legal paradigm in which security becomes the primary normative axis, displacing or marginalising traditional rule of law principles, particularly in response to non-traditional (hybrid) criminal threats. The “rule of security” gives rise to the ambivalence of security: as a legal category, security can both guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens and restrict them under the pretext of ensuring public order, safeguarding national security or protecting state interests. The issue reflects a broader trend of securitisation in law, which, without critical reflection, risks undermining the foundation of legal legitimacy of crime counteraction.

The phenomenon of securitisation has received considerable attention in political and social sciences [3; 13; 14; 15], including reasonable criticism [2; 11], however, its legal implications in the field of crime prevention remain insufficiently explored.

The concept of the “rule of security” has not yet been systematically doctrinally elaborated in legal studies, although practices in the criminal justice sphere aligned with it are becoming increasingly common.

In particular, numerous contemporary regulatory changes are driven by the implementation of advanced technical security measures. Modern artificial intelligence systems, capable of analysing vast amounts of data, enable the prediction of crime probability in specific regions or based on particular characteristics. Consequently, the paradigm of crime control is shifting: law enforcement is increasingly taking on the nature of predictive control, which in turn raises concerns about a potential erosion of the presumption of innocence.

Moreover, international and regional standards, such as the UNTOC and the ECHR, coexist with national regulatory systems that may differ significantly in their strategies for balancing security and fundamental rights. In some jurisdictions, the boundaries between law, legal exceptions and arbitrariness are becoming increasingly blurred in the context of tackling serious crime.

Furthermore, there is a growing asymmetry in adherence to the rule of law and the effectiveness of security measures across different legal regimes, indicating the transition of emergent regimes to a state of regularity by the institutionalisation of emergency powers. The national margin of appreciation permitted under Article 15 of the ECHR (derogation in time of emergency) should be carefully monitored and framed to avoid abuse of the “rule of security”.

Among others, three areas (though not exclusively) should be highlighted, which illustrate the tension between the need to ensure security and the need to uphold the rule of law.

Firstly, given the digital transformation of organised crime [6; 7] and associated hybrid threats (the use of the dark web for trafficking in drugs, weapons and human organs, the use of crypto-platforms to evade economic sanctions, etc.), a shift in the battlefield towards the cyber space is observed. An increase in security pressure in the cyber domain is anticipated, posing risks to confidentiality, privacy and the protection of personal data.

Secondly, in the geopolitical dimension, there is a growing use of organised crime by certain states to achieve foreign and domestic policy objectives (North Korea, Iran, Russia) or for broader ideological objectives such as international terrorism.  State-organised crime [5] creates a peculiar conflict of interest or paradox, where the very institutions tasked with implementing international standards to combat organised crime are themselves part of the problem. Some studies point to a link between authoritarian processes and the growing risk of the abuse of international legal assistance institutions to persecute political opponents [10]. In effect, this constitutes a non-violent undermining of the rule of law from within.

Thirdly, legal measures to combat organised crime in conflict and post-conflict environments are manifestations of crisis management. In conflict-affected jurisdictions, emergency regimes such as martial law are often introduced, significantly restricting constitutional rights and expanding the discretion of security forces. Legislation to combat crime is adopted ‘in the heat of the moment’ or retrospectively without proper legal scrutiny. In post-conflict contexts, organised crime is closely intertwined with political structures, corruption networks and the shadow economy, rendering them even more fragile. Instead of effective reconstruction and the expected rule of law, what occurs is the ‘criminalisation of peace’ [4]. Weakened institutions and high levels of corruption create a security vacuum. In response, risks of the ‘securitisation of peace’ are mounting.

Combating serious and organised crime has transcended the traditional scope of criminal justice, becoming a key issue for safeguarding democratic and legal values. In this regard, it is necessary to reevaluate the extent to which contemporary legal mechanisms for responding to organised crime comply with the requirements of the rule of law, to examine the challenges that the “rule of security” poses to democratic institutions, and to consider what the legal ecosystem of security should look like in response to crime-related hybrid threats.

These developments reflect the growing need for a new legal architecture capable of functioning in conditions of non-linear change and “unstable normality”.  They also address the need of a model of adaptive, hybrid threat-resilient legal system that relies on institutional flexibility and transparency, maintaining its democratic nature even under the pressure of exceptional circumstances.

References:

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Cockayne, J. (2013). Chasing shadows: Strategic responses to organised crime in conflict-affected situations (Oslo Forum Papers No. 2). Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue & United Nations University. https://www.hdcentre.org/publications/chasing-shadows/

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Racoveanu, C. (2024). Artificial intelligence – A double-edged sword. Organized crime’s AI vs law enforcement’s AI. Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, 18(1), 507–517. https://doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2024-0044

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Tetiana Melnychuk is an Associate Professor at the Department of Criminal Procedure, National University “Odesa Law Academy” (Ukraine), holding a PhD in Law. Her academic and research interests focus on criminal procedural law. She is currently a Visiting Researcher at the University of Osnabrück (Germany), where she pursues comparative legal research in the field of criminal justice.

