Andrii Chernousov: Children in War, or How Russia Kills the Childhood

The Russian Federation continues to involve Ukrainian children in the War violating numerous international standards and treaties.

Forced displacement of Ukrainian children remains widespread in territories that are temporarily occupied or under constant shelling. At the same time, there is still no single transparent algorithm or mechanism that allows Ukrainian children deported to Russia to be returned. Another pressing issue is the lack of a systematic state reintegration programme for returned children, which should provide long-term support and assistance to the child and their family.

Unfortunately, no significant changes have taken place in the context of deinstitutionalisation. The newly adopted strategy to ensure every child in Ukraine has the right to grow up in a family environment carries a significant risk of non-implementation due to a lack of state funding and often declaratory nature of the commitments made. The development of social protection in local communities also remains very slow. Some communities, especially those with small budgets, cannot afford to hire even one social worker or specialist for the children’s needs. At the same time, those communities that do have such specialists or even social service centres and child welfare services are also unable to fully perform their functions due to inadequate staffing levels and an increase in socially vulnerable groups.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines six grave crimes against children: murder or mutilation, recruitment or enlistment in the military, attacks on schools and hospitals, rape, abduction/transfer and denial of access to humanitarian assistance. Due to Russia’s massive shelling of Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, children are being killed and maimed. There is evidence of a physical and sexual violence against children in the temporarily occupied territories. Children are being militarised and recruited into the war, and Ukrainians are being deported to Russia.

As of December 2024, approximately, 737000 Ukrainian children are internally displaced persons as a result of the hostilities. Another 1,7 million are refugees, many of whom have been separated from their parents. As of 31 March 2025, 606 children have been killed, 1846 have been injured to varying degrees, and 19 cases of sexual violence against children have been confirmed.

As a result of targeted attacks, as well as indiscriminate attacks, Russian military troops are destroying intentionally residential buildings, schools, hospitals, sport courts, historical and cultural sites. Even after the War ends, it will be impossible to return to a significant number of cities, towns and villages, as the infrastructure there has been virtually destroyed.

In three years of full-scale War, 236000 residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed, including 209000 private homes, 27000 apartment buildings and 600 dormitories. More than 4000 educational institutions have also been destroyed or damaged, including 229 schools, 110 kindergartens and 97 universities. Hospitals, clinics and other medical facilities are regularly targeted. In total, 1554 medical facilities have been damaged, including 515 hospitals, and 465 outpatient clinics. 3921 cultural facilities, 399 religious buildings and 343 sports complexes have also been damaged. There have been attacks on energy infrastructure and water supply facilities, causing Ukrainians to experience problems with electricity, water and heat supply, as well as communications, which worsens the conditions for the care and upbringing of children.

Russia is actively using prohibited weapons on the territory of Ukraine against the civilian population. Such weapons cause more serious injuries and damage than other types of ammunition. Cluster munitions, phosphorus and thermobaric weapons, butterfly mines, etc. are particularly dangerous. Over the three years of the War, more than 6900 cases of Russian occupiers using ammunition containing dangerous chemicals have also been confirmed. According to the Mine Action Centre, about 30% of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, and more than 139000 km2 of land and 14000 km2 of water bodies need to be surveyed by demining units.

In the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, there is extensive evidence of the occupiers using civilian facilities as military headquarters and/or warehouses for military equipment and ammunition. In conditions where children are forced to attend schools and kindergartens in the temporarily occupied territories and, when necessary, visit medical facilities, this means that the civilian population is being used as human shields during military operations. It also means that the population has no proper access to medical, social and educational services, which only exacerbates the humanitarian crisis in these territories.

The Russian Federation continues to involve Ukrainian children in the War. In particular, Russian special services use mobile gaming applications and establish contact through social networks and messengers to recruit minors. Children are usually offered monetary rewards for performing various tasks, such as photographing the area, monitoring certain objects, posting advertisements, etc. For more serious tasks (delivering bags with explosives, setting cars on fire, etc.), psychological pressure and manipulation are also used. As of the end of March 2025, the prosecutor’s office had opened 173 criminal cases on the recruitment of Ukrainian children for subversive activities.

For example, in August 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine and the National Police detained two underage Russian agents who, on orders from the Russian Federation, carried out a terrorist attack in Zhytomyr on 5 August. The attack involved the detonation of a homemade explosive device in one of the neighbourhoods of the capital of the region.  One man was killed and another was hospitalised in serious condition. The investigation established that the attack was planned by a 17-year-old student at a local vocational school and her peer, who had been recruited by the enemy. Both came to the attention of the aggressor while seeking for money on Telegram channels[1]/

In addition, Russia continues to expand its network of so called ‘military-patriotic education’ programmes for young people in the Russian Federation and in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine with the aim of waging a long-term war against Ukraine and possible future armed conflicts with Western countries.

