Tetiana Melnychuk: Organized Crime Trends in Wartime: Ukraine’s Experience

Organised crime always favours stable jurisdictions with weak institutions and corrupt environments that provide relatively safe opportunities to base and conduct criminal activity, increasingly penetrating and influencing politics, economies and social life, expanding criminal markets and introducing new criminal technologies. However, due to its high adaptive capacity, organised crime effectively leverages chaos and social upheaval to generate profits and benefits.

The large-scale invasion has ‘shuffled the deck’ for many criminal groups in Ukraine and related transnational organisations, disrupting established criminal economy schemes and networks, including their logistics routes and distribution channels. At the same time, as will be shown below, the War and martial law imposed in Ukraine have created the potential for organised crime to develop new illicit activities and diversify and expand existing ones[1].

In this section, we rely on the legalistic definition of organised crime to analyse its key indicators in the pre-war and wartime periods.

In Ukraine, the normative definition of organised crime refers to the special law of Ukraine, ‘On the Organisational and Legal Fundamentals of Combating Organised Crime’, adopted in 1993.

The term ‘organised crime’ in the special Act means a series of criminal offences committed due to the creation and activity of organised criminal groups. The features of organised criminal groups refer to the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The legal definition of organised crime is highly criticized due to the poor explanation and incomplete coverage of organised crime varieties. The definition is rather imperfect and descriptive – and does not provide clear criteria for distinguishing organised criminal activity from the activities of situational groups. 

However, the law was adopted in the early 1990s – in harsh conditions at the beginning of Independence, with a significant spread in organised crime – in order to create specialized bodies for combatting organised crime, with a legal framework and legal instruments for active countermeasures. Indeed, these are still valid today.

In 2001, the Criminal Code of Ukraine enabled punishment for the criminal activity of organised criminal groups and criminal organisations.

A criminal offence shall be held to have been committed by an organised groupwhere several persons (three or more) participated in its preparation or commission, who have previously established a stable association for the purpose of committing of this and other offence (or offences) and have been consolidated by a common plan with assigned roles designed to achieve this plan known to all members of the group (Part 3, Article 28).

A criminal offence shall be held to have been committed by a criminal organizationwhere it was committed by a stable hierarchical association of several persons (five and more), members or structural units, which have organised themselves, upon a prior conspiracy, to jointly act for the purpose of directly committing of grave or special grave criminal offences by the members of this organisation, or supervising or coordinating criminal activity of other persons, or supporting the activity of this criminal organisation and other criminal groups (Part 4, Article 28).

This legalistic approach, despite its imperfections, serves as the basis for the current accounting of both quantitative and qualitative indicators of organised crime in Ukraine.

In police statistics, organised groups and criminal organisations are recorded in aggregate, with criminal organisations listed separately in a distinct column. In this subsection, the term ‘organised criminal groups’ (hereinafter – OCGs) is used to refer to both organised groups (hereinafter – Org.Gr.) and criminal organisations (hereinafter – Crim.Org.), unless otherwise specified.

The rate of organised crime and its dynamic manifestations are determined by three main indicators: the number of OCGs under investigation; the number of persons who committed crimes as part of OCGs, for which investigation was completed; and the number of crimes, for which investigation was completed. They cover all types of criminal activity and provide an integrative ‘picture’ of organised crime in Ukraine.

After the decreasing dynamics for 2013–2015, the pre-War period from 2016–2021 was marked by a gradual increase in the overall rate of organised crime in Ukraine. The number of identified OCGs grew from 136 groups committing 1043 crimes in 2016 to 499 groups committing 4318 crimes in 2021. The annual increase averaged 5,5%.

In the meantime, it should be noted that the overall crime rate in Ukraine experienced a declining trend over the same period, with an annual average fall of 9%. The share of criminal organisations among all identified OCGs also increased – from just 2% in 2016 to 9% in 2021.

The number of OCGs detected in Ukraine in 2022 amounted to 395, which represents a 21% decrease compared to the previous year, 2021. Given the negative dynamics, some unstable groups likely ceased to exist in 2022, having been forced to dismantle their networks or at least temporarily suspend their criminal activities.