According to investigators, the scheme operated systematically. Owners of so-called “porn offices” – premises used for the illegal production and distribution of erotic and pornographic content through internet platforms – paid police commanders 20,000 US dollars per month. The intermediary retained an additional 5,000 dollars. In exchange, the officials undertook not to take any enforcement action, not to document violations, and to provide advance warning of inspections.

At least several documented episodes of money transfers were established: 45,000 dollars in February 2026, 25,000 dollars in April, and a further 25,000 dollars in May – at the moment of detention. Searches yielded a fleet of luxury vehicles, five Swiss watches, weapons, and cash in various currencies totalling over UAH 22.6 million. This is not a personal success story of the suspects. It is materialised impunity.

LEGAL QUALIFICATION

The actions of the police commanders were charged under Part 4 of Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine — receipt of unlawful benefit in an especially large amount by an official holding a responsible position, committed by a group of persons pursuant to a prior conspiracy. The sanction provides for imprisonment from eight to twelve years with confiscation of property.

The qualifying element of “prior conspiracy by a group of persons” is of fundamental importance. This is not a technical detail – it is evidence of the organised, rather than spontaneous, character of the corruption. The multiple documented episodes of money transfers point to an established criminal practice, not a one-off incident.

Separate attention should be paid to the atypical architecture of the criminal group: only commanders and a driver – i.e. the highest and lowest tiers – without an intermediate level. This either reflects a carefully constructed scheme of insulation, or signals that the middle tier has not yet been identified. This structural dissonance merits separate investigative attention.

OFFICIAL STATISTICS AS A MIRROR OF LATENCY: THE CRIME IT IS PROFITABLE NOT TO RECORD

An analysis of official police statistics concerning two core articles – keeping brothels and procuring (Article 302 of the Criminal Code) and pimping or inducing a person into prostitution (Article 303 of the Criminal Code) – reveals a stark paradox. Official data shows a steady decline in registered crimes against the backdrop of widely documented growth in the underlying practices. This is not evidence of a successful law enforcement system – it is an indicator of the system’s institutional interest in keeping this market segment invisible.

This is precisely why these categories of crime are traditionally classified as “ancillary” offences relative to human trafficking: their true scale is structurally absent from official statistics, because registration runs contrary to the interests of those tasked with registering.

The peak figures were recorded in 2014 – 509 registered crimes and 379 notices of suspicion. A sustained downward trend followed, with several characteristic deviations. In 2022, following the start of the full-scale invasion, only 61 crimes of this category were recorded – a reduction of 88% compared to the peak. In 2025 the figure stood at 54.

If interpreted literally, these data would suggest that the sexual services industry in Ukraine has virtually disappeared. Reality, as documented by investigative journalism, tells the opposite story: frontline cities have become regional hubs for sexual services, with clearly structured pricing – from 30–40 euros for a “massage” to 200 euros for trips to the combat zone. Demand has grown, the market has transformed, yet none of this appears in official statistics. Because it is profitable for other people in uniform.

The dynamics under Article 303 differ somewhat but follow the same logic. After notable growth in 2017–2018 (412 crimes — the maximum for the entire period studied), figures fall again: 195 crimes in 2022, 244 in 2024, 171 in 2025. The temporary increase in 2023 (348 crimes) can be explained by a partial restoration of law enforcement functions and the dislocation of criminal networks to safer territories, but by no means by any genuine increase in this type of crime.

LATENCY AS A STRUCTURAL PHENOMENON: CRIMES TURNED INTO BUSINESS

Crimes in the sphere of sexual services are classic examples of structural latency – a condition in which crime is systematically not recorded not because it is absent, but because its registration is contrary to the interests of law enforcement. Classical criminology distinguishes natural latency (the victim does not report) from artificial latency (law enforcement conceals the crime). In the case of the “porn-rent” corruption exposed on 20 May 2026, we are dealing with the second type – institutionalised and monetised.

The mechanism is simple and robust.

First, the victims and participants in such crimes have their own interest in avoiding police attention – they are either themselves administrative offenders, or they depend on “protection”.

Second, police commanders, receiving regular payments for “non-interference”, do not merely look the other way passively – they actively suppress any attempts by subordinates to document these violations. Official statistics reflect not the actual state of crime, but the result of this active filtering.

Consider the “suspicion rate” indicator – the share of registered crimes for which a notice of suspicion has been issued. Under Article 302, it fluctuates between 64.3% (2016) and 94.4% (2025). This means that those cases which do make it into the statistics are investigated with reasonable effectiveness. The paradox lies elsewhere: only a small fraction of actual crimes are registered – predominantly those arising from competitive conflicts between market actors.

The statistical collapse of 2022 – a drop to 61 registered crimes under Article 302 – is telling. It coincided not with the disappearance of the market, but with Russia’s full-scale invasion. Law enforcement resources were redirected, traditional “protection rackets” were partially disrupted. But the market was not. The Kramatorsk hub, described in detail by investigative journalists, emerged precisely as an adaptation to new geographical and social conditions.