As of early 2025, Russian invaders had forced nearly 60,000 children from temporarily occupied settlements in the Luhansk region, about 1,800 children from the Zaporizhzhia region, and 45,000 children from Crimea to join propaganda military-patriotic movements. In just eight months of 2025, Russia took almost 11000 Ukrainian children to 164 institutions. Moreover, the programme in such camps is becoming increasingly militarised[2].

The militarisation of children is actively taking place from school age onwards. One example is last year’s publication of the first textbook for teaching drone operation in school labour classes for pupils in grades 8-9. Another example is the active manufacture of weapon parts for specific military units by pupils in schools in the Crimea.

Forced displacement remains widespread in territories that are temporarily occupied or under constant shelling. Children are often forcibly sent to ‘re-education camps’ in Russian-controlled territories, where propaganda and indoctrination are used to try to change their perceptions of their identity, Ukraine, and the course of the war. Children in such camps are forced to listen to the anthem and express support for Russia. Teenagers are often issued Russian passports, which makes it much more difficult for them to return home. The militarisation of boys and attempts to recruit them into the Russian army are also widespread. In addition, the conditions in which children are kept in such camps are unfit for human habitation. The Russians ignore the basic needs of children in terms of hygiene, medical care, adequate nutrition, etc.

According to statements by representatives of the occupation administrations, during the summer of 2024, 40,000 Ukrainian children were taken to ‘re-education camps’ as part of so called ‘Useful Holidays’ project. This is almost twice as many as last year. Children from the occupied territories went on propaganda trips to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don and Tula as part of the ‘Cultural Map 4+85’ and ‘Route for Youth’ programmes, ‘Route for Youth’ and ‘University Changes,’ and also took part in a series of ‘patriotic’ events, sometimes more than 8,000 kilometres from home.

As of March 31, 2025, Ukraine has confirmation of 19,546 deported Ukrainian children who were illegally taken to Russia, Belarus, and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The number of displaced children is likely to be significantly higher, but it is currently impossible to estimate the scale due to the lack of access to the temporarily occupied territories and the ongoing full-scale war. According to open sources cited by Russia, 744,000 children have been taken away. So far, joint efforts by civil society organizations and the government have managed to return 1,256 children.

A positive step towards preventing and returning deported Ukrainian children was the development of the White Paper “Protecting Children from Forced Displacement and Deportation” by the International Expert Group BringKidsBack UA. The book consistently debunks the Kremlin’s myths about so-called “evacuation” and, through international law, describes how the Russian Federation is systematically committing the crime of deportation and forced displacement of Ukrainian children. It strengthens Ukraine’s ability to develop effective international legal mechanisms for the return of abducted children and to ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration.

The regulatory framework for registering deported and forcibly displaced children in Ukraine has also been improved. In particular, in the fall of 2024, the Law of Ukraine “On the Registration of Information on Damage Caused to the Personal Non-Property Rights of Individuals as a Result of the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine” was adopted, which provides for the creation and functioning of a register of information on deported children.

The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1240 of October 29, 2024, which defines the mechanism for the creation, maintenance, and access to the Register of Information on Children Deported or Forcibly Displaced in Connection with the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and its use, came into force. An Interagency Commission on the Verification of Information on Children Deported or Forcibly Displaced in Connection with the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was established.

Furthermore, in October 2024, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Implementation Law No. 4012-IX in connection with the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and amendments thereto, according to which the deportation of children is now considered as genocide.

At the same time, there is still no single effective mechanism that allows Ukrainian children deported to Russia to be returned. The practice of returning children varies greatly – with the help of other countries, international organizations, through the offices of Ombudsmen, and often privately, when the parents or guardians themselves travel to the Russian Federation to pick up their children.

Another pressing issue is the lack of a state-run system for reintegrating kids who come back from the temporarily occupied territories, Russia, and Belarus, which should include long-term support and assistance for the kids and their families. Currently, there are only initiatives from the civil society sector to develop specific concepts for such reintegration in Ukraine, which include the involvement of social services, educational institutions, and the community as a whole in working with returned children. In fact, such children are currently cared for by the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights and involved civil society organizations, which, where possible, meet the children’s needs for humanitarian, psychological, social, legal, educational, and other types of assistance. At the same time, with a significant return of deported children, the existing practice of assistance will not be able to cope with the load. The state has to some extent become involved in addressing this problem with the adoption of the Procedure for the identification, return, support, and reintegration of children deported or forcibly displaced as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which requires that all returned children be placed exclusively in family-based care.