At the same time, there is evidence that the top tiers of traditional criminal hierarchies continued their operations in Ukraine despite the War. In December 2022, the leaders of the so-called ‘top’ of the criminal world were allegedly detained in Ukraine: criminal bosses nicknamed ‘Umka’, ‘crowned’ in 2014, and ‘Lasha Svan’, a ‘thief in law’ since 1995, who received their ‘titles’ from senior figures of the Russian criminal world[2].

The monthly trend lines of organised crime in war-torn Ukraine during 2022 generally do not diverge significantly from those observed in pre-war 2021, with the exception of an atypical decline in the number of detected OCGs in March 2022. This decline can reasonably be attributed to general disorganisation at the onset of the War, both within criminal networks and law enforcement investigations, which were primarily focused on the country’s defence and combating sabotage groups.

The prolonged War has been marked by a rapid increase in organised crime. In 2023, 494 OCGs were identified (+25% compared to 2022), which committed 5197 crimes, and in 2024 – 663 OCGs (+13.4% compared to 2023) and 7881 crimes. This trend clearly reflects criminal adaptation to wartime conditions and the emergence of new criminal opportunities.

Given that the share of criminal organisations among all organised crime actors increased to 11% in 2024, we can trace the continuation of the pre-War trend toward more complex forms of organisation and more serious crimes.

The trend towards an increase in the share of criminal organisations in the overall structure of OCGs is also confirmed by the growing number of offenses related to the creation of a criminal organisation, which constitutes a substantial crime. Thus, in 2016, only four such cases were detected, in 2021 their number rose to 66, and in 2024 – to 116. The indicator for the first six months of 2025 has already reached 80 cases of the creation of criminal organisation, which, based on the forecast for the next six months, suggests that the total for 2025 may surpass that of 2024.

Retracing our steps to the analysis of the overall level of organised crime in the dynamics, it should be stressed that the trend lines and indicators for the first six months of 2025 confirm the forecasts of a continued escalation of organised crime during the War. Thus, in six months of 2025, 509 OCGs and 5339 crimes committed by them were identified. This amount already exceeds the totals recorded for the entire year of 2023.

It is important to consider that during the War, the total population residing in the government-controlled territory of Ukraine has significantly decreased. While the exact population figure remains unknown, there is clear evidence that millions of Ukrainians have fled the country as forcibly displaced persons (including, likely, some involved in criminal activity), and that tens of thousands of civilians have died as a result of hostilities. In addition, a part of the population, particularly men, has been mobilized into the army, with many killed in action or held in captivity. Certain Ukrainian territories remain temporarily occupied, and therefore, crimes committed in those areas are either not officially recorded by Ukrainian authorities or are only partially accounted for after liberation. This significant population decline would be expected, under normal circumstances, to lead to a reduction in potential criminal activity. Moreover, the absence of statistical coverage for occupied territories should, purely mathematically, result in an artificially lowered level of recorded organised crime and overall crime in the country. Nevertheless, even under such conditions, the crime situation in terms of organised crime is steadily and significantly deteriorating.

The essential characteristics of OCGs are determined by their internal and external stability. Internal stability is indicated by the stability of the composition of members and the existence of the group for a certain period of time to commit a number of crimes (or one crime that required long and thorough preparation). External stability implies the ability to resist detection by law enforcement agencies, including through corrupt connections, and the ability to cooperate/compete with other groups at the local or transnational level.

The structural characteristics of OCGs analysed for the pre-war period 2013–2021 provide an informative picture of the nature of organised crime. Thus, in 2021, 14% of the identified OCGs had inter-regional ties, 11,4% used corrupt ties, 7,6% were formed on an ethnic basis and 2,2% established transnational ties. Poly-criminal activities were carried out by 45% of the identified groups, confirming the propensity of organised crime to diversify.

2021 became the peak year for the entire research period in terms of the number of OCGs with corrupt connections. In Ukraine, corruption permeates all spheres of social life – from the household level to the highest government positions. Balancing between violence and corruption as a means to achieve criminal goals, Ukrainian organised crime is more likely to use corruption, which, unlike violence, adds concealment to criminal activity and provides a long-term perspective. It is believed that during the War, some well-established corruption ties were lost, however, the general corruption in society and the corrupt nature of officials allowed for their quick restoration or the establishment of new ones.

