A few days ago, Vinnytsia hosted a meeting of the working group on harmonising the draft laws on civilian firearms with EU law. The discussion concerned the draft law “On the Right to Civilian Firearms” (Reg. No. 5708) and the draft law amending the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code (Reg. No. 5709). Both are to be aligned with Directive (EU) 2021/555 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons. The meeting was attended by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, a representative of the European Commission and representatives of law enforcement agencies.
The Deputy Minister cited statistics. Law No. 3899-IX entered into force on 25 November 2024 and for the first time introduced a mechanism for citizens to declare firearms they had found or received. Since then, almost 25,000 firearms and about 15 million rounds of ammunition have been declared in Ukraine. More than 22,000 citizens have declared weapons. These are not hunting rifles. They are predominantly military-grade weapons, including captured (trophy) weapons: according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), assault rifles make up the largest share of what has been declared. These are official MIA data. They are presented as a success. I propose reading them differently: as a warning and a reason to reflect on the future of statehood.
For the sake of precision: the most recent written data published by the National Police are slightly lower. As of 10 August 2026, 23,132 firearms and 14,063,441 rounds of ammunition had been declared. Therefore, wherever I discuss dynamics, I rely on the exact figures published by the National Police and the MIA.
Let us begin with the baseline for the calculations, because without it any per-100,000 indicator becomes manipulation. As of September 2026, there is no precise official figure for Ukraine’s population, and estimates diverge substantially.
According to Forbes analysts, approximately 30.5 million people live in the government-controlled territory, and about 35–35.5 million live within the internationally recognised borders. The IMF estimates Ukraine’s population in 2026 at 33.38 million. The highest figure comes from Worldometer, based on UN data: 39.5 million as of mid-2026. However, this figure includes the occupied territories and relies largely on pre-war methodology. A realistic range for the government-controlled territory is approximately 28–33 million, and demographers of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine point to the lower bound, around 29 million.
Therefore, all calculations below use a clearly defined baseline: 29 million people, the estimated population of the government-controlled territory. For pre-war 2021, a baseline of 37.5 million is used. This is the estimated population of the territory then under government control (excluding Crimea and the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), from which the crime statistics were drawn.
On this baseline, the picture is as follows.
Per 100,000 population, there are approximately 86 declared firearms and about 51,700 declared rounds. Using the exact National Police data as of 10 August 2026, the figures are about 80 firearms and about 48,500 rounds per 100,000 population. Approximately 76 people per 100,000 population have declared weapons, that is, fewer than 0.08% of residents.
If a different baseline is used, the figures shift, but the substance does not change. With a population of 28 million, the figure is about 89 firearms per 100,000. With 33 million, it is about 76. Under Worldometer‘s “pre-war” logic (39.5 million), it is about 63. The one-and-a-half-fold discrepancy between the extreme estimates speaks for itself: a state that does not know how many people live in it knows even less how many weapons those people have.
And there are a great many weapons. According to the National Police (April 2026), Ukraine has 812,000 registered owners of weapons and special means, who hold 1,166,001 items of such armament of various types. These are predominantly hunting, traumatic (less-lethal), gas and air weapons, and special means. On the 29 million baseline, this amounts to approximately 2,800 owners and about 4,020 items of legal armament per 100,000 population. Approximately 2.8% of residents, or one in thirty-six, have legal weapons or special means.
Everything declared since November 2024 amounts to only about 2% of the legal register. Yet it is fundamentally different weaponry: the register is dominated by hunting weapons, whereas the declared items are predominantly military-grade. The comparison is 23,132 items as of 10 August 2026, or 25,000 according to the figures announced in Vinnytsia, versus 1,166,001.
In August 2024, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs made public an estimate by European partners that citizens have held between 2 and 5 million unregistered weapons since 2014. In other words, there may be 1.7 to 4.3 times more illegal guns in civilian hands than legal items including special means (and even more compared with legal firearms alone). That is 6,900 to 17,200 per 100,000 population.
Against this background, the 25,000 declared items represent 0.5% to 1.25% of the estimated illegal arsenal. Tellingly, in April 2026 the National Police itself officially replied to a journalists’ request that it has no data on the approximate number of illegal (unregistered) weapons that may be in circulation in Ukraine. A state that is building a declaration policy admits that it does not know the size of what is being declared.
Now to the internal structure of the figures.