QUANTITATIVE DIMENSION OF THE HIDDEN SCALE

The true extent of latency can be estimated by cross-referencing several indicators. According to research estimates, the latency coefficient for prostitution-related crimes ranges from 1:10 to 1:50 in various countries – meaning that for every registered crime, between 10 and 50 go unregistered. Even applying the conservative multiplier of 1:10 yields a picture sharply at odds with official data: if 54 crimes under Article 302 were registered in 2025, the actual number of such instances may have reached 540 to 2,700 per year.

These estimates are consistent with the demographic logic: Ukraine in 2025 has over 25 million residents in government-controlled territories, a significant proportion of whom are internally displaced persons – predominantly women in extremely precarious economic circumstances. The combination of large-scale demographic vulnerability and weakened institutional control is a classic environment for the expansion of an unregulated sexual services market. Official statistics do not capture this process – they capture the size of the corruption shield that conceals it.

A further indicator is the structure of the online market. According to market participants’ estimates, approximately 90% of online sexual services advertisements are fraudulent (scams), which itself evidences the broad presence of organised criminal groups in the online segment. Organised crime, oriented towards large-scale and systematic profit, requires systematic “cover”. This is precisely the corruption rent we observe in the case of 20 May 2026.

THE CORE THESIS: PROHIBITION AS A GENERATOR OF CORRUPTION RENT

The systemic bribery exposed on 20 May 2026 is not a consequence of the personal immorality of particular police officers. It is a direct and foreseeable consequence of the state’s prohibition on the legitimate operation of adult content online platforms.

Any prohibition of profitable but technically feasible activity in conditions of mass demand creates a rent space: the market moves underground but does not disappear. Platforms such as OnlyFans are publicly accessible without registration, operate around the clock, and any person can use them without any real restrictions from the state. The prohibition, in other words, is de facto non-operational and incapable of operation.

Instead, it creates a legal lever for coercion: since the activity is “illegal”, law enforcement officials acquire the monopoly power to decide – to prosecute or to “overlook”. This discretion converts into money. This is precisely how corruption rent arises – a regular payment for non-prosecution of that which the state formally prohibits but is factually incapable of blocking.

Here an entirely absurd paradox of public administration emerges. On the one hand, the state attempts to tax women engaged in such activity. On the other hand, it classifies this very same activity as a crime and prosecutes the same women criminally. The result is the creation of ideal conditions for unlimited police racketeering. Would such systemic bribery have occurred if the operation of such platforms had been legalised? Obviously not. The state itself created the conditions for the commission of these crimes.

The criminalisation of online erotic platforms, contrary to its declared objective of eradicating them, effectively pushes them deeper into the shadows – to a place where there is no legal oversight whatsoever, where women are left entirely unprotected, and where the preconditions for direct sexual exploitation arise. Law enforcement officials occupied with collecting corruption rent objectively have neither the time nor the motivation to combat genuinely dangerous forms of crime — trafficking, forced prostitution, child pornography.

THE SYSTEMIC DIMENSION

The intermediary in the scheme was the personal driver of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. This is not a peripheral detail – it is a structural node of the entire construction. A driver is a person with constant physical access to a senior official, with unrecorded informal contacts, and with the capacity to conduct a parallel business life in the shadow of an official status. The question that inevitably arises: how far does the chain extend? No public suspicion has been directed at the Deputy Minister himself, but the mere fact that his immediate entourage proved to be the hub of a multi-oblast corruption network raises obvious institutional questions that cannot be ignored.

The scheme covered three regions simultaneously. This is not a local phenomenon and not a coincidence. It is either evidence of centralised coordination through a single intermediary, or – even more worrying – a sign of a widespread market practice in which regional police commanders independently and separately enter the market for protecting illegal businesses.

The case unfolds in the context of a full-scale war, and this gives it a qualitatively different dimension. Regional police department heads are not merely administrators. They are officials with access to operational information, accounting systems, security chains, and contacts with the SBU and military administration. A person who takes bribes and is dependent on a criminal business is a vulnerability in the country’s security system. In wartime, this is not merely corruption – it is a threat to national security.

The statistical data presented above confirm the systemic, rather than episodic, character of this phenomenon. If “protection rackets” were an isolated deviation, we would observe chaotic fluctuations in the statistics. Instead, we see a smooth downward registration trajectory with a clear correlation to general system stresses (the 2020 pandemic, the full-scale invasion of 2022) — and rapid recovery thereafter. This is structure, not accident.

A REGULATORY ALTERNATIVE

It is necessary to move away from artificial moralising and to frame the question in its real dimension: what specific moral harm has the existence of the relevant web platforms inflicted on Ukrainian society – and what moral harm has their protection by police inflicted? The answer is obvious.

The legalisation and regulation of online sex platforms is not a moral choice. It is an anti-corruption strategy. Its logic is simple: lawful activity does not require protection from the police — it is protected by law. The rent space disappears, and with it the corruption incentive.

Regulation, rather than prohibition, makes it possible to protect the rights of industry participants, introduce age and consent verification, tax revenues, and refocus law enforcement resources on real crimes — trafficking, coercion, child pornography. To speak of prohibition and criminal prosecution of something that exists completely openly, that requires no registration and operates 24/7, is entirely absurd. The state has discredited itself through the exposure of this scheme.