As of March 31, 2025, according to the Office of General Prosecutor, a total of 161,900 crimes of aggression and war crimes committed by the Russian Federation are under investigation in Ukraine. As of September 2024, about 4,000 criminal proceedings are related to crimes against children. The largest number of proceedings are in the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kherson regions. They concern cases of abduction and deprivation of liberty, forced deportation, and sexual violence. Fifty-four people have been notified of suspicion of war crimes against children. Investigations have been completed in 44 cases and the cases have been referred to court. Thirty-one war criminals have been convicted.

Among the positive steps taken, it is worth noting the pilot projects in the field of juvenile justice. In November 2024, a pilot project was launched in Ukraine to specialize judges in family and children’s cases. Its goal is to introduce child-friendly justice. Nearly 60 judges will undergo training. The pilot project is being implemented by the All-Ukrainian Public Center “Volunteer” in cooperation with the Civil Cassation Court within the Supreme Court and the Interagency Coordination Council on Juvenile Justice, with the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Ukraine. It is expected that the consideration of cases by specialized judges with in-depth knowledge of children’s rights and the age and psychological characteristics of children’s development will ensure the proper protection of the rights and well-being of every child who comes into contact with the justice system, considering their needs and life situation. It may also significantly speed up the consideration of the cases related to ensuring the right of the child to a family.

In addition, another pilot project initiated by the Interagency Coordination Council on Juvenile Justice, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, and the All-Ukrainian Public Center “Volunteer” with the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Ukraine has proven effective. Since autumn 2024, the project has been operating throughout Ukraine. It provides for the establishment of a register of psychologists who are involved in criminal proceedings involving children. The database greatly facilitates the search for the necessary specialists in the regions and ensures that the best interests of the child are respected during proceedings involving children.

Training for juvenile investigators remains essential, especially in relation to war crimes. Currently, there are almost no such investigators, and all law enforcement agencies are generally overburdened, with hundreds or even thousands of cases to handle at the same time.

It should also be noted that in early 2025, an important and positive decision for Ukraine was the appointment by the Council of Europe of a Special Representative on Ukrainian Children to draw attention to the problems they face, as well as to standards and initiatives aimed at supporting them. Her powers also include coordinating international cooperation and interaction with structures such as the Register of Damages and the Advisory Group on Children in Ukraine.

A detailed picture of administrative practice of abduction and transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia is presented in the judgement in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia[3]. What is important that the ECtHR considered the period starting from 2014 for the needs of a broader picture of crimes committed by Russian agents or other persons under the control of Russian agents.

The Court found undisputed that in the summer of 2014, three groups of a total of 85 residents of children’s homes in eastern Ukraine were escorted by armed “DPR” and “LPR” representatives across the Ukrainian-Russian border, on three separate dates and from different parts of the “DPR” and “LPR”[4].

The Court found undisputed that children from the “DPR”, the “LPR” and subsequently from other occupied territory were removed to the Russian Federation or to other occupied areas in Ukraine, separated from their legal caregivers and prevented from reuniting with them. Indeed, the evidence establishes clearly that there were such transfers in the “DPR” and the “LPR” shortly before the invasion, as purported “evacuation” measures.

In the following months, countless children from institutions and children attending holiday camps were transferred to Russia from occupied territory and were subsequently unable to return to their homes in Ukraine. Some were retained in holiday camps, while others were placed in foster care with Russian families across various regions in Russia and adopted once they acquired Russian nationality.

Numerous public statements by Russian officials do not dispute the mass removal of children from Ukraine and the ongoing presence of such children in Russia. The Commission of Inquiry was able to review the transfers of 195 such children. The “DPR authorities” themselves said that “all children previously in ‘DPR’ institutions” had been removed to Russia by July 2022. The Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights has claimed that 2,000 children arrived in Russia in February 2022 alone. The portal operated by the Ukrainian Government recorded that, by 30 September 2022 a total of 7,890 children had been removed from[5].

The Commission of Inquiry and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism mission experts concluded that in the Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv regions, the displacement of children was an organised process. Their reports concluded that the transfers were not justified by safety or medical reasons and lacked proper consent from the children’s legal caregivers. They further found that subsequent actions and omissions by the Russian authorities prevented the children’s reunification with their legal caregivers. The evidence shows that parents in Ukraine were not provided with information concerning their children’s location in Russia and that where contact was re-established it was often through coincidence or luck[6].

At the same time, Russian officials put in place dedicated legislative and policy measures for the removal and placement of Ukrainian children in Russia. Removal of allegedly orphaned Ukrainian children from Ukraine was carried out by the Russian armed forces and authorities, including by the Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights in person as well as by “DPR” and “LPR” armed groups, in coordination with the “DPR” and “LPR” “child protection authorities”. Once across the border, Russian authorities at federal and regional level accommodated the children in hospitals, social institutions or “camps” throughout. The trips were typically funded by Russia’s regional and republican governments, under the so-called “patronage” system. Official statements referred to the support of President Putin himself to the placement of Ukrainian children in Russian families[7].