OCGs with transnational connections dominated in 2013-14, when 38 such groups were identified annually. A further 28 OCGs with transnational ties were identified in 2015. Since 2016, both in the pre-war and war periods, the statistical indicators do not show a pronounced trend in the establishment of transnational ties by groups – the total number of such groups has decreased and averages 10 groups annually.

Although Ukraine traditionally belongs to mono-national countries with more than 70% of the population being Ukrainian, ethnic-based groups are quite active in the structure of organised crime, which serves as an additional factor of their unity and at the same time a factor of complexity in counteraction. The largest number of ethnically-based groups was identified in the pre-war years – 36 in 2020 and 38 in 2021. Such active documentation is likely due to the changes to criminal law introduced in 2020, which, despite fair criticism, allowed the prosecution of so-called ‘thieves in law’, a significant proportion of whom are believed to be members of ethnic minorities.

Since the outbreak of the war, the number of ethnic groups has decreased to 27. In addition, in 2023, the Strategic Investigations Department of the National Police, which is authorised to investigate organised crime in Ukraine, was granted the ability to ban ‘thieves in law’ and ‘criminal authorities’ as well as their subordinates and associates from entering Ukraine. Thus, ‘thieves in law’ who are representatives or supporters of Russia could not enter Ukraine. Accordingly, the share of ethnic groups decreased. However, the first six months of 2024 and the first six months of 2025 show an increasing trend.

The ranking of the duration of existence shows that the largest share of identified OCG is made up of those that have been functioning for up to one year, i.e. a relatively short period of time – 73,7% in 2021. Another 18% belong to OCGs that existed for up to two years. The trend of about 90% of registered OCGs operating for short periods is typical for statistical observation.

In terms of the group size, OCGs are usually small in number, mostly having three persons in their composition. So, in 2021, 49,5% of detected OCGs had three members, 48,5% had from four to 10 members, 1,8% had from 11-20 members and only one group united more than 20 persons.

Similar patterns were observed during the wartime period from 2022 through the first half of 2025. Despite the presence of OCGs with transnational connections (2,8% in 2022, 2,6% in 2023, 1,8% in 2024), organised crime in Ukraine remains a regional phenomenon without a single hierarchical subordination within the country. Interregional links were observed in 10,1% of OCGs in 2022, 9,7% in 2023, and 9,4% in 2024. Corrupt ties were present in 9,1% of OCGs in 2022, 7,1% in 2023, and 6,9% in 2024. Poly-criminal activities were established in 40,8% in 2022, 45,1% in 2023 and 43,9% in 2024 of all identified OCGs.

Preliminary data from the first half of 2025 indicate that interregional ties continue to expand, reaching 11,6% of all identified OCGs – an absolute increase compared to the total number recorded in 2023 or 2022.

As in the pre-war period, so during the War, the least stable OCGs – those that existed for less than 1 year – came to the attention of the criminal justice system (71,1% in 2022, 73,5%, 71,2% in 2024).

The year 2022 was atypical with regard to the size of identified OCGs. Not a single group composed of up to 3 members was detected, while five groups (the largest number for the entire analysed period) consisted of more than 20 members. In 2023-2024, however, the group size distribution largely returned to patterns of the pre-War period.

Among the various types of organised criminal activity during the period 2013–2021, drug trafficking related crimes occupied the largest share of all identified organised crimes (29.5% in 2021). This was followed by common (regular) criminal offences of a mercenary (theft) and mercenary-violent nature (robbery, assault, extortion – a total of 8% in 2021). All other crimes represented less than 5% of the proportion of crime committed. In 2021, mercenary crimes that fall into the category of white-collar crime, such as misappropriation, embezzlement or seizure of property by malversation (4%) have become more pronounced.

At the onset of the War, logistics-dependent forms of crime experienced the greatest turbulence. Infrastructure facilities of airspace, railway, ports, highways and roads became the key areas that suffered the heaviest attacks, severely affecting these crime types.  However, as the War progressed, criminal groups involved in criminal markets and the trafficking of illegal goods and services have found themselves in a comparatively advantageous position. The demand for certain categories of illicit goods was (is) still as relevant as ever, and in some cases has even increased during wartime. This trend is most clearly illustrated by drug trafficking, which has maintained a dominant position among organised criminal activities by a considerable margin.