Statistical analysis confirms this conclusion methodologically. If over 13 years official statistics show an unvarying decline in crimes in a sphere that is clearly not declining in reality – this is not a problem with the offenders. It is a problem with the legal model, which generates structural latency and corruption rent instead of genuine protection.

One can predictably expect that, once the initial resonance fades, yesterday’s moralists in uniform will begin to speak of the need for legalisation – precisely because their own system for protecting illegal businesses has proven vulnerable. Society should take note of those voices and verify whether real reformist will stands behind them.

CONCLUSIONS

This case is more than a criminal scandal. It is a mirror of a systemic crisis generated by the convergence of three factors: an artificial prohibition that creates a corruption market; the structural latency of crimes that serves this prohibition; and the absence of real internal oversight within the law enforcement system.

Statistical data for 2013–2025 testify not to the success of efforts to combat crime in the sphere of sexual services, but to a persistent and systemic practice of concealing it from registration. The 88% decline in registered crimes under Article 302 of the Criminal Code and the 58% decline under Article 303 occurred in conditions where actual market volumes, by all independent estimates, were not shrinking — and in certain sub-periods were growing. This is materialised latency.

The true test of intentions will not be the arrests, but the verdicts. Even more telling will be whether this case prompts a systemic review of oversight mechanisms for regional police commanders, or whether it remains another signal after which the system reverts to its customary state.

Without structural changes — decriminalisation of online platforms, audit of the internal oversight system, refocusing of law enforcement resources on serious crimes, and a methodological revision of approaches to measuring latent crime — the next such scheme will be only a matter of time. And society will again pay for it — in money, security, and trust in the state at its most critical hour.

The weapon used by the gunman was officially registered, and he himself held the relevant permits. According to journalists’ reports, the man turned out to be a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian Armed Forces – a native of Moscow with Ukrainian citizenship – who, according to some sources, had made donations in support of the so-called ‘special military operation’. According to preliminary information, he had already attacked people in the same shop three years earlier. Neighbours say he moved into the building at the start of the full-scale invasion.

These facts form a chilling picture, but our task is not to inflame emotions – it is to try to answer, calmly and honestly, the questions that this tragedy inevitably poses to society, the law enforcement system and the rule of law.

WEAPONS, LICENCES AND THE ILLUSION OF SAFETY

The first and most obvious conclusion that springs to mind is that this crime was committed using a legally registered weapon. This is not a mere detail but a fundamentally important circumstance that undermines one of the central arguments of those lobbying for the free circulation of firearms: ‘Legal Weapons = Safety’.

The debate over the liberalisation of the firearms market in Ukraine has raged for years, but it intensified particularly in the context of the full-scale war, when a section of society and a number of lawmakers began insisting on enshrining the right to bear arms in the constitution, citing the need for self-defence and patriotic duty. The tragedy in Korsun polarised society at the time: many people sympathised with the man who had used a weapon against law enforcement officers – which in itself is symptomatic and alarming.

The current case is fundamentally different. Here there is no ‘people’s avenger’ or ‘Korsun Robin Hood’, nor is there any hint of social conflict with the system. There is a retired lieutenant-colonel who shoots peaceful supermarket shoppers with a legally registered pistol. It is precisely this circumstance that should settle the debate: not ‘who’ commits the crime or what their ideology is, but the fact that Ukraine’s system for issuing firearms licences is structurally incapable of filtering out those who harbour hidden destructive intentions. Screening during the registration of firearms has proved futile. Previous attacks on people in the same shop did not lead to the licence being revoked. The system failed.

Here, however, we must refrain from oversimplification. The people’s right to resist tyranny remains a fundamental principle of constitutional theory and international legal tradition. The question is not whether a citizen has the right to defend themselves, but whether the state is capable of responsibly managing the circulation of weapons in conditions of hybrid warfare, social trauma and the psychological instability of the population. The answer provided by this tragedy is – not yet.

NEGOTIATIONS, DE-ESCALATION AND COMMUNICATION FAILURE

For around 40 minutes, negotiators attempted to establish contact with the attacker, but he did not respond. “He did not make contact. I did not hear him,” noted the head of the negotiation unit at the Kyiv National Police.

This is a key detail that requires separate analysis. Forty minutes is both a long time and a short time. For negotiators, this is a relatively brief period in tactical terms. But the very fact of a complete lack of any response from the attacker indicates not only his pathological determination, but also a fundamental problem: were these forty minutes used with genuinely professional techniques for engaging a person in crisis? Does our police force even have the necessary level of training for negotiators capable of working with people who have crossed a psychological threshold?