The Russian Federation made it easier for Ukrainian children to acquire Russian citizenship and be adopted by Russian families. After 24 February 2022 children born in occupied territory were issued Russian birth certificates and Russian nationality. This practice was subsequently formalised with the annexation of the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in October 2022. Perceived to be Russian citizens, children from occupied territory in Ukraine could be adopted by Russian families from anywhere in Russia. The evidence indicates that they were listed for adoption or foster care in Russia[8].

It has been widely reported, and confirmed in the activity reports of her mandate, that the Russian Federation’s Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, spearheaded a wide range of initiatives aimed at transferring and accommodating Ukrainian children in the Russian Federation. She herself travelled to the Russian-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to coordinate the transfers and placements of children in Russian families. She also accompanied a group of children to Russia and reported on more groups of children being ready to travel to Russia for placement in Russian families. She further adopted a child from Mariupol herself. On 17 March 2023 a pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued arrest warrants for her and for President Putin, charging them with the war crime of unlawful deportation of children and that of unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation[9].

Finally, the Court concluded that there was the movement of numerous children across the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation between 2014 and 2018. It can be inferred from the regular presence of vehicles and personnel of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and the preparations for, and carrying out of, medical checks that the transfers were organised by the Russian Federation and involved significant logistical arrangements[10].

Evacuations may be carried out only in case of “imperative military reasons” or for the “safety of the population”; within the bounds of occupied territory unless impossible; and only temporarily. There are extensive procedural rules concerning the need for written consent from parents or legal guardians and the obligation to make arrangements to facilitate the return and reunification with their families of evacuated children. Changes in their personal status are prohibited.

However, the Russian Government has not provided evidence that the children’s removal from Ukraine in the circumstances complied with any of these provisions. There was nothing to show that any of the purported evacuations of children were carried out for the reasons provided for by international humanitarian law. It is also significant that the essence of the present complaint is that the children were transferred from occupied territory to the Russian Federation, which is in clear breach of international humanitarian law in the absence of evidence showing that transfer within occupied territory would have been impossible.

The Russian Government did not implement any measures to secure the return to Ukraine and the family reunification of children purportedly evacuated, and no such measures are described in the various reports before it.

On the contrary, numerous credible reports identify cases where Ukrainian children were themselves left to try to contact their parents, often with the manifest non-cooperation of the persons in whose custody they were. The policy put in place for the mass acquisition of Russian nationality by children in occupied areas after the 2022 invasion, in breach of international humanitarian law, was nothing less than the automatic imposition of Russian.

As a result, the Court concluded that, given the evidence of changes to nationality and adoption in the Russian Federation, the children’s transfer to Russia cannot be seen as a temporary measure. Considering these considerations, the children’s transfer from Ukraine to the Russian Federation would not appear to qualify as lawful “evacuation” under international humanitarian law.

Making conclusions to the analysed problems of the impact of the War on children, it is reasonable to draw the following recommendations:

1. To ensure that all crimes committed by Russian military personnel against Ukrainian children are recorded: murders, mutilations, cruel treatment of children, and others.

2. To engage international partners to monitor the situation of children who have been deported to Russia and their return to Ukraine or departure to third safe countries.

3. To apply child-friendly justice approaches, including training the necessary number of relevant specialists.

4. To standardise at the legislative level the juvenile specialisation of the police, prosecutors, judges, and probation services.

5. To develop a clear algorithm for the reintegration of children affected by the War, in particular those returned from deportation and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. 6. To disseminate recommendations for parents and educators on identifying potential risks of child recruitment and protecting children from negative influences.

[1] Oliinyk, T. (2025). Teenagers detained in Zhytomyr for blowing up two men on orders from Russia. Ukrainska Pravda. August 7, 2025. Source: www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/08/7/7525174

[2] Shurmakevich V. (2025) Only in 2025, the Russian Federation sent almost 11,000 Ukrainian children to re-education camps. Ukrainska Pravda. September 12, 2025. Source: https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/u-2025-roci-rosiyani-vivezli-do-taboriv-mayzhe-11-tisyach-ukrajinskih-ditey-310271/

[3] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025

[4] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1569.

[5] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1573.

[6] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1574.

[7] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1575.

[8] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1577.

[9] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1578.

[10] Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], applications № 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al., judgment 09.07.2025. Para 1582.

Andrii Chernousov

PhD in Sociology, Vice-Chair (Kharkiv Institute for Social Research)