On average, there are 1.14 firearms per declarant. In the first year of the law’s operation, more than 13,700 people contacted the police to report found weapons, mostly in the frontline regions and Kyiv. By contrast, there are on average 600 rounds per firearm and about 680 per declarant. This is no longer a case of “found a rifle in a tree belt”. This is an arsenal designed for sustained firefights. Fifteen million rounds is enough to supply a military unit in combat, not for hunting or self-defence. And this is only what people themselves chose to show the state.
This ratio is not decreasing over time. It is growing. As of 1 March 2025, there were about 280 rounds per declared firearm (almost 4,700 items and more than 1.3 million rounds of ammunition). At the end of November 2025, there were about 510 (more than 15,000 items and 7.7 million rounds). As of 21 April 2026, about 570 (19,929 items and 11,385,497 rounds). As of 10 August 2026, about 610 (23,132 items and 14,063,441 rounds). Each firearm declared between April and August 2026 “brought” with it, on average, more than 830 rounds. From March 2025 to August 2026, the number of declared firearms grew roughly fivefold (4.9 times), while the number of declared rounds grew almost elevenfold (10.8 times).
Let us look at the pace. About 22 months have passed since 25 November 2024. On average, then, approximately 1,100 items are declared per month, or about 37 guns per day across the entire country.
However, the pace of weapon declarations is steadily falling. In the first three months, up to 1 March 2025, almost 4,700 items were declared, approximately 49 per day. From March to the end of November 2025, approximately 10,300 more were declared, about 38 per day. From the end of November 2025 to 21 April 2026, about 4,900 were declared, about 34 per day. From 21 April to 10 August 2026, 3,203 items were declared, about 29 per day, or fewer than 900 per month. Over a year and a half, the daily pace has fallen by approximately 40%. By contrast, the pace of ammunition declarations has barely changed since spring 2025, holding at 23,000–26,000 rounds per day. Fewer and fewer guns are coming in, but just as many rounds.
Comparing this pace with the estimate of the illegal arsenal produces another telling indicator. The current pace is about 29 items per day, or approximately 10,500 per year. At that rate, declaring even the lower bound of the estimate, 2 million items, would take approximately 190 years. Declaring the upper bound, 5 million, would take approximately 470 years.
Hence the first conclusion: declaration works as a goodwill filter. Those who declare are those who are law-abiding anyway. Those who intend to use weapons for criminal purposes will not come to the register. Therefore, the 25,000 have not been “brought out of the shadows”. They are simply “visible from the window”. Declaration statistics say nothing about the illegal market, about channels of leakage from the front, about resale via messaging apps, or about smuggling.
WHAT THE CRIME STATISTICS SHOW
Now to how this saturation with weapons is reflected in the official statistics on criminal offences committed with the use of firearms.
In 2013, 761 such offences were registered (587; here and below, figures in brackets indicate the number of proceedings in which a notice of suspicion was served). In 2014, they reached an absolute peak of 2,523, with a notice of suspicion served in only 833 proceedings, roughly one third. A prolonged decline followed, down to the historic low of 2021: 300 offences (251), meaning that suspicion was served in about 84% of cases. After the full-scale invasion, the number rose more than sixfold: 1,929 (517) in 2022 and 1,867 (459) in 2023. There were 832 (436) in 2024 and 821 (362) in 2025. In January–August 2026, 617 offences were registered (233). Annualised, this is approximately 925, which is 13% more than in 2025 and three times more than in 2021.
Recalculated per 100,000 population, the picture becomes even starker. In 2021, on a 37.5 million baseline, the rate was approximately 0.80 per 100,000. In 2025, on a 29 million baseline, it was approximately 2.83, and in 2026 (annual estimate) approximately 3.19. In other words, the increase is threefold in absolute numbers, while the 2026 rate per 100,000 population is approximately four times the 2021 rate.
Intentional homicides committed with firearms. The number rose from 36 proceedings (34) in 2021 to 247 (126) in 2022 and an unprecedented 909 in 2023. Of those 909, a notice of suspicion was served in only 173, approximately 19%. The figures then stood at 295 (154) in 2024, 187 (120) in 2025 and 111 (88) in January–August 2026. The 2025 level is more than five times the 2021 level in absolute numbers, and almost seven times higher per 100,000 population (0.64 versus 0.1).
Intentional grievous bodily harm committed with firearms. This is a small category, but a telling one. In 2021, there was one offence. From 2022, a new, higher level took shape: 18 in 2022, 14 in 2023, 14 in 2024 and 16 in 2025. In January–August 2026, there have already been 13, and annualised this will be the highest figure since 2014.