Today, a dangerous mindset prevails among some Ukrainian police officers: ‘Shoot First – Sort It Out Later’. This mindset has gained further momentum in a wartime environment, where violence is normalised and the right to use force is interpreted far more broadly than provided for by law and human rights standards. The Kyiv tragedy, like many before it, risks becoming not a catalyst for reform but a confirmation of this flawed logic. Meanwhile, the ECtHR consistently emphasises that when assessing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force, account must be taken not only of the actions of the perpetrators but also of all the surrounding circumstances – in particular, planning and control (Mikhalkova and Others v. Ukraine, para. 36; McCann and Others v. the UK [GC], para. 150). The legislative and administrative framework must clearly define the limited circumstances in which law enforcement officers may use firearms, and police officers must not be left in a state of uncertainty regarding these limits (Soare and Others v. Romania, para. 129).

The true measure of police effectiveness is the ability to resolve critical situations without resorting to lethal force. It is in this direction that modern policing is developing in democratic countries, where officers acquire skills honed over years in de-escalation, psychological influence and – only in extreme cases – the use of weapons. The ECtHR in Soare and Others v. Romania explicitly stated that the absence of clear rules and proper training explains the inadequate and autonomous actions of police officers in critical situations (para. 135). And in Celniku v. Greece, the Court held that Article 2 of the ECHR covers not only the direct actions of police officers but also staff training: if the level of training does not correspond to the complexity of the tasks at hand, the state bears responsibility.

NEUTRALISATION OF THE ATTACKER: ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE

Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated that KORD special forces carried out a raid and neutralised the attacker. During the assault, the perpetrator resisted law enforcement officers and opened fire on them.

In the acute phase of a crisis, when a person is actively shooting at police officers, the use of lethal force is formally justified even under the strict standards of Article 2 of the Convention.

The ECtHR, in cases such as McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, Nachova v. Bulgaria and Finogenov v. Russia, has consistently developed the criterion of ‘absolute necessity’: the state is obliged to prove that the person’s death was the result of force that did not exceed what was absolutely necessary in the specific circumstances. At the same time, as explained in McCann and Others v. the UK [GC] (para. 200), the use of force is justified only where the agents genuinely believed that opening fire was necessary and had subjectively sufficient grounds for doing so — rather than merely following orders.

The standard of ‘absolute necessity’ is stricter than the criterion of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under Articles 8 and 11 of the ECHR: force must be strictly proportionate (Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], para. 199; Kelly and Others v. the UK, para. 93). In a situation involving the rescue of a hostage from an armed criminal offering active resistance, these conditions may be met — but this still requires verification.

But this is precisely where the issue begins that most commentators prefer to sidestep. The state is obliged to conduct an effective independent investigation into whether there really was no other tactical option. Were all possibilities for a non-violent resolution of the situation exhausted? Was the timing of the assault correctly chosen? Is every shot fired by KORD officers documented and justified? The ECtHR in Al-Skeini and Others v. the UK [GC] (para. 163) and Armani Da Silva v. the UK [GC] (para. 233) clearly stated: the investigation must cover not only the immediate actions of those carrying out the operation but also the planning and control of the operation as a whole; it must be capable of establishing whether the use of force was justified. Any shortcoming that undermines this capability constitutes a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the ECHR. A telling example is the case of Finogenov and Others v. Russia (Operation ‘Nord-Ost’), where the Court found a violation precisely because of the incompleteness and bias of the investigation.

In the context of Ukraine during a full-scale invasion, a public demand for an investigation into the circumstances of the death of a man who had just killed six civilians sounds critically unpopular. But this is precisely the essence of the rule of law: Article 2 of the ECHR protects the right to life not only of the criminal’s victims, but also of the criminal himself. Without this principle, the entire human rights framework becomes a situational compromise of the majority, rather than a system of universal guarantees. Article 2 of the ECHR imposes a positive obligation on the state not only to refrain from the intentional deprivation of life, but also to take preventive measures to protect persons within its jurisdiction (Yuriy Illarionovich Shchokin v. Ukraine, para. 35). A general legal prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life becomes ineffective without an effective review procedure: this is precisely how the Court formulated it in Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC] (para. 249) and Al-Skeini and Others v. the UK [GC] (para. 163). Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus demonstrates that even a hostage rescue operation resulting in the death of a perpetrator may be deemed lawful – but only provided that planning was carried out with a view to minimising risk, negotiations were conducted rationally, and the operatives had clear instructions to use only proportionate force (para. 194).

Furthermore, there is a purely practical argument: a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian Armed Forces who had lived in Ukraine, made donations to the ‘SVO’ and ultimately carried out a mass shooting – this was a source of information of exceptional value to counter-intelligence. His motives, connections, possible handlers and funding channels could all have been established during interrogations. His elimination has permanently shut down that channel.

THE DANGER OF ‘SECURITY’ DISCOURSE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

This tragedy will inevitably give rise to legislative initiatives. Some will be aimed at tightening controls on the circulation of weapons — and this is justified and necessary. But others — and this is where alarm bells should ring — will use this incident to justify expanding the police apparatus, intensifying preventive surveillance and legalising ‘proactive’ operational measures.

This mechanism is well known in human rights practice: a terrorist attack or large-scale crime becomes a ‘window of opportunity’ for the state to expand its powers in areas where citizens would not normally permit such intrusion. Laws passed ‘in the heat of the moment’ are, as a rule, not repealed even after the shock has passed.