Of the 3142 crimes committed by OCGs in 2022, drug trafficking comprised the largest share – 1291, or 41% (or +10% to the same share in 2021). Although there was a slight decrease in this figure to 1047 crimes in 2023, the number of detected cases of drug trafficking doubled in the following year, 2024 (2204 crimes). In the first six months of 2025, 2566 organised drug-related crimes were detected (or an unprecedented 48% of the total number of organised crimes). This figure not only surpasses the total for all of 2024 but is also more than double that of 2023.

With the outbreak of the War, the blockade of air and sea space, and the suspension of commercial activity in port regions, the production of synthetic drugs, typically concentrated in laboratories, was temporarily suspended due to a shortage of chemical precursors previously smuggled into Ukraine. However, by the end of 2022, the production and distribution of synthetic drugs had returned to their usual state, using online platforms and the postal system.

The analysis of typical cases reveals a growing concentration of drug laboratories in frontline areas (Case A).

Case A. In 2023, 37 members of the «Dvadtsiativski» criminal group, including ten leaders, were detained. To ensure uninterrupted production of methamphetamine, the offenders organised a network of drug laboratories in rented garage space and a residential apartment in Kryvyi Rih, a city located near the frontline. The drug market covered almost all regions of Ukraine. The capacities of the laboratories allowed for the industrial production of up to 40 kg of drugs per month.

The drug cartel network consisted of three criminal organizations and six organised groups. The organizers carefully selected the “staff” and gave preference to individuals who had good physical characteristics and connections among people involved in drug trafficking. At the same time, to preserve autonomy and complicate the process of documenting criminal activity, representatives of the separate links had almost no contact with each other. To ensure proper control, operation and security of the criminal community, there was a clear hierarchy and distribution of roles: control over the work of laboratories, their security, “chemists”, “financiers”, etc.

To ensure uninterrupted trade, the offenders thought over the logistics and arrangement of storage points: they sold products in large and retail batches through an extensive “courier” network by means of ‘hidden caches’ and the “hand-to-hand” method. The group leaders transferred the proceeds from drug sales, which amounted to more than a million US dollars of “profit” per month, to the leaders of the criminal community, who distributed them among all those involved in the drug business[3].

During the years of the full-scale invasion, misappropriation, embezzlement or seizure of property by malversation, ranked second in the structure of organised crime after drug trafficking. In 2022, 210 or 7% such crimes were detected, while in the first six months of 2025, 328 or 6% crimes were detected.

The respective OCGs included officials not only from private business entities, but also from state and local authorities at various levels. These officials engaged their subordinates and affiliated business entities in criminal schemes, creating favourable conditions for holding tenders.

A particularly notable trend that emerged in 2022, directly linked to the full-scale armed invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, was the misappropriation or embezzlement of funds intended for charitable purposes and humanitarian aid.

This trend reflects not only the profit-driven nature of organised crime but also the broader tendency to use non-violent means of obtaining profits.

This shift is further evidenced by changes in organised criminal activity related to more primitive forms of property acquisition.

During the first year of the War, a record low number of thefts committed by OCGs was recorded – only 96, which is almost half the number of thefts compared to 2021, when 180 such thefts were detected. In subsequent years, the dynamics were not stable (142 crimes in 2023, 127 crimes in 2024), however, remaining consistently below pre-war levels.

The number of robberies, extortions and assaults, has shown a steady downward trend since the onset of the War.

The factors that contributed to a decrease in the number of primitive mercenary and mercenary-violent crimes were: the enhanced public safety measures imposed under martial law, including curfews, increased patrol activity, and the establishment of checkpoints; the emigration of a significant number of persons previously involved in the relevant illegal activities.

In addition, the War has brought its own specifics to the patterns of victimization. Many potential victims were forcibly displaced abroad and may not have been aware of crimes committed against their property, such as theft, thus leaving such incidents unreported.