Criminal offences committed with explosives. The number rose from 20 (17) in 2021 to 31 in 2022, 63 in 2023, 86 in 2024 and 98 (32) in 2025, the highest figure since 2015. Per 100,000 population, this is more than a sixfold increase. At the same time, the share of proceedings with a notice of suspicion fell from 85% in 2021 to approximately 22% in 2023 and 21% in 2024.
Robbery with firearms is moving in the opposite direction: 17 in 2021, 14 in 2025 and only 3 in the eight months of 2026. Likewise, only 26 offences involving explosives were registered in January–August 2026. Annualised, that would mean a drop of approximately 60% compared with 2025.
WHY THESE FIGURES CANNOT BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE
At first glance, the official statistics are reassuring. After the shock of 2022–2023, armed crime has supposedly returned to a level well below 2014 and even 2015. But this interpretation does not withstand comparison with reality.
First, the different dimensions of weapons circulation. The illicit circulation of weapons should be assessed separately from the statistics on crimes committed with firearms. That indicator reflects the response to unlawful handling and manufacture of weapons. It does not show how many times weapons were used to commit other crimes.
Second, the discrepancy with the news record. In 2024–2025, approximately 820–830 armed crimes were recorded per year. That is almost half the number recorded in 2015 (1,526), when there was no army of nearly a million, no tens of thousands of captured guns, and no hundreds of attacks on staff of the territorial recruitment centres (TCC). 2026 opened with a series of explosive attacks on police in Lviv, Mykolaiv and Dnipro, the shooting of four police officers in Cherkasy oblast, and a shooting in Kyiv. Yet the official statistics record a decline in crimes with explosives and the near disappearance of armed robberies.
Third, the collapse in clearance rates. The share of proceedings in which a suspect was identified fell from 84% in 2021 to 25–27% in 2022–2023 for firearms crimes. For firearm homicides, it fell from 94% to 19% in 2023.
Fourth, the conflation with military events. In 2023, homicides accounted for almost half of all firearms crimes (909 of 1,867), compared with 12% in 2021 and 23% in 2025.
The conclusion here is not that the statistics are being falsified. The conclusion is that they are structurally incapable of reflecting the militarisation of everyday life. Relying on them alone means painting a dangerously optimistic picture.
THE POWDER KEG
And now to the main point. We have a society in which millions of people have gone or are going through war. They have acquired weapons-handling skills, experience of violence, trauma, fatigue and a deep distrust of institutions. We have, by estimates, two to five million unaccounted-for weapons, a number the police officially say they do not know. We have crime statistics that already record a rise in armed crime in 2026, even though they structurally understate its scale. We have a state that does not even know the size of its own population. We have a legal model built on temporary wartime rules: a declared weapon stays with the person until the end of martial law and must then be surrendered within 90 days. That means more than 23,000 guns and more than 14 million rounds are to be returned to the state all at once, at precisely the moment when the system will be most overloaded. Over 90 days, that is more than 250 items per day, almost nine times the current daily pace of declarations. And we face the inevitable moment when the war ends and hundreds of thousands of people return home with experience, with trauma and, often, with weapons.
The history of post-war societies shows that the danger posed by weapons peaks after a war rather than during it. When the common enemy disappears, weapons look for new targets. These become neighbours, family, competitors, officials, politicians. The criminal dynamics of the post-war period are a serious risk for which we must prepare. Let me stress this separately: the overwhelming majority of veterans reintegrate peacefully, and they are above all defenders of law and order, not a threat to it. The risk comes not from the veteran but from the environment to which he returns. That environment is saturated with weapons and lacks a firearms law, incentives to surrender weapons and adequate social policy.
Therefore, the political elites, like the entire population of Ukraine, are sitting on a powder keg. Not metaphorically, but literally. Beneath the seats in Kyiv and in the communities lie millions of rounds about which the state knows nothing, and tens of thousands of guns it knows about only thanks to the goodwill of citizens. Every week of delay in adopting the law, every new “revised version”, every working group without results brings closer the moment when this keg explodes. And it will explode not at the front but in the rear: in schools, at markets, in officials’ reception offices, on the streets.
Twenty-five thousand declared guns is not a success report. It is the visible tip of the iceberg. And those who make decisions today should finally understand: when the iceberg capsizes, the first to suffer will be those standing closest to its top.