The right to private and family life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to the protection of personal data, the right not to be subject to preventive police surveillance without sufficient grounds – all these guarantees are under threat whenever society experiences a sudden surge of fear. The standard of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under Article 8 of the ECHR is less stringent than the criterion of ‘absolutely necessary’ under Article 2, but even this does not permit the state to introduce widespread preventive surveillance without individual grounds and judicial oversight. The task of the human rights community, the legal profession and the academic community is to ensure that a single tragedy does not become a justification for systemic restrictions on rights that will affect millions of people who have no connection whatsoever to the crime.

POLICE TRAINING

A dangerous trend that has long been brewing within the Ukrainian police has now gained new momentum: a readiness to use weapons before establishing the facts. The tragedy of 18 April risks becoming not a warning but a justification for this logic – and it is currently extremely difficult to assess the true scale of such a shift.

That is precisely why this case must serve as a compelling argument in favour of a systematic review of police training – but not in the direction of improving marksmanship or physical skills. We are talking about something fundamentally different: training officers in the art of communication, the ability to defuse tension in real time and the professional application of de-escalation techniques.

The true measure of the effectiveness of a modern police force is the ability to resolve critical situations without violence. The shift from a punitive model to one of dialogue and professional restraint is not romanticism but a practical necessity. This is where the future of Ukraine’s law enforcement system lies.

CONCLUSIONS

This tragedy presents a multi-layered challenge. For society, it is a call for restraint amidst emotional pressure and the temptation of simplistic answers. For legislators, it is a challenge to draft regulations that genuinely enhance safety without becoming instruments of punitive bureaucracy. For the police, it is a mirror in which they must see not their own heroism but their systemic shortcomings in training, de-escalation and tactical flexibility. For human rights defenders, it is a reminder that the protection of human rights cannot be conditional: either it applies to everyone, or it does not exist as a principle.

Six families are mourning their loved ones. This is an undeniable reality, and it takes precedence. But the appropriate response to these deaths is not a new wave of police aggression or a flurry of emotional legislation – it is a systematic, dispassionate and honest analysis of where the system failed, and how to fix it without losing our humanity.

Pre-war (2013-2021), Ukraine demonstrated consistent crime reduction, reaching a historic low of 321443 registered crimes in 2021, with approximately 50-54% suspect identification rates. The full-scale invasion immediately disrupted this trajectory. By 2025, registered crimes surged to 608191 – an 89% increase from 2021 – while suspect identification plummeted to 27,3%, creating an unprecedented justice gap with over 442000 criminal proceedings lacking identified suspects.

The war fundamentally transformed crime patterns. Criminality became significantly more rural, with rural crime increasing from 20% (2013-2021) to 32,3% (2025) of total crimes. The urban-to-rural crime ratio declined from 4:1 to barely 2:1, reflecting occupation-related crimes, abandoned property theft, and frontline zone criminality.

Crime categories showed varied impacts: property crimes initially decreased but fraud increased dramatically (from 23847 in 2021 to 82609 in 2023). Domestic violence crimes surged (from 4800 in 2021 to 8900 in 2024). War crimes exploded from 253 in 2021 to 62128 in 2022. Intentional homicides with firearms peaked at 909 in 2023 – 25 times the 2021 baseline. Paradoxically, despite weapon proliferation, some firearms crimes showed complex patterns rather than simple increases.

Human trafficking statistics revealed troubling gaps: despite 6,5 million refugees creating unprecedented vulnerability, registered cases remained low (105 in 2024), suggesting severe underreporting and possible law enforcement complicity.

The study demonstrates that while Ukraine maintained statistical transparency during existential crisis, institutional effectiveness collapsed under wartime pressures, creating dangerous impunity that threatens post-war reconstruction and rule of law.

The data reveal several significant patterns across the 2013-2025 period. While crimes committed with firearms indeed increased substantially in 2022, reaching 1929 incidents – a more than six-fold increase from the 2021 figure of 300 cases – this surge must be contextualised within Ukraine’s broader contemporary history.

Most notably, the 2014 figure of 2523 firearm-related crimes remains the highest recorded level in the dataset, exceeding the 2022 figure by approximately 31%. This 2014 peak coincided with the Maidan Revolution, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the initial phase of Russian military aggression in Eastern Ukraine, suggesting that periods of intense political upheaval and initial conflict onset may generate more pronounced spikes in firearm criminality than subsequent phases of sustained warfare.

The period from 2015 to 2021 demonstrates a consistent downward trajectory, with firearm-related crimes declining from 1526 in 2015 to the aforementioned historical minimum of 300 in 2021. This trend persisted despite the ongoing armed conflict in Donbas throughout this period, indicating that sustained conflict itself does not necessarily correlate with elevated firearm crime rates in government-controlled territories. The 2015 figure of 1526 crimes is particularly noteworthy as it occurred during active hostilities yet remained substantially lower than both the 2014 peak and the 2022-2023 figures, suggesting that the initial shock of conflict disruption may be more criminogenic than its continuation.

The 2022-2023 period shows elevated but plateauing figures (1929 and 1867 respectively), followed by a sharp decline in 2024 (832) and relative stabilisation in 2025 (821).