The beginning of the active phase of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine necessitated the formation of local self-defence initiatives, which resulted in the distribution of unknown but large numbers of small arms to the civilian population for the needs of territorial defence with their temporary legalization for the period of martial law in accordance with the Law. Broadly, the conduct of hostilities to repel Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine has created the preconditions for an increase in the number of firearms, ammunition and explosives in illicit circulation and has led to the emergence of new channels for the distribution of weapons, explosives and ammunition. The armed conflict in the east of the country and the occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory also contributed to the diversion of illegal flows of traumatic, air, small arms, firearms, ammunition and explosives to the rest of the country[4].

Nevertheless, earlier forecasts predicting a massive increase organised arms trafficking during the War have not been statistically confirmed so far. Available data on this category of organised criminal activity remains unstable; it is difficult to trace clear long-term trends. In 2022, only eight such cases were recorded, which is significantly lower than in any pre-war year. In 2023-2024, there was an increase to 44 detected cases, but this figure did not exceed the pre-war peak (77 cases in 2020). The first six months of 2025 show a significant increase with 59 cases of organised arms trafficking detected.

During the War, the illicit market for excisable goods intensified, reaching the scale of a threat to the Ukraine’s economic security. In 2024, there was a significant surge in the in offenses related to illegal manufacturing, storage, sale or transportation for the purpose of sale of excisable goods committed by OCGs – 209 such cases were recorded, which is twice increase compared to 2023 (96 cases). The trend has persisted into 2025, with 83 cases in just six months.

In addition to transformations within relatively traditional markets (drugs, human beings, excisable goods, etc.), the War has facilitated the emergence of new markets, such as black grain, smuggling by men who are liable for military service and are trying to avoid conscription, and trade in humanitarian aid, including military supplies and ammunition[5].

Notably, the statistical observations of organised crime in 2022-2025 fixed a considerable increase in the illegal movement of persons across the state border of Ukraine, which is typical for the conditions of the war and martial law. The number of such cases rose sharply from 54 in 2022 to 403 in 2024.

On the first day of the War, martial law in Ukraine was imposed; men of military age between 18 and 60 were banned from leaving the country. This legal restriction triggered the demand for the services of illegal movement of persons across the state border. Conscripts have been smuggled across the border both outside and through official checkpoints; in the last case with fake or fictitious documents granting the right to leave – under the guise of volunteers, drivers of transportation companies, disabled people or their accompanying persons. A common scheme involves the production of a fictitious package of documents on inability to serve in military service in peacetime and wartime, allowing persons to be removed from the military registry. In this case, the OCGs often engage doctors from the military medical commission who allegedly conduct medical examinations and employees of military commissariats to facilitate the process[6]. 

Criminal markets in the contemporary global landscape are inherently transnational, necessitating the smuggling of goods into and out of countries for such markets. It is believed that during the War, due to the closed airspace and seaports, the main smuggling routes were relocated and shifted to the western and southwestern borders of Ukraine. However, the indicators of organised smuggling both before and during the war period are very low (4 cases were detected in 2021, 0 in 2022, 6 in 2023 and 3 in 2024). It can be assumed that the main reason for this is the failure to prove the organised nature of the crimes. Many cases are prosecuted as offenses committed by individual couriers or informal groups lacking the legal indicators of organised criminality.

One of the most recent and concerning trends of smuggling is using Ukrainian citizens having temporary residence in one of EU counties as mules for transporting illicit goods, such as money or drugs, across the borders. As the War entered a protracted phase, a certain social cluster of individuals has emerged, who periodically or regularly migrate along the route between the European countries and Ukraine and back for personal, social or humanitarian reasons and provide smuggling services for OCGs[7].

The success of criminal markets is inevitably linked to the existence of corrupt connections and the possibility of bribing regulatory or supervisory officials. Since the beginning of 2022, the trend of corruption associated with organised crime has increased. In 2022, 43 cases of bribery and accepting an offer, promise or obtaining an improper advantage were detected in the structure of organised crime, 63 in 2023-24, and 100 cases of corruption crimes committed by OCG in 6 months of 2025.

This situation reveals the problem of systemic corruption deeply embedded in Ukraine’s institutional structures. The War has further exposed it (Case B).

Case B. In 2022, a corrupt scheme to embezzle funds from the export of Ukrainian grain was uncovered, involving more than 10 high-ranking officials of the State Customs Service and the management of the Odesa Customs.