A particularly troubling dimension concerns the relationship between criminal proceedings (total numbers) and criminal proceedings with suspects. Throughout the entire period, notifications consistently lag behind reported crimes, but this gap becomes especially pronounced during peak crime years.

In 2014, while 2523 crimes were recorded, only 833 notifications were filed – a clearance rate of approximately 33%. Similarly, in 2022, the 1929 reported crimes resulted in only 517 notifications, yielding an even lower rate of roughly 27%.

This declining ratio between crimes and suspects raises serious questions about law enforcement agency (LEA) effectiveness during periods of crisis. Several hypotheses merit consideration: First, the wartime redeployment of police resources to military and security functions may diminish investigative capacity for ordinary criminal matters. Second, territorial displacement and population movement may complicate witness cooperation and evidence collection. Third, the saturation of the criminal justice system with conflict-related cases may create processing bottlenecks. Fourth, and most concerning from a rule-of-law perspective, the data may reflect decreased accountability during periods when institutional controls are weakened.

The 2021 data present an interesting counterpoint: 300 crimes with 251 notifications represents an 84% notification rate – the highest in the dataset. This suggests that in stable conditions with lower caseloads, Ukrainian law enforcement demonstrates significantly greater effectiveness in investigating firearm-related crimes. The dramatic erosion of this capacity in 2022-2023, when it was arguably most needed, represents a critical challenge for maintaining the rule of law during armed conflict.

The escalation of firearm-related intentional homicides in the context of armed conflict presents a stark illustration of how warfare fundamentally disrupts criminal justice systems and public safety. Police statistics reveal a dramatic transformation in the incidence of intentional homicides committed with firearms, particularly during periods of military confrontation. After reaching a historic low of 36 registered criminal proceedings in 2021, the number surged to 247 cases in 2022, coinciding with the onset of full-scale hostilities. This seven-fold increase marked only the beginning of a more severe crisis, as 2023 witnessed an unprecedented spike to 909 registered proceedings – representing a twenty-five-fold increase compared to the pre-war baseline and the highest level recorded throughout the entire observation period.

The 2023 peak demands particular scholarly attention, as it exceeds even the initial shock of 2014, when 320 cases were registered following the outbreak of armed conflict in eastern regions. While the 2014 spike reflected localised warfare’s immediate impact on violent crime patterns, the 2023 figures suggest a more comprehensive destabilisation of social order and law enforcement capacity across broader territories. The subsequent decline to 295 proceedings in 2024 and 187 in 2025, while substantial, nevertheless maintains firearm homicide rates at levels five times higher than the 2021 baseline, indicating that wartime conditions have fundamentally restructured the criminal violence landscape rather than producing merely temporary disturbances.

Equally significant is the widening gap between registered criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with suspects. In 2023, only 173 of the 909 proceedings resulted in suspect identification – a clearance rate of merely 19%, compared to 94% in 2021. This deterioration in investigative effectiveness reflects the profound challenges confronting law enforcement agencies operating under wartime conditions, including resource diversion to military objectives, territorial displacement of both victims and perpetrators, destruction of forensic infrastructure, and the general chaos that impedes witness cooperation and evidence collection. The persistence of low clearance rates in subsequent years (52% in 2024 and 64% in 2025) suggests that investigative capacity remains compromised even as overall crime numbers decline, raising concerns about long-term impunity for violent offenses and the erosion of rule of law foundations.

The dynamics of intentional grievous bodily harm committed with firearms reveal two distinct peaks over the observed period. While the 2022 surge (18 criminal proceedings, all with suspects) can be directly attributed to the full-scale Russian military invasion, the 2014 spike presents a more complex pattern. Despite the absence of full-scale aggression, that year recorded 25 registered crimes – the highest figure in the entire dataset – though notifications remained relatively low at 8. This discrepancy between 2014’s elevated crime registration and lower notification rates, compared to 2022’s parity between both indicators, suggests fundamentally different underlying dynamics. The 2014 spike likely reflects the initial phase of armed conflict in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, while the 2018-2021 period shows sustained low levels (1-5 cases annually). The post-2022 stabilisation at 14-16 cases indicates a new baseline shaped by ongoing military conflict, with notification rates now closely tracking registered crimes – a pattern absent in the 2014 crisis.

The Figure below demonstrates the number of aggravated robberies committed with the use of firearms and the number of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings from 2013 to 2025.

On the one hand, we can observe a significant increase in aggravated robberies committed with firearms compared to 2021, when the indicator reached its lowest point at 17 registered cases. On the other hand, police statistics for 2013-2017 demonstrate substantially higher numbers of aggravated robberies – even when Ukrainian society was not as deeply saturated with firearms as in 2022.

The 2014 peak of 411 cases coincides with the outbreak of military actions in Eastern Ukraine and the initial destabilisation of state institutions following the Maidan Revolution. The subsequent decline through 2021 suggests gradual improvement in both law enforcement capacity and social order despite ongoing hostilities in Donbas. Paradoxically, the full-scale invasion in February 2022, which dramatically increased firearm availability through military mobilisation and territorial defense forces, did not produce a return to pre-2018 crime levels. The relatively modest increase to 32 cases in 2022, followed by further decline to 11 cases in 2024, contradicts expectations that widespread weapon proliferation would necessarily correlate with violent property crime.

This inverse relationship between firearm saturation and armed aggravated robbery rates warrants further investigation into whether wartime social cohesion, enhanced informal social control mechanisms, or changes in criminal opportunity structures may be mediating factors in crime suppression during the full-scale invasion period.

The Figure below presents data on crimes committed with explosives and notifications in corresponding criminal proceedings from 2013 to 2025.

The data reveal two concerning trends.

First, after a decline from 2014 (112 crimes) to 2021 (20 crimes), explosive-related crimes have increased substantially: 63 in 2023, 86 in 2024, and 98 in 2025. Second, despite this rising crime rate, the proportion of cases with suspects has decreased dramatically. While notifications roughly corresponded to crime numbers in earlier years (e.g., 55 of 65 in 2013), recent years show a widening gap: only 14 notifications for 63 crimes in 2023, 18 for 86 in 2024, and 32 for 98 in 2025. This divergence suggests significant challenges in investigative capacity, indicating that the clearance rate for explosive-related crimes has fallen to approximately one-third of cases, raising serious concerns about law enforcement effectiveness in addressing this category of criminal activity.

The statistical trajectory of firearms-related crime in Ukraine between 2013 and 2025 reveals a pattern fundamentally shaped by two periods of acute conflict: the initial phase following the Maidan Revolution and Russian annexation of Crimea (2014-2015), and the full-scale invasion beginning in 2022. However, the official figures – showing 2523 registered firearms crimes in 2014, declining to 300 by 2021, then resurging to 1929 in 2022 and 1867 in 2023 – represent only the visible surface of a far more complex and troubling reality.

The inherent limitations of police statistics during wartime and post-conflict periods cannot be overstated. When state institutions are under existential threat, when territories remain contested or temporarily occupied, and when law enforcement resources are redirected toward immediate survival imperatives, criminal registration systems inevitably suffer degradation. The stark spike in intentional homicides with firearms in 2023 (909 cases – the highest figure in the entire observation period) suggests that even as overall firearms crime statistics began to stabilise, the lethality and severity of incidents continued to escalate. Yet these recorded cases likely represent merely a fraction of actual incidents, particularly in conflict zones where bodies may remain unrecovered, crimes unreported, and perpetrators unidentified.

The proliferation of military-grade weaponry throughout Ukrainian society constitutes an unprecedented security challenge. Unlike the civilian firearms that characterised crime patterns in peacetime, contemporary Ukrainian society is saturated with automatic weapons, explosives, and military equipment distributed to territorial defense units, police, and irregular formations. The tragic incident in Cherkasy region on January 27, 2026, where a murder suspect killed four police officers and wounded another during an arrest attempt, exemplifies the lethal potential of this arsenal when weaponry remains in circulation after demobilisation or falls into criminal hands. This case also demonstrates how former or active combatants, when pursued by law enforcement, may employ military tactics and superior firepower against police forces trained primarily for civilian policing rather than armed confrontation with military-trained adversaries.

Organised crime groups have proven remarkably adaptive in exploiting the chaos of wartime conditions. The availability of military and police uniforms, combined with genuine uncertainty about the legitimacy of various armed formations operating in Ukraine’s complex security landscape, creates opportunities for criminal enterprises to commit offenses under the guise of state authority. The blurring of lines between legitimate security actors and criminals wearing appropriated insignia represents a fundamental challenge to the monopoly on legitimate violence that defines functional statehood. When criminals can plausibly impersonate soldiers or police officers, public trust in security institutions erodes, victimisation becomes more difficult to report, and the psychological distance between military service and organised crime narrows dangerously.

Yet perhaps the most concerning dimension of Ukraine’s firearms saturation extends beyond immediate criminal justice challenges into the realm of long-term social pathology. The reintegration of hundreds of thousands of demobilised combatants – many bearing psychological trauma, habituated to violence, and possessing both weapons training and often access to weaponry itself – represents a generational challenge. As an example, the mentioned above murder of four police officers was comitted by an ex-militaryman. Post-traumatic stress disorder, moral injury, and the difficulty of transitioning from the intense purpose and camaraderie of combat to the often hollow meaninglessness of post-war civilian existence create fertile conditions for violence, substance abuse, domestic abuse, and suicide. While the majority of veterans will successfully reintegrate, research from comparable conflicts suggests that a significant minority will engage in criminal activity, domestic violence, or self-destructive behavior.

The convergence of these factors – statistical underreporting masking true crime levels, widespread availability of military weaponry, organised crime exploitation of institutional weakness, and a large population of potentially vulnerable veterans – suggests that Ukraine faces not merely a temporary spike in firearms violence but a structural transformation in its security environment. The 2024-2025 figures, showing some decline from 2023 peaks, may reflect either genuine improvement or simply reduced state capacity to document crimes during intensified conflict.