They set up a large-scale mechanism for tax evasion for the export of Ukrainian grain. As a result, the state lost hundreds of millions of hryvnias. To implement the scheme, the participants involved more than 370 commercial entities with signs of fictitiousness. Through them, dealers bought wheat from private farmers, agricultural enterprises and large agricultural holdings. To “confuse” the trade chains and avoid paying mandatory payments to the budget, the offenders transferred products from one “shell company” to another. In particular, in August-September 2022, entrepreneurs exported more than one million tons of grain of dubious origin through the grain terminals in the Black Sea, Pivdennyi and Odesa ports[8]. 

The outbreak of War has significantly reshaped not only Ukraine’s legal economy but also the dynamics of organised criminal activity in the economic sphere beyond criminal markets.

With the beginning of the war economy in Ukraine has come to a standstill, shifting towards cash circulation due to significant restrictions on cashless currency transactions imposed by the banking system. This is indirectly evidenced by a 26% decrease in the total number of registered economic crimes in Ukraine in 2022 compared to 2021.

 At the same time, the budgetary sphere and public procurement under martial law became areas of increased criminal risk.

In Ukraine, along with traditional OCG, there are criminal groups close to the state and local authorities. They do not associate themselves with the criminal world, but they have organised modus operandi and operate mainly as white-collar groups in economic sphere.

In 2022, the largest number of all identified in economic sphere OCGs – 32 groups – committed crimes in the budgetary sphere, including misappropriation of budget funds intended for various types of state social benefits, among others. This number rose to 37 OCGs in 2023, 58 in 2024, and 50 in just the first six months of 2025, reflecting a growing trend of organised criminal infiltration into public sector finances.

The risks of criminalization for budgetary sphere, first of all, are caused by the possibility to purchase goods/services beyond open auctions. The fact is, the state orders for the defence sector contain sensitive state or military information, and due to the obvious reasons, should be removed from public access. Auctions in the electronic procurement system cannot properly function due to constant shelling of energy infrastructure. This resulted in headline-making criminal schemes involving high-level authorities.

Crimes in the budgetary sphere during the War represent more than misappropriation of public funds; they constitute an assault on national defence sector by undermining the procurement of weapons, ammunition, and frontline logistics (Case C). They also compromise efforts to restore critical civilian infrastructure destroyed by ballistic and drone strikes.

Case C. In 2023, a large-scale embezzlement scheme involving the procurement of food for the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the Ministry of Defense during Russia’s full-scale invasion was exposed.

The former head of a department within the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the owner of affiliated supplier companies, two executives of supplier companies and an individual were served with a notice of suspicion.

According to the investigation, in 2022-2023, the army food supply involved the procurement of the so-called food kits. This allowed for the ordering from an approved catalogue of 409 products. However, essential items such as vegetables, cereals, meat, and water made up only 10% of the list. The rest, including spices, gelatin, and berries, were rarely or never ordered.

The price of the food kits was calculated based on the average cost of all items in the catalogue. This system allowed suppliers to manipulate prices—artificially inflating the cost of high-demand products while lowering prices for unpopular or seasonal products (such as cherries or apricots in winter). At first glance, no were no violations, as the total price of the kit remained unchanged. However, potatoes, supplied in thousands of tons, cost a fortune, while seasonal berries and fruits, which were rarely ordered, were priced at mere pennies.

As a result of these fraudulent schemes, between August and December 2022, two supply companies, both controlled by the same owner, illegally generated over UAH 733 million in excess profits, as confirmed by a comprehensive forensic merchandising and economic examination.

A part of these funds was later siphoned off under the guise of dividend payments and financial assistance to affiliated companies. This money, in particular, was allegedly used by the company owner to purchase hotels in Croatia and other real estate properties[9].

Organised crime is not limited to the types of crimes analysed in this section. Other crimes committed by OCGs are assessed as no less serious, especially in times of war, such as crimes against the foundations of national or state security, related to espionage and sabotage facilitated by foreign intelligence services through the use of OCGs, cybercrime, including cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure, environmental crimes with long-term societal and ecological consequences, etc. However, these organised crimes are not specifically reflected in statistical reports and therefore, were excluded from the scope of this analysis.

Summarily, the available data and the trends in organised crime during the war constitute a clear indication of a significant deterioration in the crime situation and an increase in the threat of organised crime. Organised crime in Ukraine has long ceased to be a problem of criminal justice alone, it has become a national security issue. Given the current trajectory and available projections, it is highly likely that organised crime will emerge from the War more resilient and more deeply embedded in both the shadow economy and elements of formal governance[10]. There is also a significant risk that wartime criminal practices will be transferred to the post-war reconstruction period, when the state is in an institutional vacuum and is most vulnerable in terms of the rule of law.

[1] Melnychuk, T. (2023). Organized Crime as Institutional Cluster: Transition from Traditional to Informational Model in Ukraine. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. Source: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39532-1

[2] National Police of Ukraine (2022). Organization and participation in the so-called ‘criminal assemblies’: ‘thieves in law’ Umka and Lasha Svan detained. National Police of Ukraine. December 27, 2022. Source:  www.npu.gov.ua/news/orhanizatsiia-ta-uchast-u-tak-zvanykh-skhodkakh-zatrymano-voriv-u-zakoni-umku-ta-lashu-svana

[3] National Police of Ukraine (2023). Large-scale special operation of the National Police: activities of Kryvyi Rih drug cartel, whose members ‘supplied’ almost all regions of Ukraine with drugs, are neutralized. National Police of Ukraine. February 27, 2023. Source: www.npu.gov.ua/news/masshtabna-spetsoperatsiia-natspolitsii-zneshkodzheno-diialnist-kryvorizkoho-narkokarteliu-uchasnyky-iakoho-zabezpechuvaly-narkotykamy-maizhe-vsi-rehiony-ukrainy

[4] Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (2024). Serious and/or Organised Crime Threat Assessment – SOCTA Ukraine. Source: www.mvs.gov.ua/upload/1/8/5/3/8/2/socta.pdf.

[5] Melnychuk, T. (2023). Organized Crime as Institutional Cluster: Transition from Traditional to Informational Model in Ukraine. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. Source: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39532-1; Melnychuk, T. (2025). Illegal Grain Market in Ukraine: Harvesting War Opportunities. Journal of Economic Criminology. 100160. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2025.100160;  Shostko, O., Dryomin, V., Melnychuk, T.,  Dunaieva, T. (2025). Illicit Trade in Wartime: Ukraine’s Trends and Challenges for Counteraction. International Annals of Criminology. 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/cri.2025.7.

[6] Security Service of Ukraine (2023). Kyiv region: SBU exposes head of military medical commission who ‘wrote off’ fifty evaders. Security Service of Ukraine. August 29, 2023. Source: www.ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-vykryla-na-kyivshchyni-ochilnytsiu-viiskovoi-medkomisii-yaka-spysala-pivsotni-ukhyliantiv-za-ponad-10-mln-hrn-khabariv

[7] State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (2023). Law Enforcement Officers Block Smuggling Channel for Wholesale Cocaine in Lviv Region. State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. March 29, 2023. Source: www.dpsu.gov.ua/ua/news/Na-Lvivshchini-pravoohoronci-perekrili-kanal-kontrabandi-gurtovih-partiy-kokainu

[8] Security Service of Ukraine (2023). SBU dismantles corruption scheme at customs: millions of hryvnias stolen from Ukrainian grain exports. Security Service of Ukraine. January 3, 2023. Source: www.ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-likviduvala-koruptsiinu-skhemu-na-mytnytsi-rozkradaly-miliony-hryven-na-eksporti-ukrainskoho-zerna

[9] National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (2025). ‘Golden eggs’ of the Ministry of Defense: embezzlement of over UAH 733 million and attempted embezzlement of UAH 788 million exposed. National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. April 2, 2025. Source: www.nabu.gov.ua/news/iayitcia-po-17-grn-dlia-zsu-vykryto-rozkradannia-ponad-733-mln-grn-ta-zamakh-na-zavolodinnia-788-mln-grn

[10] Melnychuk, T. (2024). Organised Crime in Post-war Reconstruction of Ukraine: Mapping the Risks. In European Guidelines for Ukraine’s Development: Scientific and Practical Dimension in the Context of Wartime Challenges. 473–475. Odesa: Feniks.